I have changed my mind about this book...from bad to mediocre. The problem is that this book is marketed from the publisher as a scholarly study of the battle, drawn from the newly opened Russian archives, as well as the older German archives. This is not the case, & Mr. Hoyt never claims this in his book. Mr. Hoyt simply got a bunch of older Stalingrad books, and rewrote the words into his book. I respect Mr. Hoyt for actually admitting this in his appendix, which he does in great detail, to my amusement. Mr. Hoyt's choice of books to use as the basis for his are generally good secondary sources, but unfortunately are only English titles. Therefore, the well read Stalingrad student will just see a rehash of material he/she has already read. I would recommend this book for the person who just wants to read ONE Stalingrad book in his life. If you read Hoyt, you have essentially read Erickson, Chuikov, Ziemke, & a host of others.

In August 1942, all that remained between the advancing Wehrmacht and Stalingrad were open Steppe. That soon changed, as one sees in 199 Days by Hoyt. He is clever enough to give a good background of the war in the east from June 41, through the winter and on. This helps to explain to the reader why the Germans made some decisions, and why the Soviets made some of theirs. The only problem with this book is the slightly "pro Soviet" stance. While I won't argue for the merits of Naziism (for there are none), I also will not argue for the merits of Stalinism. These were two armies, essentially the tools of two despots, a point which Hoyt does indeed make. Having said that, he seems to put a human face onto the Soviet soldier more so than the German soldier. The end is good, however, the follow up winter offensive by the Soviets could have been at least alluded to in the form of an epilogue (The Soviet offensive was pressed on, well beyond its supplies, and hundreds of thousands of Soviets were captured after the fall of Stalingrad, in the area of Kharkhov). Overall, not a bad book. If you know nothing of the east front, buy it. If you already consider yourself somewhat in the know concerning the eastern front, then save your money.

Reading The Triumph and the Glory heightened my interest in WWII, particularly in the savage fighting on the Russian Front. Wishing to delve into the subject further, I bought a copy of Hoyt's book from Amazon and have to say it was very well done. Hoyt has written quite a number of books about WWII, all of them good. He doesn't quite go into great depth with any of his topics so his books are more for the general public than for more serious students of the war. "199 Days: The Battle for Stalingrad" is well worth reading, but not as definitive as Beevor's "Stalingrad", nor the classic "Enemy at the Gates".

Prior to reading this book I read another submarine book "take her deep" by Galantin. The author of that book had served on a submarine the Halibut and told in a vivid way of his time on her. The book was fascinating.

Bowfin by comparson was dissapointing. The writer is either a historian or journalist who simply has written a book based on some secondary sources. It makes rather dull reading. Another weakness is that the unlike "take her deep" there is no real effort to work out what had really happened during the combat patrols. One example of this was an encounter in which the crew of the sub thought that they sank a battleship. Galantin did a fascinating reconstruction to show that the ship sunk was probably a destroyer and illustrates in some detail why mistakes such as that were made.

In Bowfin the author makes no real attempt to look at the reasons why post hostilities evaluations of sinkings were different from those claimed in the war.

In sum give it a miss there are better books.

I've read many sub books from WW2 to present and this one stands out. It takes you from one end of the Pacific all the way to the Sea of Japan on nine patrols. I especially liked the detailed accounts of what went wrong during the sub war. The author is not shy to admit that we weren't perfect especially with the mark XIV torpedoes that most of which never hit the targets! Easy to read and understand making the story flow smoothly. I highly recommend this one.

Edwin Hoyt has written a nice book about the Battle of Guadalcanal. However it is lacking details and skips key periods of time during the confict there in the south Pacific. I would recommend this book for a person is looking to get a basic understanding of the battle there. If a reader is looking for a indepth analysis, I would instead recommend Guadalcanal by Richard Frank.

This book was my first introduction to the battle for Guadalcanal, since reading it I've done further reading on the subject and found this one to be the best account of what happened. Mr. Hoyt not only covers the ground aspect of the invasion but all so the air and sea aspects.

This book has many fascinating things in it: direct quotations from conversations with Mussolini's aides; statements about him from world figures (including a compliment from Gandhi); and information about his deeply personal feelings regarding certain matters. Unfortunately, there are no citations (footnotes or endnotes) to back any of these up. In other words, the reader has no way to judge the reliability of what Hoyt is saying.

I know that publishers of books for popular consumption tend to dislike footnotes. However, Hoyt paints Mussolini in a better light than most other biographers or historians, and many of his conclusions are controversial. The absence of citations makes me doubt Hoyt; perhaps if he had included them, I would take some of his statements more seriously.

However, if you simply want to know the undisputed facts such as when and how he took power, this book will do nicely.

This book gives a through story of his life from day one to the very last day of his life. I am doing a thesis on him and this book is great for a report.

The good news is that this book covers a lot of territory not often covered. It is worth the time to read. The bad news is the large number of typographical and factual errors.

