I am english and third generation Hong Konger, I bought the book to find out more about what my grandfather went through. The book moved me in the hardest way. I thought that it was one of the best history books that I have read so far in the last two years.

The cruelty and depravity demonstrated by the Japanese during their occupation of Hong Kong between 1941 and 1945 is one of the less well-documented chapters of the Second World War. Yet, as George Wright-Nooth demonstrates with such freshness and clarity in this autobiographical account, it is as great a story of heroism, endurance, and poignancy as any other of its time. The image of 33 individuals, British, Chinese and Indian, preparing to be executed by beheading, and being comforted from among their own group by an Sandhurst-trained Indian officer and a Hong Kong Chinese man leading prayers will long remain in the mind. What also brings the book to life are the diary extracts and the author's excellent memory for detail, which superbly capture the sense of a young Englishman caught in the sweep and suffering of a wider tragedy, but somehow retaining his spirit, his inquisitiveness and that uniquely British sense of humour that shines undimmed through fifty years and the terrible things he saw and experienced.

A large pictorial book not suitable for reading but for skimming thru on the Waterloo facts. Quite well-presented, it has its fair share of editorial typos. I like the well-presented maps.

This is the kind of history book I like to buy. No expense has been spared on this effort to present and also portray the battle of Waterloo. I sat with this book in a store for a few minutes and after reviewing it I raced to the counter with it, eager to add it to my Napoleonic collection. Objective (yes, even though it's about Waterloo) in-depth, and 'illuminating'.

This book is not just another book on the Waterloo campaign. As the author states this book is not meant as a blow by blow account of the action but rather a look at different aspects of the battle including: The campaign, Orders of Battle, Command & Control, the battlefield, the various arms of the armies, and of course the main highlights of the battle. The last section takes an impartial look at the predominate myths and controversies surrounding the battle of Waterloo and the author comes up with his own conclusions in regards to them.

The book is massive (432pages) and makes superb use of colourful maps and photographs of the battlefield which explain the battle situation at key times, the deployment and various formations of forces.

The book also provides additional curious information by the use of text boxes including some first account experiences of the battle.

All in all this is an absolutely superb book, well researched using various sources of information, beautifully presented and printed on high quality paper. I have found it hard to put down , as I keep poring over the maps and digesting all the wonderful information to found in this book. This is a must buy for anyone with an interest in the Waterloo campaign. Lets hope Mark Adkin will do the same with other Napoleonic battles.

Simply a true account of what actually happened. Honest and unbiased - a must read for anyone with an interest in the conflict.

Excellent. Of the many books I have read about the Falklands War and Goose Green and this is the most readable, informative and concise read. The book goes into great details about the individual movements of soldiers, the death of Col 'H', and the real problems they faced, quite an eye-opener. Great Maps, great narrative, couldn't put it down. I'm now looking for another book by the same author!

Great book. I truly admire the young Argentine conscripts. The majority in the Falklands fought with courage and valour. After reading Nick van der Bijl's "Nine Battles to Stanley" (Leo Cooper Limited, 1999)I have nothing but admiration for the young teenage soldiers of Colonel Mohammed Seineldin's 25th Commando-trained Regiment. No wonder it took the Paras 12 hours to crush Task Force Mercedes. Mark Adkin's book read with Bijl's book proves that conscripts can fight well in battle providing their platoon commanders are made of the right stuff. A well written book about the battle. But I must stress that it should be read along with Bijl's book who establishes that the 25th Regiment of Argentina was indeed a crack formation (the equivalent of a regiment of the Hitlerjugend during the battle for Normandy in WW2 in esprit de corps and fighting spirit).

Adkins brings out the strenghts and weaknesses of our military at that time and shows how this, but for the bravery of the rangers , could have been a catastrophe. One glaring error, on p284 the casualties listed on the calivigny raid are improper.Slater and Lannon are correctly named however the third casualty was not Sebastian Greiner but Philip S. Grenier. I can assure you of this since I am his father. Sure wish I could correct the error or at least contact the Publisher or author. Mr. Jean A. Grenier

