I found this book to be very interesting. Kelly includes a rich description of Vietnam and her people.

Katie Kelly went back to Vietnam to work with the half American street kids of Saigon. She was a friend to them and tried to teach them English. In her book she chronicles their life histories and what it meant to live in a society where taunting by their fellow students drove most of them out of school after five years or less. Her year in Saigon and her subsequent efforts on behalf of those lost Americans reveals what a decent human being she is. Would that we would have more like her.

As a former Marine Sniper who served two tours in Nam and who is still trying to understand what I went through this is an okay read. Not as good as some and a bit over blown at times but worth understanding the other side. It does make you want to better understand the other side of our current crisis in terrorism and see what makes them tick. Our leaders in Nam were a little lazy and self serving when it came to history. That is the leaders in Washington. Makes you wonder what might have been?

As a North Vietnamese colonel and high ranking Party member, the author accepted the surrender of Saigon on April 1975. He continued to work for Hanoi until 1990, when disillusioned with the communists he moved to Paris and hoped to see a free and democratic Vietnam.

In his memoir, he talked about communism being elevated to the rank of a "blind faith", the purges within the Party, the errors, greed, and corruption of communist leaders, the "arrogance of the Party" and so on.

This book is recommended to those who are interested in the inner world of the Vietnamese communist Party and the causes of its failure. It is not the ideal world painted by the communists, not the people's rule but the rule of five or six men who imposed their dictatorship on the people.

The rarest of gifts -- a credible account from a Vietnamese communist cadre! Bui Tin has done a great service to all of his countrymen, regardless political faction or religion. His assessments of legendary Vietnamese cadres, including Ho Chi Minh, Le Duan and Le Duc Anh are stunningly frank. Those interested in Vietnam or Cambodia should place this title on the top of their reading lists. There is simply no other work of its kind, although we can always hope that another courageous figure will follow in the author's footsteps.

John Prados, a veteran writer of military history, has attempted to write the first detailed scholarly examination of the role of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the Vietnam War. The Trail, dubbed the "Blood Road," was a vital pathway through the jungles of Laos and Cambodia that enabled the North Vietnamese regime to conduct a protracted guerrilla struggle in South Vietnam. Without the Trail, the indigenous Viet Cong in South Vietnam would have been virtually on their own. Nor is Prados content just to examine the history of the Trail; rather, he poses the critical question: could the United States have severed the Trail and thereby achieved a military victory in Vietnam?

There is no doubt that The Blood Trail has historical value. Prados has pulled together high and low-level accounts from both sides to produce the first real synthesis on this subject. Unfortunately, far more is promised than is delivered by this book. One major problem is the over-focus on Washington strategy sessions by Bundy, McNamara, LBJ, et al. It seems that every book written on the Vietnam War has to detour into the Oval Office, no matter how much this ground has been trampled before. The only germane aspect of these familiar policy debates is the issue of whether the insurgency in Vietnam would be handled with diplomatic or military means. Prados shows that severing the Trail by a variety of military means was the preferred option.

Although the Americans tried everything from ground attacks, bombing, mining and raiding, they could not sever the Trail. Thus Prados concludes that, "the truth is that the war fighters lost their gambit". Well, that's rather obvious Dr. Prados, given that we lost the war. Unfortunately, by asserting that we couldn't sever the Trail by military means (which actually is not proven, only that the means employed did not work), the author leaves the reader high and dry. What then should the United States have done about the Trail? Abandon South Vietnam in 1964? Negotiate surrender? How could we have known that interdicting the Trail would fail if we did not try it? There is nothing worthy of being called a conclusion here. I also believe that Dr. Prados overstates the effect of severing the Trail in any case. Even if the US military had successfully interdicted the Trail for say 6-12 months, thereby disrupting the enemy build-up, Hanoi would merely have asked for a temporary cease-fire. They could then use the period of cease-fire to repair any damage to the Trail.

