Joseph Agassi is a thoughtful philosopher, whose recent book, Liberal Nationalism in Israel, presents a profound analysis of national identity, political processes, and the relation between religion and the state. He makes a passionate plea for the separation of religion from government in Israel, arguing that the result will be greater security for the nation, a more open political life, and a healthier religious life. It should be read by every one concerned with fundamental questions in political philosophy and with the special case of Israeli society.

This is a brilliant book by a leading Israeli public intellectual on the vexing question of Israeli national identity and the relationship between church and state, religion and nation in Israel. Agassi provides a brief synopsis of the history of nationalism and Zionism from the perspective of "liberal nationalism" and develops a program for radical revision of Zionist goals and Israel's "constitution" in light of progressive enlightenment ideals. He demonstrates that "normalization" in accordance with the Western model of nation-state would have beneficial effects for Israel, the Jewish Diaspora, and the Palestinians. When the book first appeared in 1983 in Hebrew, it evoked a lively discussion, but few were willing to consider seriously Agassi's vision of a secular Israeli identity. Since then a second edition has been published, and the number of Israelis willing to follow the book's inexorable logic is constantly on the rise. An excellent translation and wonderful design enhance the pleasure of reading. A must read for anyone wishing to understand Israel's abiding dilemma.

_Who is an Israeali? Who is a Jew?_ On May 14, 1948 David Ben Gurion declared the establishment of the State of Israel. At the time there were about seven hundred thousand Jews in the country. On the threshold of the third millenium about five million Jews live in Israel, nearly one million Arabs, Druse and Circassians, hundreds of thousands of foreign workers and non-Jewish new immigrants from the Commonwealth of Independent States. Israeli Society and its political system are still engaged, perhaps excessively so, with the problem of national identity and the question of the political status of religion. The Israeli "melting pot" does not manage to smelt this great people into a homogenous "Israeli" entity. On the contrary, the chasm is deepening and it is as if it threatens to tear apart Israeli society. Professor Joseph Agassi, one of the important Jewish Israeli philosophers of our time, designs a platform for the normalization of Israel in the accepted western liberal style, and does this in the internal, regional and global contexts of Israel. This book is an absolute must for anyone who cares about the future of Israel. Professor Shevah Weiss, Chairman of the Thirteenth Knesset