"We blew them away," a senior White House advisor remarked regarding the overwhelming success of the invasion of Grenada in late 1983. For the first time in history, a democratic nation had crushed a Marxist regime-and did so with few casualties. To the untrained eye, it seemed that the U.S. military had operated flawlessly in defeating the communists in Grenada. However, the British Major Mark Adkin, Commanding Officer of the Caribbean Peace-keeping Force (CPF), contests that theory and counters in his book Urgent Fury that the U.S. armed forces came extremely close to a major political defeat. Adkin asserts that American forces were never in jeopardy of losing the battle for Grenada. However, he believes that the U.S. military command had committed major flaws in the planning and carrying out of Operation Urgent Fury. These leaders narrowly escaped insurmountable American deaths through luck and through the battlefield intuition of lower grade officers.
Adkin's main assertion is that the invasion of Grenada was not the staunching success that the military and the Reagan Administration heralded. Adkin draws out several major accounts of compromised military objectives and traces all of these back to poor planning on a senior officer's part. From the initial invasion on October 25 to the "all-clear" in December, the military units involved were sent out on poorly planned and uncoordinated missions that nearly cost America numerous casualties. Fortunately the U.S. had on its side overwhelming superiority and availability of American fire support to bail out our forces from near defeat.
The invasion of Grenada was divided into two major sections. The first was the U.S. Marine landing in the northern division of the island. The second assault was in the southern portion of the island and was composed of elements from the Navy SEALS, U.S. Army Rangers, Delta Force, and the 82nd Airborne-the Army's elite paratroop division.
It is in the second assault which Adkin details most in the book. This is because of the fact that it was in the southern portion of the island most of the major complications happened. Adkin has a major bias against the special operations units in the southern assault because he is a member of the British elite and the British and American forces tend to have a friendly rivalry. Adkin's main contention against the American elite units is due to the fact that he was the commander of the third assaulting force on Grenada, the British led CPF. Adkin personally witnessed the planning and carrying out of the invasion of Grenada. Therefore, in Urgent Fury he illustrates just how close America came to shipping home hundreds of body bags.
There are three reoccurring themes in Urgent Fury which show the ineffective leadership of the planners and senior commanders. The first contention the author has is the lack of military intelligence involved in planning the island invasion. The military had not topographical maps of the island and was forced to use outdated British touring maps to plan the invasion. Also, the nature and location of the enemy forces were almost completely unknown to the invading forces. This lack of knowledge resulted in the shooting down of several choppers by Cuban anti-aircraft guns and caused Delta Force to abort two missions. The helicopters simply could not drop the units off in the middle of a firefight.
The second problem was the lack of a fully integrated, interoperable communications system. Unlike the fighting elements which were organized to conduct operations independent of one another, communications systems were not allowed such freedom. Adkin believes that communications was to have been the glue that would tie together the operation of the four independent United States military service elements. Unfortunately, communications support failed in meeting certain aspects of that mission. It cannot be said that communications capability itself was abundant. The author cites several dilemmas in the shortages of communications, but the most compelling is the account of the SEAL assault upon the Governor-General's mansion in which the units were pinned down against an overwhelming force heavy machine guns. Hovering above the men fighting were two large gunships which they were unable to contact through the radio. They were forced to use a telephone in the mansion to call their commander at Fort Bragg, N.C. to gain radio access to the gunships. Adkin points out that the fact that these units could not communicate one-to-one could have caused more casualties from enemy and friendly fire.
However, the most shocking and dangerous part of the mission was the fact that the invasion force lacked precise data on the location of the American medical students they were to rescue. Adkin notes that attack planners did not realize that more than a thousand American medical students were spread out over three locations instead of merely at the True Blue campus in the southern tip of the island. When the Rangers counted the students they realized that there were more than four hundred missing. Fortunately for our sake, Adkin asserts, the Marxist forces did not bother with these students. If the enemy had chosen to use the students as human shields, the battle would have been much bloodier on both the military and civilian sides.
The book raises no real objections to the author validity. Adkin fought in Grenada as a commander and gives first hand account. Furthermore, he also uses primary sources from actual after action reports to support his claims on the fallacies of the senior American command. This book has raised doubts on the quality of leadership involved in the Grenada invasion, but does so logically and with thoroughly grounded contextual evidence. The book challenges our perception as to whether we should believe that superior technology always guarantees battlefield success.
In Grenada, American forces had a five to one ratio in manpower and an overwhelming firepower advantage over the Marxists and yet there were multiple opportunities for disaster. We just were lucky. Adkin believes that we cannot trust luck to guide us in future conflicts. In war, the commanders need to be aware of the potential cost of their actions. He believes that there is no excuse for unsound decisions as they are placing men's lives at risk. There is no replacement for real military leadership.

This is THE book to learn what happened on Grenada in 1983. This battle overlooked today marked the turning point in the Cold War. This was the first American military victory since the Vietnam War and sent a signal to the Soviets that communist expansion would cease under the Reagen administration. Major Adkin's book covers all of this, and points out the fight centered on the 10,000 foot strategic runway at Point Salines which as proven by the vast quantities of arms captured was the transfer point to all of Latin America for violence.

