John Byrne has presented a fascinating portrait of the fall of Al Dunlap at Sunbeam. He goes into great detail on all the irrational decisions that were made, the impossible targets, the pressure to fudge numbers and the final inevitable collapse. Byrne also spends some time on the rather unsavory private life of Dunlap (he didn't attend his parents funerals, he never meets his son or his sister). By and large I agree with the other positive reviews.

Byrne writes very well. Many business writers tend to get bogged down in detail when writing a book (as opposed to a small article) or get distracted or get stuck in flashbacks. Byrne does none of these and keeps your interest level high throughout.

If I have one gripe with the book (which is why I give it 4 rather than 5), its that it relies too much on people who dislike Dunlap or were trying to shift responsibility to him. Yes, the man is an egoist, a hypocrite, a braggart etc. But its a little hard for me to believe that every bad business decision at Sunbeam can be traced to Dunlap (or his consultants), and it seems to me that at least some of the other managers are trying to shift responsiblity to Dunlap on occasion. Also, Dunlap's attitude at Sunbeam was wrong in most ways -- still the company itself was unhealthy when he came in. The original management deserves at least some blame for the pre-Dunlap situation.

Similarly, a number of people in the book claim that they were always skeptical of Dunlap's business skills. Maybe after the Sunbeam collapse -- but I find it hard to believe they were all skeptical initially. Example -- an analyst claims that he doubted the Sunbeam turnaround story from the beginning, but he still kept on churning out positive reports on Sunbeam for his securities firm.

I found "Chainsaw" in a discounted book bin and picked it up because I wanted to learn more about the man who was hailed by Wall Street analysts as a fast turnaround artist but hated by the many employees who felt the wrath of his cost-cutting sword at the companies in which he was in charge.

Chainsaw primarily chronicles Chainsaw Al Dunlap's rocky two year tenure at Sunbeam Corp., where he closed numerous plants, fired almost half of its employees, ran roughshod over the half who remained, heaped more praise upon himself then the most conceited athlete or movie star and pretty much ran the company into the ground.

The author, John Byrne has spoken to several hundred people who have dealt with Dunlap's rage and unrealistic expectations and has been able to piece together a non-fiction work that reads like a novel. Significant amounts of dialog between Dunlap and his cronies are displayed and it basically says one thing. Chainsaw Al Dunlap ruled through total intimidation and with the exception of his right hand man, listened to nobody but himself, even though he had no experience with the products that Sunbeam sold. He fired (or actually had somebody else fire) everybody who didn't appear to him to be part of the team. Byrne perfectly sets out the tension that occurred when Dunlap was on a rampage.

The reader gets to see the desperate measures a company will go through to try to meet investor and Wall Street expectations, including accounting games which have come to the forefront as a result of the Enron debacle. I'm not an accountant, but I even have to admit that things they did were pretty shady.

Byrne wraps the book up with the final straws that led Al Dunlap to go down in flames at Sunbeam, ending in his firing at a secretive board meeting in New York City. I see that a paperback version is coming out soon, which I hope will bring the story of Dunlap up to date, including his required payment to a trust fund to settle civil lawsuits against him.

Byrne's only fault is that he is not totally objective. It's easy to tell that he despises Dunlap (he calls him a loudmouth, comments on the large size of his teeth, attacks his love of his dogs over everything else), so I knock the rating to four stars, but it's still a pretty good business case book. Bryne would be a great candidate to writeup the Enron story as he does have a way with story telling and research.

If John Byrne's "Chainsaw" were a work of fiction, it would likely be considered unpublishable because its main character is so absurdely evil. Unfortunately -- especially for those who had to endure his wrath -- the story of Al Dunlap is all too true. Byrne's portrayal of Dunlap, who was hailed by Wall Street as a turaround genius before his leadership of Sunbeam ended in debacle, is that not of an admirable business leader, but of an hysterical, violent sociopath who, if his life had turned slightly differently, might well have ended up in prison, a mental hospital, or an early grave. "Chainsaw" paints a portrait of a man who was abusive -- mentally, emotionally and even physically -- to nearly everybody in his life, from his business associates to his family to the few whom he considered friends.

"Chainsaw" chronicles the rise and fall of "Chainsaw Al" Dunlap so compellingly that even those who wouldn't think to read a business book will be hooked. However, the book is in many ways fascinating the way that a car wreck is fascinating. The reader will marvel at the amount and intensity of abuse Dunlap hurls at even his closest friends and allies, the coldness with which he treats his family (he abandoned his son at age 2 and couldn't be bothered to attend the funerals of either of his parents), and the near-perverted bounds of his ego. In fact, as Sunbeam lurches toward collapse, his only apparent interest was in signing copies of his autobiography.

