If you ever wanted to know what it would be like to go into a battlefield without a gun, read this book. If you ever wanted to know how it would feel to provide confort and counsel to men in a seemingly godless world of hate and destruction, read this book. If you are a Catholic and would like to read about some modern day "angels" doing God's work under very difficult curcumstances, read this book. If you enjoy studying the "little stories" in WWII, read this book. Don Crosby spent a great deal of time interviewing these chaplins who are literally dying off as you read this. But their captivating stories live on in this important historical chronicle. The book is an easy read and one you will fondly remember for a long time.

The Duel for France, 1944-The Men and Battles that Changed the Fate of Europe by Martin Blumenson, 2000, 432 pages (soft cover)
This easily read book never lets the reader forget that flesh and blood-soldiers, led by officers with human doubts, limitations, and determination conducted the Allies' breakout and pursuit from their initial Normandy lodgment to the German border during the summer of 1944. Martin Blumenson shows us the conduct of war. He shares command pressures and responsibilities, as well as the combat soldier's hopes and fears. The more familiar characters-Eisenhower, Bradley, Patton, Montgomery and their German counterparts are there. However, unlike most popular writings, opposing corps commanders also come sharply into focus. These particular individuals have been generally overlooked in popular writings {official as well as unofficial), in favor of regimental, divisional, army, and army group commanders. Blumenson succeeds admirably in correcting this imbalance. This is a masterly and dramatic military narrative in the great tradition-and a moving human record of a turning point in history. Its recent publication in paperback (2000) shows its enduring value.
This book was originally published less than a year after the author published the official World War II Army history of this same period of time-Breakout and Pursuit (1962). That official history represents the definitive account Operation Cobra and the Allied pursuit across France. The Duel for France, is similar in scope to the official volume but different in treatment. This is not simply a short version of Breakout and Pursuit. Rather, the author created a new book, no more definitive but more readable. He raised the level of treatment and provided a much more personalized account of the higher-level Allied and German commanders in action. In my opinion, this was because as a private author-instead of a government employee-Blumenson was able to avoid the desiccation process associated with the staffing and approval of official histories. I recommend this book to all those interested in the study of the military profession.

This book is essentially an expanded chapter from a larger history of operations in Italy during World War II, and it recounts the disaster that befell the 36th Division (a Texas National Guard unit) at the Rapido River. The book opens with a short recounting of the 36th Division's training and earlier engagements. The middle of the book (and obviously the original chapter) is a description of the two-day battle at the Rapido River. The end of the book summarizes the operations to take Rome, mentions later operations of the 36th Divsion, and briefly discusses the political fallout from the battle. The strong emphasis throughout the book is on the clashing personalities of the various commanding officers, and how those clashes worked to doom the attack.

A battle involving one division over two days cries out for a personal treatment. Fans of Stephen Ambrose's histories should be forewarned, however, this is not a book that spends much time describing the combat faced by the average soldier. Rather, the emphasis is on the highest ranking officers involved in the planning and execution of the attack. The best historical accounts present the "big picture," but also give the reader the immediacy of accounts of individual participants. This book could have been improved with some eyewitness accounts from both armies.

The 36th Division's attack at the Rapido River was a disaster, and I assume that most readers know this before they buy the book. Most readers want to know what happened, and where blame lies. Mr. Blumenson places blame primarily with Gen. Walker, the commander of the 36th Division. Unfortunately, the book contains a number of statements that seem to contradict one another, or which cry out for more support in the text. For example:

1. Gen. Walker is faulted for keeping most of the "politically appointed" officers in the 36th, yet there is not much discussion of how the officers later performed.

2. There is a brief mention of the vital role the 36th played in the landings in Italy, and it appears that the 36th performed well in its first combat. Later, there is a mention that some officers felt that the performance of the 36th was close to a disaster, but there is no real discussion of these conflicting assessments.

3. There is discussion of the horrible odds the 36th was asked to overcome at the Rapido River(attacking over a rain-soaked plain, across a swollen river, against a well-fortified enemy, all while under observed artillery fire), and the author notes that the task would have daunted the most experienced forces. Later, the author implies that if Gen. Walker had been more gung-ho, his troops would have performed better, and possibly carried the day.

4. There is no discussion of how the 36th performed in southern France later in the war.

These examples are among many that presented problems. By the end of the book, most readers will agree that Gen. Walker could have done a better job in stopping the attack in the planning stages, or in executing the attack. Many readers will also agree that Gen. Walker's reluctance may have made his men more reluctant to push forward when things were going badly (although German minefields and constant shelling may have contributed to the troop's unwillingness to press the fight).

The ultimate question for most readers is whether the 36th division failed because of poor performance by its men, or whether it failed because it was given a task that most other divisions could not accomplish. Other than noting that the British fared little better in a previous attack in a nearby area, no answer is given. More discussion of the fortunes of the 36th before and after the Rapido River would have helped answer this question, but these portions of the book are the very portions that seem added-on. Ultimately the book doesn't answer the most pressing questions, nor does it provide a satisfying account of the battle.

