It is extremely rare that the memoirs of someone who played a truly significant role in his country's history are also beautifully and sensitively written. They candidly reveal the shy and introspective man who also happen to have been a critical player in the U.S. relationship with the Soviet Union from the 1940s through the 1980s (from the late 1920s thorugh the 1950s in his governmental role and as historian and critic since then). Kennan is candid, brilliant, critical, and happens to have a wonderful writing style. This is personal history at its best. If you've read this one (which won the Pulitzer Prize), be sure to read the sequel.

"Experience had convinced us that far more could be learned by careful, scholarly analysis of information legitimately available concerning any great nation than by the fanciest arrangements of clandestine intelligence."(p48)

"In the face of this knowledge, [of the inevitable Russion domination of Poland] I could only feel that there was something frivolous about our whole action in this Polish question. I reflected on the lightheartedness with which great powers offer advice to smaller ones in matters affecting the vital interests of the latter. I was sorry to find myself, for the moment, a part of this. And I wished that instead of mumbling words of official optimism we had had the judgment and the good taste to bow our heads in silence before the tragedy of a people who have been our allies, whom we have helped to save from our enemies, and whom we cannot save from our friends."(pp209/10)

"The strength of the Kremlin lies largely in the fact that it knows how to wait. But the strength of the Russian people lies in the fact that they know how to wait longer."(p511)

[On the German war crime trials] "I have already mentioned my aversion to our proceeding jointly with the Russians in matters of this nature. I should not like to be misunderstood on this subject. The crimes of the Nazi leaders were immeasurable. These men had placed themselves in a position where a further personal existence on this earth could have had no positive meaning for them or for anyone else. I personally considered that it would have been best if the Allied commanders had had standing instructions that if any of these men fell into the hands of Allied forces they should, once their identity had been established beyond doubt, be executed forthwith.

"But to hold these Nazi leader for public trial was another matter. This procedure could not expiate or undo the crimes they had committed. It could have been justified only as a means for conveying to the world public the repudiation, by the conscience of those peoples and governments conducting the trial, of mass crimes of every sort. To admit to such a procedure a Soviet judge as the representative of a regime which had on its conscience not only the vast cruelties of the Russian Revolution,of collectivization, and of the Russian purges of the 1930s, as well as the manifold brutalities and atrocities perpetrated against the Poles and the peoples of the Baltic countries during the wartime period, was to make a mockery of the only purpose the trials could conceivably serve, and to assume, by association, a share of the responsibility for these Stalinist crimes themselves."(pp260/1)

This is a great book. It shows the progress of a fine mind possessed of a practical scholarship and a moral voice in what were often excrutiatingly ambiguous circumstances.

Kennan was in Moscow in 1935 when Stalin began the purges; he was in Prague in 1938 when Germany invaded the Sudetenland; he was in Berlin when Germany declared war on the U.S.; he was the chief architect of the Marshall plan. Of course, he is associated with our Cold War policy of "containment" of the Soviet Union, an association that he regrets, since very little of it reflects his thinking. The book is a fascinating look at modern power politics from a bemused, but acute, inside observer.

Since I am intensely interested in the subject of the American involvement in the intervention of North Russia just after the First World War (where the U.S. 339th Infantry fought against the 6th Red Army), I have a good many books on the subject, from "Fighting the Bolsheviki" to the more recent "Stillborn Crusade," and I have notes I made while researching original documents at the U.S. Library of Congress. But when I want to think in broader terms, I always pull out my copy of "The Decision to Intervene." It allows me to review the general situation at the time, including the activities of the Red Cross (who put the "Red" in the "Red Cross" Ha! Ha!), the U.S. troops in Siberia, and the Czechslovak situation at the time. I would be lost without this book. I highly recommend it!

