Fritz Fisher "Germany's War Aims in the First World War" dwells on the tremendous amount of material collected primarily from the archives of the Central powers. It deals with one topic, and deals with it in methodical and exhaustive manner - a continuation of policy of War Aims of the Imperial Germany during the period immediately preceding and throughout the First World War. Germany, only united within the memory of the generation of 1914, was fighting the war not only for its rightful place as a European Great Power, but for a leading, pre-eminent place in the European and by extension the World balance of power. Germany was aiming to displace Britain as a traditional power broker in Europe, unite Austria-Hungary and other Central European powers in the economic and geo-political unit known as MittleEuropa, dominate Russia on its Eastern border and France on its Western. Bethman-Hollweg's (Chancellor for most of the War) vision of the post-war World was Germany dominating continental Europe, and 4 Great Powers (Germany, Britain, USA and Russia) sharing the World. France was to be eliminated as a World Power, Britain as a traditional European Power broker, and Russian desires for the warm sea port of Constantinople and expansion into Persian Golf to be forever denied.

Fisher shows an incredible tenacity, determination and consistency of the War Aims policy from 1914 until 1918. Clearly Germany is to be primarily blamed (perhaps together with Russia) for the outbreak of the war; but once the war started her aims never waived. Germany's War aims were essentially annexationist, aggressive and thriving for world dominance. With France she strived to no less then for elimination of that country as a Great Power, with Britain via annexation of Belgium, to deny it security of an external border and expel it from Europe; and with Russia to annex Poland and Baltic States and thus ensure future economic dependency. One can perhaps argue that by historical irony all this came to fruit after two world wars and 90 years of world conflict; but the verdict is clear that Germany was prepared and carried its policy to the bitter end without much regard of international law, civil liberty, conventions of honor and without much sense of humanity.

Fisher points out that essentially autocratic country, with under-developed democratic institutions, with traditions of Prussian militarism, sense of manifest destiny thriving for world dominance, sense of inferiority and ambiguity about its present position - all those complex causes united in German public opinion almost uniformly supporting the War effort and its government aggressive policies. When the end came, sense of betrayal, disappointment and failure catalyzed the war generation to create the seeds for the second conflict 20 years later.

Fisher's sources are primarily diplomatic correspondence, circular dispatches, minutes of the conferences of military and political leaders, speeches and such. The book is careful to use almost exclusively primary sources; thus ensuring accuracy and lack of bias. All throughout, there is a tremendous care taken by the author not to pass judgment and thrive towards the historical objectivity. It is perhaps a somewhat dry read, but, in my view, essential to understand the motivation of policy which God granted not ever to materialize.

Fischer's works regarding Germany and the First World War is a must for anyone interested in the events and decisions leading up to 1914 and for anyone interested in historiography. When Fischer unleashed this book in 1961, it created a tidal wave in the German historian community. Germany's Aims... challenged traditional views regarding the origins of the First World War and developed conclusions that were devastating to the reputations and memories of individuals and an entire nation.

The traditional view regarding the causes of the Great War, as explained by prominent German historians on the subject like Gehard Ritter, was that the leaders of Germany felt surrounded by the allied nations and thus entered the war for defensive reasons. Most historians outside of Germany agreed that Germany was not the sole culprit of 1914. The "guilt clause" in the Versailles Treaty is still almost universally condemned. Through an exhaustive study of documents out of Germany, Fritz Fischer comes up with a different--and shocking--conclusion: Germany was to blame.

Here are a few of the ways Fischer drew his conclusion: (1) Fischer considered the authoritarian nature of German society that allowed military forces to take over. (2) He looked at the economic situation that pressed German leaders to seek more annexations or, rather, a "place in the sun" (a Marxian approach not used by more traditional historians). (3) He regarded Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg (a man with plenty of apologists) not as a man who wanted to limit the war, but as a product of the forces who aimed at world power status for Germany. (4) Most importantly, Fischer discovered the "September Memorandum" which spelled out the minimum war aims of the German civilian leadership (to overrun France and spread German power eastward by weakening Russia).