I think Prados misses the boat on this one. The Vietnam War was not an exercise in military logistics, whereby if we had severed the enemy lines of communication their war effort would have collapsed. Prados has been influenced too heavily by Jomini and Clausewitz, instead of Mao. First, the enemy would always find a way to get some troops and supplies into South Vietnam, no matter how painful we made this to them. Even if we stopped 80-90% of the troops and supplies - a real success - the remaining 10-20% would probably be enough to keep a low-level insurgency burning in South Vietnam. The war was not about logistics, it was about motivation and protracted struggle. The fact is that as long as Hanoi's leaders remained committed to victory, they could outlast any temporary US military successes. The United States never intended to adopt a large-scale, open-ended defense of South Vietnam for decades on end. Thus, the Trail was probably not as critical to victory or defeat as Prados makes out.

As a participant in the air activity over the trail in 67&68,I was hopeing for more information regarding the ground activites during this period. In actuallity, there is little information about either. Onr glareing error is the authors continuing referance to all FAC aircraft as Ravens. The Ravens came into being in 1967 and were working days, flying from within Laos itself. In most cases when the author is calling the FACs Ravens, they were actually Nail or Covey FACs, flying from Thailand. Still waiting for a book that covers the construction crews, maintainers, truck drivers and GUNNERS that were a brave and awesome group.

This is a must-read for all Vietnam veterans and students of the Vietnam War. Author Prados outlines why we were never able to interdict the flow of troops and supplies down the Ho Chi Minh Trail through Laos into South Vietnam. As a veteran of C-130 flare missions searching for trucks over the Trail, I now understand why our task was often so fruitless.

Sam McGowan
Vietnam Veteran, author of "The Cave", a novel of the Vietnam War.

This book was less about Ho Chi Minh, and more about why the United States should not fight him. This reader was hoping for a more detailed discussion of Ho's life, his philosophy, etc. This book does over some insights into Ho Chi Minh's character and life, but I was left with the feeling that the book was written for other purposes. The book was originally published in 1970, a year after Ho's death so the book also smacks of the eulogy, glorification of the dead variety.

Ho Chi Minh was, in many ways, a mysterious figure. This book reveals some of those mysteries. But also, his stalinist tendencies which caused the death of many of his fellow countrymen and women. Although a revolutionary, he was a stalinist in many ways. Halberstam is such a brilliant writer though, its worth a read.

Yes I read this. You read. You learn so much. YIf you are like me and you can like this book. I went to see Ho in Hanoi. His body was in Russia for maintenance. This was not informed to me by word of David. Sorry my English. Please visit my country.

This was not a completely balanced account of post war Vietnam. It is obvious the author was seduced by the Communist authorities when he visited Vietnam in 1989. I say that because when he talks of the effects of war on the south, he mentions the white terror of Diem without mentioning the red terror of the Viet Cong. The red terror targeted not military targets but teachers and bureaucrats. Sheehan does not mention that but Diem's terror campaign, which was mild compared to the red terror. Also when he talks of the 1963 coup against Diem, he terms it the American led coup. Again another fallacy since the coup leaderes had Washington's blessings, but was not led by Americans. Another small lie was the Cambodia invasion by Vietanm. Sheehan wants us to believe that Hanoi was not interested in dominating Cambodia. Most analysts would view this an incorrect statement. If you can read through Sheehan's opinions, it gives those interested in the war some perspective of what happened after the war. Caution is in order for Sheehan's opinions.

Neil Sheehan adds a short addendum to his Pulitzer Prize "A Bright Shining Lie," one of the most interesting books out of the many written about this debacle. The primary locations of this book are Hanoi and the north and Saigon and south. Sheehan also takes a look into other places he spent time at as a journalist in the 1960s and 70s, and how they've transformed or changed, and/or haven't, up to 1990. He notes some relevant points from his previous book, including the prophetic Ap Bac battle that took place in the early 1960s.