George F. Kennan is a man who seems to attract controversy like a lightning rod does lightning (a comparison Kennan whimsically applied to himself when dicussing the fallout of his Reith lectures in the second volume of his own superb memoirs). The historical debate over his conception of "containment" that began well over 20 years ago can finally be decisively settled by Wilson Miscamble's brilliantly researched and written "George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950". Although the terrain has been covered in previous volumes -- and done so well in many cases, Miscamble's book is the first to widen its scope away from a strict study of Kennan while still maintaining him as the focus. The literature that deals with Kennan exclusive of the context of his actions fails to show the very real constraints upon American policy, especially toward Germany and Europe in general. Yet, despite Kennan's limited freedom to manuever, he stands as one of the most influential career officials in the history of the State Department. Kennan was apolitical, yet he managed to assume a position in Truman's administration in which he literaly shaped many aspects of American foreign policy. Miscamble's book explains how this occurred and, in the process, not only delivers a valuable lesson to today's policy-makers in government but also (hopefully) settles a long-standing historical debate.

Thoroughly captivating storytelling of George F. Kennan's strategic thought. I enjoyed the book from beginning to end. If this is a first book for Dr. Russell, I believe we are seeing genius in the making. Perhaps the present forgers of US foreign policy should review this book and look to its author as blueprint for Foreign Policy as we known it. This book truly breaks down Kennan's strategic thought, with explanations a fifth grader could come to understand. Awesome. Beautifully written. Spellbinding.

Reading the book titled American Diplomacy, will be summed up in the following five pages. This was the first book that I have read by George F. Kennan. Looking at the beginning of this book, I can see that it is very well organized in a manner that you can follow the book along well. I am going to describe the following chapters in the following paragraphs. In the Forward, Kennan gives a good reason for why he wrote this book. Which also this is what I believe is the only part of the whole book that is easy to understand. Kennan explains the Thesis of this book the best in the forward. I believe that it would be easier to understand Kennan giving his lecture notes about what he put in this book, then by reading the book. Therefore, he could emphasis what he means in the book better by explaining it easier in person. He acknowledges his thanks to Charles R. Walgreen's Foundation for the Study of American Institutions, for its help on providing his lecture information. Kennan knows what is going on in this country when he states the opinion, "A half century ago people in this country had a sense of security vis-à-vis their world environment such as I suppose no people had ever had since the days of the Roman Empire. Today that pattern is almost reversed -our national consciousness is dominated at present by a sense of insecurity greater even then that of many of the peoples of western Europe who stand closer to, and in a position far more vulnerable to, those things that are the main source of our concern." I do agree with him on how he says that we are more insecure. We did show other countries in the earlier years, that we were the biggest and best country around, and then when countries need us in the 1950's, we show that we are insecure to the other countries. To summarize this chapter on "Mr. Hippisley And The Open Door" I would have to say that it was a lot easier to understand it then the first chapter of this book. The only thing that Kennan tended to do, which I did not like is get off the subject of what he was talking about and moved on the next subject. He just did not have much to say about this particular topic, so I believe that is why he threw in those extra things about the people of who the "Open Door" policy had effected. In edition, I have noticed how Kennan likes to go and use these very hard words to describe thing, and I mean that these are the types of words that you have trouble pronouncing and knowing the definition of. To summarize the whole book I would have to say that it was not an enjoying time of reading this. I struggled through many of the pages and had to re-read many things over again that I did not understand the first time I reading it. He goes through this book exactly how he produced his lectures to people, which it would be a lot easier to understand if he was lecturing this to me in person, instead of reading the book. Starting out in the beginning by telling all the wrong things that American's have done in the past, he finishes up the book, with the final chapter by saying that we have done things that we have done right. This totally changes the book, from starting out by protesting against things we have done, to agreeing to things that we have done. On a scale of one being the lowest and ten being the highest, I would have to give this book a six. This was appropriate for a class like this, but not for a Graduate class. I still would not recommend this book to no one.

This book is a collection of speeches by George F. Kennan made during the Cold War. For those unfamiliar with the author, he is the author of the famous "X" article, The Sources of Soviet Conduct, which served as the intellectual foundation of the Containment Doctrine.

