Volume I:
Life of Berkeley - by Fraser.
Commonplace Book - Berkeley's notes from 1705-08.
An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision.
A Treatise Concerning the Principals of Human Knowledge [Part I].
Three Dialogs Between Hylas and Philonous.
De Motu - this is in Latin and is NOT translated.
Volume II:
Alciphron; or, the Minute Philosopher.
The Theory of Vsion, or Visual Language, Shewing the Immediate Presence and Providence of a Deity.
Volume III:
The Analyst; or a Discourse Addressed to an Infidel Mathemetician.
A Defense of Free-Thinking in Mathematics.
Reasons for not Replying to Mr. Walton's Full Answer.
Siris: A Chain of Philosophical Reflexions and Inquiries Concerning the Virtues of Tar-Water and Divers Other Subjects Connected Together and Rising From One Another.
Three Letters to Thomas Prior, Esq., and a Letter to the Rev. Dr. Hales, on the Virtues of Tar-Water.
Farther Thoughts on Tar-Water.
Volume IV:
Arithmetica Absque Algebra Aut Euclide Demonstrata - this is in Latin and is NOT translated.
Miscella Mathematica... - this is in Latin and is NOT translated.
Description of the Cave of Dunmore.
The Revelation of Life and Immortality.
Passive Obedience: or The Christian Doctrine of not resisting the Supreme Power...
Essays in the Guardian.
Two Sermons Preached at Leghorn in 1714.
Journal in Italy in 1717, 1718.
An Essay Toward Preventing the Ruin of Great Britain.
Verses on the Prospect of Planting Arts and Learning in America.
Notes of Sermons Preached at Newport in Rhode Island and in the Narragansett country in 1729-31.
A Sermon Preached before the Incorporating Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts...1732.
The Querist, containing several queries, proposed to the consideration of the public.
A Discourse Addressed to Magistrates and Men in Authority.
Primary Visitation Charge Delivered to the Clergy of the Diocese of Cloyne.
Address on Confirmation.
A Letter to Sir John James, Bart., on the Differences Between the Roman and Anglican Churches.
Two Letters on the Occasion of the Rebellion in 1745.
A Word to the Wise: or, an Exhortation to the Roman Catholic Clergy of Ireland.
Maxims Concerning Patriotism.
Appendix: The First Edition of the Querist.
General Comments:
The books are very well produced. Cloth bound, acid-free paper, burgundy colored, with a simple and elegant design. All in all, this is a handsome edition that will physically grace your library.
Fraser's commentary and footnotes are helpful and abundant (note: this is a reprint of a 1901 work, so there is of course no commentary on how Berkeley has been read in this century).
The only thing I would have wanted different than what I got would have been translations of the Latin essays into English.
Insofar as Berkeley the philosopher, he is one of the major philosophers of history, and one of the clearest writers. He is also often scathingly funny.
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"De Motu" (On Motion) was originally written in Latin. Jesseph's first service is that he provides an English translation along with the Latin version. In this essay, Berkeley described and critiqued then-contemporary theories on the nature of motion. Jesseph does the reader a great service by introducing 17th century physics to the reader, explaining terms, and tracking down Berkeley's references.
What makes "De Motu" something other than a period piece is Berkeley's methodology. In "A Treatise Concerning the Principals of Human Knowledge", Berkeley laid out an argument against terms denoting entities which could not be experienced or imagined. An example of such a thing was Newton's absolute space. In "De Motu", Berkeley wrote:
"And so let us imagine that all bodies have been destroyed and reduced to nothing. What remains they call absolute space, all relation which arose from the position and distances of bodies having been removed along with the bodies themselves. Now this space is infinite, immobile, indivisible, insensible, without relation and without distinction. That is, all of its attributes are privative and negative: it seems therefore to be merely nothing. ... Therefore let us take from absolute space just the words, and nothing will remain in the sense, imagination, or intellect; therefore they designate nothing, except pure privation or negation, that is, merely nothing."
