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Moltke, during his most successful period, could only see the winning of offensive battles as assuring strategic success. For this reason he developed his strategic sequence which combined mobilization, transportation, deployment, movement and combat into one continuous chain of events. Widely deployed forces would converge at the proper moment and destroy the enemy in a complete or partial envelopment. This worked well in 1866 against the Austrians and in 1870 against the French. His system seemed to promise victory in any war. He had taken the gift of fire from Prometheus and changed its very nature, or so his followers thought. Moltke himself grew more cautious in his later years, suggesting that only a partial success could be achieved in a war against both France and Russia, a political solution would have to be found for the strategic dilemma instead. During the period up to and following the First World War, most German military thinkers followed Moltke's earlier views while giving lip service to Clausewitz. Moltke was the more modern man, the technician of war for the machine age, while Clausewitz was a philosopher, belonging to another time and mode of thinking, or so it seemed.
Professor Hughes' book provides translations of various examples of Moltke's writings. I found Moltke's views on the training and duties of General Staff officers particularly interesting. The editor includes excellent commentary on various German military terms and the ways that they have been translated into English in the past, some rather confusing.
In all I find this book well worth the money and would recommend it to those interested in German military history, 19th Century military history, and military strategy and tactics in general, particularly the evolution of military thought. What seems to be missing is an edition of the works of Sigismund von Schlichting, who as Hughes points out provides the key link between Moltke's theories and modern theory.
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The second astounding and disturbing book is Brooks Adams' "The New Empire." Adams covers a lot of time (4000 b.c. - 1900 a.d.) and territory (Asia, Europe, America). He shows how shifting trade routes have caused great cities to rise, and to fall. He regards these cities as the seats of 'Empires.'
Adams -- younger brother of Henry Adams -- discusses these trade routes as connections among products, resources, and markets. When water traffic became less expensive than overland traffic, port cities became great centers. When the ocean routes began to be navigated, the center of 'Empire' shifted from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic countries, especially Spain, Holland, France and England. Adams discusses various wars as inevitable forms of economic clashes. In early times, Adams discusses the importance of metals. As he moves into the modern era, he looks at coal as essential. I would love to have his thoughts about oil. But the reader can extrapolate easily enough. It's scary.
Lots and lots of good historical stories, including Gengis Khan, the Russo-Japanese rivalry, and the rise of the USA as the center of the 'New Empire." He points out that if we don't stay flexible and energetic, China could become the new center.
He discusses political administrative efficiency as a factor in determining the cost of transport and production.
Why did I never see this book in eight years of university English lit studies?
You'll love Adams' sweeping conclusions and generalities. Buy this book! Read it. It's a keeper.
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Daniel Bell is a renowned sociologist and post-Marxist, his prophetic book was first published in 1976 and republished in 1999 accompanied with a new foreword by the author. Since 1976 many of the concepts, theories and phrases Bell pioneered have become naturalised, universal conventions, and thus Bell should, most definitely, be considered a futurist.
This definitive book explores the 'coming age' and evaluates how this new Post Industrial Society will alter the structure of society. As Bell openly concedes 'the sociologist is always tempted to play the prophet and if not the prophet the seer' (Chapter 1). He does, however, explain that the 'forecasting' he attempts is different from predicting. For, forecasting is only possible where there are 'regularities and recurrences of phenomenon (and these are rare). It is only possible where one can assume a high degree of rationality on the part of the man who influences events-agreement to follow the rules'. And it seems that Bell's sociological background has given him the required understanding.
The new foreword shows considerable contemplation of the books success. Bell explains how there has been an unprecedented increase in the use of the phrase 'post industrial society' but he is not complacent, rather he underlines the lack of 'specificity as to what is connotes'. He describes how the general usage of the phrase, which is often used in reference to the decline in manufacturing and industry, does not acknowledge the parallel changes in social structure, social organisation and the new classes that will be, and have been created, specifically the class of knowledge (this theme is further explored in chapter 3, entitled The New Class Structure of the Post Industrial Society).[ Bell adamantly argues that his vision of the Post Industrial Society does not see the old one displaced by the new, rather a synthesis emerges in which the new society will overlay the old one in profound ways, much as industrialisation continues to coexist within the agrarian sectors of our society.] Thus it seems that Bell does not merely use the new foreword to hail his work a success but to redress, the misunderstood, misinterpreted or inadequately adopted parts of his social forecast.
Bell explains how it is inadequate to define the new society primarily by the services but he does see the productive nature of them. While society naturally embraces the three distinctions of industry as primary, secondary and tertiary in the new foreword Bell makes further distinctions by suggesting 'quaternary' (covering trade and finance) and 'quinary' (health and education), these are the involved in the economics of information not goods or labour. And thus it seems that while Bell has pioneered he wants to pioneer further. He further states that the central and novel feature of the Post Industrial Society is the 'codification of theoretical knowledge and new relation of science to technology'. Major developments of the 20th century came from revolutions in physics and biology as opposed to the 'inspired and talented tinkerers' like Alexander Graham Bell. This suggests the increasing dependence on science as a means of technical and social change, and science is wholly dependent on knowledge and information.