The book shows how the New Jewel Movement collapsed due to personal jealousies and assassinations leading to a swift U.S. plan to invade, which while not perfect, was necessary rather than delay in order to secure American medical students held hostage from harm. Reading the details he lays out of the U.S. Army Rangers parachuting in under 500 feet--under Cuban anti-aircraft guns---to seize the Point Salines airfield is exilherating and well wriitten, and busts open the Hollywood myths foisted by movies like "Heartbreak Ridge" that marines did the fighting and rescuing when their assignments to the north were uncontested, and without any Americans to be rescued. Adkin shows how the PRA and Cubans were dug in on the beaches waiting for a water landing when The Rangers, then the 82d Airborne Division came from the sky, catching them by surprise. Follow on operations had the Rangers rescuing U.S. medical students using mc and U.S. Army helicopters and the 82d Airborne Division fighting against stiff resistance before fanning out to secure the southern half of the island.

The book doesn't flinch however from tactical details and how things could have been done better. He has maps and drawings of where the actions took place that drive his points home, as well as photographs, to include mc helicopters that were shot down, and the leaders and rivals in the New Jewel movement. Readers will enjoy small points like the Ranger officer who used a signal mirrror t! o mark a Cuban recoilless rifle gun in a building for destruction by a TOW missile.

The point derived from this awesome book is that U.S. forces must be ready to conduct no-notice operations and to be able to come from unexpected directions like parachuting from the AIR as well as conventional sea directions. This book is a must-read for anyone in the military today or who has any interest in modern tactical affairs.

AIRBORNE!!

Mike Sparks 1st Tactical Studies Group (A)

The Charge is the story of Balaclava as a military historian tells it. This is a breath of fresh air, as most books are written by literary people, who, while they do a great job of telling the story, don't give "the reason why." This book does that, and more. Instead of writing off the tragedy to the errors of Lucan and Cardigan, like Woodham-Smith, he lays the blame at the feet of Lord Raglan, and his aide Captain Nolan. It also bares some of the myths of the charge, giving casualty figures that, when compared to say Pickett's Charge, seem remarkably mild. I would definitely recommend this book to anyone interested in the Crimean War, or the British army.

I don't think that I could really add much to the previous excellent reviews on this interesting account of the Charge of the Light Brigade. The author, Mark Adkin, has produced an excellent account of the Charge of the Light Brigade, which occurred on the 25th of October 1854 during the siege of Sebastopol. Utilising his in-depth research to provide answers to how, why and who, the narrative takes you along with the cavalrymen on their charge into the Russian gun positions. The book has a number of detailed drawings, maps, and photographs to assist you on this reckless advance into the mouth of the guns. The book is very readable and I think that the author attempts to answer the question 'who' was to blame quite fairly and without malice. Overall a very good read for the student of military history or for anyone who just enjoys a good story.

A tip for readers of this book, a new release might be of interest: 'CRIMEA: The Great Crimean War 1854-1856' by Trevor Royle.

This is the kind of book that shows how military history should be written. Although the maps and battle sketches are crude they are very effective in making Adkin's case. This is a careful military analysis of the Light Brigade's charge in October 1854, during the Crimean War, with the emphasis on untangling the hows and whys surrounding the mangled orders process that resulted in the charge. The usual culprit, the Cavalry Division commander Lord Lucan, is partly exonerated and receives only mild criticism. The primary culprits in Adkin's view are Lord Raglan and his ADC Captain Nolan. Adkin believes Nolan may have deliberately indicated the incorrect objective. Also interesting is the dissection of the actual charge, such as how many rounds were fired at the brigade and how the casualties were not as spectacular as is often claimed. It is interesting to note how incompetent the British chain of command appears next to the "amateur" generalship displayed seven years later in the American Civil War; even a Mclellan appears preferable to an (...) like Cardigan, the Light Brigade commander. The only omissions in this otherwise fine book: what kind of casualties did the Russian artillery battery suffer? What happened to the Light Brigade survivors in the brutal winter that followed?

The most interesting aspect of this work is the real nuts and bolts of the war in Afghanistan, and the Pakistani contribution to the war effort. The logistical nightmare of providing arms to the Mujahideen are only one facet of this massive supply operation, and I would strongly recommend this book to anyone who is interested in learning about this aspect of the war from a real insider.

