Ferguson has written a rare work: a family chronicle which is both a compelling read, and is good history. The text is richly detailed, while the very complete footnotes provide the reader with a clear sense of the broad scholarship that has gone into the book. One caveat: while Ferguson points out in his introduction that the work is not a financial history, he unfortunately doesn't paint as rich a picture of the financial markets of the early 19th century as the book requires. While the house's trading history makes for a fascinating read, it takes place without any contextual comparison of how other market makers behaved and traded (other than an occasional comparison of profits and losses). Still, though, it's a minor criticism of a great book. Highly recommended.

Niall Ferguson has done a commendable job of describing the developement of a captivating family saga. What I found most appealing about the book is its comprehensive nature -- it weaves the family story in the context of the political and economic developments,with which it is closely intertwined. What is even more fascinating is the level of financial details about the bank than Ferguson provides. Perhaps it is his access to the recently open archive in Moscow that allows the author to deisclose finanacial history that it fascinating and detailed.

I would highly recommend this book to any serious student of history, as well as to people interested in banking and economics. Perhaps it may appear too detailed for the casual reader.

The House of Rothschild 1798-1848 covers a pivotal time in history. The Napoleonic Wars, rise of capitalism, the rise of multinational businesses, development of the railroad and the French Revolution. The Rothschild's had a front row seat to all of this and were the focus of some of it. From humble beginnings in the Frankfurt Jewish Ghetto, the rise of this family is chronicled through three generations. Many myths about the Rothschilds are laid to rest by Ferguson's groundbreaking research, much of it original scholarship. One of the main threads running through the book is that finance had a profound role in the ability of the rulers of Europe to do what they wanted. By 1825 the Rothschild had a significant role in sovereign finance. Many things were wished for by the various despots that ruled Europe at that time, but if the Rothschilds did not perceive that those wishes would lead to stabilization and peace it typically was not supported thereby making it difficult to realize. They did not support the despots with out reserve, but they knew that peace protected their interests. That perspective makes this book unique.
The Rothschild family business was a partnership that was constructed as the 2nd generation left Frankfurt for London, Paris, Vienna, and Naples. That the partnership should survive was the 1st generation's greatest desire and was respected (most of the time) by his descendants. The exchanges between the 5 houses make for fascinating reading and are reference extensively in the book.
The book details how the Rothschilds pushed for Jewish emancipation and equality and were resisted at every turn. That did not prevent them from receiving commendations from the various governments that the worked with. It did not prevent them from gaining entry to the most prestigious universities for their children. It did not prevent Lionel from gaining entry into the British Parliament without having to swear a Christian Oath. The Rothschilds achieved a great deal for themselves and for Judaism.
Intrigue, betrayal, revolution, and vignettes of famous people make this a very entertaining book, not merely a historic rendering of dates and places. From the beginning of the Rothschild climb to prominence with the Elector of Hesse-Kassel to the French Revolution in 1848, this book will engage the reader.

In this monumental work, Professor Niall Ferguson traces the evolution of and relationship between money, the state and war. Beginning with a section on taxes (the earliest form of large-scale finance), the book continues with a history of bonds, currency and finance. Then, there is a great deal of information on how these financial institutions have influenced society. And, most importantly, the final chapters of the book look at money and finance on a global scale, analyzing everything including stock "bubbles", gold and military success and failure. This book was written in September 2000, which means that much of the author's data is right up-to-date!

The above description of this book does not begin to do justice to it. The author's knowledge is obviously encyclopedic, and this book covers a vast multitude of subjects relating to money and power. Indeed, my one complaint against this book is that, at times, does seem to meander from subject to subject, seeming to lose track of the point. However, that said, this is a fascinating book, one well worth taking the time to read.

As an aside, I must say that the author does seem to severely undermine Paul Kennedy's (author of The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers) concept of "imperial overstretch." Instead he raises up the possibility that countries have experienced "understretch" leading them into costly later wars (such as the British Empire before World War I), and that America may be understretching right now.

