These comments refer to the old Continuum edition, NOT to the Stanford edition, which is a fine translation ...

While not wishing to detract from what has been said about the importance of this book, it is worth mentioning that the English translation is scandalously bad and in need of replacement. I've had occasion to make extensive comparisons between the German original and the translation and the results are not encouraging. Much is simply flat-out wrong (e.g., sometimes the translator mistakes one German word for another) even more is unnecessarily clumsy. While Horkheimer and Adorno adopted a rather dense style of writing, nothing they produced is quite as cumbersome as what readers of this translation have had to endure.

One can sympathize with the translator -- he did the translation at a time when very little by Horkheimer and Adorno was in English and it appears that he worked under a rather tight schedule (it is possible to find errors piling up on a page and then suddenly ceasing -- suggesting that the poor fellow took a break and came back later on, with happier results). But there is no forgiving the publisher for leaving this text uncorrected for so long despite a long-standing consensus among students of the Frankfurt School that this is a deeply flawed translation. That anything of the power of the original makes it through the muck of this translation is a testimony to the force of Horkheimer and Adorno's ideas.

A new translation is long overdue. Until then, readers coming to the work of the Frankfurt School might want to seek out Max Horkheimer's Eclipse of Reason, a summary of the argument elaborated here which Horkheimer delivered in English at Columbia University at about the same time of as the publication of the German original of this book.

"Dialectic of Enlightenment", one of the most celebrated texts of the Frankfurt School, endeavours to answer why modernity, instead of fulfilling the promises of the Enlightenment (e.g. progress, reason, order) has sunk into a new barbarism. Drawing on their own work on the "culture industry", as well as the ideas of the key thinkers of the Enlightenment project, (Descartes, Newton, Kant) Horkheimer and Adorno explain how the Enlightenment's orientation towards rational calculability and man's domination of a disenchanted nature evinces a reversion to myth, and is responsible for the reified structures of modern administered society, which has grown to resemble a new enslavement. Furthermore, Horkheimer's and Adorno's treatise was one of the most ambitious attempts to synthesise Marxist economic analysis with Freudian psychoanalysis, and is developed with much complexity and skill. Their philosophical and psychological critique of the Enlightenment concepts of reason and nature (which they identify as the loci of domination) spans almost the entire history of Western thought up until recent times, from Homer to Nietzsche. The book was written in 1944, during a phase of the war when the threat of Fascist victory still hung ominously over Europe, and when Horkheimer and Adorno themselves had to flee Germany to America. "Dialectic of Enlightenment" thus represents one of the most pessimistic strands of Marxist thought, giving up all expectations of a people's revolution in Western Europe. This was, in addition to the outbreak of the Second World War, due to the meteoric rise of extremely right-wing reactionary parties in the twenties, and their subsequent popularity, which ruled out by fiat any chance of a popular support for the left. The proletariat, instead of embracing the cause of the people's revolution, opted to give their vote to the Fascists. In their psychoanalytic investigation of this phenomena, Horkheimer and Adorno identify the rise of Fascism with the return of the repressed.

One of the more important, and somewhat more readable, founding texts of the Frankfurt school of critical thought, this book (probably because of the influence of Max Horkheimer) is more readable than Negative Dialectics (by Theodore Adorno) but less readable than Adorno's book of short essays, Minima Moralia. Its orange cover, and alarming, intellectual, title, make Dialectic of Enlightenment somewhat of a chick magnet :-).

The unreadability of Frankfurt School texts is an artifact of the very phenomena they criticize. Educated people in America at the time Dialectic of Enlightenment was written were influenced, directly and indirectly, by the pragmatism of John Dewey and English Logical Positivism as mediated by Bertrand Russell and A. J. Ayer. A bit later, the Continental school of Logical Positivism came to America fleeing Fascism.

Pragmatism is the homegrown American philosophy that the useful is the true and the true, useful. Logical Positivism in Britain and on the Continent is the view that the meaningful is only the verifiable statement of natural science. Both traditions are completely inimical to the older Continental views of Adorno and of Horkheimer, based as they are on those of Hegel, Freud and Marx.

Adorno would probably see straight through the question begging that goes on in both Pragmatism and Logical Positivism. Both these philosophies fail to self-apply, in a logical failure which is also a failure to exhibit the intellectual virtue of humility. If we ask the Pragmatist about the utility of his view that truth is utility he cannot answer. Similarly, Logical Positivism's own claim, that meaningful statements are either verifiably true or verifiably false using the procedures of science, fails, even less than Pragmatism, to self-apply, because we simply can't verify the nonexistence of a meaningful but unverifiable statement. This result, which conclusively has shown nearly all major-league philosophers that Logical Positivism is deep nonsense, has been generalized in recent years to show that there are even apparently scientific statements, such as statements as to what transpires inside black holes, which are not verifiable.