While Berkeley granted that such terms could be useful in calculation, he argued that they led only to meaningless wrangling when imagined as real. He held up a difference between Newton and Torricelli on force as an example:
"Newton says that impressed force consists solely in action, and it is the action exerted on a body to change its state, nor does it remain after the action. Torricelli contends that a certain accumulation or aggregate of impressed forces is received by percussion in a mobile body, and that the same remains and constitutes impetus. ... And in truth, though Newton and Torricelli seem to disagree, nevertheless, each advances a consistent account, and the matter is adequately explained by both. For all forces attributed to bodies are ... mathematical hypotheses. Mathematical entities, however, have no stable essence in the nature of things: they depend on the notion of the definer: whence the same thing can be explained in different ways."
In sum, "De Motu" is valuable both as a general critique of science and as a fascinating application of Berkeley's epistimological ideas and is well worth reading on that basis.
The other Berkeley essay Jesseph covers is "The Analyst". This essay attacked the soundness of the mathematical foundations of Newton's calculus. Because Newton's notation, method, and terminology are no longer in use, the essay is difficult for the modern reader to follow. Jesseph's introduction to "The Analyst" is a fine piece of scholarship and immensely helpful, even necessary, to full understanding of Berkeley's essay.
"The Analyst" was motivated by apologetic purposes. Berkeley was annoyed at the contrast set up by "free thinkers" between religious belief and math and the sciences, and he sought to demonstrate that mathematics has its mysteries as much as religion. His target was Newton's calculus: in particular, fluxions. Fluxions were infinitesimal quantities, which Berkeley attacked as being literally inconceivable, following his general principals of meaning, and further that Newton did not handle them consistently - sometimes rounding them to zero, and other times not, with the only criterion being whichever was necessary to make the answers come out right.
"The Analyst" set off a firestorm among mathemeticians. Berkeley's acid style led to angry responses, but the mathematical problems Berkeley had attacked were real, and the defenders of Newton offered very different (and incompatible) approaches to resolving the problems Berkeley had raised, and they soon began attacking each other. It was only in the nineteeth century that the problems surrounding the foundations of Calculus were finally settled.
Certainly, "The Analyst" is of interest as a part of the history of mathematics, but it is also of interest as an application of Berkeley's general approach. The paragraph below on infinitesmals, for example, clearly follows the same approach as that on absolute space quoted previously:
"Now to conceive a Quantity infinitely small, that is, infinitely less than any sensible or imaginable Quantity, or than the least finite Magnitude, is, I confess, above my Capacity. But to conceive a Part of such infinitely small Quantity, that shall be infinitely less than it, and consequently though multiply'd infinitely shall never equal the minutest finite Quantity, is, I suspect, an infinite Difficulty to any man whatsoever...Nothing is easier to devise Expressions or Notations, for Fluxions and Infinitesimals of the first, second, third, fourth and subsequent Orders, proceeding in the same regular form without end or limit ... dx, ddx, dddx, ddddx, &c. These Expressions indeed are clear and distinct, and the Mind finds no difficulty in conceiving them to be continued beyond any assignable Bounds. But if we remove the Veil and look underneath, if laying aside the Expressions we set ourselves attentively to consider the things themselves, which are supposed to be expressed or marked thereby, we shall discover much Emptiness, Darkness, and Confusion..."
The last thing worth noting about "The Analyst" is that Berkeley wrote two follow-on essays in response to Newton's defenders, both of which are available in Fraser's "Works".
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I used the book as a text in a course on Modern Philosophy, making Berkeley my "featured philosopher" and it worked well. I learned a great deal and my students did as well.
I recommend the book for such courses, or for anyone curious to see and evaluate a strong claim that Berkeley's immaterialism is a persuasive and reasonable theory.
I didn't come away from Bruce Umbaugh's very readable book convinced that my world of perception is not undergirded by a physical reality, but I did come away knowing that I'd never again approach Berkeley with some smug sense of superiority over this "crazy view." Umbaugh makes one sit up and take note of Berkeley as one who deserves his place in early modern philosophy.