Niall Ferguson's The Cash Nexus (Money and Power in the Modern World 1700 - 2000) is sure to upset many. It is an impressive look at economic history for the last three hundred years in order to show that there is nothing deterministic about the apparent success of capitalism and democracy in our time. This is the most effective aspect of the book as the author makes a clear case for smashing the myth that the "End of History" has been achieved by the double helix of capitilism and democracy. It is effective in demonstrating the complexity behind the ups and downs in the various fates of countries. He relies on Britain and America predominantly and they both figure into his concluding discussion of the need for America to become involved in exporting democracy and free markets to "rogue" states (never clearly defined), by military means if necessary. This somewhat startingly conclusion is too simplistically presented at the end of the book, particularly as the theories and ideas throughout the rest of the book are far more broad ranging and complex. Nonetheless, the ideas are presented well and argued competently. Some of the economics did soar over my head and while not agreeing with everything, the book does give one much to think about. It is sure to be a controversial read that has some interesting ideas.

Professor Ferguson tries to examine the link between money and history. However Mr. Fergusson changes the argument around and persuades the reader that money does not influence history so much as warfare does. According to Mr. ferguson it is fighting between countries that has given rise to the modern state. One cannot predict when a nation will journey to war and so an apparatus(tax gathering and bond issuing) is left in place to cover any sudden conflict. Mr. Ferguson points out correctly that the state has moved away from a warfare viewpoint of government function to a welfare viewpoint. The best part of the book is the last chapter which criticizes the US for not getting involved in other countries' affairs due to a post Vietnam ambivalence. I would highly recommend this book simply because there is nothing out there right now which examines history in a different light. I would have given this a 5 star rating but Professor Fergusson tends TO REPEAT HIMSELF at times.

Neil Ferguson's first book is a provocative, erudite treatise that challenges much of the more recent writing on Germany's great inflation. Following Carl-Ludwig Holtferich's pathbreaking work, a consensus had begun to emerge that sees the mark's fall as part of a successful strategy that maintained employment and helped in the recovery of the German economy from WWI, thus giving a crucial boost to the stabilization of the young republic. The rewards of moderate inflation during the immediate post-war period were, according to this view, not confined to the Reich alone - German demand for American manufactures, for example, provided a significant countercyclical stimulus to the U.S. economy during the downturn of the early 1920s. Ferguson's strongest point is that this sideeffect of Germany's inflation undermined one of the main policy aims after 1919 - the revision of the Versailles treaty. According to the architects of 'fulfillment', the inflation would lead to an export boom as the mark's value on the foreign exchanges collapsed faster than in Germany itself. Hence, the Allies would realize that they would ultimately have to pay for German reparations through unemployment at home. Instead, because loose monetary policy caused a boom in the Reich at the very time when other industrialized countries went into recession, the trade balance degenerated as imports surged and exports languished in depressed foreign markets. Ferguson thus exposes an important inconsistency in the inflationary strategy - but it is one that only the benefit of hindsight reveals. The historical accident of the postwar boom in the UK and America turning to bust at exactly the time when the Germans attempted to 'export the cost of reparations' undermined a strategy that was based on accurate economic analysis. And even if the export surge never materialized, the monetary chaos within the Reich arguably did help in reducing inflated demands for reparations - from the 28 billion gold marks demanded by Cunliffe in 1919 to the approximately 4 billion of the London Ultimatum. Ferguson also presents a fresh argument that the 1920/21 easing of inflationary pressures could have been used for a more permanent stabilization - at perhaps 50-60 marks/ $. Three factors contributed to this change in fortunes: the fall in import prices due to postwar depression, foreign speculators expecting a recovery of the mark, and the recovery of output. Yet here, as in other parts of the book, Ferguson pays little attention to the considerable time-lag that operated between individual economic variables. The rise in output during 1920/21 was partly caused by the policies of easy money in the years before. The strength of the mark on the foreign exchanges, underpinned by 'hot money', could only last if Germany embarked on a deflation on the Anglo-Saxon model - something that not even Ferguson thinks was politically or economically possible. The argument is also not helped by simple arithmetic errors that lead Ferguson to overstate the size of the Reich's deficit in 1920 and 1922 (p. 278, p. 477) - revenue of 3.2 billion gold marks in 1920 minus expenditure of 7.1 billion simply does not yield a deficit of 6.1 billion. This book's main contribution therefore lies in the wider questions it raises, and not in the ones it answers. That is no mean achievement in a work that combines a monograph on the inflation in Hamburg with more wide-ranging chapters on the Reich's economic fortunes. For this is a study so rich in its observations about the inflation's effects on Hamburg's shipbuilding, banking, and overseas trade, and about the role of Hanseatic politicians in the policymaking in Berlin, that it could easily be mistaken for a regional study. Nothing could be further from the truth: Paper and Iron will at least partly define the research agenda for future scholars of Germany's great inflation.