Defenders of Dunlap will say that he did the dirty work of downsizing and layoffs to save dying companies, sacrificing the needs of the few for the good of the many. And true, the modern business world is filled with harsh realities and tough decision-making. But Dunlap's approach to downsizing in "Chainsaw" teeters between indifference to those downsized and pure sadism. At points in the book, he actually seems to enjoy cutting jobs and closing factories (though he usually had others do the dirty deeds). As the author says, there is a business world between being tough and being cruel -- and Byrne leaves little doubt about where he places Dunlap. Worse, Dunlap's moves at Sunbeam didn't seem to have been done with any level of intelligence, other than to get Dunlap a quick win so he could cash out fast. The result was the near-total destruction of Sunbeam rather than long-term gains from short-term pain.

In "Chainsaw," Byrne stresses that either through fear, greed or naivetee, others enabled Dunlap. The way that each of these characters is drawn creates a fascinating if morbid portrait of a dysfunctional, cannibalistic organization revolving totally around Chainsaw Al.

Byrne is a terrific writer, and "Chainsaw" is a great read. My only quibble is that, since Byrne and Dunlap apparently have had great animosity toward each other, Byrne often sacrifices any attempt at objectivity. But perhaps objectivity isn't possible when chronicling such an extreme personality.

It's good to see "Chainsaw" returning to print in paperback. Now, in the era of Enron and WorldCom, Sept. 11 and the War on Terror reminding us what real toughness is all about, and with the Wall Street euphoria of the '90s in the rear-view mirror, its perspective is needed now more than ever...

I wrote a review after I had gone through a few chapters, and I said there were "some" math errors... there are at least 50 critical math errors, including errors in the tables of trig integrals you're told to memorize. Don't buy this edition!

There is no excuse for the amount of errors in this book. Teaching/Learning from it is impossible because many of the examples, explanations, and answers in the back are dead wrong. I strongly urge any student seeking calculus help to use a real textbook.

This book makes every step clear and simple, and understandable. Whereas other books tell you what to do, this book helps you understand WHY. I'm taking calc for a pre-MBA class, and we're covering a full semester in ten weeks. Even though we are breezing through chapters at a time, this book makes learning the math more than possible.

I find it challenging to review this book, because it has some outstanding points in it. At the same time, the author's philosophy is one that I strongly diagree with based on many years of consulting experience and research. Whenever Mr. Dunlap is talking about the procrastination, wishful thinking, and "do nothing" approach of the managements he followed, Mr. Dunlap is superb. I have met some of these people, and also found their management styles to be deficient. Management has responsiblity to look, listen, and sense how well it is serving its customers, employees, shareholders, suppliers, and the communities the company services. Having diagnosed what needs to be done, good management then does something effective to make a change. Then management monitors the results and keeps making changes, until the correct outcomes follow. The people who preceded Mr. Dunlap seemed to have lived in a fairy tale world of reorganizing the internal perceptions and jobs, but doing little to affect the world external to the corporation. To anyone who wants to see how management can delude itself, Mr. Dunlap has given us valuable case histories. On the other hand, I think he is totally wrong in putting shareholders first (even if we assume that shareholders deserve a greater reward than any other stakeholder group). My experience has been that shareholders make much more money (near-term and long-term) when all stakeholder groups prosper. For example, you can make more money for shareholders by creating better products and services than you can by just reducing costs in the near-term. Our research has shown that the vast majority of companies that do large cost reductions like those Mr. Dunlap has done underperform the stock market compared to industry peers (and the market averages) after 18 months has passed. I think Mr. Dunlap was wise to sell his businesses as soon as possible after the cost reductions were over. A different management style was then needed to create longer-term and larger prosperity for shareholders. I, too, have worked in the paper industry (as a consultant) and I find the same principles apply in paper as elsewhere: There are ways to create more for everyone. But first, you have to look for them. In his haste, I fear that Mr. Dunlap has missed seeing the larger opportunity for his investors. For example, the best reason to achieve a higher stock price is to then use that stock price to create even more advantages for the shareholders (such as buying new resources less expensively, having more financial flexibility to pursue opportunities, and growing earnings and cash flow faster). If you would like to know more about this point, read my article in the Fall 1998 issue of DIRECTORS & BOARDS called "The Benefits of Having a Higher Stock Price."

The only reason this book doesn't merit a full five stars is its relentless tone of braggadocio and self-promotion. Yes, Al Dunlap did a good thing. He turned around a company and channeled the money to the shareholders, but let's not go overboard. He didn't win a war, or find a cure for a disease, or create a beautiful work of art. He just did the job he was paid to do, and he did it well. When he plasters his face four times on the cover of his book and talks about his work with words like "revolution" and "conquest", it's too much. It makes me think he's got a publicist telling him what to do. Hubris, overweening pride, has from ancient times been a trait that wise men and women were taught to avoid. Dunlap is probably a wise man, so he should dump whoever's urging him to, like a rooster, take credit for the sunrise.

