The author uses his concrete experience as a farmer in the San Fernando Valley to develop a fine point about the "low intensity" character of Classical Greek warfare. He argues that, the Greek city-states waging warfare through part-time citzen militias, the war strategy of all Greek polities centered on the idea of forcing a pitched battle in order not to keep citzens away too long for harvesting at home. The means used to force such a battle being to disturb the enemy's harvest, which, however, given the low technology tools avaliable and the resilience of the crop-species - specially olive trees - could never amount to permanent damage. Therefore the general low-intensity, boarding game character of much of Classical Greek military history. A fine argued, important book, specially for the firm grasp of the concrete realities at play.

Warfare and Agriculture is a scholarly, yet very readable, analysis of the effects of war on agriculture and rural life in classical Greece. Drawing heavily on contemporary sources, Hanson clearly illustrates the inextricable connection between war and agriculture in the Greek world. With the notable exception of Sparta, Greek infantrymen typically were farmers themselves who were often torn between their role as ravagers of agriculture in enemy territory, and the need to tend to their own crops.

Hanson's main premise is that many previous analyses of agricultural devastation in classical Greece have overstated the severity of its effects. He points out the ravaging was usually a means to incite battle with enemy infantry rather than an end in itself, and argues convincingly that the ravaging often associated with the seasonal cycle of warfare, while certainly contributing to hardship among the invaded population, was far from complete and had relatively short-term effects. Drawing on his first-hand experience as a farmer, Hanson illustrates some of the practical difficulties with destroying the olive trees, vines, and grains that formed the staples of Greek agriculture. In the course of his analysis, he brings to life the Greek countryside and its relationship to the urban center of the polis.

Although Warfare and Agriculture will be of interest to any reader interested in the classical world, it is probably of greatest interest to readers with some familiarity with Greek history. The extensive references to contemporary and modern sources, including many recent sources cited in the Updated Commentary to this revised edition, guide the interested reader to a wealth of additional information on the subject.

I bought the Landmark Thucydides because it was the only hardback edition I could find. I was pleasantly surprised because it happens to be the best modern edition available. The editor, Robert Strasser, set out to make the most authoritative book on Thucydides's History of the Peloponnesian War, and I believe he has succeeded brilliantly.

Strasser uses Richard Crawley's translation, apparently revised and updated. In any case the text is very good, though Thucydides syntax is sometimes complex and even a bit confusing. Strasser uses marginal notes besides each paragraph to summarize the events described in the text. The most valuable additions are the maps- there are maps every few pages, illustrating the geography described in the text as needed. Other welcome additions are a timeline, breaking down the events of the book according to date, appendices covering topics such as Athenian and Spartan government, trireme construction, land and naval warfare in ancient times, and even an essay on the monetary units and religious festivals used in the ancient world. There is also an introduction, discussing both the text and the author in detail and in the context of their time. There is also a full and complete index. If you want Thucydides, this is the book to buy!

Robert B. Strassler's edition of the famous Richard Crawley translation of Thucydides is a remarkable work, not only because of its intrinsic merit but also because it is quite simply unique. Mr. Strassler has provided the ultimate in critical apparatus, an exhaustive series of tools with which to understand and appreciate one of the great books of world civilisation. I have never seen anything like it. First of all, there is the index; if an index can be said to be a work of art, the Strassler index is a work of art in the way it organises and informs the text. Next there are the maps - dozens of them - not clumped together in the middle of the book or hidden away at the end, but strategically placed throughout the appropriate points in the text, right at the reader's fingertips when he or she needs them. The footnotes (yes footnotes, not those pesky and inconvenient endnotes!) would fill a small volume of their own and add immeasurably to one's understanding. And as if this were not enough, there are 11 appendices - short essays by prominent classical scholars on different aspects of the Greek world in the time of Thucydides, from "Athenian Government" and "Trireme Warfare" to "Religious Festivals" and "Classical Greek Currency." As far as I am concerned, the only problem with Mr. Strassler's edition is that is has made me greedy for more of the same - a similar edition of the Mahabharata, say, or Gibbon! Any takers?

Robert Strassler has done a remarkable editing job with Thucydides' Peloponnesian War. He has included three key features which provide the reader much luxury:

One, he has provided maps throughout the text, to the extent of repetition, to ensure that textual geographic references are always accompanied, in close proximity, cartographically.

Two, he has provided paragraph summaries on the margin throughout the work so that a reader, who has put the edition down for any length of time, may refresh their memories quickly by reading as many of these one to two sentence summaries as necessary.

Three, as Thucydides provides his narrative in chronological order, he must often leave one narrative to begin another. Strassler has provided a thread to follow each narrative through to its' end by way of footnotes.

These editorial enhancements greatly enrich the reading experience and would be a welcome addition to any historical text.

Thucydides, himself, presents the reader with a narrative unromanticized, strictly adhering to the events of the Peloponnesian War. His work possesses many passages that rivet the reader, but also contains areas where the sheer and voluminous recitation of fact can render one foggy. This is not a book for the light-hearted, though Strassler's editorial enhancements make for a pleasurable experience. It is, in short, a classic which has been classically edited.

This is the second Victor Davis Hanson work I have resd, the first being "An Autumn of War..." Hanson objectively writes of a situation (illegal Mexican immigration) that will only get worse before it gets better, unless, as he argues, politicians on either side of the aisle address the concerns and issues that he raises.

It is not, as one reviewer suggests, an anti-immigration diatribe -- that is left for the Pat Buchannans of this country. Part analytical, part anecdotal, Hanson hits the bullseye in discussing all aspects of the sitution. I detect not anger but empathy of the illegal male Mexicans who come to the USA in their teens, only to become disenfranchised at 50 due to no chance whatsoever of social and/or economic mobility.

The most important theme that hits me is that assimilation into our American culture by these immigrants, a process that Europeans and Asians successfully accomplished in the past, may not happen in this situation. Sadly, this lack of assimilation, Hanson suggests, is due to failed and flawed policies insitituted at all levels of both the Mexican and US governments, which look the other way at the porous border, each side realizing some benefit from the illegal's plight: cheap labor for the US's agricultural economy; riddance of a low-class, dark-skinned Indian population for Mexico.

Additionally, US programs embracing bi-lingualism, free social services, "wacky" insistence on cultural studies and lack of prosecutorial law only add to the issues that Hanson clearly, and without anger, addresses. Remember, Hanson has directly experienced these issues -- he's not writing from an ivory tower!

I could go on, but why tell the whole story? Buy the book and read it, epspecially if you are a Legal Southwerstern US resident OF ANY NATIONALITY who is concerned about what is quickly becoming an issue of serious financial and social consequences.