Niall Ferguson got headlines for what would have otherwise been a book for specialists of World War I when he included arguments that Britain should not have entered the war. He acknowledged that this would have certainly meant the fall of France and the acquisition by Germany of territory in the East at the expense of Russia. His argument created a great stir in Britain, which (like France) suffered enormously high casualties in World War I, much worse than in the World War II. Ferguson's book is a thoroughly argued, revisionist approach to the War. He disputes everything from the importance patriotism and war fever played in the early rush of enlistments to whether the Allies were economically more efficient than the Central Powers. Do not buy this book expecting an easy read. Ferguson supports his arguments by large amounts of statistical studies that are daunting even to a reader familiar with the controversies surrounding the war. In the end, one is left with the belief that it could not have been a good thing for Germany to have eliminated France and Russia as world powers, which would have allowed it to build up its Navy in competition with Britain. Of course, there is one benefit that would have come from Germany winning World War I; with the German political structure intact and victorious, it seems certain that Adolph Hitler would have lived his days out in obscurity.
In short, this book is only for someone deeply interested in the economic and social history of World War I.

An easy read despite it's length. I found this book very compelling. The author is not a true expert on this subject and I've read some minor criticisms of this work. It's not in the style of a traditional history. Some of the details of the book come across as "gossipy" or journalistic. The book does shed light on the economics of the war, the problem of finding effective tactics, and the role of the media. Much is included in the book, but I wonder what was left out. If you haven't read a general history of the war in France already, you might want to before reading this book. Very clearly written, and exciting to read.

From the History Channel to Barbara Tuchman every account of World War I describes the ecstatic patriotic fervor that swept England, France, Russia, and Germany in August 1914. In fact, writes Ferguson, almost everyone was depressed by the outbreak of war - and he assembles contemporary newspaper accounts and memoirs to support this. Why did soldiers continue fighting, year after year, under awful conditions with no hope of victory and little hope of surviving? Because they loved it, Ferguson claims, and he points to evidence. He agrees the treaty of Versailles led directly to World War II but not because it was so vengeful. It was too generous, he maintains. It humiliated the Germans without punishing them. They paid little of the reparations (after their victory in 1870 Germany forced huge reparations on the French - and collected).

This is contrarian history of the best type: topsy-turvy interpretations by a brilliant writer who makes a genuine attempt to back them up. Experts quarrel with most of his points, but experts have read a great deal of history. Don't read this without doing the same.

About a decade ago Niall Ferguson wrote an economic history of early 20th century Hamburg. This got him the respect of his fellow historians, but not lots of money. In 1998 he published "The Pity of War" which, while less thoroughly researched, earned him considerable public notice. Ferguson became one of the most prominent historians in Britain, and he has now published "Empire". This book purports to show that the British Empire was an ultimately beneficial endeavour that benefited the world by showering it with the benefits of globalization and free trade in labor and capital. As such, it is a model the United States should consider as it faces the threat of Al-Qaidya.

