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"While America Sleeps" is an engaging, insightful work of comparative history. Using Great Britain between the wars as a point of comparison for the US today, the authors outline the great dangers we face as a nation. In much the same way that Britain demobilized after WWI, the US has taken a huge "peace dividend" and gutted it's military since the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, US foreign policy has been consistently erratic, misguided and timid over the same period.
By using well known examples like Iraq, North Korea and the Balkans, the authors illustrate how the US has failed to make a strong stand when confronted with aggression. Furthermore, when a stand is made, it is usually ineffective and half-hearted.
They describe how the Bush (the 1st) administration had many of the right ideas about the role of a lone superpower, but failed to implement them. This was due largely to a failure to educate the public, and a lingering "Vietnam Syndrome" that continues to plague the military. They go on to lambast (and rightly so) the Clinton administration for both failing to understand the dynamic of global relations, and for utterly misapplying military force.
Make no mistake, while the Kagan's have a point to make, this is not a work of theory. The history is excellent, and makes superb use of primary sources. It is the quality of the research and writing, and the urgency of the conclusion that make this book. The author's opinions are clear, but neither dogmatic, nor partisan.
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But the main interest of this book is not just its relevance to current events or lessons to be learned. Instead, the book is fascinating because of the events covered, the interesting people and culture.
I wished that Prof. Kagan analyzed things a little more and gave background information. For example King Sitalces of Thrace had an army of 150,000 men including 50,000 cavalry. How is it possible that such an unimportant area as Thrace can field so many soldiers when Athens and Sparta had only a few thousand soldiers in most battles? Why was it so hard to capture walled cities that were defended by a few hundred soldiers? After all, Alexander the Great and the Romans captured these cities so easily. I wish there was a map showing ALL Greek colonies in the Mediterranean and Black Sea including Sicily, Spain, etc. and showing where the grain is coming from the north. Maybe an appendix would have been nice.
This book should be required reading for all high schools and colleges. No man can call himself educated, if he/she hasn't studied the events of this book. Stop listening to news, reading newspapers, and get really educated.
Ozdal Barkan.
But the main interest of this book is not just its relevance to current events or lessons to be learned. Instead, the book is fascinating because of the events covered, the interesting people and culture.
I wished that Prof. Kagan analyzed things a little more and gave background information. For example King Sitalces of Thrace had an army of 150,000 men including 50,000 cavalry. How is it possible that such an unimportant area as Thrace can field so many soldiers when Athens and Sparta had only a few thousand soldiers in most battles? Why was it so hard to capture walled cities that were defended by a few hundred soldiers? After all, Alexander the Great and the Romans captured these cities so easily. I wish there was a map showing ALL Greek colonies in the Mediterranean and Black Sea including Sicily, Spain, etc. and showing where the grain is coming from the north. Maybe an appendix would have been nice.
This book should be required reading for all high schools and colleges. No man can call himself educated, if he/she hasn't studied the events of this book. Stop listening to news, reading newspapers, and get really educated.
Ozdal Barkan.
The Peloponnesian War reminds many of the major conflicts of the 20th century, and some of those comparisons are quite illuminating. For example, the showdown between the two "superpowers" of the era, Athens and Sparta, reminds many of the Cold War, and there are indeed many intriguing similarities. Professor Kagan, who has written about such comparisons at length (see "On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace"), understands these parallels as clearly as anyone. But focusing on these parallels to make distant events appear "relevant" is, to him, unnecessary. His view, which I share, is that the Peloponnesian War does not need to be "made relevant:" it IS relevant, because of the unchanging character of human nature and human problems. If you expect this book to be filled with statements like "President Bush is just like Pericles because..." you will be disappointed. What you will get, however, is much more valuable.
Observing how people have dealt with the crises of the past makes us more intelligent observers of the present, not because all situations are exactly the same in their details, but because human hopes, fears, and needs are fairly constant across history. It is this insight that Prof. Kagan brings to bear so effectively in his work. One of Prof. Kagan's favorite quotes from Thucydides states that nations (or city-states, as the case may be) are motivated by three things: "fear, honor, interest." It is Prof. Kagan's view that this assertion is as true today as it was in 431 B.C. Nations have always sought to protect themselves from those they fear, maintain their national pride, and further their interests. In the process, of course, they must contend with internal and external forces - internal dissent, military rivalries, reluctant allies - forcing the leadership to make crucial choices about which path to pursue as they seek the optimal outcome for their nation. To any observer of recent events, this process would seem very familiar. And that is as it should be, for it is from this process that history unfolds.