I do find flaws in this work, however, and they basically arise from the real difference of opinion about the US role in that conflict. Yes, the United States was interested in supplying the rebels for the sake of Great Power Politics. A defeat of the USSR in Afghanistan surely would be a great victory for the West, and that is why the arms were supplied. Lets get real here. The author seems to take exception with the fact that after the Soviets pulled out, the US did not seem very interested in defeating the puppet government. Why would they care? The weapons were not supplied out of any desire to assist in the Jihad, nor were they provided out of a hope for a better future Afghanistan. Afghan politics was (and is) made up of rivalries, warlords and open conflict. The US had little interest in getting involved before the Soviet occupation, so why would they after? Any interperetation to the contrary is to miss the point. Standard realist politics, pure and simple.

The author also believes that the US removed support from the Mujahideen so that they could not defeat the communist government and create a fundamentalist regeime. The recent events in Afghanistan showed exactly why this was of such great concern to the US. Hindsight is certainly 20-20, and this book was written and published well before the 9/11 attacks on the US. But I feel that the author's concern about the lack of US support for the defeat of the puppet government has been conclusivly shown to be the correct policy choice. The fundamentalist Taliban government allowed Al Qaida to flourish, and we all know how that turned out. I don't beleive too many people who will read this book will feel sorry for the failure (at that time) of a fundamentalist take-over of Afghanistan. Too bad they eventually did so. Maybe the US should have done even more to prevent it.

Also, the author seems to find reason to blame the US for pretty much everything that went wrong with the war. Even when he had no proof, he did not hesitate to show how the US could have done the bad deed. I found very little thanks to a country that sent millions and millions of dollars to help fight the war, even if it was for reasons of self-interest. (Realist politics again.) I continually found it difficult to read where the US was selfish for only wanting to help defeat the USSR, and that the CIA should somehow have been interested in Jihad or helping the historically conflict-ridden political parties within Afghanistan. Even during this war with the USSR, the warlords (according to the author) would sell arms they were given, fight with each other, and pretty much do what they wanted. It was only by using the carrot of more arms and heavier weapons could any control be established over these groups. Why would the US want to get invloved in that???

The subject of the Stinger missiles is covered in great detail, and the introduction of these weapons really changed the whole nature of the conflict. It is claimed (correctly) that the CIA did not want to give this weapon to the Mujahideen for fear it would find it's way to terrorists and unfriendly countries. It was pointed out many times in the book how "if we had the stinger" and this defeat was because they didn't have it, the author himself admits that several weapons DID find their way into Iran. So the US was right all along to be concerned. All air travelers should be concerned that these weapons are still floating around somewhere. Pretty scarey, and the CIA was right to be worried. But that did not seem to be of interest to the author.

So all in all, it is a very good work for the inside scoop on the war from the Pakistani point of view, and it should be read as such. But, the attitude against the US was pretty hard to fathom, and it got to be an annoying part of this book. I'm hardly a flag waver, but give credit where credit is due. The major reason the Soviets left Afghanistan was because of the massive US aid effort. Perhaps that should have been pointed out more in this book.

This is a very interesting book. It provides a good amount of detail about the US - Pakistan process for arming the Afghanistan fighters. It is also an eye opener about the world of international arms sales - what surprised me the most was that many Arab nations were willing to send complete junk for weapons to fellow Muslims. I also enjoyed the story of the first shoot down of a Soviet helicopter and the videotape that made its way to Reagan.

I would argue with the statements about the abandonment of the US - we did leave but we were never in this war to nation build. All of the countries helping out the Afghanistan's were doing so to fight the USSR, not to nation build Afghanistan. We completed a bargain, however unseemly, which was to supply weapons not to make Afghanistan the 51st state. The one thing I would have liked was a bit more size. Overall, a good book and I would recommend it.

This is one hell of a book. It goes into a lot
more detail than most people want regarding
covert operations against the Soviets during
the Afghanistan war. The descriptions of the
CIA's efforts to obtain deniable armaments is
tragedy mixed with comedy. Checkbook war-fighting
doesn't work very well.

The most interesting thing I found in the book was
the description of the failures of the SAM-7 and
blowpipe missiles to bring down Soviet helicopters,
followed by the success of the Stingers. In the
book, Stingers are described as having IFF, which
makes them incapable of shooting down American
military aircraft. Perhaps this is true. If it's
not true, why would a book published 10 years ago
make an offhand claim like that?

The story of how the war ended is disturbingly
familiar to those who watched the end of the Gulf War.
Because we preferred anarchy over a fundamentalist
government, the US betrayed the mujahadeen as soon
as the Soviets left the country. After five more
years of civil war, the fundamentalists took over, anyway.

There are lots of other tidbits, and the overall
effect is to bring things into focus. It's not a
pretty picture. You can see why the various governments
involved didn't really want this book published.

After September 11, it is more relevant than ever.