However, the nonsense of Pragmatism and of Logical Positivism had in the period 1930 to about 1980 much influence, again direct and indirect, on educated Americans. Directly, they were exposed to it in undergraduate survey courses and of course as philosophy specialists. Indirectly the ideas were in the air, and they have had strong influence on the management, and the mismanagement, of America's economy and its foreign policy.

For this reason, and because of the deconstruction of a decent educational system, contemporary post-moderns in America find actual post-modern classics including Dialectic of Enlightenment tough going.

But to be constructive. "Dialectic" in the title refers to a form of logic which commencing with the early 19th century German philosopher Hegel. It is presented, superficially, in survey classes as a weird kind of pseudo-logic in which things become their opposite, and then the thing and its opposite "synthesize" to form a higher, more involved thing.

But this superficial nonsense fails to account for the dialectic at all. The dialectic is a response, in the real material conditions that have obtained in developed societies since the end of the 18th century, to the fact that mere traditional logic is a closed system. Mere traditional logic seems to the ordinary person verbal games and, strikingly, it is the same to the evolved modern mathematician if he's of the "formalist" school. You merely have to change the axioms to get the results you want in mere traditional logic.

Tradtional (and modern) logic is like a machine for accomplishing our purposes that it becomes (in indeed a dialectic fashion) the opposite of what we need. The 17th century philosopher Leibniz was so impressed by the apparent power of primitive forms of modern logic that he thought that any dispute would be by now, at the close of the millenium, settled in gentlemanly fashion with "let us calculate, sir." As what would now be termed a high-paid "consultant" to the CEOs of his time and place (petty, and small-minded, German princelings) Leibniz included political and social matters in this view.

Leibniz saw in logic a machine that would remove decisionmaking from passion and self-interest and indeed logic, and its technological, embodied form the modern digital computer, does so with such thoroughness that the "fair" decision machine becomes its opposite. We merely have to change the program to get the results we want, whether those results be true and fair and just, or deep nonsense.

Hegel, Marx and Freud were healthy and human reactions to this manipulative spirit, and dialectical logic, far from being anti-modern-logic (as its more hysterical opponents like Quine seem to feel), actually rescues traditional and modern logic from criminal manipulation. For example, in human and in social affairs, the very fact that each actor is not a thing and has capabilities to react to features of the system in totality, consistently makes social planning self-defeating. In the Five Year Plans of the Stalin era, the very fact that factory managers were more or less informed of the direction of the whole caused the numerical decision procedures used in determining whether those targets would be met to be distorted towards optimism that caused famine and war. In the Reagan White House, the commitment of an autistic Chief Executive to meeting impossible economic targets likewise caused his budget director, David Stockman, to fudge the numbers using a primitive spreadsheet and what Stockman called "the magic asterisk" to identify needed savings, not yet identified, that would balance the books.

Traditional and modern logic is a babe in the woods as regards such chicanery. But the dialectic, centering human over technical relationships, sees and can account for this behavior. Its overall procedure is to weigh irreconcilable interests against each other, to predict the synthesis that will result. In Horkheimer and Adorno, the dialectical claim is that the very science and technology produced by the 18th century enlightenment would over time produce its opposite. Kant's individual freedom to be a knower (a scientist or independent entrpreneur) would turn, amid the pressure of real human events, into a higher form of enslavement.

Since nobody found the previous review helpfull, I'll change it. In fact, I'll use this space to point you in the direction of more helpful criticism. Read "The Opium of the Intellectuals" by Raymond Aron...I just want to point out his comment that "[p]olitics is action: political theory is either the comprehension of action crystallized in events or the determination of what action is possible or advisable in a given situation."
Mr. Adorno's writings exist in the nebulous world of ideology, and some bright people have undergone a great deal of mental contortion to bring his ideas down here to the earth's surface. It seems from other reviews that Mr. Adorno is respected for his insights into modern culture. But let me ask: what are we to do with these brilliant epiphanies? Can they actually guide us toward anything real or useful? No. I believe his fragments fail, ultimately, under the weight of their own pretension. They are nothing more than semi-artful ways of serving up less-than-brilliant thoughts. No new ground is broken here. Adorno hasn't found a different way of seeing things, just a different way of saying them. And really, his way is impossible. Take a look at the prose for yourself. It's thoroughly uninteresting. A good writer is sometimes distinguished by references that are at first hard to understand, so that the reader is later drawn back to the work. Adorno crosses the line, however, relying too intensely on an elitist use of language that in some instances contradicts his arguments. I am highly turned off by this book. I recommend avoiding it.

