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Yet Aron expects to get away with it--and based on the reviews of this book, he will succeed. The New York Times has termed Aron's book "a fine, full-blooded portrait of Yeltsin." With the help of ignorant blurbs like that one, Aron's target readers will end up believing that Yeltsin and his friends were doing God's work, or at least Adam Smith's--rather than divvying up the plunder of a fallen empire while its stunned, exhausted people were too weak to resist.
None of the great scandals of Yeltsin's reign are mentioned, let alone explained. Where's the Loans-for-Shares scheme, possibly the biggest single act of embezzlement of the twentieth century? Aron has such contempt for his readers that rather than come up with an alibi for Yeltsin, he never so much as mentions the whole sleazy deal. In fact, Aron has so little respect for his readers that he actually attempts to tell them that the oligarchs are a myth:
"...The secrecy in which the Russian robber barons cloaked their dealings resulted in a vast exaggeration of their wealth and power both by the Moscow rumour mill and by the resident correspondents of Western newspapers and television networks..."
Having assured his readers that Yeltsin's accomplices are mythical beasts, he goes on to deny, without elaboration, some well-proven charges against Yeltsin:
"...equally bizarre [is] the 'theory' that explained Yeltsin's dependence on the oligarchs by the gifts which they showered on his family--as if the President of Russia, should he decide to do so, needed intermediaries in raiding the country's treasury."
What's so "bizarre" about that "theory"? "Intermediaries in raiding the country's treasury" is, if anything, a mild description of people like Berezovskiy and Chubais, who may well be remembered as the greatest thieves in the history of the world. Yeltsin's job was to present a "democratic" face to the West while the robbery was being carried out, not to heft the sacks of cash out to the car by himself. (He's not in that kind of condition.) That's not a "bizarre theory"; that's simple division of labour.
But the sleaziest move of all is Aron's slander of every Russian who objected to Yeltsin's regime. Aron, trusting once more that his audience is totally ignorant of Russia, dares to assert that all those who opposed Yeltsin were anti-Semitic fascists. In other words, Russians who objected to seeing their jobs, their savings, their country whisked away were no more than Jew-baiting racists. What to do, then, with a man like Yavlinsky, the half-Jewish leader of the only truly democratic anti-corruption party in the Duma? Aron, whose tolerance extends to monsters like Chubais, loses control whenever he's forced to mention Yavlinsky's name. In Aron's grovelling tale of the Yeltsinschina, Yavlinsky--virtually the only uncorrupted politician in contemporary Russia--becomes a villian.
Goebbels would be proud to have written this book. Aron was no doubt well paid to string together so many pages without a glimmer of truth. And judging by the response of the American press, it was money well spent.
Stylistically it is fairly readable, though it is probably longer than it needs to be, and a bit heavy-going at times. As you might expect, it is not as readable as some of the journalistic accounts of Yeltsin's Russia. Aron relies a lot on formal sources like Yeltsin's speeches. Although he did go so far as to hunt down and interview some of Yeltsin's old acquaintances in Sverdlovsk, the same kind of intimacy with insiders is lacking later in the book.
One peculiarity of the book is the amount of space devoted to Yeltsin's career before he became president. This is both its strength and its weakness. Aron does a convincing job of showing that Yeltsin was no bumbling alcoholic, but a first-class manager and an astute analyst of Communism's failure. He rose to power because he was the quickest to recognise the irredeemable failure of the Soviet system which Gorbachev was trying to fix. Aron accurately depicts the Soviet economic collapse - something which gets almost forgotten today, when everyone wants to blame Russia's economic problems on Yeltsin.
Unlike the yes-men which the Communist hierarchy bred in droves, Yeltsin also had remarkable political courage. He showed this on several key occasions, most notably during the coup of 1991. Yeltsin correctly foresaw that the coup would fail, at a time when this was far from obvious to everyone else.
While the analysis of Yeltsin's early career is welcome, it could have been trimmed down. It seems a bit eccentric to devote less than a third of the book to Yeltsin's presidency (with only a single chapter on Yeltsin's second term). This compares with an entire chapter on a trip Yeltsin made to the US in the 1980s, for example.
The account of Yeltsin's presidency also makes some important points. Yeltsin's main political opponents were indeed a pretty unsavoury bunch, and not misunderstood social democrats. Yeltsin did launch real and necessary economic reforms - another act of political courage. Under Yeltsin, Russians have indeed become freer than at any previous time in their history.
But Russia isn't entirely democratic either. Aron skirts around some more unpleasant aspects of Yeltsin's rule. While he is surely right that there were many objective reasons why Russians voted for Yeltsin in 1996, several Yeltsin advisers have admitted that the elections would have been cancelled if Yeltsin had believed that he was going to lose. Fraudulent privatisations are mentioned, but they don't get much analysis. Sometimes we find that other inconvenient facts (like allegations of vote-rigging) are confined to footnotes.
As well as the bold (but rather intermittent) reformer, there was also another Yeltsin: the ex-Soviet apparatchik with his bevy of unpleasant cronies. This Yeltsin does crop up in Aron's autobiography, particularly in the second half of his first term. Aron is quite forthright in his condemnation of the Chechen war, for instance. But he regards this Yeltsin as a kind of temporary abberration.
The trouble is that this Yeltsin actually had a habit of recurring. The book ends rather abruptly with the appointment of the Primakov government in 1998, but extending the story to 2000 would probably not help Aron's rehabilitation of Yeltsin. The last year of Yeltsin's presidency was dominated by sordid corruption scandals, a new war in Chechnya, and an unceremonious struggle for succession.
All the same, the appointment of Putin looks a lot smarter than it did at the time (something which can be said about several of Yeltsin's mercurial hirings and firings). And with the political stability that Putin has provided, the economic reforms of the 1990s now seem to be bearing fruit. Despite fears over Putin's authoritarian tendencies, the democratic achievements of the 1990s also seem pretty secure.
A case can be made for saying that despite all the scandals, Yeltsin was guided in many key decisions by a consistent vision of a reformed and democratic Russia. This is essentially the case that Aron makes. Not everyone will be convinced, but Yeltsin probably deserves more credit than most people are inclined to give him these days.
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The politics are rough and tumble, and not without some intrique.
I would definetly recommend this to any one who has the remotest interest in this field.