Empire is not a vulgar apology for imperialism. Indeed, it is not much of an apology for anything, since argument doesn't play that much of a part in it. This is a book for a television series, and, ultimately, is not much more than a coffee table book. [It seems] More care has been taken to choose the illustrations than provide a coherent narrative. What we have basically is a narrative that starts with Sir Francis Drake and then hits the high points up until the Suez crisis. It is very much a "great man" history. We learn a lot about Dr. Livingstone and his missionary efforts. We learn little about the people he converted, or for that matter the vast majority he didn't convert. We are told that there were racists, but we learn little about racism or nationalist ideologies. Nor does Ferguson mention the many colonial subjects who immigrated to Britain, and their effect on the country. Come to think of it, various parts of the empire flit in and out of the narrative for half-centuries at a time, whether it is the Caribbean, South Africa, Canada or Burma. (And did Ferguson ever actually mention Nigeria, a country whose 130 million people is that of Britain's?) With its focus on battles and spectacles, this might make an interesting television series, but it adds nothing to our knowledge of the empire.

For a historian known for his enthusiasm for neoclassical economics, Ferguson does not really draw up a balance sheet for empire. To be fair, it's not that he ignores the dark side. Weren't the Pequots and Tasmanians massacred? Pretty much, he says. Weren't the Caribbean colonies founded on the vicious exploitation of hundreds of thousands of slaves? You can't deny that. What about the Irish Potato famine and the Boer concentration camps? Pretty bad. Once emancipated, weren't the Caribbean slaves denied political liberty and forced into new unjust economic arrangements? Yeah, that's not pretty. What about the Indian famines in the late 19th century that killed anywhere from 12 to 30 million people? Yeah, that wasn't nice. What about Imperialist opposition to Home Rule for Ireland? Ok, that was wrong. Didn't Baden-Powell, founder of the Boy Scouts, systematically starve the native population of Mafeking so that the white settlers could live out the Boer siege in comfort? Now that you mention it, that's kind of embarrassing. There are some interesting details, such as the 6,000 servants for the Viceroy's Palace in India, of whom 50 were employed solely to shew birds away. We aren't told how many people were killed when the British suppressed the Sepoy rebellion in 1857, but Ferguson tells us that they hanged 150 people from one very large tree in Cawnpore alone. We listen to Anthony Trollope say with pseudo-stoic Tory humbug of the Australian aborigines that "it was their fate to be abolished." We learn Hitler's view that if he ran the British Empire he would have Gandhi summarily shot. Ferguson actually suggests that much of the notorious "Thugee" murders were not caused by the infamous Kali cult but by demobilized soldiers engaging in humdrum highway robbery.

Ferguson tries to make an argument that British rule was good for India. Irrigation boomed, there were new coal and jute industries. But he also admits that India basically stagnated for two centuries, at a time when British living standards more than quadrupled. The truth is even worse. In 1750 India had a quarter of the world's GDP. By 1900 it had only 1.7%. And its industrial production collapsed. Rather feebly, Ferguson points out that independence didn't help China, although elsewhere he notes British aggression and interference in that country. (The most outrageous being the Opium wars, in which a Liberal Britain forced China to import narcotics.) More important he ignores the counter-example of Japan, which is clearly better off for avoiding imperialist rule altogether. He manages to ignore a whole host of historians of India, such as Parthasarathi, Guha, Sarkar and Hardiman, while the late Christopher Thorne is also missing from his shallow bibliography. The most Ferguson can say is to suggest that "things might conceivably have been worse" under native rule. The same problems occur in his conclusion when he suggests that immigration would have been less without a British empire, though in the 19th century immigrants overwhelmingly went to the United States. We are told that capital exports and free trade are unalloyed benefits, though whether Latin America has ever benefited from Britain and the United States' financial arrangements is very much open to question. He writes that Britain sacrificed their empire to defeat Hitler and asks rhetorically "Did not that sacrifice alone expunge all the Empire's other sins?" Leaving aside the fact that Churchill did not know he was making this sacrifice in 1940, I can't help but notice that the Soviet Union sacrificed even more. Where the British lots hundreds of thousands, they lost tens of millions. What atonement will Ferguson give them? So if the British received absolution for their conquests, aggressions, famines and genocides they got it at an excellent bargain. And it is a bargain that, like so much in the history of the "good" empire, the British paid with other people's lives.

