This is a great book. A compilation of memoirs and first hand accounts from German Soldiers who were there. It doesn't get any better than that. In the second half of the book maps are widely used and incredibly helpful. However in the beginning of the book there are no maps. This portion of the book was dealing with where the German commanders believed the invasion would come. It would have been very helpful to have a map showing where each officer believed the invasion would come and where it actually did. I am interested to know how close their estimates were.

Not to mention that some of these little French villages are a bit obscure, and a map would be helpful. Don't get me wrong the second half of the book has a lot of maps and is a pleasure to read. A very good addition to any library concerning tactical defense of the Normandy Coast in WW II.

This volume seeks to show, from the viewpoint of the German Army, one of the most decisive events of the Second World War: the Allied invasion of Normandy on D-Day, 6 June, 1944 and the events leading up to it and those flowing from it. It consists of parts of the military studies written for the US Army by senior (lt. colonel and above) German Army officers post-war and have been used as source material in all subsequent writing on Normandy. They represent, together; the most detailed German account of the fighting.

As has often been pointed out, these documents all have to be used with caution. The earlier ones were done when the authors were prisoners of war, the later ones when they were paid employees of the US Army. Most of them - especially the earlier reports -- were done largely without reference to war diaries, war maps or official papers. While written by participants - many of whom never wrote their memoirs or other accounts in any language - while their memories were still fresh, their immediacy is not matched by attention to detail - dates and places are sometimes wrong or inconsistent - or their impartiality.

In some cases, the threat of prosecution for war crimes obviously influenced the writing. Some ended up doing hard time or the high jump. Blumentritt's admiration of his boss, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, was doubtlessly genuine. But it comes across as "my boss was a wonderful old gentlemen, a natural aristocrat, and ignorant of any atrocities. I can say this because I burned all the incriminating evidence myself". The authors also do not spend much ink on introspection and self-revelation, but self-justification and pointing the finger at others is always in order when former generals are let near a typewriter, as the recent round of Gulf War memoirs show.

A Rashomon-like quality pervades, with the same events being described by multiple writers while - even more frustrating - more significant events are ignored. The quality of the writing and the translation varies greatly.

This book certainly does not tell the complete German side of D-Day. But the documents included in this volume remain a valid part of that picture.

Fighting the Invasion is how the German Army experienced D-Day. It brings together accounts by those who saw it from the front-line positions and those who saw it from higher headquarters. These narratives cover D-Day: the initial Allied airborne landings that so disrupted the German defenses, the fighting on the beachheads, the start of the Allied advance inland, and, finally, the failed German counterattacks. It also covers the preparation for the invasion: the building of the Atlantic Wall, the disputes over strategy between Rommel and von Rundstedt, and the improvisation of the fighting divisions the Allies would attack on D-Day.

Since the authors are all, I believe, now dead, I have tried to pull together these accounts with minimal editorial intrusions from the accounts they originally compiled for the US Army's historians. These accounts have been a major source for all historians writing about on the German side of D-Day since then, as a check of the bibliography of any of the better books on Normandy will show. I think if it's worth while for the historians to use them, then there is value in brining access to these accounts to a wider audience.

These accounts discuss both the fighting on D-Day itself and the strategy and tactics that shaped them. The authors include members of the high command, such as General Jodl and Admiral Donitz and their respective chiefs of staff. It also includes army, corps, division and regimental commanders and chiefs of staff. General Geyr gives his estimate of the quality of each of his panzer divisions, explaining the factors that would make each one a threat on the battlefield. Baron von der Heydte describes organizing and training his Luftwaffe parachute regiment and then leading into battle against the US 101st Airborne Division in the confused and bitter fighting around Ste. Mere-Eglise on D-Day. Generals Spiedel and Blumentritt provide their unique insights, as chiefs of staff, into the generalship and personality of Rommel and von Rundstedt. Oberstleutnant Fritz Ziegelmann, assistant chief of staff of the German 352nd Infantry Division, is in my opinion the most useful source. His D-Day communications log is included in this volume along with his account of how his division ended up behind Omaha Beach on D-Day and how they managed to make it a "near run thing".

This book is aimed at those with a deep interest in the Normandy campaign. It helps to have a good idea of the general course of D-Day going in, as the authors are not all that helpful about explaining things. German generals were not used to explaining. Nor is the latest and most insightful account of the Germans on D-Day. There has been 55 years of historians' work devoted to that. But it does give you the views - self-exculpatory, buck-passing, complaining though it may often be - of some very important fighting men you are not likely to hear from elsewhere.

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The book is one of a large number written by German Officers after the war. All of these books were of some interest but had one fatal flaw. That was that the germans had little knowledge of what was happening in Russia and the dynamics of its defence. Most books from this time tend to have a common theme. Masses of Russians coming from every where and it was all Hitlers fault.

The book has large slabs of Hitlers dialogue in it. This was fairly interesting. The inclusion of the dialogue was included to show his irrationality. The reality is somewhat different with Hitler appearing from time to time a bit obsessed but in general terms having an idea of what was happening and a quick mind for detail.

The book fails at times trys to limit the armies responsability for a number of war crimes including he order to execute without trial Russian party officials. This part of the book lacks any conviction.

The book is of some historic interest but scholarship has passed it by.

The ONLY reason I bought this book was because I found some of the discussions between Hitler and his staff interesting. I had read Guderian's 'Panzer Leader', which featured some of this. There are many accounts about Hitler's misdeeds, but it is interesting to read of him discussing minutae about various fronts, battles, and personalities. Even though Adolf Hitler was an evil man, he was still a human, as this book shows. The rest of the book, which is mainly General Warlimont's observations on various military happenings on different fronts, I found rather dry. P.S. Readers who want an interesting side of Hitler should read the fictional 'Hitler's Niece' by Ron Hansen, about his early political days and his weird relationship with his niece Geli.

The book is interesting for the student of World War II, since it gives a good account of life at Hitler's headquarters, the ambiance and the point of view of the general staff on the strategic situation. However, there is a lot of emphasis on the bureaucracy and organization of the German Army, and on the power struggles inside the General Staff, which I found not very interesting. You often get the impression that the author views the war more as a professional challenge, without expressing his opinion on its political and strategic implications.