This collection of philosophy is a decent (but perhaps somewhat outdated in some mind-matter concepts) introduction to Metaphysics. In general it is a valuable source and interesting read. It shows us the eternal change, or flux, of reality. Constant creativity, or, eternity. If movement isn't everything, it is nothing. This is a book about Duration. He sees time as only that which prevents everything from happening at once. But the broader perspective of this book is noteworthy. Philosophy needs precision and the genuine search for truth which is held by science. Without scientific precision, we preoccupy ourselves with false, unanswerable questions. And he goes over some of these, and by resolving them shows such things as it is absurd to suppose that disorder logically or chronologically precedes order. He sees science and philosophy as capable of being complementary."Science and metaphysics will differ in object and method, but will commune in experience." It seems that the precision is needed to actually arrive at answers to our questions as opposed to giving birth to even more new questions. His works are against the widespread solely dialectic philosophizing which applies its facts to all other areas outside of its investigation. The difference between metaphysics and science will be, namely, that whereas science relies on analysis metaphysics will use Intuition. He holds them as definitely two distinct arts, but both of equal value and both capable of reaching the bottom of reality. He makes a big claim: that he rejects the accepted consensus of the relativity of knowledge and our inability to reach absolutes. Between the two fields of precise knowledge, he places moral, social, and even organic life. This should be a well appreciated book to the philosopher of any level. The philosopher neither obeys nor commands, but seeks to be one with nature.

As has been noted by others in previous reviews this book is about several issues: one a kind of autobiography of his life's work and as well a lesson in what philosophy is and should be in comparison to science. Bergson points out that science much as other fields such as literature, philosophy, art and so on rely on two ways of approaching reality one is the scientific systematic, mechanical way which is practiced by the majority of researchers and the intuitive way which is used occasionally to make headway. The first of these approaches clarifies succinctly what has been discovered in a systematic way which aims to make the phenomenon explicit as a whole, the second of these, the intuitive approach, is that which is required to make the initial leap, the creative surge needed to make sense of a phenomenon which no longer makes sense when old approaches are applied. As such, both of these approaches need to be practised side by side with scientists and artists both making use of them. Unfortunately the first of these, the standard methodical approach, is prone to be considered the only way of attack on a problem given the intellect which is a system to analyse and make use of the world's phenomena. This ensures a mechanical way of thought comes to the fore. Bergson stresses that this method is well and good where it applies, mostly after a discovery has been made, but in the stages where something is to be understood as a whole rather than as made of parts, intuition comes in providing the guiding light, a sort of vague feeling of rightness or truth which cannot be denied. From this pont it is developed using the first method, but the first method cannot succeed without this creative step.

It needs to be noted that the systematic approach is relatively easy to implement for a mind trained in it, as are most of today's researchers, and unfortunately it is difficult to escape the confining modes of thought which prevail once this method has gained a firm foothold of the mind. The creative approach is vague and fleeting seeming to glide past you as you attempt to grab hold. This is the wrong approach, it needs to be cultivated without a method otherwise it is a sham intuition and just another form of the first method. Strangely enough once such an intuition has overwhelmed the mind it convinces not by argument or proof but by a strong sense of rightness, "this is true and that is all", it cannot be denied. Any attempt to deny this makes no sense as even those who argue against this possibility themselves suffer from these intuitions which they cannot explain either.

Bergson was a man who lived this intuitive mode more than most, especially through his experience of duration. He is qualified more than most in describing this way of "thinking", actually sensing, and he brings it out in this fine book. Although not as illuminating as his "Creative Evolution" it is still a very well written book and he deserves his Nobel prize for literature. Compare this with for example "Process and Reality" by Whitehead which is so full of obscurity it stands as a prime example of how not to write. It is Whitehead's attempt to be clear which is his downfall in fact.

As always Bergson's books are themselves examples of intuitive writing if there is such a thing.

This book is composed of two introductory essays accompanied by several other essays from various period's in Bergson's life. Thus, there is no flow in the book; one can probably start on any of the essays. However, because the book lacks a direct flow of thought, I found it necessary to often go back and reread sections that are further elaborated on elsewhere. Prior to this book, i was only familiar with Bergson through Deleuze, yet Bergson does not assume that his reader is familiar with concepts such as "duration" that are developed more completely elsewhere and gives adequate explanations in "The Creative Mind." Bergson's main task in this book is to explore "philosophical intution". He admirably points out the necessity for such a way of knowing, namely, its abilty to grasp pure movement, duration. He argues against the idea that philosophy should attempt to be a grand synthesis of positive science and instead argues that philosophy should be complementary to science, such that they have "points in common" at which they can verify one another. In addition to this, there are several other topics discussed, such as the "possible" in relation to the "real". Overall, although i really enjoyed reading this book as it is full of clever insights and is written with an honesty and passion that is rare in philosophy, i find that Bergson ultimately fails to distinguish metaphysics from science in the manner in which he desires. Despite this, as the title suggests, this is a book that encourages us to recognize what is unique and novel in things, including our own thought, as opposed to thinking of ourselves and other thinkers as merely part of a historical norm and things as existing only in relation to some higher essence-- that is, what is unique and novel in things, their essence, comes from within and is immanent to the things themselves and does not come "from above".

