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Aleksandr Fursenko is Chairman of the History Department of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Timothy Naftali is a Fellow in International Security Studies at Yale University. Their book, based on unprecedented research into Russian archives and exhaustive unearthing of official American documents, provides the most authoritative account of superpower brinkmanship before and during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, which at its height was arguably the most dangerous moment of the Cold War. Their analysis explains how and why by 1960 the Cuban issue had come to define the superpower conflict as forcefully as the future of West Berlin or nuclear testing. Rightly, the story begins with what has often been forgotten: the popularity of Fidel Castro and his triumphant visit to America in April 1959, less than four months after over-throwing the Cuban dictator Batista. Castro's primary objective was to decrease American leverage over Cuban affairs, while the Kremlin was planning a covert operation to assist the Cuban army at the request of Fidel's brother, Raul Castro, who was a secret member of the Cuban Communist Party, a fact then unknown to Fidel. The opening of KGB and Presidium documents shows that Moscow was ready to do more for Castro than Castro felt it prudent to accept, given his domestic struggle for legitimacy. By March 1960, however, the explosion of a Belgian arms shipment in Havana harbour convinced Castro of the need for overt Soviet assistance to deter American intervention. By July 1960, Cuba had moved into the Soviet camp when Khrushchev gave a Soviet commitment to defend Cuba. From January 1961 Khrushchev identified his leadership of the communist world and the prestige of the Soviet Union with the health of Cuba and Castro.
Cuba was an immediate priority for John Kennedy in December 1960. On 12 April 1961, he assured the world that America did not intend to invade Cuba. This book gives a detailed description of the bungled Bay of Pigs operation later in April, which was largely caused by the failure to understand how essential air superiority would be to the success of the entire operation. Thereafter, Moscow took a commanding role in the Cuban security service. The choice of communism had been made by Raul in the early 1950s, by Che Guevara in 1957 and by Fidel in 1959. Now a proper police state had been set up at an eight-minute flight away from Miami. After the Bay of Pigs, the link between the Attorney General Robert Kennedy and the GRU (Military Intelligence) representative, Georgi Bolshakov, gave the Kremlin the best look inside the thinking of the Kennedy administration that any intelligence service could hope for. Notably, the KGB file on the younger Kennedy showed him to be more anti-Soviet than his brother. Cuban security intelligence, improved by the KGB, thwarted CIA and central American attempts to assassinate Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara in the summer of 1961. This prompted Castro in September 1961 to ask for increased Soviet military assistance. Moscow could see how the situation was heating up when John Kennedy made contact with Khrushchev's son-in-law and slyly compared his problem in Cuba with what Khrushchev had faced in Hungary before 1956. Kennedy wanted the problem to be solved without an American invasion, but his wish was opposed by the CIA..
In May 1962, Khrushchev discussed with his closest advisers in the Presidium the plan to put medium-range missiles with nuclear warheads in Cuba. Although seriously criticized by Alexseev, the KGB representative in Cuba, the Presidium approved the missile proposal, which Khrushchev explained had the dual objective of demonstrating to Castro that the Soviet Union would defend his revolution, while reminding Washington of Soviet power. Castro interpreted the Soviet plan as a gesture to improve the position of the socialist camp in the international arena, not as a desperate ploy to prevent an American attack. In July 1962, the Kremlin used the Bolshakov link to warn against the use of American reconnaissance planes to photograph the cargoes on the ships making their way to Cuba. Before the end of the summer of 1962, Khrushchev instructed Bolshakov to explain to Robert Kennedy that the Soviet Union was placing defensive weapons in Cuba. He now took the line that the Soviet Union and America were equally strong, and in September 1962 he authorized the sending of six atomic bombs while emphasizing his control over their use. This meant that by the end of September 1962 Khrushchev and Kennedy were much closer to military action that they had ever wanted to be.
On 2 October 1962, Kennedy ordered the armed services to start preparing for military operations against Cuba. Three days later, Bolshakov claimed to Robert Kennedy that the weapons being sent to Cuba were defensive. In fact, he was not informed of the truth. Bolshakov lived to see the end of the Cold War, but he never got over his bitterness at having been used to deceive the Kennedys. On 16 October, a U-2 spotted two nuclear missiles and six missile transports south west of Havana. But on 20 October, from a divided Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ex Comm) the blockade group carried the day against those favouring an air strike. This was reflected in Kennedy's quarantine Radio/TV address on 22 October, while Robert Kennedy assured Khrushchev via Bolshakov that America had excellent evidence of the missile deployments. So by 25 October, Khrushchev decided to dismantle the missiles, conceding that a head-to-head struggle in the nuclear era could only bring devastation to the Soviet Union. His letter of 26 October to Kennedy was a climb down. The following day Moscow was informed from Havana that Cuba expected an American air strike in the immediate future. But Khrushchev stood apart from most of the Presidium in believing that America would not attack Cuba and he did not want to threaten nuclear war when it might actually lead to one. A negotiated settlement was now within reach, as Back Channel diplomacy seemed to have succeeded.
