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As he so well points out... "the speed which one implements technology relating to process management in order to accomplish large tasks" will differentiate success from failure. This is a "must read" for senior management if they wish to survive in a complex "project management", collaboration /Internet environment. How to utilize technology to accomplish this is the key!!
A great resource for management.
He fully understands the relationship between collaborative technology as it relates to project management in a large enterprise environment.
As he so well points out... "the speed which one implements technology relating to process management in order to accomplish large tasks" will differentiate success from failure. This is a "must read" for senior management if they wish to survive in a complex "project management", collaboration /Internet environment. How to utilize technology to accomplish this is the key!!
A great resource for management.
Would, however, have liked to see a bibliography & some footnotes for the statistics cited
Collectible price: $79.41
At the start of the book, William C. Welch and Greg Grant tell us that "gardening is one of the oldest, and richest, of our Southern folk arts."
The authors divide the book into two sections. The first section refreshingly explores French, German, Spanish, Native American, and African-American contributions to Southern gardening.
The Spanish, for instance, intensely developed and utilized small garden spaces, while African-Americans used brightly-colored flowers in the front yard as a sign of welcome.
This section also has a commendable essay on historic garden restoration in the South.
The second section addresses the plants "our ancestors used to build and enrich their gardens."
There are nearly 200 full-color photographs here, along with dozens of rare vintage engravings. While some of the pictures are a bit small, they are still informative.
Southern gardeners and historians will particularly enjoy this fine volume.
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This book has excellent sections on Business Case, Functionality (showing the links between modules, not just functions)and Deployment Options. It really helped me understand what I was going into implementing SAP for my company.
The Book has only two dissappointing sections. The chapter on process reengineering could have been better structured and applied, Hammer has better material. The walk through of methodology in chapters 17 and 18 was dry, uninspiring and again unapplied. More could have been written on ASAP.
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The guide is set up so that the brand names are listed in alphabetical order, there's a section on the history of baseball cards, a guide to help you determine the condition of your cards (and folks, please know ahead of time, it's not kosher to put rubber bands around your collection) tips on how to Sell them, a Terminology section, a small section on how to collect, where to find them and how to preserve them. Each of the sets are broken down to list each single card of the set. You may find production numbers in the listing, as well as any known error cards or other variations. Rookie cards are designated with the RC mark. Here are some examples of the kinds of sets Beckett has listed in the guide: Topps, Fleer, Donruss, Upper Deck, Sportflics, Bazooka, Old Judge, Squirt, Topps Big, Topps Tiffany, Score, O-Pee-Chee, Denny's, Nabisco, Pacific, Ralston Purina. You will get listings of lots of subsets and parallel sets, and you will get photos of certain cards. If you are putting together a set, and it's listed in this guide, you have the perfect checklist to help you keep up with what you do and do not have. This book is a valuable tool for any baseball card collector or investor.
G'Bye
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Why only four stars and not five? Subtle reasons, mostly. The main reason is that this book, despite being released recently, does not do a very good job of covering the professionally graded baseball card market. This is even more surprising as Beckett does have a grading service of their own. As such, the sections covering the history of baseball cards and how to grade cards is lacking and is pretty much a reprint of what's been appearing in Beckett books like this one for over fifteen years. They really could have done a better job of modernizing those sections.
However, as a reference book to help identity cards and give approximate values, this book cannot be beat. Buy it now!
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Grant's amazing victory was as much politically as tactically driven. From the point of view of Grant's career, he had to win, had to take unorthodox chances, because he was as close to being dead meat as any Union general ever came. For months and months he was bogged down before Vicksburg. We know Lincoln was so dissatisfied with Grant that he sent Charles Dana to Vicksburg as the President's special envoy to see what was really going on.
General Banks, a Lincoln political appointee and very close friend, was driving north from Baton Rouge toward Port Gibson and Vicksburg. Banks stalled and Grant was ordered by Halleck (via Lincoln??) to assist Banks. Grant disobeyed this command from the then General in Chief of all Federal armies and went his own way. WOW! Big decision. What a way to make friends when you are under the looking glass.
Last, placed within Grant's command structure is another Lincoln political appointee and friend, General McClernand, who Grant subsequently relieves prior to Vicksburg's capitulation. Is he thumbing he nose?
At Vicksburg we see Grant's first inclination to tactically detach himself from direct supply and communication lines. But what caused it? Was it Pemberton's chauvinistic defense of Vicksburg and Grant's straight forward desire to defeat his foe? Or was it the internal pressure within the Union army and Grant's desire to save his career that forced Grant to do very, very differently from then current military principals, causing him to develop this amazingly different set of operational plans he would resort to again and again during the remainder of the war?