...when it comes to praising this book. as a european refugee in this country, i feel that adorno's lucidity is almost uncanny. many times i read and reread one page, enjoying and deeply respecting his wisdom and intellectual courage, shocked by his insight. it is not an easy reading and it is mostly painful...but very, very rewarding. i love books more than anything, and i spend all my money and time on them, but until now i have not read anything comparable. the only other book i know of that offers such challenge and such solace is le mythe de sisyphe by camus. by the way, i hope the english translation is good, but i recommend to read it in german.

The paradox of Adorno is that he is known as a "difficult, complex, and hard to read" writer...but the typists at the Princeton Radio Research Project, at which Adorno spent a few unhappy years, found his work quite readable.

The administrators at the project found him difficult as a writer and perhaps personally because they were so embedded in the very system Adorno had identified ("the administered world") that they could not think outside its categories.

Although Minima Moralia does presume some knowledge of Continental philosophy and German literature, it is quite readable, entertaining, and at the close rather moving: its "finale" reminds me of the ending of Alban Berg's Violin Concerto.

Now, the "Logical Positivist" philosopher Rudolf Carnap has called philosophers like Heidegger and Adorno "musicians without talent." This shows a mistaken view of music (inherited from Plato) as at best entertaining sounds without meaning, and it fails to account for entertainment, which is taken as a primitive.

There is a musical quality in Minima Moralia but even as the informed concert-goer finds layers of meaning in good works, Minima Moralia rewards the patient reader.

Teddy would shudder at my saying this, but Minima Moralia is a good buy because it repays re-reading.

I do not understand Adorno's fame or appeal. The consequences--witting or unwitting--of many of his ideas are frighteningly inhuman. This is to speak only of the ideas I found scrutable. But really, the parts I didn't understand could have been a map to the unattended cook's entrance of Heaven; but it would not mitigate that which concerned me most about what I DID understand.
No offense to the Schoenberg estate, and no offense to those who enjoy experimentations with tonality, but to my sensibility the elevation of Arnold Schoenberg to aesthetic eminence just seems representative of the lengths to which many will go to avoid thinking about black traditions in art, literature and music. Adorno's music writings insist that only classical music might liberate us from the pull of ideology and/or 'mere' existence. It offends me that a man who will not even try to appreciate Coltrane's A LOVE SUPREME--and moreover a man who would immediately equate said album to one of the means by which we maintain and spread cultural sickness--insists that he has navigated some sort of means for salvation to which we all should turn.
Not being grossly essentialist, I would expand the concept of 'black' within this context to mean "people who do not insist on the idea that resentment and worldweariness are ontic categories and/or define these traits as, to use K. Burke's term, 'necessary equipment for living'." This means that each of us can escape Adorno's grasp. Let's consider: Curtis Mayfield was paralyzed by an accident backstage during a concert venue. He could not move below the neck. For the rest of his years he persevered, making one more album. Adorno, on the other hand, escaped the Final Solution, then returned to Germany for the rest of his life. For most of the time, he enjoyed not a little comfort. And yet somehow Adorno was melancholy, almost comically so. Mayfield made music Adorno couldn't understand. Was the humanity of Mayfield's perseverence something Adorno couldn't understand as well?
If black world traditions of music, art, speech etc. were just as advertised--traditions--shouldn't many of us develop a useful understanding of those traditions? (Or could we at least recognize the courage of Fela Kuti and Adorno's failure to match up?) The task does not even seem particularly difficult, yet the rewards are great. Yes, many times more people will 'understand' pieces within these traditions than people would 'understand' a piece by Schoenberg. But the summitt of the former, I am certain, towers over the summitt of the latter.
It would behoove us to address the reasons that Adorno's work is scoured day and night, with the intent purpose of locating 'genius.' And it behooves us as well to investigate into why the semantic vagaries of a term like "tha bomb" renders the same scavenger hunters for Adorno totally lost. It is noted about Adorno's book that paragraphing and cohesion and coherence are abandoned, forgotten or arranged idiosyncratically so as to instigate some kind of paradigmatic challenge, apparently. But minimal immersion within a vernacular culture would provide any student with the means of vernacular comprehension and comfort, if not vernacular mastery. Adorno's supporters strain for any act or utterance from Adorno to have profound meaning. A short survey of vernacular urban culture, for example, would provide a wealth of possibility for finding profound meaning. No strain, but a fair, competent consideration of many aspects of vernacular urban culture will reveal clearly the wealth of possibilities within that culture. Why insist on the insistence of genius? Why accept, especially, a flat denial of art's social value or social nature, in a way that always places Adorno's aesthetic theory in a position of strength compared to more 'grounded' ones? Doesn't this automatic suspicion help to hide the excesses of the idea of ideological contamination and underpinnings?
Finally, consider two victims of the Nazis: Bruno Schulz and J. Huizenga. Schulz' comic outrageousness still inspires; Huizenga made the perceptive argument that man is by nature 'one who plays,' and that that was the best way to understand ourselves and to liberate ourselves. The Nazis killed these two. But is not, in a fundamental way, Adorno, who, in his declaration that, "There is no poetry after Auschwitz," reduces those two to ash and dust? To proscribe such essential ways to see the world with love, hope, and the possibility of one's agency, in the name of theory or aesthetics, is to me something that cannot be defended. Adorno did not fall then. Neither did he risk falling: he had escaped to LA. Yet he felt it imperative to strip certain sensibilities from our psyche, sensibilities that might get us over such attempts to destroy humanity as the Final Solution. Has Adorno stooped to a level of 'inhumanity'? In some real way, his concepts of ideology and classical music in effect see his brethren who enjoyed Klezmer music as getting what should be expected: victims of ideology are victimized to the last.