He returns to many of the places of conflict and speaks with the people. His time in Vietnam and the relationships he had there had an enormous influence on him. His return seems to be a mix of catharthism and a quest for objective observation and curiosity. It should be up to a nation's own people to decide how to do things, but in one regard he could have been more critical and questioning of the policies of the post-1975 Vietnamese government. 100,000 people were sent to "re-education" prisons. Southern supporters and participants of the NVA (Viet-Cong) were forced out to be dominated by northerners: The communists were very repressive.

The title does make one wonder. "After the War Was Over," was written 14 years after the fall of Saigon. Another Vietnam "War" book? Not really, and that is good. It discusses the lives and conditions of those who participated in the drawn-out conflict from not just both, but the many sides that actually existed, and where these people are at today in their lives.

Some of the post-war communistic economic policies and later reforms were described, which are interesting. After the fall of Saigon in 1975, De Luan and the communists in Vietnam tried to collectivise agriculture. A proven disaster 50 years before in the Soviet Union, and then again in Maoist China. Collectivization was an outright failure in Vietnam as well. In addition to collectivization policies, the Northern Cadres forced the northern concept of central planning on the entrepreneurial South Vietnamese, which again, just simply doesn't work, being so contrary to human nature. It doesn't spur efficient production nor proper means of distribution of resources and goods. Did the Vietnamese communists learn anything? Yes, they did--after the fact. Now they claim to be the "first ones" to have departed (in 1986) from the moribund Soviet model. A patriotic communist Nguyen Van Linh, was reformist minded and his positions on policy within the government have labled him as the Vietnamese "Gorbachev." He had ideas that were considered by the post-75ers to be "right wing" or radical, but in the end he had their ear, showing some of the ways the South Vietnamese did things, which were objectively speaking, successful.

In this piece two cities are described, Hanoi and Saigon. Street addresses are mentioned and you can learn where significant happenings took place in both cities if you are going there. Many modern buildings, houses, and hotels are noted also. If someone is coming to Hanoi or Saigon, this book can be useful to learn about where things happened. I discovered that I work in the same building where the Pentagon press briefings called the "five o'clock follies" took place.

Some of Sheehan's coverage of Vietnamese history noted how the Vietnamese drove out the Mongols in the 13th Century, and have been invaded by the Chinese no less than 17 times prior to the 20th century. This book can be knocked off in a day.

Fenn's ``biographical introduction'' is a good resource -- one of the best, in fact, until Duiker finally published his fine full-length biography this year. Duiker's has made this one mostly obsolete. It is a slim volume from 1973, so it has none of the perspective nor heft one would expect from a definitive work, but it does an excellent job of conveying the many faces of the enigmatic Uncle Ho.

Before John Neff retired in 1995, he managed Vanguard's Windsor and Gemini funds for over 30 years. He managed these funds well enough to beat the Standard and Poor's 500 Index over 70% of the time. During his tenure, Vanguard Windsor became the largest mutual fund in America. Neff's account, "John Neff on Investing" contains three distinctive parts. Part One, "My Road to Windsor," is autobiographical in nature.

Part Two, "Enduring Principles," guides the reader through Neff's low price-earnings investing methodology. John Neff lists his main ingredients in picking stocks as a low price-earnings ratio (p/e), a 7% minimum earnings growth rate, a desirable dividend yield, and a favorable "total return ratio." To limit downside risk, Neff considers fundamentally strong companies and industries, and cyclical companies with extremely attractive price-earnings ratios.

John Neff low price-earnings strategy begins with a "total-return ratio" formula. Neff estimates a company's earnings growth rate, adds its dividend yield and divides the total by the stock's price-earnings ratio. Historically, Neff has generally looked for stocks with a "total-return ratio" greater than two. Interested individual investors can access and try John Neff's "total-return ratio" formula, with the option of entering up to five company ticker symbols at a time.