Last, from the Confederate side there is Jeff Davis' incredible stupidity. Did Jeff Davis hang Joe Johnston out to dry? And lets not forget Pemberton's direct disobedience to his theater commander's, Joe Johnston's order: Save the army, abandon Vicksburg. Why did Jeff Davis never censure Pemberton not only for the loss of Vicksburg, strategically and psychologically important to the South as it was, but also the loss of an entire army, complete with thousands of men and irreplaceable stores, arms and ammunition? And why does Davis again relieve Johnston from command, not reinstating him until the final hours of the war?
Seen simply from the viewpoint of the Union high command, i.e., a traitor in his midst (McClernand), a presidential spy at headquarters (Dana), an unwillingness to unite forces with a fellow field commander (Banks) and the disobedience of his direct superior's orders (Halleck's), Grant should be thankful for Lincoln's reaffirmed evaluation of him: "I cannot spare this man; he fights". Good for you, Charles Dana.
Grant's military victory at Vicksburg IS amazing and this book is as good an account of it as there is. But the author fails to live up to his title's claim. Grant's political coup (Lincoln's willing recognition of his ability despite his incredible disobedience and non cooperation with Lincoln favorites) is even more incredulous than his military one. Had not Meade just beaten Lee at Gettysbury on the very same day that Vicksburg fell? Which would have been of more immediate importance: a captured Confederate army on the Mississippi River or a victorious Confederate army next door to Washington? If Lee had won at Gettysburg, Vicksburg would have been what it will always be, a spectacular feat of arms. But Union army and Northern political concerns aside, maybe, just maybe, Jeff Davis and Robert E. Lee lost the war that fateful day when they made the conscious decision to risk swapping Vicksburg for Washington and lost their gamble on both counts.
The most important item to come from the Vicksburg conflict was not Grant's victory as much as it was Lincoln's recognition of Grant as his next General in Chief. And in that vein it was not Grant's victory at Vicksburg but Lincoln's subsequent promotion of Grant over Meade that won the war.
But like the title, a little too grandoise in its assertions. Grant's amazing victory was as much politically as tactically driven. Here we see Grant's first indclination to detach himself from direct supply and communication lines. But what caused it? Was it Pemberton's chauvenistic defense of Vicksburg (and Grant's straight forward desire to defeat his foe) or was it the internal pressure within the Union army (forcing Grant to do very, very differently from then current military principals)that caused him to develop this amazingly different set of operational plans he would resort to again and again during the remainder of the War?
Prior to this victory, Grant, as a general, was probably as much at risk to continuing his command as any time subsequent in his military career. He had horrifically bogged down at Vicksburg. General Banks, Lincoln political appointee and close friend of Lincoln's, is driving North from Baton Rouge. He is stalled outside Port Gibson and Grant is ordered by Hallack (via Lincoln??)to assist him. Grant disobeys this command from the then General in Chief of all Federal armies and goes his own way. WOW! Big decision.
Also, within his command structure is another Lincoln political appointee, General McClernand, who Grant relieves prior to Vickburg's capitulation.
Last, there is Jeff Davis' incredible stupidity (did he hang Joe Johnston out to dry)and Pemberton's direct disobedience to his theater commander's, Joe Johnston's order; save the army, abandon Vicksburg. Why did Jeff Davis never censure Pemberton not only for the loss of Vicksburg, strategically and psycologically important to the South as it was, but also an entire army, complete with thousands of men, stores, arms and ammunition? And why does Davis again relieve Johnston from command, not reinstating him until the final hours of the war?
Seen simply from the viewpoint of the Union high command,i.e., a traitor in his midst, McClernand, an unwillingness to unite forces with a fellow field commander, Banks, and the disobedience of his direct superior's orders, Halleck's,he should be thankful for Linclon's non military, non political eveluation of him: "I cannot spare this man; he fights".
Grant's military victory at Vicksburg is amazing. But his political victory (Lincoln's willing recognition of his ability despite his incredible disobedience)is even more incredulous.
The books limitation is Arnold's almost infatuation with Grant and the need to make Vicksburg the pivotal battle of the war. While the strategy that Grant utilized was daring and unorthodox that does not substantiate the comparison with Napoleon. There is nothing in the campaign that demonstrates that Grant's tactics were Napoleonic in nature.
Whether Vicksburg was the pivotal battle of the civil was may be true. However, Arnold did not make the case that it was. A Union loss at Gettysburg surley would have had a dramatic impact on the Unions will to continue the war. While the issue of which battle was more important was not important to the Vicksburg story, once the issue was raised Arnold should have at least spent more than a moment discussing Gettysburg.
As a story about the Vicksburg Campaign, the book excells.