Henri Bergson believed that to laugh was to correct. Only the intellectual laughed, one who was detached from emotion. Bergson's claim is that laughter requires an absence of emotion, yet at the same time throughout his essay he proved how laughter is always accompanied with emotion. Bergson's main thesis loses value in his assertion of the necessity of understanding another to laugh, his own attachment of emotion to laughter and his consistent contradiction of his points throughout the work. In the non-emotional world where Bergson resides pure-intelligences refrain from all tears but still participate in laughter. Laughter is a state of no emotion which those who understand the social and moral laws use as a tool. Of course one must have risen above emotion to use this tool. In fact according to Bergson it is impossible to laugh if one has emotion. The first problem to this thesis is found on pg. 11 where he is describing what is necessary for someone to laugh, "This intelligence, however, must always remain in touch with other intelligences." The idea that one individual can be in touch with another revolves around the essence of emotion. It is impossible to read another person without emotion.

Understanding and feeling another's perspective is the only way to be in touch with that person. Thus an intelligent person who apparently is the one who laughs is also the one who is in touch with others. Bergson goes on to further contradict himself as he reiterates later on that one must silence his/her emotions and rely only on intelligence. The most intelligent person according to Bergson is a laugher. He says, "Comedy can only begin at the point where our neighbors personality ceases to affect us." (121). Heaven help us if the most knowledgeable leaders of society are people without feeling for the person next door. Bergson himself adds emotion to laughter himself in a statement he writes on pg. 95. "If laughter were not always a pleasure and mankind did not pounce upon the slightest excuse for indulging in it." Does not the feeling of pleasure require an emotion? Pleasure is an emotion. Pleasure cannot be described appropriately without attaching the word feeling to it. One cannot be absent in feeling and then feel pleasure at the same time. Does one look for the slightest excuse to do something that brings them no feeling? According to Bergson it does.

Bergson's final statements about laughter also add emotion. Laughter is apparently gaiety on the outside and when one really comes to know it then it becomes bitter. How does one know gaiety? He/she feels it. How does one know bitterness? She/he feels it. What is emotion? It is simply being in a certain state of feeling. While discussing the cause of laughter interpersonally Bergson said this: "Or rather our body sympathizes...we put ourselves for a very short time in his place...if amused by anything laughable in him, invite him, in imagination to share his amusement with us"(175). All of the sudden laughter has become a sympathizing moment, it no longer is a point where we could care less about our neighbor. Then on the following page his argument changes again. "It would fail in its object if it bore the stamp of sympathy or kindness." Within in a matter of two pages Bergson has labeled laughter as sympathizing and then without sympathy. If Bergson was able to make up his own mind about the nature of laughter perhaps he would be more convincing. Laughter sometimes holds no consideration for another person, Bergson is correct there. Where he has failed is in covering only one aspect of laughter. Although Bergson tried to describe laughter as something intended to humiliate, even he could not stick to his point. Laughter, in his writing, came with emotion no matter what way he attempted to get around it. His own writing destroyed his thesis as it smelled of laughter being an emotional experience.

Bergson is the second philosopher who consider laughter and try to find out the reasons why we laugh. Aristoteles did also this in his book about comedy, but here we have a more modern view on it. I recommend this to all who are interested in why and from what we laugh.

Why is a pun amusing? In brief, it treats something human as if it were something mechanical. Language is a way of conveying meanings from one human to another, and the most inflexible, most mechanical, most artifiial POSSIBLE way of looking at words is to classify them by their sound alone. That's precisely what a pun does.

When Mel Brooks is playing a Polish actor playing Hitler, he says: "All I want is peace. A little piece of Poland, a tiny piece of France...." That is amusing -- the juxtaposition of the vital and the mechanical.

More sophisticated jokes than such puns are based on the same juxtaposition. Here is one of Bergson's example, from a play by Labiche. "Just as M. Perrichon is getting into the railway carriage, he makes certain of not forgetting any of his parcels: 'Four, five, six, my wife seven, my daughter eight, and myself nine.'"

This book is an evangelical revival for intellectuals. Here's a quote:

"And all great mystics declare that they have the impression of a current passing from their soul to God, and flowing back again from God to mankind.
Let no one speak of material obstables to a soul thus freed!"

It might delight a religious scholar but what little I was able to penetrate left me desparate for clear meaningful statements.