"Air-Mech-Strike:..." is a thorough, and much needed, look at how to restructure our armed forces for the 21st century. Specifically, it recommends the creation of light, air-mobile forces to compliment our heavy (M1/M2) forces. The purpose of this force would be to fill the gap between our heavy forces, which pack a tremendous punch, but have limited deployability, and our light forces that are easily deployed but have limited striking power and maneuverability.

This book truly shines when the authors are discussing the creation of this force; they have clearly done their research, and repeatedly make strong cases for the right type of equipment to acquire (or modify). At the heart of their new force structure are modified M-113's (as a medium element) and modified German Wiesel's (as the light element). They delve into detail as to why these systems should be chosen: there is a tremendous experience with these chassis and they are proven systems, they are easily modified for a variety of missions and they are easily maintained. Most importantly, though, they are helicopter deployable/supportable. Thus, they would provide the Army with a potent, sustainable strike package that could be inserted to maximum effect in areas unexpected by the enemy.

The authors go on to discuss at great length the structure, organization, implementation and finances of such a force structure. I was particularly pleased that they found a role for the M8 AGS, a victim of ill thought out Clinton era budget cutting. Of particular interest was their detailed discussion of the ability to implement this force with off the shelf components and vehicles. For example, I was very impressed with, and intrigued by, their discussion of how to implement a hard-hitting recon/strike unit using primarily commercial (albeit modified) ATV's. Finally, their discussion of the deployment of WIG (Wing In Ground) transports is highly warranted and long overdue.

As the title of my review indicates, however, there were some serious issues with this work. Perhaps most glaring, for a discussion of a helicopter deployable force, very little discussion is given to the role of the AH-64 Apache, and there is absolutely no mention of the RAH-66 Comanche. Considering that these two platforms will be the backbone of the Army offensive air fleet for the foreseeable future, I find this oversight puzzling, to say the least. Along these same lines, at the same time that the authors are advocating smaller, more flexible units, they advocate the pooling of the bulk of Army Air at the Corp level without much in the way of explanation.

Finally, the actual physical layout of this book is appalling, almost embarrassing. I cannot imagine how a book so loaded with spelling, formatting, and grammatical errors could have made its way into publication. Moreover, the illustrations are frequently confusing and are often downright laughable (I almost choked when I saw a toy UH-60 used in an illustration). Of course, content is always paramount, but it is difficult to take a book seriously if the authors aren't even willing to take sufficient time to assure that their ideas are cogently put forward.

There is tremendous merit in the work, and anyone who is serious about understanding the direction our armed forces need to take in the post-Cold War world would do well to read it. As I mentioned though, it does have serious flaws. If I could make a suggestion to the authors, it would be this: pull this edition, get together with the best editor, illustrator and map-maker you can find and reassemble this work to make it worthy of Simpkin and Macgregor, two authors you obviously (and rightly) admire.

Attention readers!

Remember March 15, 2002 well!

This was the day the U.S. Army conducted its first helicopter-based Air-Mech-Strike combat assault in Afghanistan during Operation Anaconda...just like described in the book. Co-author Major Charles Jarnot is in Aghanistan NOW and he emailed me the following description:

Air-Mech-Strike in Afghanistan!

The war in Afghanistan has seen several combat firsts for the U.S. Military, first use of an armed un-manned aerial vehicle and the first use of the B-1B Bombers in a close air support role to name just a few. Now in Operation Anaconda another first for the U.S. Army, the first employment of helo-based airmechanized forces by a U.S. field commander in combat, complements of the 3rd Battalion of the famed Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry Battle Group.

On March 15, 2002, the Canadians attached to the U.S. Army's 2nd Brigade 10th Mountain Division, used U.S. Army CH-47D Chinooks to air assault their armored tracked BV-206 airmechanized vehicles into the operation Anaconda fight.

Airmechanization is a relatively new maneuver warfare doctrine extensively developed by numerous European armies. First theorized in the 1930s by Soviet Field Marshall Tuchachevskiy, today the Russian, British and German armies have fielded airmechanized brigade and division sized units. The concept involves the vertical insertion of tracked combat vehicles via helicopter and fixed wing para-drops. The idea is to use aircraft to break friction with the ground and cross vast treks of terrain and obstacles to quickly gain positional advantage. Once inserted, the mechanized vehicles provide the vertically inserted force with tracked terrain mobility, protection against small-arms and shrapnel and significant increase in firepower via the heavier weapons carried on the vehicles vice foot mobile troops inserted by parachute or helicopter.

The technical challenge to airmechanization is how to build a tracked combat vehicle that has sufficient protection and weapon capacity yet light enough to transported by helicopter or parachute. Advances in information/reconnaissance technology, weapon lethality versus weight and the increases in aircraft
lift performance have all contributed to the boom in airmechanization. Today five other countries beside Russia, Britain and Germany, are in the process of fielding airmechanized brigades, including China. The most expensive part of this concept is the fielding of large numbers of heavy lift helicopters and short field cargo airplanes. The vehicles themselves are relatively inexpensive. In the U.S. Military, the critical air component is already in place with over 600 heavy lift CH-47D Chinook and CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters and 500 plus C-130 Hercules aircraft in the inventory.