Fischer earned many critics because of his work. One weakness is that Fischer only studied German documents. To be fair, a similar exhaustive examination of the archives of the other belligerents would be an impossible task for any one historian. Fischer's work needs to be seen as a starting place not as a final assessment. The ramifications of this study on Germany are clear: it's obvious Germany was the most to blame for WWII. Having to also accept blame for WWI would be a hard pill to swallow.

What were Germany's aims in WWI? WWII has completely overshadowed the first war in our classrooms. This work may seem a little much, but it will give one a sense of the causes of German aggression in one complete source.

Having not quite completed this work, I am hesitant to render some sort of verdict, but I feel that since I have placed this on my top 15 list that I should give it a go. This book presents more in depth historical scholarship on the First World War than almost any other; the concentration on Germany is laudable but the author cautions that his country's is only part of the full tale. However, I would say that once you have finished this book you will be able to ask some critical questions:

1. How much was Fischer's thesis influenced by the holders of many of these Imperial records in 1960 - namely, the East German State? Could it be that only an occupied, divided Germany could be prevented from rising to threaten Europe again? I think the answer is no, there was no effort made by the East German authorities to influence Fischer's work - such an effort would be too difficult to conceal anyhow - especially for a Communist bureaucracy like the Stasi. 2. Did the Eastern European client states and the `Mitteleuropa' planned by leading German industrialists and Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg foreshadow 1942's (Hitler and Dr. Walter Funk's) New Order in Europe? Unquestionably, yes! AND NOW, this leads to a flowering of still more questions for Germans and other Europeans here today in the year 2001 - 3. Are the economic and political objectives sought by Chancellor Hollweg and the 2nd Reich still being pursued TO THIS DAY, if only by different means? Do those means include debt relief in exchange for GERMAN ownership of former Russian state owned firms... that own big chunks of the Donets Basin and southern Russia? What about NATO's expansion into Germany's former Baltic client states (Hanseatic League members?). Does the European Union represent a kinder, gentler version of the Kaiser's Central European Customs Union, as Niall Ferguson has suggested (implying that British resistance to such a system was and IS futile!). Now you know why you should read this book! It may be hard to get but it is definitely worth the price!...

Unlike the author, I WAS in the Peace Corps. I was in Togo, West Africa as a health volunteer from 1968-70, the time his book includes. I found very few points with which I could agree in his repetitive, one-sided compilation of quotes and opinions.

I do appreciate the acknowledgment of the work and committment put in by us as volunteers. In 68 we had no anti-communist indoctrination, no Marine-like physical boot camp, and (unfortunately) no Outward Bound experience.

I did finally learn French (after 3 useless years of it in school) through the intense, effective Foreign service language training. I would say the phrase "The toughest job you'll ever love," which was a Peace Corps slogan, is fitting. The two years I spent in my village, the only white person, working side-by-side with the village midwife, form the most vivid experience of my now 53 years.

I returned once, 20 years after my stint in Togo, finding my village "family" as warm and appreciative as ever. My 16 yr old son and I are going back this Dec/Jan, so he can taste what I've talked about his whole life.

Don't bother with this book.

This book brought back untold memories to me. I volunteered in Guatemala from 1967-69 and Mr. Fischer has reminded me of the waves of human suffering I witnessed. In one brief shining,moment we sought to stem the flow of crimes against humanity. This was a time long before profit margins and balance sheets ruled the day, when success was measured by the lives saved and babies fed. I thank Mr. Fischer for taking me back to a simpler time, long before day trading and front page presidential fellatio. Thank you, Fritz Fischer, for rocking my world!!

Mr. Fischer has done us all a favor with this book. His analysis, combining history and real life experience, rings true. More than that, the book evokes an earlier, more idealistic America, one where, in JFK's words, one "asked not what your country could do for you, but what you can do for your country."

Read this. It could change your life.

This is a well argued, well researched and SHORT book by Fritz Fischer, who rattled the German Historical establishment with his books _Grab for World Power_ and _War of Illusions_ which challenged the prevailing wisdom that the first world war was mainly an accident. Fischers work reamins largely unread outside academic circles largely because he raises questions about german history that many people are unwilling to confront, but also because his prose tends to be incredibly turgid. This book, which argues a continuity in war aims between the two world wars raises important issues not only about Germay but about war in general, and represents Fischer at his most lucid.