What the heck has happened to Niall Ferguson? Before reading Empire, I had him placed in my mind as an eccentric and enjoyable young historian and the author of sometimes inaccessible historical tomes that -- if you could make it through them -- often gave innovative takes to what had been tired subjects.

I cannot say that I agree with everything in previous efforts from Mr. Ferguson: in The Pity of War, for example, one of his main points was that Germany was not militaristic before the first world war. And in The House of Rothschild (his best book), I believe Mr. Ferguson's take on the French family judges them to harshly by using today's standards on a 19th century history. But with Empire, the author appears to have completely lost his hold on reality.

Mr. Ferguson spends most of the book's 352 glossy pages glossing over some of the atrocities of Britain's colonial period (he does not claim it was faultless, only that the spilled blood was necessary). He argues for the virtues of colonial rule in India, and spends far too little time and effort on the policies that set the stage for apartheid in South Africa. He says that the money and technology the empire spread balanced out the evils committed in colonial Africa and parts of Asia and the Caribbean. But this is all just setting the stage for his argument about the current American empire, and the lessons it can learn from Britain's former position as the world's lone superpower.

The issue of America's role in the world using history as a guide is an important and interesting subject -- and I enjoyed reading Mr. Ferguson's argument that, as a former British colony, the U.S. is a kind of heir to Britain's empire. But his appalling conclusion is that the U.S. should tighten its grip of influence on the world and make its self into an empire in more ways than the simple economic, social and military dominance it has now. What? Isn't America's might and unilateral policies what sparked anti-Americanism across the globe? If the U.S. followed the British example, wouldn't the kind of uprisings and insurgencies that crippled it at its peak be many times worse now, when combined with modern technology?

This book is not designed to be read on its own, but as a companion to a BBC television series. I have not seen the series, but I must imagine that certain topics were selected and highlighted because they made good television. I don't know how that explains Mr. Ferguson's dangerous conclusions, but I am gripping at straws here. I guess I don't want to believe that a writer I have admired in the past has really become so distasteful.

As an ex-British colonial subject (and a citizen of another British ex-colony), living next to the United States, I find Ferguson's "lessons" personally and painfully interesting. On the one hand, he argues that America is already an empire conducting an "imperial" policy. (It's only an empire "in denial.") On the other hand, he thinks America is failing to behave properly like an empire. For instance, America is irritatingly reluctant to put lots of troops in the Middle East and to commit them there for a long time, by which he means not months but decades - centuries if necessary (like the Romans in Egypt). President Bush's repeated claim not to stay in Iraq "one day longer than necessary" is simply maddening!

Well, IF America is an empire - and in a sense it is - it ceased to expand when the frontier reached its continental limits - after Alaska and Hawaii were added to its territory.

American colonies, like the Philippines, Puerto Rico, the Virgins and some islands in the Pacific (like Midway) are evidence of imperialism, to be sure. But these are small potatoes (some already given up) compared the British Empire: India, Pakistan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Nigeria, most of the Middle East (including Iraq, Egypt, Mecca and Medina, and control of the desert regions) - and a swath of African colonies running straight down from Sudan to South Africa - plus strategic locales like Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Singapore, Bermuda, and numerous Pacifc islands. The Middle East was particularly important not because of oil - not yet discovered - but because of Egypt's importance to the British Empire due to the Suez Canal, which was Britain's lifeline to India and the Far East. (All these "glorious" exploits are superbly recounted in this book.)

Is America's foreign policy today "imperial" already? But, wait, isn't President Bush willing to take the fight against terrorists everywhere in the globe, and if that's not "imperial," what is? So Ferguson gleefully argues. But the fight against terrorism is a form of self-defense, just as containment of communism used to be. If that's "imperial," so be it. I'm all for it (with one caveat below). By stretching his definitions of "empire" and "imperial" so much, Ferguson may be putting too much water into his wine.