I have read every book written by Hanson. From the hoplites of ancient Greece, the farming crisis of the 80's, the history of warfare and culture, the teaching of the classics and now this searching analysis of the debacle of our non-policy on immigration, I have been astonished at how skillfully this man writes and with what intelligence he cuts to the essence of whatever subject he addresses. In the present book Hanson turns his gaze to a subject he is personally familiar with: the transformation of his native California by massive illegal immigration from Mexico. Hanson is not anti-Mexican. He has several Mexican relatives, his daughters are dating Mexican-Americans and most of the people he grew up with are Mexican-American or Mexican. What Hanson is opposed to is our feckless non-policy on immigration which allows steady waves of illegals to flood our border states and does not give us time to allow us to assimilate the Mexican immigrants here. Hanson believes strongly that the vast majority of immigrants, given time and opportunity, will assimilate and become good citizens. However it is impossible for this to be accomplished unless we gain control of our southern border and curb most illegal immigration. A timely book on a major issue that both the Republican and Democrat parties steadfastly ignore.

In our all to politically correct, liberal state (California) it was nice to read a book that did not pull any punches and spoke freely and honestly about the terrible problems illegal immigration is causing here in California. The author is so correct when he states you cannot speak about the problems associated with the deluge of illegal latinos into California. If you do you are branded a racist. If you want to get a real view of what is happening here and what is going to happen in your state if illegal immigration is not stopped buy this book. It will open your eyes and hopefuly make you take action to stop the madness of uncontrolled, open border illegal immigration.

Victor Davis Hanson has recently emerged as a particularly right wing columnist at the National Review. However, anyone familiar with his writing there should be aware he is a far better historian than pundit, at least when it comes to Ancient Greece. His basic thesis is that the ancient Greeks evolved a unique form of warfare, focused on a single, short and bloody clash between two armies of citizens. This warfare arose from the circumstances of their society. The typical soldier was an independent small farmer who supplied his own arms and fought as part of a body of amateur citizen soldiers to defend his land and city-state. Generals were chosen from among the citizens and led from the front, sharing risks equally. Conflicts had to end quickly so the farmers could get back to their fields. Consequently, the Greeks developed a style of warfare that emphasized equal risk among soldiers, strength and courage over skill and maneuver, and seeking a decisive battle even at a high cost to their own side. When the Greeks came into contact with less determined cultures, they scored devastating victories. This kind of warfare became the standard for Western armies up into modern times. Hanson further argues that the reliance on citizen soldiers and the emphasis on equality produced a society of democratic, free speaking, free thinking men and ultimately accounted for men such as Socrates and Thuycidides. When small farms started to die out and states began to rely more on professional soldiers, Greek democracy and intellectual life declined as well.
Hanson's work suffers from two flaws, one minor and one major. The minor flaw is that he puts most of his effort into reconstructing Greek warfare and relatively little in demonstrating how that style of warfare dominated Western armies. The focus, as the subtitle suggests is on the Greeks. John Keegan's "A History of Warfare" does a much more thorough job of developing and supporting this thesis (Keegan relied heavily and explicitly on Hanson's work when discussing Greek warfare and wrote the introduction to "The Western Way of War.") Hanson's sentimentality is a far more serious flaw. A farmer himself, he deeply admires the small independent farmers who made up the backbone of Greek armies and society. Consequently he tends to disparage later military developments. For him, the clash of amateur citizen soldiers, with generals leading from the front, is the ideal form of battle. He mocks as cowards and fools Hellenistic era military theorists who shied away from frontal assaults, encouraged generals not to expose themselves to danger and preferred professional soldiers to citizen amateurs. Here he makes selective use of the evidence. By his own account, the professional soldiers of Sparta were regarded as superior and other Greeks feared to face them in battle. Likewise, Xenophon, who had served as a common soldier and was elected an officer by his fellow soldiers, was one of the military theorists who argued against generals risking themselves in battle. Hanson is so fond of the amateur citizen soldier that he seemingly cannot bear to acknowledge that other forms of warfare might be more effective.
Why should anyone in the general public be interested in a book on ancient Greek warfare? The current crisis provides a strong reason. Hanson shows how the Greek way of warfare was integrated into their society and government. A body of citizens decided elections and battle alike as equals. The shift away from amateur citizen soldiers paralleled the shift away from democracy and toward autocratic government. In our current war we are depending heavily on a professional military, rather than citizen soldiers. In previous wars the bulk of troops came from ordinary citizens. Now military service is no longer part of citizenship. As in the time of the Ancient Greeks, there are practical reasons today for relying on professionals. However, there are social costs to such a change. President Clinton's disputes with the military are only the most obvious examples. Hanson reminds us that we cannot easily separate how a society fights wars from how it is governed. There is a sense in his sentimentality. For that alone, his book is worth reading.

This is my second time through the book and it is still an excellent read and provides an engrossing account of the orgins of how warfare in the Greek world was waged and its impact throughout history. On that note I must disagree with George Delke Sr. that the Greeks were not the inventors of this type of warfare and that the Assryians were good at it (if they were the Greeks wouldn't have slaughtered them as often as they did).

Dr. Hanson makes a thorough and thoughful analysis of the Greek hoplites and the way they fought. From the hoplight to the their commander no stone is left unturned. But while the main emphasis on the book itself is the hoplight and Greek warfare in general there is much more to it than just that. The Greek hoplights were not successful because of their bravery or for their numbers, the Assyrians were brave and they outnumbered the Greeks in all their battles, then why was it the hoplight armies were so successful against the Assyrians. It was because of their orginization and their training (this is why I disagreed with the previous reveiwer). This then is the underlying theme to the book, not the heroics of one man but the performance of the whole.

The Greek structure of warfare will go on to conquer almost the whole ancient world under the hands of men like Alexander the Great, Scipio Africanus, Julius Ceasar, and the other great Roman generals of the ancient world. But the traditions of Greek warfare would go on to influence the later nations of the European world and from there the whole of the Western World.

Using a plethora of sources from ancient authors, battles, archeology, and others the author has managed to write an excellent resource that is original, readable, enthralling, and most importantly is its credibility. This is a must have for any student of military history, both professional and layperson alike.

