I have read the autobiographies of most of the top German military leaders, Guderian, Doenitz, and Kesselring, not to mention other non-military leaders such as Albert Speer. However, when I read Manstein's book "Lost Victories" I came across something I hadn't encountered in any of the other books - the banal evilness of the German military leadership. Manstein participated in military campaigns which cost hundreds of thousands of soldiers their lives yet he never shows much appreciation of that suffering - and when he does it is only for the Germans who suffered not their victims.

This came through most clearly in the chapter on the invasion of France and the one on the battle for the Sevastopol. In France Manstein's division came up against a French colonial division composed of black troops. Describing their combat abilities Manstein writes that "the enemy fought bravely - the negroes with their characteristic bloodthirstiness and contempt for human life..." If one studies history from the Thirty Year War up through WWII it is clear that it is the bloodthirstiness of the Germanic peoples that has no equal. And for Manstein, who murdered so many innocents in his wars of conquest, to make such a remark is disgusting Regarding Sevastopol Manstein refers to the Russians fanatical defense of the city as being an Asiatic trait that shows they don't value life. Yet somehow the Germans fighting to the end in Stalingrad were heroic. It is also worth noting that Manstein quite frequently gives casualty figures for his opponents but never once gives numbers of German casualties.

Another perverse point is where he points out how humane he was by allowing German soldiers who were going to be executed for desertion to be reinstated in their units so that they could die honorably on the field of battle!! What makes all of this even more disturbing is that he never seems to express any interest or concern in what the war is about. Hitler may have been evil and insane but if you believe that the German people are really a superior race then fighting a war of world conquest does have a certain logic to it - the horrors of war are a temporary expedient to bring about a better world. Manstein doesn't believe any such thing - he does what he does because it is his job - nothing more nothing less. It really is too bad that the Russian partisans never managed to get ahold of him.

The book itself has many shortcomings. The maps are few and generally not very good. Make sure you have the West Point Atlas of WWII around for reference when you read this book. Also, the translator has seen fit to cut out significant parts of the book to make it palatable for the U.S. market. I guess they figure that Americans are too lazy to read a two volume book (its those same kind of assumptions about American laziness that helped get Germany into trouble in WWII). The chapter on the battle of Kursk is only 10 pages. Come to find out the translator didn't include the chapter on Kursk from the original book but rather substituted a short magazine article that Manstein wrote on it for another publication!!! What a travesty. About the only really positive point to this book is that Manstein does give a honest portrait of Hitler and admits that in many respects he was a brilliant man and military strategist, though of course very much evil as well. Manstein does admit that Hitler was no "corporal" as many would like to suggest.

Field Marshall Manstein has written a very readable, yet technically accurate history of his 'Grand Operational' command in the Second World War. Never as popular as Rommel in person or Guderian in print, he is considered by many to be Germany's most proficent General of the war. Manstein's skill was obvious, even to der Fuhrer: no other General dared the insubordination he often displayed. Manstein was required to consider facets of war (unity of command, morale, logistics) that few other commanders have had to contend with. Of note is his enlightened handling of the people in occupied Crimea, allowing them to police and protect themselves. This was so effective that Stalin interred many Crimeans after the war. This book is well balanced between his personal relationships starting early in life and changing perceptions of battle. Starting WW 2 as an Infantry Division Commander in Poland, he is promoted to command 30 Inf Corp in France and finally to Field Marshall of almost 400,000 men in Army Group South. His narrative of the latter as the tide turned against the Reich is irresistable as his tenacity, skill and sense of impending doom is conveyed not by lucid prose, but by thorough analysis of options, often bad and worse. Dark humour in his devious handling of 'Hitler's stand fast order' is balanced with news of the death of his son in battle. And yet most memorable passages are from "the happy times", when Barborrossa was first launched and he commanded the 56th Pz Corps. Elan matches skill as he proudly notes his unit sliced through 200 miles of Russian territory in only 4 days. Although a manifestly German point of view containing facts now challenged by releases from Russian sources, this is must read. Manstein's account is objective in description of battle yet subtly personal as the war takes its toll. Anyone half serious about military history should consider this worthwhile volume.

General Feld-Marshall Erich von Manstein explains the personality of Hitler and the essential differences between the OKH (oberkommando des heer) and the Fuhrer. Beginning with the Polish campaign, the Feld-Marshall explains how the OKH became subordinated to the central high command (OKW) or oberkommando des wehrmacht. This cripples the German Army leadership and places it at Hitler's heel for the entire war, with disastrous consequences for the Eastern Front and the West as well. Von Manstein demonstrated his abilities with his plan for the attack on the West and his near salvation of 6th Army at Stalingrad. In fact, his alternative plan at Kursk, to attack straight into the salient rather that on its flanks might have spelled German victory. This is a must read for historians interested in the ground war in Europe, especially the early war in the West and the war on the Eastern Front.

This book is Manstein's version of WWII. Manstein obeyed Hitler during the war but later was critical unlike Rommel. Manstein, after supervising over the death of millions of his countrymen and others, himself went into comfortable retirement.

Quite simply, in late November 1942, the situation did not seem potentially disastrous to the Germans, from Hitler downwards. Their intelligence agencies had completely failed to discover the buildup of the Soviet Armies poised to surround the Sixth Army. They simply could not believe that the Soviets still had such strong armies left.

Hitler and his generals all believed that the losses they had inflicted on the Soviets had to be crippling. Their underestimation of Soviet strength was what led to Stalingrad, no matter what Manstein may claim he would have done otherwise, the Soviets would still have been victorious.

This book was a very good read, but I wouldn't believe everything he says either. However, if you're interested in
the Russian Front Campaign and the events surrounding the disaster the Germans never recovered from at Stalingrad, this book will put a lot of those events into perspective.

Upon reading this book it would appear Manstein not only had a talent with the sword but also the pen. Manstein's book is a very readable account of his war time experiences. Included in his book is the demise of the OKH ( General Staff of the Army) through its lack of decisiveness in making a military decision.The formulation, acceptance and implementation of the "Mainstein Plan" which was adopted for the offensive in the West as other plans would NOT acheive total victory. Mainstein shares his simplistic but interesting views on how the Battle of Britain should have been fought.

He then takes us through his brillant victories in the Crimea which were acheived againsnt overwhelming numbers and where his successes were largely acheived through having a free hand and no interference from Hitler. Mainstein devotes a chapter on Hitler as Supreme Commander and analyses Hitlers strengths and many weaknesses.

There is a fascinating detailed account of the German tragedy at Stalingrad and how the beleaguered Sixth Army had the opportunity to break out towards Mainstein's relief forces. However the opportunity was lost due to the Army's hesitation and Hitlers insistence Stalingrad must be held. The sacrifice of the Sixth Army however gave time for other Army Groups to leap frog back to safety and deal a counter blow at Kharkov.

One diappointing feature of the book is the short chapter devoted to operation "Citadel" ( or the battle of Kursk). This is because the translators of the book have taken a much shorter translation than what was orginally contributed by the author. I would be most interested in obtaining the orginal full length translation.

Mainsteins views on how operations should be fought subsequent to Kursk were constantly at odds with Hitlers views on holding onto everything. This along with some other top Nazi Party members insistence that Manstein was a defeatist guaranteed his dimissal in April 1944.

This book is a MUST READ and indispensable to anyone with an interest in the Second World War.