"Neff on Investing" continues in Part Three with "A Market Journal." This chapter chronicles Neff's formidable challenges and remarkable successes in his years at the helm at Vanguard under varying business, economic, and market conditions. Nearly one-third of "Neff on Investing" is devoted to Neff's personal history. Readers who wish to get a full measure of Neff's life - and his investment philosophy, methodology and investing track record may wish to purchase "John Neff on Investing."

As many have already pointed out; Neff's record speaks for itself. But what his book does is give you an idea of how he achieved his results throughout various economic & political cycles. Most of the book reads like a chronological journal. This gives the reader, and hopefully many new investors, an idea of how much stock valuations, and peoples attitudes towards them, can & do change. For example, in '78 the Windsor fund was valued at 5.6x earnings (an implied earnings yield of 17.9%), with an estimated growth rate of 9.7%, & current yield of 5.5%. More tantalizing is the company specific valutions he writes about. Such valuations sound absurd by todays standards, but after following Neff during his career, hopefully some readers may realize that today valuations may be just as crazy.

Along with some recent market history (the last 30 yrs.), Neff imparts to the reader the importance throughout his career of buying low P/E stocks & always focusing on the price paid for each company.

All in all a very good book & most certainly informative for any investor.

There are thousands of books that give investment advice: "buy this", "sell that", etc. John Neff reveals how a successful contratian investor actually does the homework, the analysis, and makes and sticks to his judgements. There are no pat formulas here, but wonderful display of a great financial reasoner doing his stuff in all kinds of market conditions. Neff's returns from 1964 to 1995 were double the S&P's because of his way of interpreting the economic scene and his determination to find values where others saw dreck. His story is described in fast-paced language and a wry sense of humor. Some people might argue that today's market conditions are unique, so what's the point of dredging up and discussing the market of 10 and 15 years ago. And okay "value investing" is not very fashionable, since recent value funds have under-performed against the averages. But that is precisely the kind of opportunity that Neff just loved to wade into, when value stocks were a bargain. After the current technology and IPO frenzy has subsided, the Neff approach will be what investors turn to. This is not a how-to book: better it turns on a light inside the mind of one of the few professional investors to beat the market over many decades.

As both a motorcyclist and a traveller, I found this book both an interesting read and useful for planning a trip to Vietnam.

While academics might look down on this witty work for merely touching on difficult questions, I found it the most useful preparation for a two week trip to Vietnam. Hunt gives poignant images of young people trying to survive in in a fast-changing country. They fantasize about the fabled suburbs of America - the land of infinite consumer goods, exciting movies, and Bay Watch. Yet the museums provide evidence of the long, brutal war known as "The American War."

Hunt's Vietnam remains an odd, exotic country where anything can happen. How many places are there where police shake you down, negotiate a bribe, and then give you a receipt! I could relate to Hunt's twin desires to push the limits and explore the unknown while riding along the broken Ho Chi Minh trail - and being genuinely afraid. When does riding alone on a dark road become stupid? Can you trust the innkeeper? How can you transcend being the "rich" American in a poor country? What do people expect or want from you? What do you want from them? When are you being set up? Does evil lurk behind that smile? What topics, besides critizing Ho Chi Minh, are taboo? Where are the boundaries of speech in a corrupt police state? Is it fair for an American tourist to even comment on Vietnam's woes If you plan to see Hue, Saigon, Hanoi, or go to Laos, then this book presents awkward situations worth considering before visiting Southeast Asia. It's a travelogue, not an academic history of the area. Hunt critizes many aspects of Vietnam - he's judgemental. That also makes the book more real because I can't avoid, no matter how hard I might try, making judgements. You have to make choices, and Hunt shares his decision making process with us. I appreciated that! I looked at many, many books before my trip. I took Lonely Planet and the Rough Guide. This was the only book on Vietnam that I read cover to cover with delight.

As someone who enjoys motorcycle travel overseas, I found this book invaluable for planning my own motorcycle tour in Vietnam. Some reviews have said the writer is 'shallow' etc, but I think his comments are dead on.