Hanson historical perspectitive of the Greek City-State wars provides valueable insight into the human suffering, carnage, strategies, and life of the Spartian and Athenian Hoplite foot soldier. Hanson makes the distinction between battles and wars. The hoplite was enlisted to fight a battle, after which he returned home to continue work as either a farmer, merchant, or craftsman. Fighting was considered risky business, whereas the Spartian considered himself as a professional soldier, not bound to maintained land thus having no responsiblities to the harvest crops back home. Hanson moves "The Western Way of War" narrative into a more direct focus of the emotions, consequences, and circumstances of battle. In contrast to Hanson's book "The Ancient Greeks and their way of war" where he puts more of an emphasis on tactics, field formation, armament, and the phalanx. One thing can be sure while reading this book, the reader will get a good feel, for the conditions surrounding the infrantry man's life within the phalanx. Hanson suprebly illustrates the fear generated as massive formations squared off with radiant breast plates, bronze helment, thousands of men compressed together, the war cry, individual painted shields, and waves of trembling and teeth chatter before the order to charge. Battle formation was a matter of agreement with the phalanx arranged in eight rows with spears lowered in the front three rows. The phalanx created fear within the oppositing army as the army crossed no mans land, with each party, striving for maximum momentum and force for a crushing impact, often resulting in the the spears shatter or being cut. It is easy to understand why the spears shattered since they were only one inch in diameter. As the phalanx passed over the injuried the rear rows of soldiers smashed down a steel butt on the end of their spear into the injuried soldier. The front line pushed and stabbed with their favorite targets being the thigh, shins and foot, and groin. Pressure increased as the shield being three feet in diameter was used by the hoplite pressing shoulder against shield into the enemy force. The shield was made of wood an weight about sixteen pounds and often could be pentrated by the spear or sword. The breast plate warded off arrows and protectile missiles. Also the breast plate acted as a solar collector leaving the soldier fatiqued and dehydrated after hours of fighting. Should a soldier fall down, the additional 51 pounds made it literally impossible to get up. The phalanx soldier was recruited at eighteen years of age and could serve until sixty years of age with many phalanx formations being an average age of thirty. Simple commands were given to the phalanx because of limitations in mobility and sight. Often times the general fought along side of the soldier and in many cases died on the field of battle. The most dangerous phenemenia confronting the phalanx was panic and fear. Panic and fear could cause gaps where the enemy could enter and attack from the sides or the rear. If the battle was not going well for the front line, the rear rows could panic and abandon the battle leading to massive slaughterings as the enemy attack their backs with spears, arrows, or protectiles. The phalanx discipline against superior numbers work if they continue a slow march forward.

Victor Davis Hanson is a rarity among classical scholars: he writes with elegance and conviction not only about classics (I admired Who Killed Homer?, which he wrote with John Heath), but about the decline of independent farming in America. A fifth-generation California grape farmer, he has written previously in Fields Without Dreams about his struggles to retain the family farm. (He wrote so passionately, in fact, that I used to read quotes aloud to my husband after dinner, alternately enthralled by brilliant insights and disturbed by weird tangents into political conservativism). A classicist myself, I am startled and impressed by his ability to relate the experiences of farmers in America to ancient Greek agriculture. Though I still read Latin on weekends with my husband, I have known very few classicists who can write compellingly about anything outside their narrow field of knowledge This new collection of essays, The Land Was Everything, is more palatable to the common reader than Fields Without Dreams: he educates the general public about the social and economic whys and wherefores of independent farming in the twenty-first century. His book pays homage to J. Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, a Frenchman who wrote Letters from an American Farmer in 1782, and explores American farmers' options, describing their war on pests and weeds,the history of chemical poisons and pesticides, the impact of suburban sprawl, weather, trespassers, and other enemies of agriculture. I'm a fan of this gallant classicist-farmer curmudgeon, though I don't agree with all he says.

Agrarianism goes down to a hard and dusty death. The realities of growing commodities as a family in California are tough. Hanson does know what he's talking about, contra reader S.M. Stirling, below (I wonder if this fellow even read the book, his comments are so off, not to mention being practically a personal attack on Hanson); he lives the reality of this difficult life while also being a classical scholar. He seems uniquely qualified to illuminate the Greek and Latin roots of agrarianism as the foundation of democracy, and with a lifelong interest in the classics, I found this very interesting; I learned a lot. I highly recommend this book, which I found compelling...

This is one of those few books that I enjoyed and thought about so much that I bought six copies from Amazon to hand out to friends who I believed would also appreciate Hanson's efforts. It really is that exceptional! The thing most notable about "The Land Is Everything" is how much response it will provoke out of you if are a "thinking type". That doesn't mean you will love or hate it all...you will, however, THINK! Despite the definite order the book is arranged in, you will get a sense that much of it was almost written in streams of thought. Hanson seems to meander on tangents at times and in other places even rants but, this stream is still flowing briskly! He focusses in on "Man versus Nature", "Man versus Man", and "Man versus Self" in the realm of small-scale farming.

Hanson is uniquely qualified to write about the subject of farming and it's effects on character. He is a fifth generation grape farmer in California while also a Professor of Classics at CSU Fresno. The clincher is that he can convey his beliefs to paper with a VENGEANCE! The crux of this book is showing how the decline of self-reliant family farms in America is sapping the core character of what an "American" was in our first 200 years. He passionately describes the life, both good and bad, of the American farmer and gives numerous examples of issues that influence his/her character and culture. The fact that America, up until fairly recently, was predominantly a land of farmers is elaborated on at length. Hanson admires and respects the ways the brutal realities of farming the land force farmers to stay literally rooted in hard work, ethics, and honesty even if it sometimes makes them crazy! He then launches into his assessments of the effects on the gradual loss of this culture on the United States today as it becomes more and more "urban" and "cosmopolitan".

One thing I can almost promise: you WILL have an opinion on this book once you've read it. There will be points that you will agree or disagree with strongly and many others that will fall somewhere in between. The bottom line is that you will definitely feel better for having read it.

Finally, if you have found yourself drawn to understand the heroism and motivation of the New York City fireman who fought and died at the World Trade Center attack on 9/11, I doubly recommend this book.

I've gotten a kick out of reading others' impressions of this book. As a former Classics B.A., I can sympathize with lots of sides of this argument, and so the book comes off a little bombastic. That said, the message that classical education should be saved from extinction is a very important one, and deserves as wide an audience as possible.

The issue is relevant to everyone, on one of any number of levels: the importance of history, the value of translation, the psychological insights into ancient culture and therefore human nature, I can go on. Studying ancient languages,as a general exercise, can serve a valuable individual, and en masse cultural purpose in the pursuit of meaning and the construction of better ways of living for the present. It runs the gamut of educational value: as philosophy, as politcal science, as psychology. I think most people, at least in theory, would agree with this.

All the authors are saying is that the value of studying ancient languages is simply not being preserved by any particular stewards, as in centuries past. They are concentrating on Greek and Latin because those ancient languages are the key to understanding our Western culture. They are not saying that Chinese or South American ancient languages are less import PER SE, they are simply saying that Greek and Latin are the MOST RELEVANT languages to our Western culutre, whose values have influenced more and more cultures across the world. These values- democracy, equality, freedom, etc.- are taken for granted by my post-Vietnam generation, and so studying their roots may not seem very PRACTICAL. But one can only hope that some cultural awakening may open more young peoples' eyes to the value of understanding the past and the rich intangible personal rewards of initimately knowing an ancient text.

Which brings me to the point of contention most fervently drawn out by the authors: that the intrinsic value of classical stewardship (as "the keepers of the flame") seems to have been lost in a selfish, uppity, ridiculously esoteric publishing game that leads the profession, and its subject matter, into a dead end. Although it is important to find new ways of looking at things to reach new understanding, the authors seem to suggest that it's more important at this point in time to abandon the incestuous pursuit of arcane, often boring and largely irrelevant dintinctions and "discoveries" and re-assume the duty of passing on tradition.