The book takes a look at the big picture of Japan's involvement in WWII, covering the history from the opening of Japan to the West up to 1952, concentrating on the Japanese point of view. Unfortunately, no one who understood Japanese proofread the book. In addition to the typos in English, there is a huge number of errors in Japanese. Some of them seem to be deliberate; for example, "Nomonhan" is consistently referred to as "Homonhon."

Unfortunately, the errors aren't limited to typos and misspelled names. As a simple example, in the preface the author states "The result, as the world knows, was the war Westerners call the Pacific War, but which the Japanese have always referrred [sic] to as Dai-Toa Senso, the Great East Asia War." While this is indeed one name by which the war is known, it is certainly not the only--and in my own experience, not the most common--name for it. I also understand that some of the photograph captions contain blatant misidentifications. Much more seriously, the author seems to let his opinions guide his selection of facts. For example, in the final chapters, the discussion of the effect of the atomic bombs on the attitude of the Imperial Army is quite good, but the author goes on to say that the bombs had no effect on the Emperor's decision to surrender. This, in spite of the "minor" detail that the Emperor himself said that the second atomic bomb was what made him decide to force the militarists to lay down their arms.

All in all, the book is worth reading, but it would be even more worthwhile if the author and publisher had taken more care in its production.

One interesting aspect to this book is the fact that it traces Japanese military history back to the mid 19th century, which provides the reader with a better historical perspective to understand the rampant militarism and unbridled war fever characterizing that country at the outset of WWII. Author Edwin Hoyt does an impressive job covering the details of the war, and brings some provocative and fresh insights into several issues concerning the war as to why Japan decided to initiate it, why we were so unprepared to meet the challenge in 1941, and why they so fatefully misunderstood American character and behavior so badly to not understand that the US would enter the fray with a "terrible vengeance and resolve".

The author provides a lot of interesting data for the reader's consideration along the way. For example, he introduces the strategic notion held by the Japanese of the "eight corners of the world under one roof", or 'hakko ichiu'. This, according to the author, is key in understanding their military preparations for the war, and why their historical rivalry with the United States made them believe war was quite likely, if not inevitable, between the two countries. This is something the Japanese seemed to understand much better than did most Americans, who never saw the conflict as either likely or inevitable. Of course, given American tendencies toward international isolation, it isn't surprising we were caught so unaware.

The book is impeccably researched and documented, and the writing style is literate yet not to scholarly to be off-putting. While it certainly doesn't read like a novel, it is very entertaining to read. The author gives credence to the notion that the war in the Pacific was a quite complicated and intricately interwoven series of events that takes some deliberate effort to understand in context. Thus, his approach is painstakingly deliberate, detailed, and comprehensive. This is an excellent one-volume study of WWII in the Pacific theater of operations, and I recommend it to anyone seriously inclined to learn as much as possible about the history of the Japanese so as to better understand what happened that led to the decision to attack Pearl Harbor as well as an excellent overview of the conduct of the war itself.

This book's focus is on the motivations and background activity relating to Japanese Imperialism. It also has the Japanese viewpoint of Western Imperialism and how foreign activity (primarily British & American) influenced Japan. Since this perspective is seldom found in histories of the war in the Pacific - I rate it as 5 stars. Interesting and informative . . .

Overall I enjoyed this book, and found it to be relatively easy reading. Like any good oral history, it focuses on a handful of personalities and tracks their experiences throughout the relevant period ... in this case, the whole American involvement in WW2. A good example is Cpl. Moglia, a member of the First Infantry Division, who is introduced during the pre-war years. His participation in the various major campaigns, with the attendant promotions up through the ranks, provides a bit of "personal" cohesion to the chronological narrative.

The value of the book depends on what you're looking for. It is intended to encapsulate the whole GI experience in the African and European theaters, and does a fair job of that. Moglia is joined by Lt. John Downing as main narrative figure to give some insight into life in the junior officer ranks. There isn't much depth, however, to the individual stories. We learn something about what these men did, but not much about the men themselves. The author bounces around quite a bit between subjects, and spends a fair amount of time in the upper echelons to make sure the "big picture" remains clear to the reader.

As a historical tool this book's value is obviously limited, since there is no real attempt to provide a detailed account of even primary engagements. Such an endeavor would fill a much larger volume than this. In general, it's an enjoyable look into the experience of the average GI, and worth reading in that respect. For anything else, I would look for a more serious treatment of the subject.

"The GI's War" is a solid offering from Hoyt, but does leave something to be desired. The stories tend to get repetitive and although the book follows a few characters throughout the war, the reader never gets to feel as though he really knows the people whose stories Hoyt is telling. It would be more interesting if the author told us a little more about what the soldiers were thinking and feeling when they had these experiences rather than just what they were doing. Because this is lacking somewhat, the stories become repetitive to a degree. Also, more maps would have been helpful. Dozens of towns are referenced with little information on where they were or how far apart different actions occured.

Despite these shortcomings, Hoyt does a good job relating the day to day grittieness of infantry life. The descriptions of life before the start of the war and during mobilization are good in that they are usually omitted in others' works.

Although this is a solid work, a more comprehensive work on the GI's life is Stephen Ambrose's "Citizen Soldiers".