Yet America's foreign policy is not imperial enough to his taste. (It sounds so confusing because it is. Ferguson doesn't think he's being self-contradictory or schizoid: can America be an "empire" with an "imperial" policy without acting the way he thinks America is NOT acting? But America is NOT acting the way he thinks America should be - and yet he insists America IS an "empire"?) But to be "imperial" in the British (or for that matter, Roman or Mongol) sense required, and requires, much more than self-defense, as readers can find out in this book. To acquire Hong Kong they forced the Chinese to become addicted to opium. To get India they had to put down a Mutiny with brutal violence. To get Africa they had to mow down natives by the millions with Maxim guns. And so on. If that's "imperial," then I doubt most Americans have this in mind (not because they don't think all this is not "imperial" - it is - but because they believe all this is IMMORAL, and rightly so.)

When I see mass demonstrations against the US in the Middle East - for whatever reasons - as well as the tearful partings and joyful family reunions of American servicemen and women on CNN - broadcast live frequently enough - I'm pretty sure that Ferguson's prayer for a large-scale, decades-long occupation of Iraq will never be answered. And the rest of the Middle East? To me, fighting terrorism doesn't necessarily mean HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS of American boys and girls living PERMANENTLY under the hot desert sun in a predominantly HOSTILE Muslim world. But for Ferguson, it does, at the very least. (Two or three million troops stationed all over the oil-rich Arab lands and Iran for the next six to eight decades should please Ferguson's fantasy. In the name of fighting terrorism!) My answer is to this is negative, not because it is hard work, but because it is foolish and self-defeating. Let's not give the likes of Bin Laden another excuse.

If my American friends start behaving like the murderous bully that the British were when building their Empire, I'd be the first to declare myself wrong and Ferguson right. But I doubt that day will come.

Read this book by all means. Skip the last chapter. Forget about his "lessons".......they won't do you, or your country, any good.

(As for Ferguson's claim that British Empire brought much of the world democracy, free market and the rule of law, I have some doubts. India had little interest in free market capitalism after decolonization; instead it plunged itself into a quasi-socialist system. Africans had neither democracy nor free market nor the rule of law, before or after the British left. To this day they still don't, many would argue. Hong Kong - my hometown - never had the taste of democracy under the British. It does now - but only a taste. As for free market, Hong Kong did get it (perhaps too much of it). And the rule of law? Hong Kong was governed well under British rule of law. But there were two rules of law - one for the Chinese, another for the British expatriates. On the whole, Ferguson's claim is dubious because the record is mixed. Moreover, it can never be proved that former British colonies would have got none of these things had the British not been there in the first place. I'd rather live in South Korea today than any part of former British Africa - or India for that matter - and South Korea is no ex-colony of anyone, except for the Japanese........a long time ago.)

Believe me, I really tried to appreciate this book as either a thought-provoking exploration of scenarios of alternate history, or as a solid study of the art of history itself. I was disappointed both ways. Strangely enough, this book is purported by the publisher and editor to be both of those things, but the results prove otherwise. This book is very unfocused and academically arrogant, and it barely even explores counterfactual history, except at an extremely basic and dry interpretation of the term. Note: This book is from England and is quite Anglo-centric, so a working knowledge of British history might be an asset before you begin (this is not a criticism, just a recommendation).

This book gets off to a horrendous start with Ferguson's 90-page introduction in which he attempts to explore the nuances and importance of counterfactual history. Instead he delivers an extremely tedious and repetitive treatise on the study of history itself, which has little to do with the supposed focus of the book. A large portion of this intro is dedicated to "determinism" vs. "predestination" in history, but this is historiography rather than an exploration of counterfactuals. This is also written in that dry and verbose academic style in which it is more important to endlessly pile on repetitive evidence in order to impress one's colleagues, than to actually enlighten the reader. Ferguson shows a sheer desperation to confound other historians who don't think highly of counterfactuals, and in the process forgets that he is writing a book for the public. He also complains about researchers in his field not being taken seriously, but then insults people in other fields who are interested in counterfactuals, such as sociologists and fiction writers.