I'm not saying that comparative studies of literature and language are without purpose; rather, the degree to which it has become the focus of Classics departments in the US seems to have reached the point of absurdity. Granted, there is intense competition for very few jobs, so who could be blamed for scraping the bottom of the intellectual barrel for kernels of academic novelty? But at what price? Whatever it is, it's too great. That seems to be what the authors are saying, and I think the authors say it courageously. The need for this book being great as it is, its sometimes extreme tone and POV can be overlooked.

On a personal note, If there were more jobs in academe, especially Classics, I would have probably foregone the business world. But there is a culutral amnesia that belittles the value of understanding the past, and thus the demand for Classics classes is just low. This book is very valuable, in that it courageously draws first blood against the cultural forces threatening the preservation of the historical roots of the West.

Hanson and Heath present a tightly reasoned, completely convincing thesis: that is, the American University student has been robbed of a precious cultural inheritance, the genius of Greece.
I have recently returned to a college campus after many years in the work force and I can attest that the undergraduates are fed a curriculum which denigrates the Western cultural tradition. It is quite possible to graduate without the slightest knowledge of the monumental geniuses of the Classic world who founded our civilization.
It is important to contrast the Greek intellectual stance of continuing questioning and seeking with that of Islamic scholars who maintain that all important questions have been asked and answered and further questioning is blasphemous and harmful.
It is not a coincidence that science has prospered in the West.
Our students cannot appreciate the value of our Constitution without understanding the it was the product of minds steeped in the thought of classical Greece.
Particularly now I fear for my country. Our young people are unprepared to defend the culture of free speech and free inquiry.

I thoroughly enjoyed this book. Itawoke in me a new desire to reclaim a classical education (which I am now doing by learning Ancient Greek!).

It is important in today's era of "multiculturalism" to recognize that not all cultures are created equal. The Greco-Roman tradition gave us the foundation for our own form of a Democratic Republic. While it is the PC fashion now to criticize the Greeks for their treatment of women and slaves let us not forget that many countries/cultures still engage in slavery (West Africa), or brutal treatment of women (Islamic). As so elegantly pointed out, the *only* culture which took major steps to eradicate these inequities were the Western ones and most specifically the United States.

Even in Ancient Greece, many voices (Aristophanes, Euripides) can be read as speaking out against social injustice. If we let the classics die in our colleges and universities upon the sacrificial altar of feminism, multiculturalism, or political correctness, we will have lost part of the American soul and more importantly - our intellectual heritage! This book is a clarion call to what is so wrong in academia today and to the fact that we had best wake up before it is too late!

By the way - I am a liberal, but not a radical leftist!

Hanson's "An Autumn of War" is a book of essays where the author utilizes military history to show how much of September 11th and its effects have been visited on us and other civilizations before. Refreshingly opposed to ubiquitous political correctness, Hanson discusses various topics related to the 9-11 massacre: the Taliban and bin Laden; Hollywood and academia's baseless anti-Americanism; discussions on the Civil War's General Sherman and the generals of ancient Greece. At times, Hanson's tone is a bit too opinionated, and he packs his essays with historical events and characters with which the layman may not necessary be familiar. Nonetheless, Hanson tackles a wide array of topics leaving the reader with a much better view of 9-11 and the necessity of current military action.

Anyone familiar with the writing of Victor Davis Hanson, a professor of classics and journalist, knows his views on the subject of this book. He is a passionate defender of American greatness, hates the tyrants of the world with all his soul and has nothing but scorn for the appeasers and bashers of America among the intellectual elite. All these views are well amplified in this book, a collection of essays published, mainly in National Review Online, between September 12 and December 31, 2001. The topics are far ranging and the tones of the essays vary considerably. In many, Hanson writes with an eloquent passion in defense of Western civilization and Western values. Indeed, his words may be called Churchillian. (One essay is entitled "What Would Churchill Say" and liberally quotes the great man.) In other essays, Hanson envokes important military figures from the past such as Sherman to demonstrate his view that the great Western nations go to war reluctantly but with an unrelenting savage fury. Other essays are satirical in tone including one in which he imagines the modern media covering the Doolittle raid on Tokyo. The most inventive essay is one in which he conducts an "interview" with Thucydides, the great chronicler of the Peloponesian War by interposing questions about the war on Islamic fascism with actual quotations (complete with citations) from Thucydides himself.

Hanson is no lightweight pundit. The man is a brilliant scholar filled with passionate yet truthful opinions. He amply supports those opinions through the exploration of history. This excellent book is a welcome antidote to the venom produced by the left and the pablum produced by most of our punditocracy. Hanson fills me with pride in being an American. His writing is never jingoistic but always passionate and patriotic. If you feel pessimistic and think maybe America's day has passed, read this book. It will make you feel better.

Dr. Hanson is one of the foremost military historians of our age and a classicist. These essays, written in the Fall of 2001, foretold the outcome of the rapid U.S victory in Afghanistan when most pundits were warning that that mountainous country has been the graveyard of empires and would be a quagmire for the U.S. The author's knowledge of world military history from ancient times, and his keen insight into human nature gleaned from an unsurpassed knowledge of classic literature, enabled him to exhibit amazing prescience of the rapid defeat of the Taliban. This, and Dr. Hanson's other books such as "Carnage and Culture" and "The Soul of Battle" are well worth reading, as are his continuing essays appearing in National Review Online, The Wall Street Journal, and other periodicals. Perhaps it is not only his erudition that makes the author so wise, for so many learned people were totally wrong in their comments during the aftermath of 9-11. Dr. Hanson grew up on a farm and continues to live on the California farm where he was born. Farmers have a reputation of being not only close to the earth but close to reality. Perhaps it is the combination of a surpassing knowledge of Western classics, military history, and wise practical experience that makes Dr. Hanson's insights and analysis so compelling. Even those who disagree with his views would have to admit his logic and the points he makes are eloquently stated. This book is influencing thought and action on the war on terrorism--The Washington Post in an October 1992 article on the influence of Vice President Cheney on the Bush administration stated that this book strongly influenced Cheney's thinking, and that Cheney was a powerful influence, among many competing voices, on the President's chosen course of action.

Sir Winston Churchill once remarked: "History will be kind to me, for I intend to write it." It is this characteristic blend of assertiveness, blunt honesty and a hint of good-natured irony which so endears the British bulldog to his admirers, and which makes his account of the Second World War not only an informative read, but an immensely enjoyable one as well. Moreover, the admission of subjectivity does not detract at all from Churchill's writings, but rather serves as further proof of his greatness, making them an even more impressive and valuable source. The result is history at its most fascinating, from a man who made it.