Adorno keeps your mind at thinking, not consuming thoughts. Even when you disagree with his brilliant idiosyncrasies they provoce you to think about modern art, philosophy and society.

Theodor Adorno's "Aesthetic Theory" is in one respect about the end of art;it was written partially in response to his friend Walter Benjamin. Benjamin's views on the ends of art and the pontentialities, the encrusted meanings waiting to me unleashed in mass produced art. Benjamin had thought there was an emancipatory moment in art in now the age of mechanical production. Since Adorno had outlived Benjamin until 1969, Adorno's task was to furnish us with the conception of art now as a pennyless child gazing into the candystore, an art in exile, an art where the disintegration of cultural pillars have long eroded away. Schoenberg's varigated orchestral scores was the ultimate rebellion in a private world, the subject at last trying to find truth and resemblance within the aesthetic crumbs leftover from the 19th century.

Adorno's " Aesthetic Theory" is not only a treatise, a counterflow, a tone-poem of fragments, symphonic forms exploded into motives and cells of thought, it is a bridge between all arts,although the relativily new form of film is neglected. Adorno had thought this fragmentary style of writing as satisfying with the collapse of system-building within philosophic thought.The aesthetic strategy of Adorno's thought then is one which interfaces, interrelates, crosses itself in its various readings of art. And the reader expects this complexity to be apparent. Robert Hullot-Kentor's translation is indeed something which encourages this reading of Adorno. He allows us to enter Adorno's thought in its full complexity. So, graphically he allows the undivision of paragraphs to remain as Adorno had originally composed in draft form. Adorno's thought continually overflows,continually creates layers, multilayers of references. Hullot-Kentor's term "paratactical form" is the localized struture of Adorno's thought and if form at all survives it is within this density of Adorno's thought and not any external structure. The first English translation by C. Lenhardt(1984)! maintains these divisions within the body of text and is still indespensible despite all the American jargon.Adorno's thought on first encounter needs all the divisions one can find,but once learned you can move beyond it into Hullot-Kentor's. The introduction to Hullot-Kentor provides a good history of Adorno's work with aesthetics a subject he came to late within these treatise-like dimensions. Adorno has been the focus of numerous studies, Frederic Jameson,Martin Jay, Albrecht Wellmer,Peter Berger, as well as art critics Donald Kuspit. Lambert Zuidervaart has a book-length critique of "Aesthetic Theory". All have used Adorno's thought to advance a particular cause mostly justified.Jameson's diatribes with the post-structural cadre for one, Wellmer in making a bridge to the communicative theories of Adorno's former assistant Jurgan Habermas. Who has been left out of this theoretical landscape? has been the practicing artist, and understandibly so for those I've mentioned are not burdened with the daily committment to creation of the artistic object and the set of philosophic problematics that entails. As a practicing composer myself I came to Adorno long ago, his "Philosophy of Modern Music" was a seminal text, a breath of fresh air from the self-serving pitch-set-theory ideas of academia. In fact Adorno's legacy is only now entering the mainstream of thought in musicology, with profound contributions into the creativity,and historical dimensions in opera,social sub-themes in the 19th century or new music. "Aesthetic Theory" is a fundamental resource for the composer, the poet, the performing artist,especially within the collapse of genre distinctions in today's art. Within the complexity of Adorno's thought we find the crossing of genres. Although he had structured his thought for quite different reasons for the search in locating truth and meaning and non-meaning wherever it may reside.In "Aesthetic Theory"although you may only find the grand auteurs,Kafka,! Mahler,Wedekind,Proust,certainly Beckett(where Adorno had found a pinnicle of his idea of the disintegration of value) we today can find parallels for creativity in the collapse of genre distinctions today. Certainly the positive side of postmodernity has been the proclivity toward research. A composer for instance may learn the complexity of Central American culture as pre-compositional studies for a set of piano preludes, a wonderful enrichment of the genre. If nothing else Adorno's thought compells one toward research and the meaning in art from a conceptual global perspective. For that's the definition of truth that Adorno adheres to. Truth must reside for everyone, truth is not an elitist endeavor. The truth content in a Beethoven symphony for instance is in its relative accessible directness of musical gesture. You, anyone understands his musical motives immediately. It was this clearness of meaning which produced a conceptual impasse within for instance Mahler who could not resolve the dilemma of the symphonic form apart from accreting its length. Today then a composer in his/her search for instance can no longer ignore the complex use of text, and the challenge that represents, or a playwright in the subtle use of lighting. Every creative artist must explore his/her creativity beyond the four-corners of the page, and I'd like to offer this perspective as one part of Adorno's legacy.