Understanding how nations and their leaders pursue their goals, make their decisions, and perceive the world around them is what makes reading history interesting. By choosing the Peloponnesian War as your case-study, and Donald Kagan as your guide, you will have one of the most interesting reading experiences you are ever likely to have.
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The basic argument is that the US needs to exercise world domination, here spun as "benevolent global hegemony" and that there are a number of external obstacles which stand in the way and must be dealt with. These are Iraq, Iran, North Korea, China, the Middle East peace process and an independent Europe. In its clear and reasoned enunciation of strategy and future plans, it both rivals and surpasses the later chapters of Mein Kampf. Here is the game plan which must be read to understand where these people intend to take the world next.
If we ignore the desirability of this mission, its feasibility (the cost in money, lives and freedom) certainly merits discussion, but here the book is thin, relying on fairy story assumptions (budget surpluses!!!) and wishful thinking.
The one distasteful aspect of the book is the attempt to wrap the entire endeavour in the cloak of "American morality", understood as protecting citizen's liberties. This is breathtaking stuff from accomplices in the most extensive attempt to incinerate the Constitution in recent history.
Stripped of its ideological air cover and romantic fantasies, this is still an important, timely and lively document since this is the future course of foreign policy which the Bush administration plans to pursue.
The central thesis seems to be that the US is (or maybe WAS immediately after the Cold War) at an unprecedented position of influence and power over the world, and should use it to secure the safety of the whole world before those who wish to threaten the free world acquire the means to do so. The book was written at the end of the Clinton administration, but many parts of the book are extremely prophetic including the need to confront the members of the "Axis of Evil" about their efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction and the palestinian uprising against the stalled peace process which had not yet begun when the book was written. Like I said, even if you're not in agreement with Bush administration policy, you'll learn what some of the influential minds are thinking (and why their right!).
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Warning! Dangerously boring contents enclosed. Fasten a bib so as to not drool on your clothes before proceeding.
Yet another boring "brainiac" book in the saga of Kagan books; please think before you buy! It's not any better than the previous editions for the earlier sections of history. Yes yes, it has photos...oooh, ahhh. Now, let's pretend that you actually will read it. Oh! Haha! That's right! It's not possible! It's too boring. Names, dates, locations...it's very drawn out and you don't get enough of the "why's" to understand the significance of these events in history. They should take Elvis's advice and return this baby to sender!
This book is so boring that I often find myself staring blankly at the page for long periods of time wondering why I even signed up for Dual Enrollment Western Civilization (we use this book, unfortunately). The text, which bombards you with facts, dates, names, and geographical locations one after the other unceasingly, is enough to scare anyone away from a history major. It has numerous maps (one every couple pages), but geez, the book is the cure for insomnia for crying out loud! Two words into the text and I'm out like a light! It is far too technical. It also talks of things as if you already knew what they were talking about, like it's supposed to be a refresher for us.
As an 11th grader on block schedule, I have already taken World History (1 year ago), and I have to say, I remember more from THAT textbook right now (which wasn't fun either) than from that which I read last night from this textbook. Lists of dates and names don't cut it. It doesn't give interesting info, and some areas are surprisingly summarized into only a few sentences while others are unmercifully long winded; and should not begun to be read past 6 PM! God forbid a battle come up, it's like a list of geographical locations: so and so fought at the [insert place], whereafter they fought at [name] and so forth until I can't even clearly distinguish from the text WHY the battle even started in the first place. The Persian War and Peloponnesian War are what we've covered on the war fronts, and they listed what the militaries did and where they fought. It was like a manual. I'm sure that's great reading for a historian, but for the average Joe, it's equivalent to staring at a blank wall for 10 hours- you don't accomplish or remember anything.
That's a high schooler's take on the book. For a high schooler, this book equals doom! For older people, it might be a pleasant read....(*yeah, sure...)
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So, in conclusion, I suggest you steer clear of this textbook unless you are stimulated by lots of colorful pictures and enjoy reading books that are more suitable for gathering dust.
