"Democracy is hard to love." Iris Marion Young writes these words near the beginning of INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY (2000). The love/hate relationship many people have with democracy originates in part from a love of democracy in theory but displeasure surrounding the outcomes of democratic systems in practice. I write this review from Jamaica during a time in which the struggle for democracy has reached critical proportions. The imminent national elections will play a part in determining the future direction of this polity. Jamaica presently operates under a neo-liberal economic system. Its flirtation with democratic socialism in the 1970s, though, along with its strong ties to Cuba hinted at a potential turn to socialism at a time when revolutions in Grenada, Iran, and Nicaragua fueled the Cold War Red Scare. The failure of both communist state capitalism and neo-liberalism among developing countries before and after the fall of the Soviet Union has left open the question, "What constitutes a democracy?" Furthermore, developed nations such as the US in the post-September 11 era are questioning WHO and WHAT constitute the fabric of their democracy amid daily economic struggles and racial profiling.
Young, like the late Hannah Arendt, is trained as a philosopher yet writes primarily as a political theorist. As such, Young is offering a theoretical framework in her discourse rather than a text full of regressions or allusions to philosopher-kings and queens. For academics in the discipline of "political science" who see a divide between the theorists and empiricists, this work offers fresh ideas for both camps. For the grassroots organic intellectuals and activists, you too will find new ideas.
Young outlines reasons why we should love democracy in three ways as I read the book: (1) Detailing an overview of contemporary democratic theory, (2) providing her criteria of the components of a democracy and (2) offering future directions in democratic theory. Per the title, "inclusion" is a cornerstone element of democracies and the prevention of exclusion is paramount. Jurgen Habermas has been criticized for composing theories that exclude several groups outside his closed Enlightenment project. What is telling about Young's thought is that Habermas taught a recent course at Northwestern University interrogating Young's ideas on multiculturalism and race. Young asks very important questions on the meaning of inclusion in a democratic polity.
So why read this book instead of the recent spate of works on the topic? The author is able to do something that unfortunately many writes cannot: compose a highly readable work that is simultaneously informative. In terms of innovations, Young links political theory, distributive justice, and social justice queries with "international" concerns for global justice; a move persons like Charles Beitz began and John Rawls avoided.
In conclusion, I urge anyone reading to pick up this work. The journal POLITICAL THEORY offers a useful recent response by Young to a critic of the book. Lastly, read Young's previous works on feminism and social justice (esp. JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE) to see get a sense of the author's writing. The only way we all can forge democracy in these precarious times is to talk, read, debate, and throw away the false belief that political theory is only an isolated academic exercise.

If you love feminist philosophy, and you don't mind all the impractical ideas and flawed logic, then this is your book. I cannot stand these things, so I found this book to be a waste of trees.

It's tempting to write an essay detailing exactly how politics as a rationale for a system of justice must fail, and indeed should fail, but I don't want to waste my time or yours because this book isn't worth it. To make a long story short, Young's thesis is that in order for justice to be met in our patriarchal, racist, classist society guilt and punishment should be measured by the relative "power" of the people involved. Thus a white man should be punished more than a white woman for the same crime. Not only that, but if a white man were to murder, for example, another white man his punishment should be lighter than if he murdered a black man. Is this justice or an attempt to apply notions of group justice to what must be a system that addresses guilt or innocence on an individual basis? Young actually creates criteria to define exactly how oppressed you are so that through her system you can get what's coming to you.

Perhaps the most ironic part of her diatribe is that she uses her criteria and argues that women are historically more oppressed than blacks. This one example destroys her argument for justice based on politics. As a feminist "philosopher" she deconstructs her argument by tipping the scales to suit her needs, thus oppressing blacks still more.

I've written more than I wanted to, but there you have it in a nutshell. If you think justice is best served through politics then buy this book. If you believe, as I do, in justice as a set of principles to be applied fairly to each person as is their due, then run, don't walk, away from this book.

(Since I wrote this review I came to realize that anybody looking for a book such as this would probably not have the qualms I do regarding misplaced social justice. Nonetheless, if this book jibes with your worldview, so be it. You're welcome to it.)

Young's clasic book is most often read in seminars on social criticism and/or feminist studies. This is as it should be, for Young's work brilliantly illuminates the direction debates about justice and oppressed groups must go. However, I read the book from the point of view of the work of Warnke, Habermas, and Gadamer, more along the lines of hermeneutics and ideology critique. What I found was an absolutely riviting account of how we define the groups to which we belong, how we believe those groups interact with each other, and the way that the competing demands of these groups are met and dealt with. As Warnke does, Young realigns the concept of justice along a communitarian axis rather than an individualistic axis, proposing that we look at justice in terms of communitites than individuals. Only in this way will the individuals within those communities be able to come to the table with their respective concerns. Like Habermas, she investigates the rhetoric of power that underlies old ways of discussing justice in terms of distribution, denying that justice is a finite commodity that must be rationed. And like Gadamer, Young stresses the need for an understanding of presuppositions in developing theories of history and interpretation. After all, how we define "our" group in great part determines how we define "others".

I found her turn from a rural to an urban paradigm of community to be nothing short of revolutionary. She develops an idea of community-oriented justice that revolves not around the model of self-suffient hamlets, but around the interlocking and often messy communities that exist side-by-side (though often in isolation from each other) in cities. Showing that the idea of self-sufficiency is unworkable in the curent context, Young holds out hope that these interconnected yet distinct communities will show us the way to not only survive but flourish in the postmodern world. Justice does not compete with difference; it grows out of it.

An excellent study, it should be read by any and all, though the jargon cannot help but be technical at times. I agree with the previous reviewer, a good second-year book for students of social work, religion, philosophy, education, or politics, and a great any-time book for anyone concerned with issues of justice in the world today.