That said, I can go on to the ideas in the book, which are very good and long overdue. First, simplicity. Dunlap says it several times: business is simple. Contrary to what the gurus and B-school touts would have you believe, business is not rocket science. Business is the part that comes after rocket science, when you try to make rockets as cheap as you can and sell as many as you can at the highest possible price. In Dunlap's case, paper had already been invented. It just needed to be marketed and sold at a profit. An opulent headquarters and an elitist bureaucracy did nothing to attain that goal. So Dunlap fired most of the managerial class and sold the headquarters. Simple. He then sold all of the companies in the Scott conglomerate that didn't have any relation to tissue paper. Then he dumped most of the consultants because, he reasoned, why would a high-priced so-and-so know more about running a paper company than a person who'd spent years working in a paper company?

One of Dunlap's greatest strengths is his common sense. He was able to see, and had the nerve to say, that Scott's consultants were too brainy and pricey for the tissue paper business, and that Scott executives could work in less luxurious offices. He was able to see that a power plant was not a sensible part of a paper products company. Most important, he was able to see that Scott was not serving the people who owned it. None of these things are profound insights, they're just common sense.

It is the core of Dunlap's philosophy that I find most agreeable. The job of the employee, whether great or small, is to enhance the value of the shares of the company. Dunlap blasts away at the fashionable notions that one by one have replaced the idea that the goal of a company is to make a buck for the people who invest in it. Many of his critics believe the object of a company is to provide a steady income and benefits package to its employees. Not so, says Dunlap. Those things are secondary to a company's mission. They only make their income and benefits because the owners put up their money in the first place. The owners deserve priority. Others believe a company is a vehicle for social change, something akin to a legislature or philanthropic foundation. In this view, an executive is a mere conduit for the money which must flow from consumers to company and eventually to the institutionalized panhandlers known as fund-raisers. This class, which includes everything from college presidents and grant "writers" to fundamentalist preachers and social activists, has come to believe that they are the proper beneficiaries of corporate profit. Incredible to relate, so do some CEOs! Dunlap went into Scott with his chainsaw, and severed the link between them and his company. It's not that greed is good and charity is for suckers, as Hollywood would have us believe is the credo of business. It's that charity is the responsibility of the individual.

Dunlap doesn't mind executives doling out largesse to charity, as long as it happens after shareholders have been served.

The logical thing to do is to make sure your executives are shareholders. In this, Dunlap put his money where his mouth was. Upon becoming CEO of Scott, he invested $4 million of his own money in Scott stock. Then he summoned all the executives who hadn't been fired, and ordered them to invest heavily in Scott. By making sure his executives were shareholders, he assured himself that they would keep the shareholders interests foremost.

After these drastic steps were taken, the rest appears to have been easy. Whether it really was easy, and whether the drastic steps were easy, we may never know. Mean Business makes it sound like going into a corporation and changing deeply-rooted habits is like George Patton going in and whipping the US Army into shape. The book makes no mention of any opposition to Chainsaw Al that lasted any longer than a few minutes. Employees and directors were dismissed by the hundred, assets were sold, habits were changed, and never once did Dunlap receive a setback of any kind. It is marvelous if true. But I suspect some has gone untold in the interest of creating a legend.

It may be that the story of Sunbeam and Dunlap, if ever told, will be more interesting than Scott and Dunlap. For as Bill Clinton illustrates, an egomaniac is far more interesting when squirming than when trumpeting.

Having read many reviews of the book, I began it thinking it would be everything that I do not believe in. I was wrong. Al Dunlop's style is not one I admire, approve of or emulate. However, as a straight cost cutter there is probably no one better. The problem is that after cuttiing costs, most businesses want to stay alive and grow. When Mr. Dunlop is finished, there is only a business to sell. Through Share Price Growth 100, we now know that there are ways to significantly grow stock price, have very happy shareholders and manage costs as a core competency. We can now have very happy shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers and the communities in which our businesses operate. There are now real 2,000 percent solutions to most business stalls.

I'm a big fan of what the Templeton Foundation does (bridging the gap between science and religion), so I was interested when a fictional work came out by Templeton himself. Alas, the great man has no knack for philosophical allegories. In this numbingly symbolic tale, a smug clam named Columbus (get it? He's on a voyage of self-discovery) meets a clam named Agape (get it? Love helps us make those discoveries) who helps him understand his limitations. I kid you not. The story is actually about clams trying to look beyond familiar confines and open up to the greater world. Or something.

There are plenty of strained metaphors (Columbus refers to "The Book of Clams," a thinly-disguised stand-in for the Bible), long digressions in which Columbus ponders his state in life and what it's all about, and tortured quahog jokes. Whatever Templeton's trying to say, it just isn't working. This is one time when you're better off spending your money on beanie babies.