This book was clearly written to advance a Marxist/Liberal agenda, while being disguised as a scholarly work.
The conclusions in my opinion are contrary to common sense and observable fact. Those with some experience under their belts will recognize that fact.
The authors dispense with any notions of scientific inquiry and simply custom tailor their research to their own needs/agendas. So, in their twisted logic, someone with strong family ties, strong religious affiliations and a great career is "aggresive", "with unconscious layers of psychopathology" and of course "racist".
While folks from broken homes lacking in parental affection are "independent", "responsible" and "open minded"
If you believe that, run and buy this book

Adorno wanted to explain the catastrophe that was the Nazi regime and WW II. How could this happen in the midst of Western civilization? What of Western education, morality, and cultural achievements? Why did they fail to prevent this disaster?

Adorno, while a Marxist, was heavily influenced by Nietzsche. He belonged to the so-called Frankfurt school, a group of German intellectuals, the center of whose activities was Frankfurt, before Hitler came to power, and they had no practical choice but to flee. Adorno was the most psychologizing of the Frankfurt school. He believed that many answers to social and political problems are found in the psyche of the individual.

The political debacle that was the Nazi Germany led him to believe that his native country's case was not unique, that all Western societies, the U.S. included, are full of authoritarian personalities ready to follow tyrants at any moment. In fact, Adorno claimed that this is already happening everywhere, but in ways less subtle than in the Nazi Germany. The crisis in not merely German, or European, it is the crisis of Western civilization. The conditions of what he called "late capitalism" produce abundance of authoritarian personalities. There is not much direct coercion in America a la Nazi-ism, because we coerce ourselves internally, we are not really free spiritually and emotionally, so no concentration camps are needed for us--we are enslaved already. I have no response to this, as Adorno's extrapolation from the Nazi Germany to the U.S. of the second half of the twentieth century is absurd. What else can one say about it? He also belonged to a holistic tradition that tied together culture with social and political phenomena. So he argues that our music and our popular culture indicate that we are far on the road to enslavement. Adorno considered jazz as an artistic equivalent of castration, and the fondness for jazz as a desire to be castrated. He believed that surf boards, rock-n-roll, and popular culture in general were fetters of the "late capitalism" that de-spiritualized America and made it not very different socities that are openly dictatorial.

By and large, I think, Adorno's insights are not valid. He overgeneralizes. He is too Eurocentric, and especially, German-centric. He did not know great jazz musicians, such as Charlie Parker and Miles Davis, and he did not understand the American popular culture in general. He comes across as too speculative, gloomy, and Eurocentric.

Let me see. If you think about buying this book. Forget it. It's a No No! The context are dull and boring. Believe it or not, this book really IS BAD! This is more like a history copy.