I have a first printing of this book which I first read in 1982. I recently decided to reread it to better understand how Herman Kahn's pioneering work on scenario development had held up over time. Based on understanding where it had worked well, I wanted to get insights into how to repeat his process.

Well, was I in for a surprise!

When I first read the book, I was overwhelmed by its optimism . . . coming on the heels the "Stagflation" following the Oil Shock in the 1970s. At that time, the stock market was about to make a major bottom, having fallen well below the highs of both 1966 and 1973. Treasury bonds were yielding 15 percent. Inflation was romping, and the economy wasn't. President Reagan had just been elected and taxes had been cut, but it hadn't seemed to help yet.

Since then, we have enjoyed an unprecedented prosperity with only one brief recession in 18 years. Yes, Mr. Kahn got it right.

But what was astonishing was to read his specific predictions. For example, his description of future computer networks matches what we do on the Internet today very well. His descriptions of a worldwide plunge in adult female fertility in economically advanced countries were right on. His thoughts about government policy, how to fight inflation, and social adjustments that would help reduce inflation were all highly accurate.

How did he do this? Well, he used a combination of examining long-term trends (usually over centuries), determining the causes of these trends, and then considering scenarios for areas where individual action could make a difference. Most impressive.

For those who like Harry S. Dent, Jr.'s work (and I count myself among that group), Herman Kahn's book will be an important extension of that thinking.

Since Kahn used so many long-term causes in his thinking, the observations stand today. You just have to extend them a little more into the future on your own, now that Mr. Kahn is no longer with us.

I hope that his publishers will consider having someone do a new edition of this book that puts the track record beside the original, and thoughtfully extends the book into the next 20 years. It would be a most valuable resource.

Where else do we miss the big picture by looking at the ripples on the lake rather than the lake itself?

Identify and go with the irresistible forces!

I too read this book in 1982 and from time to time have thought about it over the years. Now in the year 2000 I find myself fairly stunned at how accurately Kahn predicted the future. Books about the future were common in the 70's and 80's, Future Shock, Club of Rome, Greening of America and so on, but none so clearly predicted the world we have today.

Mr. Kerwick has said it better than I can. If the book is out of print, try looking in zShops, there is a copy of it there now.

I first read this book in 1982 when its optimism seemed questionable, if not preposterous. Now, almost 20 years later, through good (then) and bad (now) administrations, Kahn's predictions proved astonishingly accurate. They contrast markedly and tellingly with the gloom and doom pronounced by a lot of people who are still around and still misstating the present and future (did you hear that Al?). Herman Kahn is said to have achieved the highest score ever on military standardized tests during his youth in the 1940's and he was undoubtedly one of the few American geniuses of my lifetime. The Hudson Institute lives on as his legacy, but it has never quite lived up to his own level of excellence. The great reason to look for a copy of this book long out of print is to consider the premises and rationale and compare them to the prognostications from the greens and others on the left. No one can tell the future and probably few if any even approach the intellectual prowress of a Herman Kahn, but a review of the methodology of genius (and that of the chicken littles) ought to go a long way in defining where to place our trust and where to assign our skepticism.

On page 22 of The Next 200 Years Herman Kahn said: "[We live in] a structural society which emphasizes organizational and professional pluralism in the distribution of power and presstige. Knowledge rather than experience becomes the major asset and there is the increasing problem of 'educated incapacity'. By 'educated incapacity' we mean an acquired or learned inability to understand or see a problem, much less a solution. Increasingly, the more expert, or at least the more educated, a person is, the more likely he is to be affected by this."

Remenber this the next time a PhD expounds on global warning.

This is an excellent book on the future for those who want to predict it and for those who are just curious. It was written during a time in which Americans were somewhat gloomy about over-population, depletion of resources, and future wars; and yet it predicted an optimistic scenario which history has proven correct over the last 20 years. Furthermore it gives some insight on how to make sucessful predictions for the long term. There are 18 tables and 11 figures illustrating how we (rich and poor alike) are likely to be better off in the future.

I read this book several years ago as an assignment in school. It is an interesting foray into nuclear policy and the mechanics of nuclear war. A student of the Cold War may find this book useful.

