In this book Admiral Woodward has provided the reader with an informative and candid view of a task force commander at war. His myriad of concerns; logistics, weather, technology, numbers, and the interference of politics and the modern media in the campaign are presented in a very readable format. It was interesting to read his asessments that Argentina could have won the war by concentrating their air attacks on the 2 British carriers (fortunately the Brits hadn't sold them) or the amphibs. As a naval officer, and a student of military history, it was refreshing to see a modern commander admit that such things as acceptable losses and expendable commands really do exist in the conduct of warfare. His humor and leadership style, warts and all, are a primer in command and control under fire. The book presents dramatic descriptions of many tragic episodes, such as the sinkings of the HMS Coventry and the Atlantic Conveyor. Unfortunately, since the book was written from a naval officer's point of view, the land campaign was given rather short notice therefore leaving out an important portion of the fight. I highly recommend the book for professionals and buffs alike.

This fine naval autobiography takes us behind the scenes of the Falklands sea/air (not ground) war and modern battle management in general. Admiral Woodward didn't exactly know what he was sailing into back in 1982, and makes no attempt to hide his personal sense of vulnerability as Britain's first fighting admiral in high-tech warfare. In fact, the entire book is refreshingly down-to-earth. Woodward is quick to note that he was tapped for the job because he happened to be the navy's closest flotilla commander at the time (in Gibraltar)--and confides that his superiors almost replaced him with a higher-ranking officer even as he led the task force into danger. This is no stuffed-shirt memoir.

Woodward and co-author Patrick Robinson weave accounts of grand strategy and military politics through a genuinely absorbing narrative of men and machines in heavy weather, incessant tactical maneuvering, and flashes of terrifying combat. Along the way, there are plenty of 'what-if's to chew on. We learn that Woodward had to manipulate London to get HMS Conqueror to sink the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano (British subs weren't under his tactical command). He explains why the sinking was both necessary and tragic, and how Conqueror watched but spared Argentine ships coming to Belgrano's aid. He also reveals that his ships almost shot down a Brazilian airliner mistaken for a pesky Argentine recon jet; he personally gave the order to withhold fire. And Woodward's character shines through his account of ordering HMS Alacrity on a potential suicide mission to scout mines--in an exceptionally gracious mea culpa of command, he praises the captain's sterling courage while faulting his own mundane direction.

Also fascinating are the individual stories of the high number of British ships damaged or sunk, and Woodward's frustration with underperforming anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems. This was more of a close call than the world knew at the time, as he makes abundantly clear. Ultimately, his modest approach on paper belies the fact that he and his task force pulled off a truly impressive naval feat. And it's a credit to Woodward the author-analyst that 'One Hundred Days' transcends the Falklands War to give an illuminating, first-person view of campaign and tactical battle coordination. It could find a home on bookshelves of Fortune 500 executives as well as students of naval and air operations. The style is also breezy (and occasionally humorous) enough for the casual reader. I've never seen it in a U.S. store, so thanks, Amazon.

A superior autobiography. Although the focus is plainly on the Falklands, the author provides a fascinating account of the RN's submarine training program -- which reminds one of why the British military, though tiny in size, still maintains some of the best trained warriors in the world.

The meat of the book retells the story of PM Thatcher's courageous decision to retake the Falklands. The author provides a fine defense of the UK's controversial decision to sink the Argentine crusier Belgrano and a compelling account of the terror visited upon his task force by (French-made) exocet anti-ship missles. Unlike many commanders' post-mortems, this book contains little of the standard blame shifting usually found in such works. The Admiral takes you through his decision-making process step-by-step never letting the reader forget that the decisions he made often were made on the basis on VERY incomplete information under intense time-pressure (from the US, the UN and the coming South Atlantic winter) and, often, under fire.

Overall, one comes away thinking the author would have done a bang-up job at Trafalger or Jutland . . . or even taking on the Soviet Navy in the North Atlantic. A must have for those interested in finding out what -- to paraphrase the Iron Duke -- a damn near run thing the Falklands campaign really was.