Then there are those who write about it. Victor Davis Hanson is such a professional historian, or at least used to be full-time before he took up political punditry. As readers of those vociferous columns will know, he lacks not in assertiveness, but rather more so in honesty or self-irony (the latter, particularly, is never the mark of "angry" writers). And even though he is usually a lot less accurate, impartial or thorough in his depiction of history than Sir Winston ever was, Hanson presents his work as Gospel truth under the mantle of scholarship, and as the result of careful research and study. In truth, his aim is political rather than historical. The result is revisionism, from a man who rewrites history around his own, highly personal and contemporary agenda.

A textbook example of this approach is "Carnage and Culture", or in another edition: "Why the West Has Won: Nine Landmark Battles in the Brutal History of Western Victory" . Reserved taglines, both! Here Hanson is trying to uncover the underlying reasons for a huge and apparently simple fact: that for the last 2500 years, the West has generally beaten the non-West in armed conflict. By "the West", lest we forget, he refers to (or rather assumes) a curious and underdefined cultural continuity that somehow stretches from ancient Athens and Rome through feudal Europe, the Spanish conquistadors and Victorian England right up to present-day America. By the non-West, he means the rest.

The precision continues: Hanson illustrates his case not with, say, an exhaustive analysis of long-term political, social or economic developments, but rather pinpoints nine (no less!) "landmark" battles throughout the course of the two-and-a-half examined millennia. Apparently, the argumentative structure here is a little more fragmented than Hanson's notion of a homogenous West... Anyway, the battles presented range from ancient times (Salamis) over the Medieval and Renaissance Ages (Poitiers, Tenochtitlan) to 19th century colonialism (Rorke's Drift) and World War II (Midway).

As varied as the times and places involved are the reasons which Hanson cites for Western victory: there are overarching factors like the development of science and economy, which ensured that the West had better weapons, and more of them. There are large-scale social conditions, such as the fact that Western armies used freemen and citizens rather than slaves and mercenaries, or that their conduct of war was subject to open debate. On a tactical level, there is the superior morale of citizen-soldiers, and the initiative of people brought up in free societies. All of these factors are valid and relevant to a certain extent, of course, and even though there is nothing really original about any of this, they illustrate nicely the outcome of the individual battles that are discussed,. It's just that they never form any sort of cohesive argument, let alone one that would support the questionable thesis of "Western values" continuity which Hanson traces from Themistocles through Cortez to McArthur.

Rather than attempting to argue coherently in any clearly defined direction, Hanson works like a lawyer - the more arguments he can pile up, the better. Moreover, he picks and chooses, seizing only the points that will make his case, and omitting or explaining away all others. Like, for instance, all those battles that do not quite fit the "Western victory" mould - three Roman legions slaughtered by Germanic warriors at Teutoburg Forest, several centuries of defeat against Ottoman land forces, the German blitzkrieg that crushed France in 1940, or the significant contribution that Stalin's Soviet Union (emphatically not a democratic state) made to eventually overthrow Hitler's regime. But Hanson just has an a priori argument about Western superiority (military and in general), and like any good revisionist, he fits the evidence to his argument rather than the other way around.

"The faults of this book are legion" as The Independent remarks, "so there is space to concentrate only on the most egregious." Like the peculiar take on Rorke's Drift: readers might think that the technology gap between the Zulus and the British sufficiently explains which side was going to prevail, but Hanson characteristically adds the fact that the Zulus served a despotic leader. The spear-throwing warriors could have won or at least prolonged the war, one presumes, if they had only adopted a constitution... After noting a tally of 400-800 Zulu dead and over 20,000 expended British cartridges, the author concludes about the superior Western military culture: "Strict firearms training guaranteed that they would usually hit what they aimed at." Quick maths check: divide 800 by 20,000, remembering that the battle took part at close range - do we find anything that warrants the term "usually"?

At least in the final chapter, where Hanson claims the Tet Offensive as an American victory which only the "coffeehouse academic posturing" of liberal opinion turned into a defeat, he's honest and reveals for a fleeting moment the true political agenda of the book - even though it means contradicting his earlier argument that societies with democratic scrutiny of the military win more wars. Whatever, it will delight the good people who have always distrusted the confusing complexities of those defiling intellectuals, and who prefer a cozy black-and-white worldview. In fact, "Carnage and Culture" is made for them. More educated readers, and those who value accuracy over polemics, will put down Hanson's book well before the end anyway, and return to Sir Winston.

Carnage and Culture is a fascinating and very well written book. Professor Hanson's subject is Western military prowess, which in his view stems from inherent cultural advantages that have, for the past two and a half millennia, endowed the West with a uniquely lethal way of waging war against its adversaries. He chooses nine landmark battles in which western armies either triumphed, usually against numerical odds, or else recovered from defeat with a vigor that demonstrated indomitable military superiority. He starts with the dramatic naval victory of the ancient Greeks over the invading Persians at Salamis, and moves chronologically forward up through the so-called Tet Offensive, in which twentieth century Americans battled Vietnamese communists. Along the way, he discusses Cortez's destruction of the Aztecs, the British conquest of the Zulu nation, the American victory over the Japanese navy at the Midway, and four other bloody encounters between Western forces and Muslim, African or Asian adversaries. Professor Hanson opens each chapter with a vivid description of the battle itself, then devotes the remainder of his text to placing the battle into the political and social context of it's time and to weaving in the threads that tie it to the bigger historical picture he wants us to see. While I found Carnage and Culture to be highly thought-provoking, I have some problems with it too. Critics on the left will discern a conservative ideological agenda at work here, most obviously in the Vietnam chapter, where he digresses into a well-argued but off-the-subject attack on the 60's anti-war Left and the media. Beyond that, the book tends to strain as the author squeezes 2500 years of complex history into a pretty narrow dimension. He's selective in his focus and dismissive of much that doesn't seem to fit. Problematically, he never really addresses the question of what he, or the rest of us, mean exactly when we talk about "The West". He states, and I think sincerely, that he's not making any kind of racialist argument here. But then what? Aztecs or American Indians or Zulus are not part of "The West". Alexander the Great was, but presumably contemporary Macedonians would not be. Oddly, he rarely mentions the Russians, and it's not clear which box he would put them into - probably NonWest, since they usually seem to lose their wars. If what he's really doing is simply generalizing about technologically underdeveloped people and telling us they lose wars, then the argument devolves into tautology. But I think he's doing quite a bit more than that. Hanson is a professor of classical studies, and his understanding of the ancient Greeks permeates this book. If pressed on the issue, he would probably define "The West" in the conventional manner as those societies whose cultural and intellectual roots can be traced back to these remarkable people. Reduced to basics, Hanson's thesis is that it is the spirit of empirical pragmatism - i.e., scientific method - that facilitates development of tools for cultural, economic and military dominance. At this level, of course, the argument is beyond debate and too obvious to be of much interest. However, he goes on to argue that it is the spirit of democracy which unleashes the full power of scientific method, providing both the creative freedom and the incentive necessary for an unrestrained pursuit of practical objectives, including the annihilation of enemies on the battlefield. Since the ancient Greeks were pioneers of both scientific method and democracy, it is with them that we see the first flourishing of this lethal combination. It is with them and with modern-day Americans that Hanson's thesis rings most convincingly, but with much that lies between, it tends to falter. Hanson, to my mind, goes too far in attributing the benefits of democracy and scientific method somehow to the various monarchies and autocracies that have dominated much of Western history until recently. Furthermore, he seems to rely too much on assumption and stereotypical thinking in describing the relative disadvantages of the ancient Persians, medieval Muslims, and the other non-Western adversaries, about whom historians really know very little. Hanson teaches at an American university, and I'm told by my university friends that at most schools today, debates about "The West" are fashionable, with embattled conservative minorities generally defending "The West" against ascendant leftist multi-culturalists. It seems likely that the ideological edge to Hanson's book emanates reflexively from his own pre-occupation with academic politics. It's odd, though, that he isn't arguing any moral superiority on the part of the West, only superior capacity for mass slaughter on the battlefield, a point with which his leftist critics would surely concur. So the debating point would seem to be wasted anyway. Hanson is a lucid thinker, a knowledgeable historian, and an excellent writer, and despite its limitations, I enjoyed Carnage and Culture immensely. He could do much more with this subject if he would let himself turn away from the tedious West-NonWest focus and give us an objective study exploring the historical relationship between democracy, science and military power.