There was a time, back in the 80's, when much of the population lived in fear of a nuclear war. Peace activists made it clear that any nuclear war would mean certain doom for everyone. As long as we were armed, war was eventually certain, so disarmament was our only hope. War plans were akin to suicide. Into this debate jumped Herman Kahn, who insisted we think rationally about the prospects of a nuclear war. His book emphasized that such a war could come in any form and that its consequences were uncertain, and not necessarily fatal to most.

The first half of Kahn's book looks at scenarios for nuclear war and how we should respond to them. It also lists a number of arguments that Kahn rejects as foolish and untenable. The second half discusses nuclear issues such as civil defense, arms control, and European defense. Kahn is something of a right-winger to be sure, but not always. He supported a policy of no first use and believed more deterrence did not always make us safer.

Perhaps the best thing about his book is his contention that a nuclear war need not be seen as the end of the world, or even the end of the U.S. Horrible as it would be, the survivors could rebuild and life could go on for most. One is reminded of the arguments made before the Second World War. Strategic bombing, it was said, would destroy whole cities and kill all their inhabitants. The first raid would destroy nations and end the war immediately. The only hope lay in appeasement of the dictators. Maybe the people of the thirties would have done better to do as Kahn instructs, and think about the unthinkable.

Herman Kahn was a futurist who worked for the RAND Corporation. During the 1960s, he wrote the original "Thinking About the Unthinkable." It was the outgrowth of his research and of the "Gedenken" (Ger. 'think') expeirments that he carried out. These experiments were role-playing and 'what-if' scenerios, during which the participants, members of the military/diplomatic community, would theorize on what the rules for nuclear war might be, as well as on what, besides the obvious, keeps one from breaking out. For example, if a mad Russian general had bombed New York, could the United States, even knowing that it was an accident, have witheld retaliation? What would be appropriate? Bombing Moscow? In this example, it was agreed that Moscow means as much to Russia as New York and Washington, D.C., and that retaliation would be necessary to save face (and you never know if it's an accident, anyway, so keep the cost of 'accidents' high). Instead of Moscow, hitting Leningrad was seen as equivalent retaliation, and attacking Moscow as escalation. Deterrence was divided into three levels as a result of another experiment: Type I deterrence was a nation's ability to attack opponents by virtue of first-strike ability (the not-incredible ability to inflict heavy damage). Type II deterrence was the preceived ability to have enough capacity, after surviving a first strike, to counterstrike with crippling effect. Type III deterrence is the ability to deter conventional war by credible threat of nuclear escalation, as in Truman's threat to bomb China during the Korean War. The book is a mine of wealth about the thought processes involved in conducting Great Power relations in the Nuclear Age. Some will be offended by the concept that nuclear war is thinkable; nonetheless, it is as necessary to think about how to deter, limit, and defend against the threat of nuclear war as it is to apply the same reasoning to any other ugly problem. It exists, therefore it is better to think and plan for contingencies, rather than to rely on blind luck or good will to save the future. This book is no relic of the Cold War; with the Indo-Pakistani nuclear tests, our national debate over missile defense, North Korea's missile program, and the loss or black market sale of ex-Soviet nuclear materials, these issues are more relevant today than ever before, because a multi-polar world, with both national and private players (terrorists, drug cartels, etc.) is less stable than the Cold War ever was. Indeed, in twenty years, we may look back on it with nostalgia. -Lloyd A. Conway

