It is easy to be suspicious of the way in which Ian Knight churns out books on the Zulu, as if he were a machine rather than a hard-working author. But that would be an unfair assumption. Knight researches his books thoroughly, and give or take the odd minor error, he excels at what he does. This latest offering is my favourite Knight book because, at last, we get something that looks beyond the Zulu kings (although there are chapters on Shaka and Cetshwayo)and examines some of the men who helped them build the Zulu kingdom. Some of Knight's choices as the ten great Zulu commanders are bewildering. He includes Ntshingwayo kaMahole, the Swazi prince Mbilini kaMswati, Cetshwayo's rash and blundering half-brother Dabulamanzi and even Bambata (of Bambata Rebellion fame), but declines chapters on Shaka's brilliant general, Mdlaka kaNcidi; perhaps the most famous Zulu warrior of all, Zulu kaNogondaya; and, to a lesser degree, Mpande's faithful old commander Nongalaza kaNondela, who ensured that Mpande defeated Dingane at Magqonga hills in 1840. That aside, one can't help but marvel at the manner in which Knight has put this book together. It is a great read as the personal lives of the great Zulu warriors have been totally ignored by most historians.

For those who are in to Military Miniatures, this book has some of the best colour plates of all uniforms worn by those units involved at Isandlwana & Rorkes Drift, Zulu, British and Colonial. Ian Knight knows his topic well (even interviewing family of battle participants) and doesnt present the British forces in a negative light like some other books covering the debacle at Isandlwana. Knight points out the various communication and resource issues that lead to many of the problems that day 22 Jan 1879. A large book (coffee table copy) easy to read, broken up into specific sections (The camp, leaders, escape etc). Along with the Plates, there are some excellent B/W pictures and photographs rarely (if ever) seen in other books on the subject.

An interesting and informative account of the Zulus' greatest battles is, unfortunately, not as comprehensive as it could have been. While Knight has, once again, done his homework (his accounts of the battles of Thukela and Blood River are vivid)there are some thrilling battles in earlier Zulu history which have been afforded little attention. For instance, the battle of kwaGqokli hill, which featured the young Shaka leading his men against the powerful Ndwandwe of Zwide kaLanga, lives in many an imagination as the first reckoning of the great Zulu empire. But while there are valid reasons not to include the aforementioned clash, the battle of izinDololwane hills, which saw Shaka, with the help of his white allies, shatter the powerful Ndwandwe kingdom once and for all, surely merits an inclusion. That aside, the book is typical of Knight: colourful, interesting, objective, factual.

A useful and informative introduction to the Zulu wars. Several major battles are covered in depth, and the general trends of the war explained. Overall tactics for the Zulu Nation are discussed in some length, however the same treatment is not given to the British side. The reader is left with the overall impression that the main tactic of the Zulu Nation was to field vastly superior numbers, and without this there was little chance of victory. There is a lack of detail on the weapons and equipment and dress used by each side which would have been an important and interesting addition

The book is small, and covers only the lead up to this epic battle and the battle itself. No real mention of the subsequent Rorke's Drift battle or who escaped from the one only to fight in the other. I suspect this was saved for another book. Lots of low-qual pictures but they do convey the story fairly well. Not a bad book but a bit pricey for what you get.

In 1992, Osprey's Campaign Series #14 entitled Zulu War 1879 by Ian Knight and Ian Castle, covered the dramatic Battle of Isandlwana. Ten years later, Ian Knight thought it would be a good idea to cover virtually the same ground in the new Osprey Campaign Series #111, entitled Isandlwana 1879. Granted, the focus is narrower than in the earlier volume and the graphic quality of the maps is superior, but this book essentially covers much of the same ground that the first book did. While the original title only spent 30% of its length on the Battle of Isandlwana, this new volume spends 55%. Overall, Isandlwana 1879 is a decent if not very original summary of that British military disaster, but it certainly lacks any real value-added quality over the original.

Isandlwana 1879 begins in standard Osprey format with the usual short sections on origins of the conflict, a campaign chronology, opposing commanders, opposing armies, and opening moves. Readers will certainly be impressed with the author's in-depth knowledge of Zulu leaders and units, but might have benefited from a short pronunciation guide on how to handle names like "iNgobamakhosi" or "uKhandempemvu" or just what the heck these names mean. At times, Knight seems to have the zealot's assumption that everyone in conversant in African tribal terms and hence, further clarification is unnecessary. Overall, these sections get the job done but in somewhat boilerplate fashion, as if Knight merely dusted off material from his other books. Readers familiar with the classic, "Washing of the Spears," will doubt that Knight is making a real effort to be incisive. The volume includes six 2-D maps (the war in Zululand, the attack on Sihayo's Homestead, Isandlwana Camp, initial dispositions, the British collapse, Chelmsford's movements and the British withdrawals), three 3-D "Bird's Eye View" maps (British movements around Isandlwana, climax of the battle and the British collapse) and three battle scenes (Durnford's auxiliaries stumble on the Zulu army, the British collapse and the final stages of the battle).

Knight notes that none of the Zulu commanders had any experience fighting British regulars and that, "a practical ignorance of the destructive potential of the modern weapons they [the British] possessed, had led to a dangerous over-confidence at the middle and lower levels of command." On the other hand, the British commander Lord Chelmsford was influenced by preconceptions gained in previous frontier warfare in Africa. Knight notes that in Chelmsford's earlier campaign against the Xhosa tribe that he, "faced only an elusive foe who showed a marked reluctance to engage in decisive combat." This sounds remarkably like the preconceived tactical mindset that influenced Custer three years earlier at the Little Bighorn. Yet if both sides were over-confident and didn't appreciate their enemy's strengths - as Knight claims - why was Isandlwana such a lop-sided battle?

The battle narrative comprises the bulk of the book and it also gets the job done, but with much effort to address the reasons for the British defeat. While Knight makes it clear that British pre-battle reconnaissance was a bit sloppy and based on too many false assumptions, he fails to address issues like faulty British tactical dispositions or ammunition resupply problems. Based on what happened elsewhere in the war, it is clear that the Zulus could not defeat British regulars who were defending in square or behind obstacles. The only enlightenment that Knight adds about the battle concerns the final moments of the British infantry, which he deduced from participation in an archaeological dig on the battlefield in the 1990s. Knight demonstrates that clumps of British infantry survived the overrunning of the camp and slowly tried to fight their way back to the border, but were overwhelmed enroute.

Modern military professionals could use this volume as an excellent starting point for a study of regular forces fighting less well-developed opponents, and might see parallels with contemporary operations in Afghanistan or Somalia. It is interesting to discern how over 1,300 British troops - including the battle-experienced 1st Battalion/24th Infantry - could be annihilated in the space of four hours by an opponent that was regarded as hopelessly inferior. The root cause of the defeat at Isandlwana was the same as at the Little Bighorn in 1876 or Mogadishu in 1993 (or Bunker Hill in 1775): professional soldier arrogance. While the Zulus were ultimately defeated - at much greater cost in resources and time than the British had bargained for - they did demonstrate that not all indigenous military forces merely sit around waiting to be picked off like clay pigeons by superior military technology.

Ihated this book it had bad text and type buut the good part aboutit was the graphics they were good