Victor Davis Hanson's illuminating work is sure to be provocative and controversial. The book's thesis is the West's unique and lethal form of warfare has propelled it to dominance in world affairs. This military tradition has common threads dating back to Ancient Greece and is reflective of a Western culture that emphasizes political and intellectual freedom. Hanson illustrates this unique Western way of warfare by studying 9 battles from the Greek-Persian encounter at Salamis in 480 BC to the Tet Offensive in Vietnam. Unlike recent books, such as Jared Diamond's "Guns Germs and Steel" (a book I greatly admire), that explain the world's unequal power distribution through geographical and topographical determinism, Hanson's book emphasizes military prowess determined by culture. Hanson, like Diamond, rightly disregards racist theories on Western power because they are totally without foundation. The work is fascinating because it does an outstanding job of exploring the sensitive subject of culture and its influence on military affairs. However, a few weaknesses detract from the overall message. First, China is hardly explored. Given its preeminence through much of ancient and medieval times, this is a serious omission. Secondly, Hanson's belief in "shock battle" as the superior form of warfare has undergone serious revision in the 20th century. Even with these weaknesses, the book is still an excellent read.

Throughout the work, Hanson constantly emphasizes several key attributes of Western warfare.
They are:
1)Desire for decisive battle or "shock battle" as he calls it. Unlike other military traditions that stress deception, raiding and skirmishing, Westerners prefer head-to-head collisions of massive armies on the battlefield.
2)Civic militarism or a "nation in arms". Western armies and navies are staffed with free citizens who are fighting for country NOT slaves and mercenaries.
3)Free inquiry and rationalism. Western militaries are self-critiquing and encourage individual initiative. Like all armies, Western armies have hierarchies, but they are flatter, more flexible and give their soldiers a rough sense of equality with their fellow comrades. Adherence to rationalism allows Western armies to place ultimate emphasis on military efficacy regardless of its impact on social and political structures. Constant innovation in tactics and technology is considered independent from political arrangements.

Hanson then goes on to explain that these attributes did not appear out of a vacuum but are reflective of Western culture. With its origins in Ancient Greece and Rome, this culture nurtured the concepts of citizenship and elaborate property rights. Although these states were hardly democracies by today's standards, they did create an environment where free individuals actively participated in decision-making and had rights and obligations within the state. Most soldiers in Ancient Greece and Rome were drafted from the small farmer class. These people owned their own plots and could not afford long and endless military campaigns. Armies in other ancient kingdoms were manned by slaves and mercenaries and therefore were not troubled by such campaigning. To minimize time away from the farm, Western armies sought short and decisive battles that would determine the outcome quickly and with finality. It also imbued Western soldiers with motivation seldomly found in Non-Western armies staffed with mercenaries and slaves - the desire to protect one's livelihood and freedom. Even when the Romans suffered a crushing defeat at Cannae, Rome was able to raise new armies of free soldiers by calling the nation to arms. Since these soldiers were free men who entered into a consensual contract with the Republic, they willingly succumbed to military discipline and temporarily shed their individualism to become part of a mass, uniform formation - the ultimate expression of egalitarianism. Western guarantees of property rights, limits on arbitrary government power and judicial review, allowed the productive energies of capitalism to flourish, therefore providing Western armies and navies with copious quantities of advanced weaponry. Hanson makes no claim on the moral superiority of Western warfare. In fact, he illustrates that this form of warfare is particularly bloody and gruesome.

The weaknesses of the book are twofold. First, he ignores China. Given China's significant contributions to warfare and technology throughout ancient and medieval times (i.e. gunpowder, compass, printing press, paper money, stirrup etc.), this is a major omission. Of course, this book is about the West, not China, therefore it might be beyond the scope of this work to examine China's military history in depth. Even if this is so, some form of a short comparative analysis with China's traditions could have lent more credence to his view of the uniquely lethal form of Western warfare. Secondly, one has to wonder about the future efficacy of "shock battle". Although this work is a retrospective look, a concluding chapter with a prospective view would have been interesting. The frontal assault's declining effectiveness was already evident early in the 20th century. Verdun, Somme and Paschendale (all WWI battles) were classic examples of direct encounters gone wrong. They all typified massive bloodletting with no decisive victory. Maybe in this age of advanced munitions, "shock battles" are just too costly to fight. After the catastrophic encounters of WWI, military planners had to devise more effective ways of combating the enemy without "running into the breach of a cannon". The most successful strategies of WWII and the last 50 years have emphasized maneuver and the "indirect" approach to warfare. The German Blitzkrieg, the American Pacific island-hopping campaign, Israeli victories in 1956, 1967 and 1973 and Desert Storm were all tremendously successful because they avoided enemy strong points and deceived the enemy as to the true direction of attack. The objective in all of these campaigns was decisive victory BUT through an indirect approach. Of course, all of these strategies were developed by Westerners, so Hanson should be proud.

