Feuchtwanger has a provided a valuble introdcution to Bismark for the English speaking world. While superior to other single volume treatments of Bismark in English (like Waller and Taylor) Feuchtwanger's work is nonetheless limited in its understanding of Bismark's political genius. For example, Feuchtwanger constantly refers to the "reactionary" policies of Bismark and his "conservative" cohorts toward German liberalism but does not seem to think of the revolutionary aspirations of the liberals as a "reaction" in itself to the Prussian monarchy. A tacit acknowledgement on Feuchtwanger's part of Bismark's own "white revolution" does not receive the analysis necessary to explain how Bismark was able to successfully navigate between the kaiser, parliament, Zollverein, liberal German nationalists, an overmatched Napoleon III and the Osterreich to create modern Deutchland. Bismark so sucessfully tied together a land that had never been politically unified because of internal conflict and constant invasion from France from the west, and pressure from Russia in the east and the Habsburg's from the south, that it was able to withstand defeat in two world wars and over four decades of political division in the form of Soviet occuapation. There is nothing in Feuchtwanger's work that attempts to explain how this was possible. Obviously this is because Feuchtwanger does not want to explain it--taking the usual position of the Left by stating the creation of Germany could have been achieved differently and ignoring the historical fact that for a thousand years it had not been done differently--choosing instead to view Bismark through the ideological lens of Britian's contemporary Labour party.

Throughout Feuchtwanger fails to come to grips with Bismark's own lack of ideology and use of all means available to him (of course the famed _Realpolitik_) as if it is inconceivable that a statesman not simply bow to the philistine forces unleashed by the French Revolution. Regardless of how "mythological" a figure Bismark may be in German history one cannot explain such an unlikely achievement in the face of overwhelming odds without a more thorough analysis of the facts themselves. Feuchtwanger tell us in his introduction that Germans struggle to deal with the "Bismark myth" but that Anglo-Saxons have the advantage of approaching Bismark without such mental baggage. Feuchtwanger however was not able to overcome his own Anglo-Saxon mental baggage resulting from the aftermath of two world wars and the Anglo-Saxon desire to dole out blame for these great political disasters. Nor does he point out that Germans were historically disposed to view France as an arch enemy which had for hundreds of years prevented the unification of Germany out of fear of German ascendency. Feuchtwanger admits that Bismark was far too adroit politically to subject Germany to such overwhelming military odds, and far too sophisticated philosophically to engage in the practices that emerged after his departure, but nontheless surreptitiously links Bismark to the events that followed. I do not deny that Bismark manipulated the forces available to him in a way that prevented others, like the National Liberals, from gaining more political power in Germany, thereby preventing the institutionalization of needed governmental agencies. But to conclude from this that Bismark himself, and not the geopolitical and historical factors alluded to above, was the "cause" of events that occurred in the next century is quite dubious. I would suggest this is much closer to mythology than the mythology Feuchtwanger wishes to invoke. It is typical of left leaning historians to speak of the "myth" of the Great Man as a force of history but then to turn around and make responsible those same Great Men for whatever ills they wish to lament. There is sufficiant documentary evidence, however, to clarify the case of Bismark. After all, what Bismark actually did (unify Germany through masterful foreign policy and make it the most powerful state in Europe) is there in the historical record. The myths as historical connections are foisted on afterwards.

Alan Mitchell's thin book describes the relations between France and Germany under Bismarck. France was a diplomatic pariah in Europe. But when Napoleon 3 overthrew Louis Philip, Bismarck realized that Napoleon iii was unpredictable, but he could be dealt with. Bismarck decided that Prussia should keep its options open toward France, no matter what Austria decided. France's success and Russia's defeat in the Crimean War supported Bismarck's belief that the Holy Alliance was over and that Napoleon 3 was a man to be reckoned with, and that Napoleon 3 did not want to oppose Prussia. Bismarck also realized that France might deal with Russia because they did not conflict with each other over anything.

After 1866 Bismarck placated Napoleon 3 desire for territorial compensation with empty promises. Napoleon 3 moves were useful to Bismarck to persuade the southern states to join the northern German confederation.

Mitchell quickly describes the Roman and Luxemburg problems and the causes of
the Franco-Prussian War. He writes about the peace negotiations for the Franco-Prussian War in detail. The resulting territorial annexations by Germany created a permanent desire for revenge in the French, and Bismarck wanted to make the French unable to carry out that revenge. France stayed weak and divided, not necessarily because of Bismarck, until Bismarck left office.

Mitchell's book was too short for the subject covered, but he included an excellent bibliography