Although dated, especially since the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, this short book provides a useful look not only at the ideas of one of our most eminent Cold War thinkers, but also of the atmosphere and conditions of the period.

Mr. Kennan is a fine example of the best in American thought. Europeans who complain that U.S. policymakers are not thoughtful about the world would do well to read this book. Fantastic.

Not only students of Kennan's foreign policy writings will get something out of this book. The topics are wide-ranging, and the observations are thought-provoking. I especially enjoyed his thoughts on our addiction to automobiles. One criticism is the writing style, which is generally stuffy and verbose. (For example: "But what, to me, distinguishes this Spirit from the all-powerful Deity of established Christian doctrine is precisely the fact that the Spirit bears, in my view, no responsibility for the natural order of things in which the human individual is compelled to live.") Nevertheless this is a worthwhile book.

George Kennan is a rare commodity--an extremely intelligent, literate man who possesses a broad and encompassing view of life and the world at large and who has devoted his life to public service without desire for recognition or acclaim. This book gives the reader an opportunity to participate in his musings and to experience clear-eyed and patriotic visions reminiscent of Jefferson.

George F. Kennan, a former ambassador to the Soviet Union, looks back at the 20th century and concludes that the US needs a group of senior advisors to guide US policy. The Council, as he calls it, would be appointed by the President from a list of nominated names, perhaps two from each state. This list would be a role of honor -- just being nominated would be considered to be an honor higher than the Congressional medal of Honor.

Nine people chosen from the list would serve, as the Supreme Court does, for life or until they are seen to be unfit or until they resign. A salary would keep these Council members independent from Congress or President, since they would have a budget to 1) investigate leading questions of the day and 2) implement their suggestions on a trial basis. For example, the COuncil might conclude that donating needs to drug addicts would reduce the spread of AIDs and they could run a trial to test their conclusion. Estimated budget might run $10 million a year.

The focus of his proposal is on the wisdom of experience. People who have seen so much over 40 or 50 years of public service could be called on to give their view of an issue....and the Country would benefit from this experience.

Kennan is still alive (as of August 1998) and he welcomes response to his proposal. I met him in June 1998 and at that time he expressed dismay that not one major book reviewer took his proposal seriously. He's a member of the Princeton Class of 1925, making him 95 years young this year. If you read the book and find it interesting, I"m sure he would appreciate a letter or a postcard with you comments: you can contact him through the University:

George F. Kennan Class of 1925 Alumni Office Princeton University Nassau Street Princeton, NJ 08540

Even after his passing, his family will no doubt appreciate learning that his writings have made a difference. Join him on that cragged hill and you will see the world and its future in a different way.

reviewed by Steve McCrea '81

This book is a bit of an anachronism as the century in question has ended and an entire new set of problems face American foreign policy. George Kennan remains, though, more of a sage than one who can offer practical foreign policy advice. His knowledge of US-Soviet relations remains nearly unparalleled, but it is not really that important any longer.

Kennan writes and speaks with pragmatism, though one does not have to read far into the book to know that he is warning of what he feared would be a US-Soviet military clash if the war hawks of the Reagan administration had their way. Time and again he elaborates on how the Soviet Union is (was) not the enemy. He feared that somehow the seeds he first planted as containment of a political philosophy would spell doom in the military arena.

This book is a collection of speeches, editorials, book reviews, and other public appearances that focuses on the late 1980s and early 1990s. Kennan is nearly a century old, and if the reader goes between the lines one gets the image of a wise old man attempting to spread his message of peace to a world that doesn't seem to hear.

Kennan remains one of the most remarkable figures of the twentieth century. Unfortunately, we no longer live in that time.

This is a tiny book that talks about a very large one. This book is summarized into a foreward in many reprintings of Custine, and if you have read that, this is unnecessary. It's a good study of Custine's life, however by a biased source.