Joseph Agassi, The Philosopher's Apprentice: In Karl Popper's Workshop. Series in the Philosophy of Karl R. Popper, Volume V. Edited by Kurt Salamun. Editions Rodopi, Amsterdam and Atlanta GA, 1993. xx + 252 pp. -- Agassi describes himself as "the foremost exponent and leading critic"(p. ix) of his teacher, Sir Karl Popper, who, he claims, is "the greatest philosopher of the mid-century" (p. xiv). This account of his studies under Popper applies the idea that criticism is an expression of respect, so forcefully preached by Popper, and notes Popper's tragic failure both as teacher and as a leader. Agassi does not hold much back, not even the charges of treason voiced by insiders provoked by the circulation of earlier drafts of this work. To discourage those who might dismiss this work as mere gossip, we may observe the rule proposed herein: discuss a book's importance before considering whether its message is true (p. 182). Agassi succeeds in applying the idea, so forcefully preached by Popper, that criticism expresses respect. And we learn here of Popper's failure to practice his own teachings, of Agassi's loss due to a repeated failure to communicate, and the public's loss of Popper's intellectual leadership. The importance of this work is in the unblinking courage with which it presents this record of failures. In addition to the "melancholy" (p. ix) story, the "wild" (p. xi) narrative structure of this book, which is sometimes chronological, sometimes thematic and always open to an interesting digression, makes it hard to summarize or characterize. It opens thus: Popper's (Einsteinian) view of science dispenses with the authority of science and with the demand to defend views. Why then do scientists and philosophers -- including Popper -- continue this defense? The problem receives its face from embarrassingly detailed descriptions of the tensions between Popper and his associates, the harshness of their personal dealings, their defensiveness and their intrigues. As the story unfolds we see Popper's unbecoming sides, his cult of hard work, his maudlin Christianity and his anti-semitism (p. 25), and his resentment of willful distortions and dishonest dismissals. The estrangement between Agassi and Popper haunts this book. Gratitude, admiration and discipleship do not overwhelm his autonomy, nor do they mute his criticism. He views Popper's thought as the best expression of the morality of critical autonomy. Yet his efforts to secure his autonomy create the rift never to be mended. Indeed the most crucial source of the rift is Popper's refusal to discuss ethics. Agassi criticizes Popper's retreat from traditional positivism as "not sufficiently open" and as concealed under his constant (and just) disavowal of "logical" positivism (p. 173). This conduct is at variance with his own strong condemnation of "surreptitious" changes of opinion (p. 174). When Agassi criticized Popper's theory of corroboration, he generously conceded in a footnote that here Agassi may be right, as he may have correctly detected in Popper a "whiff of inductivism" (p. 6). This, he suggested, should satisfy Agassi's desire for recognition and silence his further criticism. Agassi, on his part, rejects the acknowledgment as far too generous (p. 7). How could Popper, the philosopher of critical rationalism, be so apparently closed to criticism? Agassi' s answer is the central lesson here: "... no one can judge how open to criticism one is and no one can declare adequate one's acceptance of a criticism and one's subsequent alteration of an opinion" (p. 69). One can never be one's own judge. Popper's personal failures should be seen as a shortcoming not of the critical standards he espoused but of the view of oneself as able to judge oneself in one's sincere efforts to be severe with oneself. Popper's life in the intellectual community, his reputation there and its sources are discussed in a series of vignettes that concern some of the most important figures in mid-century philosophy: Wittgenstein, Ayer, Carnap, Isaiah Berlin, Bar-Hillel, Bartley, Lakatos and more. Carnap and Lakatos emerge as villains. The latter was an ambitious and treacherous schemer who, appealing to Popper's vanity and defensiveness, isolated and manipulated him. Carnap's distorted version of Popper's views became canonic for a generation and blocked their public exposure. His Testability and Meaning (1936) identifies Popper's view as concerning not science but its language. The difference is this: the negation of a scientific theory is not scientific, yet the negation of a sentence is a sentence. So while science does not include the negation of the theories that it includes, any language does. Confusing the two leads to confusing refutation with verification: the refutation of a theory is confused with the verification of its negation. Thus verifiability and refutability, Carnap's view of science and Popper's, would appear symmetrical. The novelty and significance of Popper's vision are thus lost. In the final chapter we find an insightful critique of Popper's theory of leadership and a discussion of Popper's mistreatment at the hands of the philosophical leadership(p. 235). The epilogue is a call for the "grass root revolution in philosophy" (p. 246) implicit in Popper's views. This explains the resistance to them: leaders tend to be conservative. Yet "the present global crises which threaten our very survival" (p. 244) and the inability of philosophy to "join the action" (ibid. ) make the revolution imperative. Agassi suggests that discussion of the issues raised in this volume, particularly among students, is a contribution to this revolution. Being myself a former student of his, I wished to test his suggestion. I did, and I agree. I hope this important book is widely read and discussed, and that we begin an open debate on the criteria of what is serious philosophy. This would indeed be the start of a philosophical revolution. -- Michael Chiariello, St. Bonaventure University.

Agassi trained in physics and then studied logic and scientific method at the University of London with Sir Karl Popper. This book consists of a series of dialogues between the author and his son Aaron on the history of physics. The book demonstrates Agassi's "view that scientific activity is an endless dialogue,with problems and proposed solutions which are criticized as unclear, or as unsatisfactory, or as false. Science is and has been a continuing revolution" (8). The author does a good job of presenting the conceptual problems and solutions that led to the Copernican and Newtonian revolutions. He also covers some of the advances that created doubts about the magnificent Newtonian edifice and led to relativity theory, which is briefly discussed. The book provides an excellent starting point in physics for the non-scientist. In deceptively simple prose, Agassi provides ample evidence for his view that "...if we want progress, we have to test our theories very carefully and rid them of mistakes" (147).