But Castro was furious that Moscow had cut a deal without consulting Havana, as Mikoyan soon learned at the start of his visit when no common ground could be found between the two. Indeed, by 16 November, Khrushchev was prepared to pull the plug on Soviet assistance. On 20 November, Kennedy announced that Moscow had agreed to withdraw their II/28 bombers within thirty days and in response America would lift its blockade. On Christmas day 1962, a Soviet ship quietly left Havana with the last of the tactical warheads. Khrushchev's anger with Castro subsided in January 1963 as he sent him a 27-page letter, which received mixed reviews in Cuba. However, in March 1963 Castro agreed to visit the Soviet Union where he stayed for a month and had several meetings with Khrushchev discussing Soviet policy in Algeria, Angola and Albania. Khrushchev also authorized military support for Cuba and renewed the nuclear guarantee that he had first made in the summer of 1960. In June 1963, Kennedy looked forward in his ground-breaking American University speech to an early agreement on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The 'Hot Line' was also established. The Cuban missile crisis had passed into history; but Castro still loomed in the background as a potential obstacle to the achievements of the new Kennedy/Khrushchev relationship.
NIGEL CLIVE
Toland interviewed over 300 people close to Hitler: Tradul Junge, his secretary, Max Wunsche and Richard Schultze, his adjutants, Eva Braun's best friend and many others. He went to the source and his oral interviews constitute a tremendous historical resource.
Toland shows that Hitler was sexually normal, which is important since Hitler's supposed "deviant sexuality" is the lynchpin of many inferior books.
If you are to read one book about Adolf Hitler, make it this one. Nothing better has come down the pike in the 25 years since this books publication. For anyone interested in the history of the 20th century and World War II, this is a must read.
Well, if these questions continually vex you, you ought to read John Toland's splendid and provocative biography on Adolf Hitler. It is well-written, and very thorough, as it chronicles Hitler as a young boy growing up in Austria, to the founding of the Nazi party, and culminating with Hitler's ascension and command of the Third Reich. Toland provides probing insight into the forces (both in his personal life and the external political environment in Germany) which drove Hitler to relentless anti-Semitism, and the reasons for his obsession to rid the world of Jews.
He also delves into Hitler's troubled personal life, detailing his close relationship with his mother, and his somewhat ambiguous relationship with his wife, Eva Braun.
But Toland also describes other elements of Hitler's life which were more positive, such as the construction of the autobahnen (auto routes) for military transport, and the founding of the Volkswagen (the People's Car). While these are rather prominent cultural icons in today's society, who would attribute them to a man as hated and reviled as Hitler?
For anyone interested in obtaining a "complete" and "objective" picture of Adolf Hitler as a man who achieved great power and influence in one of the most economically advanced countries in the world, and not just a chronicling of his anti-Semitic actions (which should not be minimized), then I would strongly recommend John Toland's fascinating biography,"Adolf Hitler."
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This book had a profound impact on me. These types of books make me look at myself a little differently. They make me wonder just how I define what's important in my life, and they make me awe at how easy it would be to redefine "important." For Ivan, what's important is an extra bowl of food, dry gloves, and a little tobacco. But we know, when we read this, that it wasn't what was always important--once upon a time, he had a life.
Simply by becoming a prisoner of war, he's become an enemy of the State; and a prisoner of a much larger war (Stalin's war on his people).
This book is about more than Stalin and more than a workcamp. It's about much more than a day in the life of a single prisoner. It's about humanity, about questioning who we are and what it would take to make us radically different, and yes, about communism and another world.
Read it yourself--and find out.
The character Ivan mirrors A.S. in some respects, most notably in the fact that he doesn't care at all about any of the ideology behind the camp. Some of the other characters debate politics or sociology and mostly get thrown into solitary confinement. But not Ivan. He thinks about food and how he's going to get more of it. He thinks about keeping his foot wrappings dry and leaves the political proselytizing to the fools who will soon be dead.
Ironically, this is where the book finds its true literary achievement. At the heart of this character is a total disillusion, not the smallest spark of hope or faith in ideals or humanity, and yet the experience of watching this character carefully manuever his way to an extra bowl of soup, a pinch of fresh tobbacco, an old crust of bread -- it's magical somehow. The scene of the prisoners laying bricks is practically transcendental. Here there is dignity, pride, a sense of accomplishment, community, even a small amount of pleasure. Did we forget we were reading about a communist forced labor camp? Yes, for a moment, we did.
There's a powerful statement about the nature of a human being in that. This is A.S.'s achievement, the puzzling complexity of this book -- it is precisely out of his hopelessness and disillusion that Ivan Denisovich's humanity and strength arise.
You can still feel the author's conflicted sorrow, the unquenched bitterness and the utter frustration with a communist system that was completely irrational and blindly destructive. Yet the source of that frustration is the love he had for his country that nearly destroyed him. This confusion and melding of opposite poles is only appropriate for literature about Soviet communism -- a system based on such high utopian ideals, yet responsible for some of civilization's most massive atrocities.
All in all a quick read and honestly not as depressing as it may sound. An incredible novel as well as an incredible piece of literary history. Besides, when was the last time you got off so easy reading a Nobel Prize winner?
PS. I happened to pick up All Quiet On the Western Front at the same time as this book. They turned out to be quite similar in a number of ways. If you like one of these books, you will certainly like the other. Both fascinating and oddly beautiful accounts of the misuse of the population by those in power.