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This was Robert E. Lee's first full campaign as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia and the Federals gave Lee the strategic initiative in Virginia by abandoning the Peninsula. The book details Lee's campaign from the Rapidan to the battle at Manassas. Many interesting and critical events prior to the Manassas are described. While the two armies were stalemated on the Rappahannock, Stuart's raid striking Pope's rear is narrated followed by an account of Stonewall Jackson's August 25 flanking movement which resulted in the burning of Bristoe Station and the capture of Manassas Junction August 27th. The author notes that throughout these actions Pope's cavalry failed to produce intelligence about Lee's movements and intentions but rather "stood ragged and impotent"
John Hennessy details the bloody battles on August 28, 29 and 30. The author writes "Pope's decision to attack Jackson near Groveton was both momentous and fateful, for Pope was committing to fight a battle on Jackson's front and Jackson's terms. It was a battle that need not have been." The book describes how the Union commanders under Pope launched attacks against Jackson which often breached his lines but lacking coordination and support from other units, after much gallantry failed with heavy losses. For example, the text states "Grover's regiments had indeed performed admirably, but the more important point was that they fought alone, and were doomed to ultimate failure." The author provides an excellent analysis of each engagement plus
gives both the background and an evaluation of the commanders involved stating that Pope never provided the leadership for the required coordinated action and support for these attacks to succeed.
The arrival on August 29 of Longstreet's Corps in support of Jackson and the failure of McClellan to support John Pope dramatically changed the tactical and strategic situation. The author notes that by 5 PM on the 29th "Longstreet suggested that the major effort be postponed until morning" and Lee laid the groundwork for "what he hoped would be a decisive attack the next morning...." Most interestingly, Pope concluded "the enemy was retreating; indeed the battle might be won!. ... quickly decided to mount a pursuit." The text continues "History could hardly have conjured more disparate--and ironic--reasoning ....Pope thought the Confederates in wild retreat; Lee sought to lay the groundwork for the battle's climatic attack. No other incident of the campaign more succinctly demonstrates the diverging quality of command each side enjoyed, or, in the case of the Federals, suffered." Hennessy writes that after waffling all morning on the 30th and rejecting what information he received, Pope ordered General Porter to attack what Pope believed to be retreating Confederates. After a gallant and tenacious effort, Porter's troops had to retreat. An interesting story from this fight was the stone-throwing by some Confederates after their ammunition was gone. The text notes, amazingly Pope failed to recognize the danger to his left and continues "With Porter long since gone from his threatening position ....Longstreet recognized his opportunity to completely envelop the Union left.To accomplish this, Longstreet selected as the objective of his attack the old battleground of Henry Hill."
At 4 P.M. on the 30th, Longstreet attacked the Union left. The author notes that "Union defeat seemed a certainty. Only the magnitude of the defeat remained in doubt." and he continues "The position most important to the safety of the Union army was Henry Hill" The author provides an excellent account of the fighting for Chinn Ridge and Henry Hill; and states that the Confederates captured Chinn Ridge but due to Union General McLean's fierce defense, precious minutes were gained allowing the Federals time to organize the defense of Henry Hill. With only an hour of daylight remaining, the battle for Henry Hill ceased. The Confederates had not captured Henry Hill thereby allowing the Federals to retreat, but the Union left was turned and crushed; Pope had been outmaneuvered and out fought.
The book describes the Union retreat, the subsequent fighting with a final battle at Chintilly, and Pope's withdrew to Washington DC. The Epilogue gives an analysis of the campaign stating "The well-oiled performance of the Confederate army contrasted sharply with the disorganized toil of Pope's Army of Virginia. Few Yankee soldiers of any rank emerged from the disaster at Second Manassas with enhanced reputations...." except for General McLean on Chinn Ridge.
For the Confederates the text notes "Second Manassas represented James Longstreet's most important contribution to any of Lee's victories." Hennessy notes "The Second Manassas Campaign also marked the emergence of Robert E. Lee. it represented the happiest marriage of strategy and tactics he would ever attain...." In summary he states "The Confederate victory at Second Manassas was primarily a triumph of maneuver and timing abetted greatly by Yankee mismanagement."
The author concludes "That John Pope lost this campaign to R.E. Lee was the fault, primarily, of John Pope....He utterly failed in the basic responsibilities of commanding an army on the battlefield."
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