The book chronologically presents the experiences of hundreds of American combat soldiers who served in Europe during World War II. Though Hoyt does present many, varied stories, he continues to return to the stories of about a dozen officers and enlisted men. These individuals make up the backbone upon which the rest of the book has been crafted. Hoyt mixes traditional narrative history with the oral history in order to keep this well-written book moving along at a quick pace. The stories, themselves, range from the mundane (soldiers' dislike of C-Rations was a constant topic of discussion) to the surreal (an American sergeant who was reprimanded for being impolite to a German general officer that he had captured) and from the amusing (British soldiers brewing up tea before going into battle) to the horrifying (the massacre of American prisoners by the Waffen-SS at Malmedy).

While recommending this book, it does have some minor problems. Firstly, the book contains only about a half-dozen or so maps. In dealing with military history, it is almost impossible to properly understand the story without being able to refer to maps. Secondly, while 14-pages of pictures are to be found in the middle of the book, most of the photos chosen are of no real importance to the story. The first few pictures are of central 'characters' of the book, but the other pictures seem to have been chosen almost at random and do nothing to aid the book. Lastly, and most significantly, the author does not provide a postscript concerning his core 'characters'. It is horribly frustrating to become attached to these men and then not know what became of them after the war.

This book was written in the 1960s so many facts were not presented, such as MM's alleged affairs with the Kennedys. The author did not know MM so he presents MM from a distance: a hard-working, neurotic, promiscuous, fearful actress who eventually committs suicide. Now we know that MM's life is much more complex with many more questions about her death. Still, Hoyt tries to get to the real person behind the public mask. If you can locate this hard-to-find book, I think you'll find his perspective fascinating.

Who would have thought? A story recounting George Armstrong Custer and the Battle of the Little Bighorn is about as exciting as a worn 7th-grade text book. Initially, the idea seemed appealing. A novelization of this infamous battle in the vein and tradition of Michael Shaara's brilliant "The Killer Angels." But there's just one problem - author Edwin Hoyt's interpretation of these historical characters (Custer, Sitting Bull, Elizabeth Custer, Frederick Benteen, Marcus Reno, etc..) displays the life spark of a department store mannequin. No hyperbole here, but that's not a plus. This novel plods along to the inevitable climax on those slopes of Montana and we never get to know these characters. Their motivations, their weaknesses, their thoughts - it's a mystery in "The Last Stand." Perhaps I'm being a bit harsh. No book about this subject matter will ever match the power of the Evan S. Connell's classic "Son of the Morning Star." So why do I keep buying this drivel? Why do I continue to torture myself by reading book after book on this battle? Because it's a supremely entertaining story. "The Last Stand" does not do this historical story justice. In fact, I'm not sure if I have ever read a book as agonizingly monotonous as this one in reference to this event. Hoyt chooses to recount Custer's undocumented affairs with women in New York - including a graphic sexual encounter which takes up two pages - rather than detail the the Rosebud battle between General Crook and Crazy Horse. Crazy Horse, by the way, is only mentioned two or three times in this entire book. I guess Hoyt would rather dote on a laughable myth, which is suspect at best, about Custer's supposed Indian child. Oh Yellow Hair! A tragic child caught between two worlds! And finally the battle itself. It takes up about two pages of this sterile account and suddenly - our tale has been told. If you hold out for a thrilling conclusion, a moment of supreme realization - "Yes, that's how it happend!" - you're not going to find it in "The Last Stand." From a technical standpoint, Hoyt's interpretation of the final battle (and there have been many) is essentially accurate. If he just could have added some color, a dash of detail, the residue of drama, the caterwaul of desperation. I suppose if your only exposure to Custer and the Little Big Horn battle comes from a black and white Saturday afternoon matinee starring Errol Flynn and Anthony Quinn, this book may interest you. But for any reader even remotely knowledgable on this subject matter, "The Last Stand" rings with the scrawny chord of a rusty bugle.

Book is really mediocre. I only finished it to see how Custer died this time. Go read Little Big Man instead if your looking for a Custer novelization. Heck see the movie too.

Reading the publishers review of this book I thought it would be a interesting addition to the Stalingrad literature: it is not. It tries to be a "as they saw it" picture of stalingrad with largely unsubtantiated quotes from anonymous soldiers but has annoying factual errors. Eg page 89 after discussing the intial superioty of the t-34 says "and when they introduced the Tiger and panther tanks in 1943, the russians had altready gone onto the kv1 tank which was again superior" . The KV1 came out in 1941 and the tiger/panthers where intially superior at least throughout 1943. The book is riddled with dubious comments which makes you question the numerous "behind the scenes" unsubstaintiated quotes. More a piece of journalism than a serious attempt at history.

I have studied the book about admiral Yonai. So what I tell here is only about that. But for me it is enough. If you take his book about Yamamoto: "Yamamoto: the man who planned Pearl Harbor" (New York 1990) you will find that what Yamamoto did in the one book about becoming (vice-)minister of Naval Affairs, in the other Yonai did. Most facts about Yonai in "Tree Military Leaders" are wrong. And a lot about Yamamoto too! That was enough for me to lay down the book and keep it that way.