Bob Corbett Department of Philosophy Webster Univesity St. Louis, MO. and Vienna, Austria
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As for the work itself it's a recasting of Berkeley's earlier work the Principles into dialogue form. Quite what the point of this was since the Principles were already easy to read is unclear, (although a case could be made that the Dialogues require less prior knowledge of Locke than the Principles did and are therefore a better introductory work) but it's difficult to be sorry that he did as he writes the dialogue form so well, easily the best since Plato, and in my opinion probably marginally better than Plato. He handles the character who he's trying to refute much better than Plato ever did. Unfortunately his ideas aren't on a level with Plato's. As with the Principles his writing sweeps you up and it almost convinces you that perhaps matter doesn't exist and the mind is all there is, but once again take a step back and the flaws become all too apparent.
Berkeley's too important to ignore though, and besides his books are a pleasure to read. You can't do better than this edition.
As for Berkeley himself, he probably needs no introduction from me. Arguably the most judicious commentary on his thought is that of T.H. Green, who in his great _Introduction_ to Locke and Hume remarked as follows:
"His [Berkeley's] purpose was the maintenance of Theism, and a true instinct told him that pure Theism, as distinct from nature-worship and daemonism, has no philosophical foundation, unless it can be shown that there is nothing real apart from thought. But in the hurry of theological advocacy, and under the influence of a misleading terminology, he failed to distinguish this true proposition -- there is nothing real apart from thought -- from this false one, its virtual contradictory -- that there is nothing other than feeling. The confusion was covered, if not caused, by the ambiguity, often noticed, in the use of the term 'idea.' This to Berkeley's generation stood alike for feeling proper . . . and for conception, or an object thought of under relations. . . . Misled by the phrase 'idea of a thing,' we fancy that idea and thing have each a separate reality of their own, and then puzzle ourselves with questions as to how the idea can represent the thing . . . . These questions Berkeley asked and found unanswerable. There were two ways of dealing with them before him. One was to supersede them by a truer view of thought and its object, as together in essential correlation constituting the real; but this way he did not take. The other was to avoid them by merging both thing and idea in the indifference of simple feeling . . . -- an attempt which contradicts itself, since it virtually admits [the] existence [of such oppositions as inner and outer, subjective and objective] while it renders them unaccountable." [_Hume and Locke_, 1968 Apollo edition, pp. 140-142.]
This summary may not be quite adequate to Berkeley's thought overall, as later in life he does appear to have come round to a view not altogether unlike Green's. However, it seems to me to be an eminently fair assessment of the Berkeley represented in the present volume.
At any rate Berkeley was a fascinating thinker and this volume is as good an introduction to him as is available. The _Dialogues_ should eventually be read in conjunction with the _Principles_ (which they were intended to support), but anyone looking for a single volume in which to meet this great and seminal philosopher will be safe in beginning with this one.
If you are studying Berkeley seriously then it would be best to get the Oxford editions of his Principals and Three Dialogues. They contain much longer and better introductions and numerous other notes. But it may also be worth your money to buy this book too. Although the majority of this book is the two works just mentioned, also included in this collection are several other rare works of Berkeley's including his notebooks and De Motu among others. It's extremely difficult to get hold of these outside of the reprint of the 1901 Collected Works, and so if like me you don't have $450 to throw around, this is your best option, especially since it is so cheap.
Berkeley's concepts can be only examined out of pure reason basically, since his theory rest merely on speculative thought. Nor is it possible to show any concrete proof for his arguments, however I find it much harder to disapprove his concepts since it all depends on rational thinking and not material evidence. His views provoke an exciting approach to a new metaphysics and reality.
This book should be read with the utmost clearness of mind, and one must eliminate all prejudice from the mind. Although a fairly easy book to read, one must dedicate time to deep reflection when considering its arguments.
I highly recommend this book for those interested in philosophy, specially in metaphysics, this is a must-read!
First, this edition is, like the others in this Oxford range, superb, with an excellent long introduction and numerous helpful notes. You can't do better than this unless you're looking for all of his works shoved into one volume, like the Everyman. So basically, if you're looking to study Berkeley seriously, get this edition (and pick up the Dialogues too).
On to the work itself. Berkeley's starting point is Locke's theory of substance, so it's a good idea to familiarise yourself with that first. His basic proposition is Locke's theory of ideas, without the substratum supporting them - there is, therefore, nothing material in the world other than our minds. Berkeley is a brilliant writer and he sweeps you up so thoroughly in his arguments that you can't help but be convinced. But once you've stop reading and take a step back the gaping holes in his arguments become quickly and painfully apparent.