ON THERMONUCLEAR WAR is Rand Corporation think tank genius Herman Kahn's classic study on nuclear war "scenarios", deterrence strategies, and effects of nuclear conflagration. It is a "scholarly" tome whose subject is nightmare, and whose academic tone is as frightening as the subject it concerns. FINITE DETERRENT; COUNTER-FORCE; MASSIVE RETALIATION; OVERKILL; PREVENTATIVE STRIKE; and MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION (MAD) are among terms connoting Apocalypse that are bandied about as casually as a local weatherman delivering his nightly forecast, or a high school junior varsity baseball coach discussing building- year prospects for next year's team. Stanley Kubrick's Dr. Strangelove (played by Peter Sellers in the black comedy of the same name) and The Professor (played by Walter Matthau)in Fail-Safe, are satirical incarnations of Professor Kahn which cannot match the surreality of his essays revelling in the possibility of mankind's self-annihilation. "More than 10,000 Tons of TNT PER PERSON (ad the population of the entire planet)" is ascribed to nuclear arsenal fire-power of the United States and the former Soviet Union (circa 1960) in one of OTW's many "fascinating" appendices. ( An over-kill ratio of 5:1 was averred to the United States, allowing it to sustain a Soviet first strike and annihilate Russia in consequent retaliatory response). ON THERMONUCLEAR WAR is indeed fascinating if you wish a glimpse into Lucifer's equivalent of the Book of Revelation. Forget about Nostradamus or any occult prognostication to be gleaned from The Inquirer or your favorite "seer". Herman Kahn is the annointed Adept of the "theology" of nuclear war. (His discussion of tactical nuclear war and First-strike Options is enough to cause nightmares!) Dante's INFERNO will always remain the ultra-non-plus description of Hell. OTW may be regarded as the classic "cook" book on how to get there as a civilization. Most people have probably never heard of it, nor will read it. But ON THERMONUCLEAR WAR is worth a respectful scan...not for its factoids (which undoubtedly were surpassed years ago)...but rather, for a gaze into the visage of the Beast, the Final War, where Kahn is quoted to state: THE SURVIVORS WILL ENVY THE DEAD......

On Thermonuclear War is a work from 1960 that runs counter to the conventional wisdom of his day, and which still exists to this day. He attacks the so-called "cataclysmic" view of nuclear war. Kahn provides numbers to show that a total nuclear war is survivable, and that our society could eventually recuperate. Make no mistake, at no point does he advocate nuclear war, he merely makes us face the fact that it could happen, and that we had better be prepared to deal with it. After all, the Soviets did. Although this book would seem to be dated in this Post-Cold War era, remember that we and the Russians still possess hefty nuclear arsenals, and the world is a much less stable place than during the Cold War. This book can be hard to read, given the plethora of technical information, but it is worth it.

Although it was written in the 60s, this book has great relevancy to today. Mr. Kahn has the backbone to state his opinions without sugarcoating or clouding the facts. It is a little on the technical side, but is an enlightening read.

"For The Japanese Economy WWII was unquestionably a disaster of the first magnitude." - Kahn
This quote from Herman Kahn's book clearly sums up and emphasizes a book full of solid information. Whether for casual reading on Japan or a research paper, Kahn delivers strong, decisive opinions on the matter. I used it for a research paper on Japan's economy and found it extremely useful. Again, it is also a very interesting and well-worded peice of literature. I recommend it to all.

During The Cold War the Rand Corporation and the Hudson Institute were associated with work on nuclear warfare and the conduct of the Vietnam War. Herman Kahn produced a number of books on the subject in the 1960's including: "On Thermonuclear War", "Thinking About the Unthinkable" and "On Escalation". Kahn was also concerned to document the process of escalation of conflict and to establish common metaphors and language, which could be understood by both sides. Kahn stressed the essential role of communications between opposing sides. He pointed to the cultural problems which made it difficult for the US and North Vietnam to understand the way in which the other side would react to new developments during the Vietnam War.

In "On Escalation" Kahn pointed out the problems that arose between the British and the Germans in World War II because German propaganda failed to clearly communicate German intentions.

The same problem currently bedevils the relationship between Israel and the Arabs. At worst we have a "dialogue of the deaf". Normally even during War there will be a dialogue based on mutually agreed rules, for example the rights of civilians will be honored. Where one side fails to honor the implicit agreement not to behave in a particular manner then the other side will normally feel free to retaliate in ways that it has previously forsworn. The reaction to September 11th is a classic example. Where communication breaks down, as appears to have occurred in Israel, this can result in action and reaction, leading to a spiral of violence and alienation, which can only be resolved by the total collapse of one side, or an understanding by both sides that the mutual interest requires a stepping-back from such actions. In the US the public protests effectively ended US involvement in the Vietnam War.

In short Kahn deals with important issues that are if anything more relevant today than they were in the 1960's. Not the easiest of reads, pick something lighter for your next flight, but if you are interested in the process of negotiation, rather than the headline news then you should look at Kahn's ideas.