Stansfield Turner was a Rhodes scholar and naval officer who rose to command of a carrier task group, a fleet, NATO's southern flank, and the Navy's most prestigious intellectual institution, the Naval War College. He served from 1977-1981 as Director of Central Intelligence under President Jimmy Carter, and his book in my mind was the first serious contribution-perhaps even a catalyst-to the growing debate over whether and how much reform is required if the U.S. Intelligence Community is to be effective in the 21st Century. His eleven-point agenda for reform is of lasting value, as are his ideas for intelligence support to those responsible for natural disaster relief and other non-military challenges.

This book is a very fabulous book that every person on the intire planet should read. I happen to know the author, and he is a very good writer and knows what he is talking about. I DEMAND YOU TO READ THIS BOOK :) YOU WILL ENJOY IT!

~ChristinE~

In this book, Stansfield Turner attempts to outline a clear and immediately applicable nuclear arms control strategy that seeks to drastically reduce the number of nuclear weapons in the global sphere without sacraficing regional and national security interests in the process.

Turner draws heavily upon his experience as both a government official and military leader in formulating an arms control regime tailored to operate in the post-Cold War world. Turner was chosen to be the Director of Central Intelligence by President Carter and has also served as an Admiral in the United States Navy. However, prior to his appointment to the position of DCI, Turner had no political background or experience in the intelligence community. As DCI, Turner chose to rely most heavily upon National Technical Means (NTM's), such as satellites, to gather information. He drastically cut human intelligence initiatives, such as spies and covert operations as a result of his unwavering faith in NTM's. Although it is true that NTM's provide valuable information, they are subject to technical fallibilities and hindered by the fact that satellites are not a stealth means of information collection. Human intelligence is still the most direct source of information. When Carter's presidency ended in 1980, so did Turner's reign as DCI. He has not since served in public office.

While his writing is easy to read, his solutions are often over simplistic or too radical to generate any substantial support from policy makers. Turner's plan mandates that the majority of nuclear weapons be placed in "strategic escrow". In other words, nuclear warheads should be removed from operational strategic launchers and placed in designated storage areas at some distance away from the launchers, thereby making them unavailable for immediate use. Foreign observers will be allowed to view this process, in hopes that they will choose to follow suit. The "strategic escrow" solution carries with it the additional problem of where to store these thousands of dismantled nuclear weapons. Both of Turner's solutions are somewhat problematic. First, he suggests that the warheads be further dismanteled and stored as plutonium and uranium counterparts. This increases the probability of having readily available fissile landing in the wrong hands, which could have disastrous and unpredictable effects. Second, Turner suggests that additional storage space be used in sizable remotely populated areas throughout the world in regions committed to a non-nuclear security regime. Specifically, he suggests Norway, Sweden, and Greenland. It seems rather presumptuous to assume that these non-nuclear states would be willing to allow storage of the worlds quantity of weapons of mass destruction within their sovereign territories. In addition, assessing how strong a commitment against implementing nuclear weapons is a risky endeavor in itself. If the capabilities are there, whether dismantled or not, the temptation for experimentation is there and might be encouraged.

In conclusion, Turner's book outlines a detailed plan to reduce nuclear armaments in the coming century. His ideas and thoughts are meritorious in that they are well organized and systematically ordered for what appears to be immediate implementation. However, careful analysis of his solutions suggest that there are still problems with his remedies that are likely to hinder his vision of achieving a world in which there are virtually no immediately operable nuclear weapons.

This is an extraordinary book coming from the hand of one of the men who once was tasked with carrying out the U.S. SIOP plan. Admiral Turner's analysis and suggestions are timely, especially in the light the slow pace of nuclear arms control and the real threat of nuclear proliferation. The failure of the nuclear superpowers to move more forcefully in reducing their nuclear arsenals lends credence to those new or aspiring nuclear nations to subscribe to the nuclear madness. Admiral Turner raises these issues and the danger of accidental launch and nuclear smuggling in the post Cold War era. However, one can question his advocacy of the wisdom of Ballistic Missile defenses. The abandonment of the ABM treaty could have drastic consequences. However,on balance, Admiral Turner's suggestion that we escrow the nuclear weapons offers intriguing possibilites to break the slow pace of nuclear reduction and elimination.