Discrete good ideas. But the book does not present solid practice evidence that the framework will work. The core is model and in many places the authors implied good quantifications. In real world it is hard to get near precise and one needs to handle many quantity and quality unknowns.

About a year ago I was faced with a business problem to solve. My intent was to try and develop client offers which concurrently delivered value to the client, the employees and the shareholders. I had a conceptual frame work in mind but I didn't really have any idea of how to go about the task. Synchronicity at work - I had purchased a copy of "The Value Enterprise" about two months earlier but had not yet read it. I thought it might have something to offer. What I found was a well thought out "How to" framework to support my conceptual "What". After finishing the book I contacted Brent Wortman, we were able to do some work together with great results. I found the book to be an easy read, with practical application.

This is a must-read for anyone who aspires to business greatness -- from shop floor manager to CEO. It's no longer good enough to see stock price as the be-all and end-all of corporate performance, and Tully, Wortman and Donovan see the whole picture. Companies need to retain their talented employees, deliver the best products at the best price and THAT's what leads to solid financial performance. Fundamentals are out in today's dot-com world, but they'll be back. For leaders who still believe in value, this book should be top of their reading list.

As is often the case with Western scholars writing on things Russian, one simply cannot properly understand Russia -- culturally or politically -- without first understanding Byzantium and Eastern Orthodoxy. Russia is a heir to Byzantium, and Orthodoxy determined and shaped its culture. Mr. Wortman tends to treat his subject as if he were part anthropologist, part literary theorist, part psychologist -- all premised on the assumption that the idea of Monarchy itself was and is simply a "forest of symbols", as arbitrary in its connection to any sort of transcedental meaning as any other "system. This betrays the disease of modern academia: political systems are mere ideologies, constructions that mask power. To ignore the theology of the Orthodox Church and the various writings both in Greek and Russian on Monarchy is an oversight to say the least. To try and psychologize or play with semiotics as a way to unmask the Russian Monarchy is bad history. The Czar and the Church represented the two heads of the double eagle inheritted from Byzantium. One head -- the Czar -- protected the Kingdom and the Faith from foreign invaders and preserved a Christian Kingdom in rule and law; the Church -- the other head of the eagle -- tended to man's salvation and his soul. These two heads worked synergistically. This is the essence of the Russian Monarchy: the Czar's role cannot be separated from his duty to God and the Church. To understand how this works and why, turn to Byzantium or Pebodenostev.

Wortman seems to be one of those deeply conservative "leftists" who think that narratives of a ruling class or body are academic narratives - that is, that the history of the Russian monarchy is full of symbols that an upper middle class college prof with *way* too little interest in the suffering of the serfs and *way* too much interest in trying to be taken for a clever reader of historical artifact (academics of this bent mutually praise one another, but readers genuinely interested in the subject matter feel differently, and don't have as much time to waste as the "theorists" do, alas.)

There are many good books on this period, and on this subject. Don't let yourself get cheated.

How to summarize the history of the Romanov dynasty? Well, Peter "the Great" murdered his son, Catherine "the great" murdered her husband, and Alexander "the Blessed" was complicit in the murder of his father. After that the dynasty went into a bit of a decline. For the past two decades historians have been increasingly interested in the world of monarchist ritual. They have looked at how during the nineteenth century these rituals became more, not less, elaborate and they have pondered on the use of these rituals as examples of aristocratic hegemony. Wortman's well written and well documented second volume looks at the Russian version from the ascension of Alexander II in 1855 to the abdication of Nicholas II. We certainly get a lot of information on the elaborate ceremonies of the monarchy. We learn of the elaborate rituals and liturgies of the coronation ceremonies, along with fulsome and increasingly sycophantic paeans from the ranks of Orthodoxy. We are in a world of great popular feasts for the people, "entertained by acrobats, jugglers, stunt riders, and carousel rides," which comes to its horrible climax when at least 1,500 people are trampled to death on the feast festivals of Khodynka at the coronation of Nicholas II, the direct result of tsarist incompetence. We enter the world of elaborate balls, and the exquisite detail of faberge eggs (one designed to look like Assumption Cathedral). We see new strains in royalist propaganda as Alexander III presents a nationalist and orthodox message, while Nicholas II presents a Victorian and domestic picture of his family. Rather revealingly Wortman quotes Tchaikovsky's contempt for the 1812 Overture that he composed for Alexander III's coronation.

But there is a larger point in Wortman's account. Much of the literature on royal power deals with its ability to dazzle the larger population. Increasingly, however, royal ritual only dazzled its monarchs. Alexander II starts off with the "scenario of love." After the (partial) emancipation of the peasantry, Alexander II increasingly emphasized his "loving" and "benevolent" nature, as if his self-professed amiability automatically deserved to be reciprocated. As it happened Alexander II's marriage was visibly crumbling as he carried on with a much younger woman. At the same time Alexander moved away from a western path of development, he also sought to ignore what laws and regulations existed to force the rest of the nobility to accept his paramour as his second empress.

Alexander III's reign saw an emphasis on an increasingly chauvinist vision of Russia and Russian orthodoxy, with a new emphasis on monarchies and cathedrals. There was a weird, increasingly unreal and almost necrophiliac admiration for 17th century Moscow, before the liberal rot had set in under Peter I. There was a new emphasis on miracle as the country moved towards a military dictatorship. Nicholas II believed in all these ideas and more, but whereas Alexander III relied on the army and the dictatorship, Nicholas increasingly deluded himself into believing that he had a direct relationship with the Russian people. In this increasingly mystic view in which the "real" Russian people gave him their complete and unequivocal support, Nicholas II viewed the bureaucracies, the army, the episcopacy, other politicians simply as barriers to the implementation of his own will.

As a result during his rituals Nicholas II never missed an opportunity to demean the Duma, the parliament he had reluctantly allowed after the 1905 revolution and which he was planning to emasculate before war broke out in 1914. Nicholas became obsessed with "holy men" who supposedly represented the Russian people, and he and his wife shamelessly bullied the Orthodox hierarchy in order to declare one of them a saint. Reading reports from his bribed press, easily impressed by the crowds who flocked to the anniversaries and royal tours, Nicholas had deluded himself into believing that he was one with the Russian people. Becoming commander in chief of the army against the advice of almost all his ministers, by the end of his reign Nicholas could no longer count on the army, or the church, or the conservatives in his rigged parliament, or most of his family, indeed on anyone other than his wife and children. And yet he was outraged after his abdication that his brother Michael might speak hesitatingly of a constitutional monarchy. The emphasis on Victorian domestic harmony was an illusion; Wortman clearly shows that any chance Russia had of moving on towards a non-revolutionary modernity was fatally hampered by its monarch with a seventeenth century soul.