After this tedious start, the book doesn't get much better, as various historians contribute chapters on key episodes in history. With only a few exceptions, each author commits the errors of the introduction by failing to explore counterfactuals, which is supposed to be the point, and merely shows off his own historical knowledge in tedious ways. One noteworthy exception is the essay on home rule in Northern Ireland. Otherwise, the pattern here is to spend 95% of the essay describing what really happened in a straight historical fashion, then briefly knock off a few possible alternative scenarios without really exploring them, as if the editor forced each author to do this. In the end, this book can't figure out what it wants to be, and you will be unable to figure out why you're reading it. Is it trying to comment on the study of history itself, or present straight history with an intellectual twist, or explore counterfactuals? It tries to do all of these, with disappointing levels of success, and is only unfocused as a result. If you decide to tackle this, good luck - you'll need it.

"Virtual History: Alternatives and Counterfactuals" is a collection of thought-provoking essays, edited by historian Niall Ferguson, that explore a number of 'what if?' scenarios such as:

*What if Charles I had avoided the civil war?
*What if there had been no American Revolution?
*What if Britain had stood aside in August 1914?
*What if Germany had invaded Britain in May 1940?
*What if communism had not collapsed?

As previous reviewers have noted, this book is fairly Anglo-centric; however, that should not be surprising given that a majority of the contributors are from Britain and in particular from the Oxbridge universities.

The part I enjoyed the most was the conclusion in which Ferguson brings together all the essays and constructs an alternate history of the world over the last three hundred years. Other strong essays were the ones dealing with World Wars I and II.

Two caveats for the potential reader: first, the introduction was extremely long and dry - basically a history of the study of history, and secondly, a general knowledge of the events discussed in the book would be a great advantage.

Overall though, "Virtual History" is a very interesting read and well-worth the effort.

Overall, I found "Virtual History" to be an excellent exploration of the value of counterfactuals in historical writing. There is no debating the quality of the writing in this book. From the rousing introduction, to the various essays, and the clever conclusion, the authors do a superb job of engaging the reader in their various areas of expertise. That said, the work overall is somewhat uneven.

I believe this stems from the fact that the various historians don't all share the same comfort level with projecting the consequences of their counterfactuals. Some barely scratch the surface of what might have been, while others go into extensive detail (in particular, "What if Hitler had Invaded England", my favorite). However, this complaint speaks more to the flow of the work overall, and not to the quality of each essay.

In conclusion, "Virtual History" is an outstanding work, that shows top notch research and excellent writing. My one caveat to the potential reader would be that this is not a particularly light, easy reading book. If you are looking for a somewhat less rigorous, less scholarly look at counterfactual history I would recommend "What If?" (Cowley ed.).

This book is not about the members of this vast family. I wish to know what the writer knows of the real Rothschild family, the people, their lives, everyday living? Their pain and heartaches? What does he know? Why not print the truth's about the family behind all he has to say about this so called empire. There are real people here....

The second volume of the family saga is not as compelling as the first. Perhaps that is due to the length of time covered, or perhaps due to the relative decline of the Rothschilds in the world of finance. Still, this is a compelling story, which is skillfully narrated by Mr.Ferguson

let me begin by saying that i am not in the habit of handing out five stars in my reviews, but this fine book certainly deserves it. i am not quite sure what to make of some of the criticisms leveled at this book in the reviews until now--too many facts, overly exhaustive, too much about continental finances or politics? can a definitive work of non-fiction have too many facts or be too exhaustive? what meaning do the rothschilds have if not in the context of continental politics. i loved every one of those three qualities about this book and, to boot, though it was appallingly well written as well. i found ferguson exhiliratingly (is this an adverb? it ought to be one) willing to assume that i could assimilate mass amounts of data, only sometimes arcane, and still want to follow a linear, only sometimes, social history--that's what definitive works are all about, i think. i applaud ferguson's not dumbing down history. and perhaps that is the difference between those who very much this book and those who didn't. i wanted to read history, and got it; others, perhaps, wanted to read a good yarn and didn't.