This is the kind of book that throws off ideas like sparks from a sparkler. On its surface, it is a sober, if not solemn, examination of how three great generals (Epaminondas, a Theban; Sherman, a Union general; and Patton, in Europe in World War II) commanding forces made up of free men from democratic societies were able to achieve great results against adversaries who were supposedly very powerful, but who were representatives of slave societies and whose power turned out to be less than expected. Hanson argues that the moral power of an army that comes to realize that it is fighting on the side of good against true evil is beyond what could be expected from the sheer numbers. Also, that the forces of evil -- the parasite warriors of Sparta, the oligarchs of the Confederacy who fed the ordinary people into the furnace of battle while protecting themselves and their goods, the madmen of Nazi Germany -- often turn out to be less formidable than one would expect, perhaps because they realize on some level their own moral inferiority or that there is something special about the forces confronting them. Hanson is writing as a military historian (he is a classics professor in a local college in California), but he is not really very interested in the nitty-gritty of exactly how phalanxes worked or what Patton had to do to flummox the Germans. Also, he is a little too reliant on dubious sources such as Goldhagen's polemical indictment of all of the German populace. Yet, he is bright, articulate, and on to something that seems to have gotten past the military technologists: there is something larger than sheer skill and numbers that can sometimes make a difference in how humans on both sides of a battle or a war respond to what they're doing and an army that understands that it is fighting for higher human values against a dehumanizing enemy, like the Spartans, the Confederate slaveholders or the Nazis can do wonders. Also, another point often overlooked in our late 20th century world view, is that leaders who can focus and direct this moral energy are both rare and terribly important. This is a book that should be part of every high school history curriculum and that should be read by every thinking adult. The moral dimension of war (and, by extension, of all that we do in the world) is often either overlooked or handed over to zealots or pious frauds. Hanson is a clear-eyed and down to earth thinker and writer. There are some things he just doesn't get, such as why Alexander really was Great and some basics of proofreading, but this is a fine book that should turn into a historical (dare I say philosophical?) classic. If you want to learn from history and/or are a student of human behavior (are these different?) this book is one that you must read.

This book is about three Western military leaders--Epaminondas (from ancient Greece), William Tecumseh Sherman, and George S. Patton. All three demonstrate, according to Hanson, his thesis that the most fearsome army is one made up of "free men who march unabashedly toward the heartland of their enemy in hopes of saving the doomed, when their vast armies are aimed at salvation and liberation, not conquest and enslavement." That is, an army is most effective when the troops believe they are fighting a war that is "a just and very necessary thing to do."

Hanson argues convincingly that Sherman, not Grant or Lee, was the best general of the Civil War and deserves credit for ending it decisively, because his famous march was aimed not so much at the destruction of enemy troops as it was the destruction of the Southern will to fight. Had the war ended only with Grant's defeats of Confederate armies, the South may have risen to fight again another day. Because Sherman destroyed the soul of the South, his victories guaranteed there would be no second Civil War. In this respect, Sherman "redefined the American Way of War, but his legacy was not Viet Nam, but rather the great invasions of Europe during World War Two, in which Americans marched right through the homeland of the Axis powers."

By contrast to Sherman, Grant and Lee both fought battles in the traditional manner of lining up armies and launching frontal assaults, a strategy that was much more inhumane than Sherman's because it cost so many more lives. "By April 1865, Grant at horrendous cost had at last overwhelmed the best of the Confederate army; Sherman at little human expenditure defeated the very soul of the Confederate citizenry."

Had Lee been foresighted enough to follow a strategy like Sherman's, he would have been far more effective: "For all of Lee's supposed genius, the North was fortunate that he, not a man of Sherman's mind and ability, led Southern troops into Pennsylvania in 1863. Otherwise the huge Confederate army of 75,000 would have threatened various towns, created a swath of destruction from Pittsburgh to Philadelphia, bypassed Union resistance, and then made a lightning-quick descent on Washington, creating a panic among the citizens and a general loss of confidence among the troops at the front."

This book is a very compelling and fascinating interpretation of three great military leaders.

When a free and consensual society feels its existence threatened, when it has been attacked, when its citizenry at last understands an
enemy at odds with the very morality of its culture, when a genius at war leads the army with freedom to do what he wishes, when it is to
march to a set place in a set time, then free men can muster, they can fight back well, and they can make war brutally and lethally beyond
the wildest nightmares of the brutal military culture they seek to destroy.
-The Soul of Battle

Such is the case that the outstanding military historian Victor Davis Hanson makes in The Soul of Battle. Drawing mainly on three
historical examples--Epaminondas leading Thebes against Sparta; Sherman marching through the South; and Patton driving the Third Army
to Berlin--Mr. Hanson illustrates the similarities among these different leaders, the men they led, and the ideals for which they fought. He
makes a compelling case that there is no more dangerous military force in human history than a democratic populace, raised to righteous
moral anger, and commanded by leaders who understand the unique strength of such an army. He demonstrates that though even we tend to
accept the myth, fond in the hearts of totalitarian leaders and the rest of those who hate us, that democracies are necessarily inefficient when
it comes to warfare and that the freedoms of such societies are hindrance to the prosecution of said warfare, in fact :

Democracy, and its twin of market capitalism, alone can instantaneously create lethal armies out of civilians, equip them with horrific
engines of war, imbue them with a near-messianic zeal within a set time and place to exterminate what they understand as evil, have them
follow to their deaths the most ruthless of men, and then melt anonymously back into the culture that produced them. It is democracies,
which in the right circumstances, can be imbued with the soul of battle, and thus turn the horror of killing to a higher purpose of saving
lives and freeing the enslaved.

And what is "the soul of battle" to which he attributes such world-changing power? :

A rare thing indeed that arises only when free men march unabashedly toward the heartland of their enemy in hopes of saving the
doomed, when their vast armies are aimed at salvation and liberation not conquest and enslavement. Only then does battle take on a
spiritual dimension, one that defines a culture, teaches it what civic militarism is and how it is properly used.

Mr. Hanson thus provides the reader with an invaluable framework for understanding history, modern and ancient, and for understanding the
often underestimated strengths of democratic society.

Lest prospective readers dismiss the book as mere triumphalism, as some are wont to ignore Francis Fukuyama's The End of History, it
should, first of all, be noted that Mr. Hanson's portrayals of the three generals are absolutely riveting. Most of us are familiar with Patton, at
least through the movie, and somewhat with Sherman, but the name Epaminondas summons forth little more than an old mildly racist folk
story. Mr. Hanson restores him to his rightful place in the pantheon of democratic heroes, the destroyer of Spartan helotage, just as Sherman
helped destroy slavery and Patton helped destroy Nazism. These men's stories would be worth reading if only because of the role each
played in the utter destruction of the abominable regimes of their time, but the idiosyncrasies and flamboyant aspects of their character, their
deep commitment to learning and to the craft of warfare, and their unusual understanding of the opportunity that their societies had afforded
them by granting them command of these armies, makes them truly fascinating to read about. Particularly enjoyable is the way in which he
redeems each man against his more revered colleagues--Epaminondas vs. Pericles; Sherman vs. Lee; Patton vs. Bradley and
Eisenhower--showing that in their single-minded focus on the battle itself, each deserves greater credit than their more political, and more
self-interested rivals, and that, though each is considered bloodthirsty, in reality the very thoroughness with which they sought victory
ultimately saved lives. Perhaps most importantly, Mr. Hanson helps us to see why democracies need such men, however politically
incorrect, even somewhat demented, their behavior may be at times. A McLellan, a Marshall, an Eisenhower, a Colin Powell, is all well and
good for the bureaucratic function of running an army, but when it comes to inspiring men to fight, kill, and die, we must have Shermans
and Pattons and Schwartzkopfs to turn to in the field.