But what about the risk posed by ultra-light combat vehicles? Isnt massive armor needed to survive? Lightweight Airmechanized vehicles (AMVs), like those employed by the Canadians in Anaconda, might seem on the surface to be extremely vulnerable. But surviving on the battlefields of Afghanistan may demonstrate a shift in this traditional paradigm. For example, the greatest risk to vehicle movement in Afghanistan is not Taliban/Al-Quedas Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs), but rather the millions of land mines laid throughout the country. The Canadian BV-206 AMV used in Anaconda mitigates this risk by virtue of the very light weight and tracked suspension that results in extremely light
ground pressure. This not only contributes to its excellent terrain agility but makes anti-tank mine detonation a very small probability since the BV-206 ground pressure is far below the minimum necessary to set off a typical anti-tank mine.

Wheeled combat vehicles on the other hand, are extremely vulnerable to land mines due to the high ground pressure characteristic of typical wheeled vehicles. The separate cabs of the BV-206 also lessens the potential casualty effects of RPGs by compartmentalizing the blast areas. The lightweight also means that it can approach the enemy from terrain deemed non-useable by heavier armor and thus lessens the chances of moving into a planned vehicular kill zone. These features combined with the lethality of high tech weapons like the Javelin anti-tank guided missile (50 pounds and 2,500 meters range) and light weight auto cannons and grenade launchers like the M-230 or ASP-30 30-mm and the Mark-19 40-mm make AMVs a deadly package for their size.

Airmechanization, a competitor for the Armys planned transformation based on the Striker wheeled armored vehicle? Intuitively all new ideas are intellectually competitive with older concepts and the same is true of the 3-Deminsional airmechanization idea versus the 2-Diminsional Striker program. But in practical application there is no conflict. As most professional Soldiers know, combat is a combined-arms affair where different weapons, platforms and the specialties of different organizations combine to have a collective greater effect than any one part. The Armys Striker transformation is slated for the light infantry divisions and some of the heavier formations. Airmechanization would be more applicable to the Armys Airborne and Air Assault units where the Striker is not scheduled for fielding. As the European armies who have fielded airmechanized formations will tell you. These agile forced-entry units are battlefield enablers to heavier forces and
not necessarily their future replacement.

Like the use of the armed predator UAV in Afghanistan, this first modest employment of airmechanized forces in Anaconda will undoubtedly generate heated debate on the utility of this new and controversial maneuver doctrine. This historical event may be the catalyst for the U.S. Army to convert its own airborne and air assault divisions along the European Airmechanized models or like the ill-fated Pentomic Divisions of the 1950s, be simply a flash in the pan. Still the question that this event will pose for the U.S. Army as whole is the continued validity of parachuting or helo-insertion of dismounted troops close to the enemys crucible of anti-aircraft fire, shoulder-fired missiles and RPGs. The American public and our enemies, should know that the U.S. Armys leadership in Afghanistan is not tied doggedly to any written doctrine. The first use of airmechanized forces in combat by an American commander demonstrates the mental agility and creative prowess of a unified effort that will "leave no stone unturned" in its effort
to defeat the Al Queda and Taliban, to include employing a Canadian airmechanized force!

Major Chuck Jarnot, 101st Airborne Division Liaison
Officer in Afghanistan

Yes. I am currently one of them. I understand your criticisms and your accolades. Therefore, not being one of the original authors, I can play "Devil's Acvocate" with both the reviews and the book.

For the Reviewers: Air Mech Strike is a book by individual authors that bring their long years of experience and study into the mix. There is some duplication and the layout does "hurt the eyes" somewhat. The emphasis on the names, while appropriate, does not add anything to the singular basic argument that 2D and 3D warfare need to compliment each other. While not everyone will be able to readily understand all of the new the concepts , the book is well documented with references to websites, studies, books, and articles. Finally, speaking to the Wing In Ground Effect vehicle points up the problem of strategic airlift. We cannot fight if we can't get there, no matter how light the force may be.

For the Book: The book takes up where the Howze Board, the 11th Air Assault, the 1st Cavalary and 101st Airborne Divisions, left off. Placing troops in the rear or on the flank of an attacking or withdrawing enemy force is the best way to divide the enemy's effort, make him fight two battles on two or more fronts at once, resulting in his piecemeal destruction. It is a follow on to the mission of air assault and air cavalary forces. The difference is that light equipment, beyond the vision of General Gavin's light arms, are also a part of the assault. M113s and the Germany Weasels can be flown across the FLOT to deliver both dragoon infantry and ground cavalry to rip up the attack or withdrawing enemy's C3, artillery, and logistical force. The book emphasizes this type of mission to compliment the 2D maneuver of heavy forces.

Airborne, Air Assault and Light Divisions should be the next units to be moved to the IBCT structure, whether that be an air mech strike capable IBCT or remain a 2D capable IBCT. The air mech strike concept, as theorized in the book, is capable of being carried in the C-130 while the other is not.

Air Mech Strike is lighter and can get there faster. With the limited air lift available, air mech strike gives the Army the ability to get the units there in C-130s and sling them on helicopters once on the battlefield. The book is very clean in this regard and both are required.

This is a readable, well-researched book. Carroll tells how Grange rose to become one of America's first true superstars and how he left school early to join the then-disrespected ranks of pro football. While scholarly, a feeling for a truly humble man shines through.

This book does a great job of giving interesting detail and thoughtful perspective so you can see how an individual fit into the times and how the events of the single life mirrored the larger developments in society. You learn a lot about football, about men of that era and what character traits they valued, and about the role of the media and it's use of celebrity to create an audience. I enjoyed this so much I bought another Carroll book on a different early football hero - Fritz Pollard - and that is just as informative and insightful.

My father always talked about Red Grange. I never really knew who he was. This book brings everything into perspective. Mr. Carroll captures the essence of Red Grange, but more than that, he makes clear why Grange was the most important college player of this century and how he created the momentum which led to the explosion of pro football