The events depicted are often out of order, making it harder to understand the timeline. The writing seems inconsistent, sometimes short and understandable but often is long-winded and unclear. The authors of this book assume you have some knowledge of both of the geography in Europe and at least some knowledge of Europe's history already. In most of my fellow students' case, they assume wrong. If you do not already have some experience in studying Europe, then I would recommend searching for a different book.
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That said, the parallels pointed out by the Kagans between the Britain of the 1920s and 1930s and the United States of the 1990s and early 21st century are remarkable. Especially fascinating is the interesting similarities drawn by the authors between the 1919 Treaty of Versailles that ended World War I and the 1991 armistice ending the Persian Gulf War. The Kagans note that the peace in both cases was made with a weakened but not absolutely defeated power. They further point out that, to compensate for this fact, the victorious powers imposed an onerous peace which, in order to work, would require a permanent obligation by the victors to impose their terms. That, in its course, would require the victorious powers to maintain large military forces and a willingness to use them should the terms of the peace be violated.
Here the Kagans have hit on the nut of the matter. As the Europeans, particularly the British and the French, are learning to their great cost in the War on Terrorism, military power and a willingness to use it matters. Despite the best hopes of man and the fondest dreams of Eurofederalists, economics, commerce, treaties and international law do not govern the world, brute force still does. The prudent exercise of power, particularly military power, saves lives and makes for a more peaceful world in the long run. At the end of the day, there is no substitute for the prudent pursuit of a national self-interest.
Ironically, though, this is the point at where the Kagans fall down. They point out that in 1919, Britain was the only power capable of acting as a global policeman, and that in 2002, the United States finds itself in a similar position. They rightly point out that, in order to play that role, armed forces of sufficient quantity and quality are essential. Yet, they never tackle the essential question of whether the role of global policeman is appropriate.
Consequently, the Kagans are left offering American policymakers no useful guide to what constitutes an appropriate foreign policy. They correctly point out that the American armed forces were, and remain, badly overstretched. Yet, they never question whether the United States should have been going into places like Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans. Because of the book's narrow fixation on the necessity of a properly constituted military establishment, the authors never get to the more essential question of when America should use its military power.
The Kagans are not wrong when they say that the phrase, "America cannot be the world's policeman," has become tired and overused by those who are pushing other agendas. However, they are wrong to suggest that the phrase itself lacks a kernel of truth. They ignore the possibility that the United States ought not try to be the world's policeman. Not only because this would not be sustainable in terms of domestic politics, which has to be considered though not slavishly so, but also because being the world's policeman would tend to draw together a coalition of interests hostile to the United States.
The fact is that America is wasting its military resources and its money in the Balkans in a cause in which it has only the remotest of stakes. NATO forms the boundary of America's national interests in Europe, not the Balkans. America currently finds itself leading an alliance of military dependents in the War on Terrorism because, instead of compelling the states of Europe to develop military forces to protect their own Balkan interests, America supplied the forces for Europe.
Similarly, the fact is that, in Haiti, America had no serious interests worthy of a military intervention, but was left with no choice but intervention because American foreign policy was unwisely couched in globalists terms of universal norms. Historically, the United States had been willing to accept any regime in Haiti so long as it danced to America's tune in the global arena. The innovation that the character of the Haitian regime mattered to America's national interest was anomalous and wrong. More importantly, the ability to correct that regime's brutalities is well beyond any power the United States might ever be able to bring to bear.
To be certain, at different times throughout the book, the Kagans make these and similar points. However, in the end, they never make the connection between their contention that America must be a global policeman because it has the power to do so, and that in so doing, America will be drawn into places where its interests are not at stake, and therefore will needlessly fritter away its power. In short, the Kagans conflate the idea that because a nation has the power to do a thing, it must do that thing. They choose the model of a global policeman, rather than the less utopian and more practical model of the balance of power.
For all of that, the Kagans deserve much credit for reminding Americans that an effective foreign policy is inseparable from a strong and modern military. In the global arena, in the final analysis, it is not just 'the economy, stupid.' Unfortunately, they neglect to go beyond that point, and the result is a book that is really nothing more than a pitch, however necessary, for a bigger defense budget. That is important, but it is ironic. In the end, the Kagans, shrewd and insightful historians though they are, have decided that Kofi Anan has more meaningful things to say about America's foreign policy than Theodore Roosevelt.