Nor is Mr. Hanson just saying that "we win, because we're us". He is equally good on the reasons that democracies (particularly America)
have failed in wars that do not follow the guidelines he lays out. In Korea, where McArthur could not go after the Chinese; in Vietnam,
where we fought an entirely defensive war; in the Persian Gulf, where Schwarzkopf was not allowed to march to Baghdad, we not only
failed to win the wars, but needlessly prolonged the suffering of Koreans, Vietnamese, Iraqis and Americans. In the end, the immediate
dealing of death would have been more humane than ever the seemingly moderate limitations proved to be. And Mr. Hanson forces us to
ponder how much better a place the world might have been and how much misery might have been averted had Patton and Curtis LeMay
(under whose command Mr. Hanson's own father served) been given the free hand they desired to carry a liberationist war to Moscow.
Instead, as Patton protested :

[T]in-soldier politicians in Washington have allowed us to kick hell out of one bastard and at the same time forced us to help establish a
second one as evil or more evil than the first.

Out of these bitter experiences flow lessons that have special relevance to our own times. For one, we would do well not to let people like
the radical Islamicists continue in the delusion that because we are a democracy we are an overripe fruit ready to fall and rot. It is the nature
of our system that in times of peace we disarm to an almost absurd degree, but our unwillingness to spend money to keep up the armed
forces and our hesitancy to get involved abroad should not be confused with terminal helplessness. As bin Laden has found out, to his likely
dismay, once provoked, we remain willing, even eager, to unleash a totally disproportionate level of lethality upon those who rile us. On the
other hand, we would do well to remind ourselves that once moved to action there should be no surcease to the battle until we have entirely
rooted out the evil we face. The most important lesson that Epaminondas, Sherman, and Patton have to teach us is that democratic brutality
turned against totalitarian evil, and carried to its ultimate conclusion, is capable of utterly destroying those malevolent systems. The
measures we take may briefly trouble our consciences but they succeed brilliantly. Having picked up the sword, we owe it to ourselves, and
even to the populace in the nations we oppose, not to set it down again until the job is done.

Mr. Hanson's book would make rewarding reading at any time, but it is especially applicable right now. And be sure to look for his
outstanding column in National Review. His writing on the current conflict has been consistently prescient; not surprising, since this book
itself predicts much of what has occurred so far. It remains though to be seen whether President Bush and his advisers understand its full
import.

GRADE : A+

This book is well described by its subtitle: "The World's Foremost Military Historians Imagine What Might Have Been." The twenty essays and numerous sidebars are actually only by American and British, so the use of "World's Foremost" is a bit of a reach, but nonetheless, there is a nice variety amongst the essays. Almost all of them are lively and compelling examples of what is known in jargon as "counterfactual reasoning," providing plenty of food for thought to chew on.

The essays progress in chronological order, and in general I enjoyed the ones that concentrated on the older events more, perhaps because they are more removed from time and consciousness and thus are easier to credit. As might be expected, John Keegan's brief "How Hitler Could Have Won the War: The Drive for the Middle East, 1941" is the exception here. In general, the more titillating notions are found in essays like Thomas Fleming's "Unlikely Victory: 13 Ways the Americans Could Have Lost the Revolution." or Cecelia Holland's "The Death that Saved Europe: The Mongols Turn Back, 1242." Irrespective of one's particular interests, this is a spectacular anthology of alternate history. It should be noted that the maps accompanying each essay are outstanding.

For anyone who likes history, this book is an uneven, but overall excellent and very enjoyable, series of exercises in "counterfactual" history. Not the silly, frivolous, or nonsensical kind, where Robert E. Lee all of a sudden is given a nuclear bomb, but instead serious, meaty (even highly PROBABLE) ones, like what would have happened if there hadn't been a mysterious plague outside the walls of Jerusalem, or if there had been a Persian victory at Salamis, or if Genghis Khan's drunken third son (Ogadai)had not died just as his hordes were poised to conquer (and probably annhilate) Europe, or if Cortes had been killed or been captured Tenochtitlan, etc.

The major flaw with this book is that the essays are of somewhat uneven interest level, style, and quality. Personally, for instance, I found the essay on the Mongols to be fascinating, sending chills down my spine! "D Day Fails" by Stephen Ambrose, on the other hand, didn't do much for me at all, nor did "Funeral in Berlin." In general, I would say that the essays covering earlier periods in human history tend to be better than ones covering more recent history. Possibly this is in part because the later periods have been covered to death. I mean, how many "counterfactuals" on the US Civil War can there be before we get sick of them? But a well-written, tightly-reasoned counterfactual which, based on events hundreds or even thousands of years ago, quite plausibly leads to a result where there is no Judaism, Christianity, or Islam, or Western culture at all, is absolutely fascinating in my opinion. If nothing else, books like "What If?" show how important CHANCE is in human history, as well as the importance of the INDIVIDUAL, as opposed to some Hegelian/Marxist-Leninist historical "inevitability." The bottom line is that it is rare that anything is truly "inevitable", and the aptly titled "What If?" gives us some excellent case studies.

As you already know after considering the book, this is a series of counterfactuals - the "What Ifs" of historical events. The focus is on military events and run from 480 BC to the Chinese Communist revolution of the late 1940s. Roughly one-third of the writings focus on world history prior to 1830 (Greek warfare, Napoleon wins at Waterloo), one-third on American history (Revolution - Civil War) and one third 1900 World History (WWI - Cold War). Each counterfactual is authored by respected historians including Stephen Ambrose (whose contribution is surprisingly weak), James McPherson, Cecelia Holland and Stephen Sears. There is also a series of interesting, smaller, one to two page articles spread out through the book.

The authors take various approaches to the challenge. Some launch into intriguing 'what ifs' and their consequences. These include the impact of Alexander the Great's pre-mature death, ways the American Revolution could have easily failed and what if the Battle of Midway had been won by Japan. Other authors take a different approach of only reviewing how events could have been different or how variants were avoided, but they never discuss the impact of the alternative event. This is the only weakness of the book in my opinion. Most articles joyfully carry through on the full description of how events could have differed and how the world would be different if they had turned out this way. For example, would Lincoln have negotiated peace with the Confederacy if Lee's orders for Sharpsburg had not fallen into McClellan's hands allowing the South to win this battle?

Finally, the scenarios are relatively realistic. There are no discussions of 'what would have happened if the Americans had automatic weapons in 1776...' The articles are very interesting for historians and those interested in military history. The broad discussions and topics also make the reading captivating and easy to read. Each article is less than 15-20 pages long, so you won't have to read "war & peace" to cover the topic. Enjoy!