Blumenson's prowess as a military historian is well known and, while I would not rank this book among his greatest works, it clearly shows the skill of the author.

The focus of this monograph is the failed attempt by the 36th Infantry Division (Texas National Guard) to cross the Rapido River in Italy in January 1944. This particular battle was, of course, merely one small facet of the larger campaign to capture Monte Cassino and, ultimately, to capture Rome.

Blumenson does a good job of both presenting a chronological study of the battle itself and dealing with the individual personalities at play in the various U.S. Army officers. These personalities are crucial to the understanding of any endeavor, but are even more important in battle, as officers are more than mere computers that make decisions based purely on their training, background, and education. Officers make decisions based on ego, personality, fear, hatred, and a concern for the lives of their men (which is an underlying theme of this volume). The caution (if one can call it that) that Blumenson gives to students of military history is that a commander must value the lives of his men, but he can never allow the men to be more important than the mission.

The principle characters of Blumenson's drama are Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, commander of the 5th Army, Major General Geoffrey T. Keyes, commander of the II Corps, and Major General Fred L. Walker, commander of the 36th Infantry Division. One of the sources of contention between Clark, Keyes, and Walker was their difference in age. Now it is important to note that U.S. Army officers have always been taught to respect the chain of command and be loyal to their superiors. Nevertheless, it is easy to understand how an officer might feel slighted by having as his commander someone who is actually younger than him. This situation occurs most frequently during wars, since the rapid expansion of the Army accelerates promotions. In this instance, Clark was almost 10 years younger than both Keyes and Walker, while Keyes was a year younger than Walker. Keyes and Walker, therefore, were both somewhat resentful of Clark's rapid promotion, while Walker himself harbored a similar attitude toward Keyes. Another source of contention between Clark, Keyes, and Walker were their differences in personality. Blumenson describes Clark as, "aggressive, impatient, imperious in bearing, and inclined to be sharp of tongue," while he also had, ". . . a flair for publicizing himself and his activities." (19) Keyes was a just more pleasant individual, who had, ". . . a gift of tact," but Walker believed that he was, ". . . too impulsive, too restless, too flighty - in short, too cavalry - in outlook." (39-40) Walker, unlike his compatriots, was, ". . . diffident and self-effacing, patient and mild-mannered." (20) It is with these, as other issues, as a backdrop that Blumenson begins his examination of the battle itself.

During the Battle of the Rapido River, the comparatively inexperienced 36th Infantry Division would be faced by the battle-hardened German 15th Panzer Grenadier Division. Not only was the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division a much more experienced division, but it also occupied a carefully prepared defensive position, which had its forward edge along the Rapido River. Lastly, the 36th Infantry Division was expected to make a night river crossing despite the fact that its assembly areas were under full observation by the enemy during the day.

Ultimately, the 36th Infantry Division would be badly mauled in its attempt to cross the Rapido River. Who was to blame for the division's failure to secure its objectives? Who was to blame for the severe casualties that the division suffered? These are the questions for which Blumenson attempts to find answers, but it is the interplay of personalities, rather than the battle itself, that really makes his monograph worth reading.

Martin Blumenson's "Heroes Never Die" is a decent book, probably really quite good for a "newbie" to WWII history, but it will likely disappoint those more versed. This book is a compilation of essays Blumenson has written over a nearly 50 year period, most of which have been published before elsewhere (although not together). Blumenson's style is pretty good and he weaves a nice story, however he appears (from this book and the titles of his other books) to be very focused on limited topics of WWII. Now don't misread this comment, this is not all bad. Blumenson is certainly one of the world's expert biographers of G. Patton. But having said that much of "Heroes" is redundantly dedicated to Blumenson's personal favorites. When I say redundant here, this also should not be misunderstood - I do MEAN REDUNDANT! Redundant to the level of self-plagiarism. I read many passages, almost verbatim, at least three times sometimes more. Several chapters are dedicated to Patton but after the first two you read the rest provide little new, although 30-40 years separate the publishing of some. I can however say that despite the redundant nature of "Heroes" that there was enough "new" material here for me to walk away satisfied. Most of my WWII reads are centered between Berlin and the Channel and the Channel and Berlin, with a few stops in northern Africa. I had previously read little about the Italian campaigns, and this seems to be one of Blumenson's favored topics. Thus I was treated to ample new material (although again in a redundant fashion).

I gave "Heroes Never Die" three stars here but if it were slightly (even a few of the 40 plus chapters) less redundant in content it would have gotten 4. It's a solid, easily read book that I did enjoy. A bit pricey as a new book but certainly worth a used cost. If you're new to the genre this is a worthy book, even at full price.