Regardless of the validity of his argument, it's worth buying the work for two reason; his historical importance, and the sheer quality of writing - it's a highly enjoyable work to read; only Plato equals Berkeley for easy and enjoyable to read works of philosophy.
This book is to be strongly recommended as it provides a multitude of resources that contextualise, criticise, and clarify, the positions put forward by Berkeley in this work.
The most substantial contribution is the extensive introduction comprised of 15 punchy sections, covering Berkeley's life, his academic heritage, and analysis of his thought (both internal and external to that given in the Treatise). Dancy is fair to Berkeley in setting forth the most robust defences of his position, and marshalling critical arguments against the Berkelian stance. This is supplemented by an extremely thorough set of endnotes that are continually present in the background of the text, offering detailed guidance whenever necessary, or desired.
Additionally, the book offers a summarised concise overview of the arguments provided in the Treatise, a glossary of archaic terms(!), and a very helpful short section entitled "How to use this book" (why don't more books include this sort of thing?). There is also a manageable annotated bibliography of further reading to trail a path for academic expansion.
Overall, I found that this book provided a systematic treatment of the text and provided a solid structure of support surrounding the subject. Also included, the letters between Berkeley and Johnson, provide an unexpected bonus. This book is relatively cheap, considering its breadth and depth. In my opinion, it is an ideal text through which to study (and enjoy) Berkeley's Treatise.
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Berkeley reasons that philosophy has gotten away from common sense, and that the way to make philosophy and natural science more accessible is to use the vocabulary and understanding of the 'vulgar' masses. Berkeley's philosophy is called Immaterialism. He holds that the only things that can properly be said to exist are 'ideas' and 'spirits.' Ideas are all objects perceived by our five senses or by logic and inference from those objects. Spirits are our minds or souls, those things that perceive, think, and exercise will. He says that all other philosophical terminology only tends to confuse us. We cannot doubt the real existence of anything in the world, because we see, feel, hear, touch, and taste these things every day. What we can doubt are philosophical quandaries like abstract ideas - for existence, while we can think of a particular person in motion, we can neither conceive of a person in abstract nor of motion in general. This, Berkeley contends, is all that common sense gives to the plainest of people. Ordinary people do not doubt the existence of trees or gloves, nor do they conjecture about matter or substrata underlying the things they interact with everyday.
The 'Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous' serve to support the philosophical arguments that Berkeley made in the 'Principles.' Hylas is a materialist, while Philonous represents Berkeley's immaterialist argument. Their three dialogues are extremely entertaining and informative. They compliment the technical philosophy by providing concrete examples, which are many times missing from Berkeley's treatise. While the treatise and the dialogues can be read and understood on their own, the fullest appreciation of Berkelely comes from reading both. One limitation of Berkeley is that his 'vulgar' notions are almost too simplistic. He takes Occom's razor almost to the point of absurdity, which causes him to dispute notions like gravity, which these days one may well frown upon. Other than matters of advanced mathematical or scientific complexity, however, Berkeley's immaterialism seems, on the surface, to make great sense.
Another interesting facet of these two works is their religious component. An Anglican bishop, Berkeley makes use of his belief in God both to support his arguments, and uses immaterialist arguments to simply (far more simply than Descartes) prove the existence of God. Not quite an enthralling read, but, who reads philosophy to be enthralled? The arguments are interesting, the arguments well-supported, and possible objections deftly handled.
The most important work of Berkeley is "A Treatise Concerning the Principals of Human Knowledge [Part I]" (there is no part II - the partial manuscript for it was lost while Berkeley was travelling). "Principals" has two principal sections: one epistemological and the other metaphysical.
In the epistemological section of "Principals", Berkeley argued that when we use words to describe entities which we literally cannot imagine, we block our own understanding - "that we have first raised a dust and then complain we cannot see." We can use words to stand for a multiplicity of different entities (such as "triangle" to stand for all possible triangles), but that an abstract triangle, one that is "neither oblique nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once", (here he was quoting Locke) is an impossibility. The significance of this is subtle, but critical to his argument since he came back to it again and again throughout his works to differentiate between meaningful and meaningless words.
