Roy Godson is the only person to have systematically studied intelligence requirements in a holistic manner, consistently distinguishing among collection, analysis, counterintelligence, and covert action. His series in the 1980's, and then again in the 1990's, on intelligence requirements, stand alone as efforts to define and measure key elements.

With this book, written and published prior to 9-11,Godson provides both a historical and a prescriptive treatment of the two most neglected and mis-managed elements of U.S. national intelligence: covert action (concealed influence) and counterintelligence (protecting our secrets by catching their spies and agents of influence).

While 9-11 demonstrated our incapacity in both these vital areas that comprise the black art side of national power, there is no other book and no other expert that has done more to itemize the details that must be contemplated (and are not now being contemplated) by those responsible for devising homeland security defenses. The author's appreciation for pre-emptive "offensive" counterintelligence and covert action, and his understanding of terrorist and criminal and other nonstate actors (one should include rogue corporations, of which there are many), make him particularly well-qualified to advise the Administration and Congress as we move toward what must be a draconian reconstitution and revitalization of national intelligence.

SPY BOOKS have evolved. Early in the 20th century we had thrillers and fantasies, shamelessly implausible but racy and fun, culminating in Bond. Thoughtful spy novels began with Somerset Maugham's Ashenden (1928), featuring a detached hero on a journey to disillusion, a process brought to its apotheosis by le Carre via Greene. In parallel with this were volumes of reminiscence prompted by espionage of two world wars and the Cold War. But in recent decades, another strain has emerged: the academic study of intelligence, of which this book is a good example. Roy Godson is a Professor of Government at Georgetown University and heads the American-based Consortium for the Study of Intelligence. He rightly asserts the importance of intelligence studies to any understanding of 20th-century international relations. Given the number of Cold War political decisions to which intelligence was a contributor - sometimes a determinant - any history of the period which leaves it out is, at best, one-eyed. Counterintelligence (CI) and covert action, the subjects of his book, are significant sub-divisions of intelligence activity, although syping can happen without them. In Godson's definition, the primary mission of CI is to "identify, neutralize and exploit the intelligence or secret infrastructures of others". In other words, CI is spying on spies, studying, distrupting and, if possible, turning against themselves the activities of hostile organizations who are trying to spy on you. Most examples given are American, but one familiar to British readers is Oleg Gordievsky, the British agent who ended up charge of the KGB's London operations and who, according to Godson, was thus able to prevent the M15 officer Michael Bettaney from spying for the Russians. (In fact, Gordievsky was more than an outstanding CI agent: he was also a producer of very high-grade political intelligence.) Godson defines covert action as "influencing conditions and behaviour in ways that cannot be attributed to the sponsor". It ranges from getting articles into the press to sponsoring guerilla warfare. Although governments without an intelligence service can mount effective covert action - the American 1902 acquisition of rights over the Panama Canal is an example quoted - it usually demands resources that only an intelligence service could maintain. Thus, when the British and American governments sought the overthrow of the Mussadegh government in Persia in 1953, they mounted a joint covert action using the existing British intelligence network. This is not a collection of shock-horror spy revelations or stories of derring-do but an academic study of the bureaucracy of the cloak and the politics of the dagger. The ending of the Cold War, Godson rightly says, does not mean an end to conflict - "World politics continues as it has for much of mankind's existence" - and the present "low levels" of government in parts of the world does not mean the end of the nation state. There are, he estimates, more than 100 intelligence organizations targeting American interests. American attitudes towards CI and covert action have traditionally suffered from "fits-and-starts" - as often too much as too little - and what are now needed are consistent, well-thought-out foreign policies to which these activities contribute systematically. They should neither dictate policy nor be tactics of last resort. If you want spy thrills, this is not your book; but if you want to understand how the whole thing works at Washington level, and to have an idea of what George W Bush is hearing from his advisers, then reading this will prove quicker and cheapter than setting up your own spy network.

It is interesting to note that Codevilla wrote two of the best introductions on "how to think" about two major subjects- about war in "War, Ends and Means" and "Statecraft". It is a crime that this book is out of print, and one should do everything in ones power to obtain a copy.

The only other book in the intelligence field that approaches this level of worth is "The New KGB, Engine of Societ Power", an older 1980's book by Robert Corson. All the other poor books on intelligence either take the character of "The Puzzle Palace" (which is stupid and an insider's pro-old boys network hack job) or one of Noam Chomsky's blithering semi-conspiracy theories. "Informing Statecraft" is the only type of really usefull intellectual companion to intelligence work in all existance.

This book is exactly what an intelligence book should be- an attack on the structural inadequacies of the United States intelligence community in the guise of a "how-to" book on how to run things correctly. Flipping through the book, one will wonder at the bales of common sensical yet brilliant realpolitik critiques involved in his analysis of what intelligence should be about.

Maybe the reason for Mr. Codevilla's excellence is his devotion to translating Machiavelli (now that's someone I'd like to have in an intelligence agency), or maybe not. What I do know is this book talks first and foremost about the basic questions intelligence operations should be asking about themselves and their work.

I've read a lot of books about intelligence agencies, but they all end up being either a) anecdotal, story like intepretations, b) partisan tracts on different aspects of intelligence work, or c) op-ed pieces.

I would put this book even above such works as "The Puzzle Palace". The only other book I have read with this caliber material was on Russian intelligence, "The New KGB: Engine of Soviet Power".

This book, however, takes the cake, and it restores my faith in looking up obscure intellectuals- this reminds me of the HL Mencken maxim- "There are only two types of books: the kind of books people read and the kinds of books people should read". This book is the latter. Buy it and read it twice.

Don't try this one unless you are a student of the Intelligence process. And, if you are under 50 with your brain one line, you will quickly see these Cold Warriors sre simply trying to reinvent theselves. While the Soviet Dragon was slain at the end of the Cold War, the authors claim the rather harmless snakes in the grass are just that. Enter Saddam. These snakes have grown legs and are dangerous. Fossil-write will note solve current national security problems.

I stumbled across the reviews of this book by chance, and was quite stunned to see what almost appears to be an orchestrated trashing of what I regard as a useful barometer of informed professional opinion.

Yes, some of the authors and some of the views of the authors are relatively conventional, but by and large I am not only quite pleased to have this book in my library, I find that the thoughts of Jennifer Sims, Douglas MacEachin, and Robert Kohler, and Britt Snider, to name just four--I like the others as well--are as essential a starting point for reform as the more radical ideas of myself, Senator Shelby, Senator Rudman, or others.

Bottom line: Roy Godson and these people have been troubled by intelligence ineffectiveness, and have done more than most to publish in this arena, than anyone else I know. This book is not the end all, but it is a vital historical reference point for any serious professional. I would not reprint it, but I would certainly recommend it as a used book acquisition, and I hope that a new set of authors comes together to provide a 21st Century "second look" in the aftermath of 9-11. In the meantime, I would point folks toward Godson's "Dirty Tricks or Trump Cards," Allen's "None So Blind," and Zegart's "Flawed by Design," inter alia.