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I found Moll Flanders to be resourceful and ingenious in her methods for securing her own survival. The book puts prostitution and premarital sex in a whole new perspective. As one can deduce from this book, life was not so simple for women in the 18th century, especially if they were abandon as children, or even if they husband died and left them without means to exist. Moll takes her position as a dependent woman and finds power in her mind to devise schemes which will allow her a secure lifestyle without compromising her self.
I found Moll to be a woman of character and repute, with self esteem, who made her own way in a world where women had no power, money or choices aside from their dependence upon men.
It should be noted that this book is action driven, although Moll Flanders still undergoes considerable character development. For example, when she begins her extremely successful career as a thief, she is doing it for survival reasons. But after a while, she is doing it for greed. It is interesting to see what causes her to change in various situations.
I highly recommend this book.
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Moltke states that if one makes a mistake during the initial deployment, one cannot compensate for it later. As the forces evolve, the error propagates concentrically outward like a chain reaction, jeopardizing the outcome of the entire campaign. The French deployment during the Franco-Prussian war suffered from such deficiencies.
According to Moltke, during the decision phase the commander must champion only one perspective to the green table. Once he has arrived at a decision, although it may not be the best, his subordinates should execute it resolutely. The consistent execution of even a mediocre plan will more often lead to victory (in the long-run) than an inconsistent execution of a great plan; hence, Molke's maxim that 'strategy grows silent in the face of the need for a tactical victory'. Moltke states that only a layman believes that it is possible to foresee and predict causal events deterministically in war.
Moltke counsels commanders with one force just how vulnerable they are to envelopment when they maneuver their force between two opposing formations with 'interior lines' and 'central position'. This appears to be a trivial statement; however, one must realize that 'interior lines' was Napoleon's favorite attack maneuver, which he implemented so successfully against numerically superior but divided forces (See The Campaigns of Napoleon by David G. Chandler). Napoleon I succeeded because he adroitly maneuvered his one force directly, halfway between the two opposing forces, which effectively neutralized his opponents from acting in concert and from supporting one another. Then he would march to attack one of the two, but the other opponent had to march twice as far (to support), hence, Napoleon I could concentrate on defeating the first opponent and then countermarch to defeat the second opponent that arrived too late, thus, his single force fought as well as two. During the Franco-Prussian war, Napoleon III intended to implement a similar maneuver to cut Prussia off from south Germany. First, he hoped to defeat Prussia, alone, which would entice Austria and Italy into forming a triumvirate with him. Then he hoped the triumvirate would attack the south German Confederation.
During the Franco-Prussian war, Prussia was victorious in battle, but as Moltke says, 'at what a cost'. It seems to me that Prussia's losses were rather high, primarily because of their reluctance to change plans and to break off any engagement once it began. Then the 'peoples army' arose like a phoenix in the midst of the vanquished French field armies, which made the consummation of Moltke's final victory elusive. He could not pursue all the remaining military targets; therefore, he just focused on one-Paris. He surrounded the French capital with the preponderance of his remaining forces (150,000) because it was the only strategic option left open to him.
The commander should position himself with his uncommitted reserves to ensure that they are committed where and when they may be of greatest service; he should not be at the front with units already committed. He should send reserves to those areas where the forward units are already nearly winning, thereby, overcoming these areas of resistance faster, with fewer losses by their timely intervention. Secondly, he should endeavor to bolster tenuous positions or those that are in danger of being lost.
The attack has the advantage of dictating the course of events to the defender who must conform to them. The advantages are greater morale and confidence gained through the knowledge of the time and place of the attack. The best method of attack is to envelope the opponent with two forces. First, one must attack the opponent frontally with one force to pin down as much of their main force as possible. Then the second force must attack the opponent's flank. Moltke believed that both the frontal and flank attacks should be performed simultaneously, however, if I were attacking the flank, I would wait until it has been sufficiently denuded, since the opponent will be drawing forces from it to counter the frontal attack (i.e., feint). The flank attack is usually the center of gravity (Schwerpunkt), but the frontal attack may be the center of gravity as well. There should be a reserve element to cover the force attacking the opponent's flank. An example of precisely this method took place during the battle of Koniginhof (Austria, 1866).
This book is a compendium of essays written by v. Moltke that covers many practical aspects of the art of war with historical examples. Many of these methods are just as valid today as they were in 1860. Moltke writes very lucidly with great candor, which is precisely what one would expect of a Prussian Officer.