Having laid out a differentiation between meaningful and meaningless words in his epistemological section, Berkeley then proceeded to the metaphysical section, in which he attacked the idea of matter, principally as expounded by Locke. Berkeley argued that matter is a meaningless word, signifying nothing that we can imagine. He argued that all of the properties that materialists ascribe to matter are either perceptions (non-existent in the absence of a perceiver) or utterly meaningless. Thus, Berkeley argued that a theory of matter to account for our perceptions was a meaningless proposition. Our perceptions of the world (our ideas of it), however, still required an explanation. To this end, Berkeley argued the things we perceive are ideas that are put into our minds by God. They differ from things that we imagine by our lack of control over them, and in their consistency and vividness - properties that are the result of their being the product of a mind other than and vastly more powerful than our own. In this argument, Berkeley felt that he had discovered a powerful counter to atheism, that his theistic idealism could account for the world whereas atheism, with its dependency on matter, could not.
"Principals" did not meet with the acceptance that Berkeley had hoped for it (to say the least), so he presented his metaphysics again in a more accessible form in "Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous." "Dialogs" is easier to read, but not as good a source as "Principals" for really understanding Berkeley. In either form, the critical side of his argument against matter had and has great force, even if his proposed alternative has never attracted many adherents.
Berkeley also presented his metaphysics again in less detail in two other works: the fourth dialogue in "Alciphron; or, the Minute Philosopher" and in "The Theory of Vision, or Visual Language, Shewing the Immediate Presence and Providence of a Deity."
"Commonplace Book - Berkeley's notes from 1705-08." is a collection of short notes that Berkeley jotted down while he was working through his philosophical ideas and preparing to publish them. "Commonplace Book" itself was never intended for publication but is of interest in understanding how Berkeley's thought developed.
Berkeley also wrote on scientific matters, consistent with his views as laid out in "Principals", on vision in "An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision", (which he actually wrote before "Principals" which he hoped would soften the audience for the presentation of the full theory in "Principals" and also in "De Motu" (On Motion).
Berkeley also wrote on mathematics, again consistently with his philosophical writings in "The Analyst; or a Discourse Addressed to an Infidel Mathematician" and the follow-on works "A Defense of Free-Thinking in Mathematics" and "Reasons for not Replying to Mr. Walton's Full Answer". "The Analyst" - an attack on the foundations of Newton's calculus, set off a furor in British mathematics that lasted a century.
"Alciphron" alluded to earlier, was a work of Christian apologetics, and was Berkeley's longest work. It is not without interest today, but it has not aged as well as his other works mentioned above.
"Passive Obedience: or The Christian Doctrine of not resisting the Supreme Power", was a work of political philosophy. It is not at all connected with his other philosophical works and was regarded as dangerous and somewhat subversive.
The last work of Berkeley that deserves individual mention is "Siris: A Chain of Philosophical Reflexions and Inquiries Concerning the Virtues of Tar-Water and Divers Other Subjects Connected Together and Rising From One Another", a curious (to put it mildly) work on both "tar-water", which Berkeley held to be a panacea, and metaphysical speculation inspired by reading classical sources (if you don't know what tar-water is, don't worry - you can get the recipe in "Siris"). "Siris" was written near the end of Berkeley's life. The metaphysical speculation in it did not constitute an abandonment of his earlier ideas, but it did not strike me as at all developed - he was going somewhere new but had not yet arrived when he wrote it.
Apart from his intellectual endeavors above, Berkeley also led a full life and was an active Anglican clergyman. He travelled, wrote on purely religious matters, and also wrote in support of social justice and tolerance. These works round out the man, as does "Life of Berkeley", Fraser's biographical essay at the start of the collection.
The collection is not without its flaws. Chief among these is that "De Motu" is left in Latin and untranslated both it and "The Analyst" really require more extensive introductions to be easily understood by a contemporary reader. Douglas Jesseph's "De Motu and The Analyst", Volume 41 of "The New Syntheses Historical Library" is a highly recommended supplement to the "Works".