This is, at present, one of THE books (in the English language) on understanding the roots of today's headlines. Mr. Roberts takes a scholarly and refreshingly unbiased approach to the tangled history of the two rival Yugoslavian resistance movements: the monarchist and Republican Chetniks of General Drazha Mihailovich, and the communist Partisans of Josip Broz Tito. With the excellent book by Richard West titled "Tito and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia" a reader will be much more informed than by the pedantics of Western left-wing and right-wing editorials and so-called "news reporting" of the past decade.

"With Stalin Against Tito" is an outstanding monograph on a crucial period in post-WW2 Yugoslav history by one of the field's preeminent historians. The Tito-Stalin split in 1948 was the first major rift to occur among the countries of the former Eastern Bloc, and its repercussions were felt in Yugoslavia, the USSR and the Soviet satellite states of Eastern Europe. Banac convincingly shows that although the conflict between the Yugoslav and Soviet communists assumed an ideological veneer, it was primarily a power struggle between two willful autocrats. This partially explains why the Yugoslav "Cominformists," who ended up supporting Stalin's line, were such an ideologically diverse group - from national (populist) communists to dogmatic internationalist hardliners. The only thing that united them was opposition to Tito and unquestioning loyalty (in some cases) to Stalin and the much-revered Soviet Communist Party. Banac bases his study on extensive research into this area, and it's interesting that he made use of subsequent cultural production (i.e. novels, films, plays, poetry) that deals with the Cominform crisis and its consequences for Yugoslav society as valuable source material. Banac's analysis is top-notch and his writing style is very engaging and never dull.

This is an excellent history of Yugoslavia over the past critical fifty years, and sheds light on the roots of Yugoslavia's violent breakup in the 1990's. Reading this book will give insight into the sinister nature of the communist dictator Tito, who like Ceaucescu of Romania was one of the Western powers' favored, "good" communist despots. The chapters on Tito's rise to power during World War 2 and subsequent years of control will let readers in on the reasons for the 1990's Yugoslavian wars. Well worth the cover price.

A good read! This book is well-researched and contains information that everyone and their brother and sister should read. This man knows Yugoslavia, knows the history of the country, and demonstrates that the world had done nothing toward solving the "nationalities" problem after the fall of Nazi Germany, when a reconciliation was possible. The author demonstrates how the world stood by and allowed the Ustasha to highjack planes, to blow them up in mid-air, to run rampant with their terrorist ideals while the Communists were in power, even going so far as to give them the places to train their terrorist soldiers. While the author condemns Tito for not confronting the problem in Yugoslavia and dealing with it while he was in power, the author also condemns the rest of the world for their complicity to the crime.

During the recent troubles in former Yugoslavia we learned to hate the Serbs for their policy of ethnic cleansing. But this book explains that the Serbs had ample reason for their hatred of the Croats and for their desire to turn the tables on their former tormenters. The one ray of hope is that many Yugoslavs live in peace with their neighbors and intermarry regardless of ethnicity or religion, not obsessed with prolonging the hatred.

The atrocities against humanity committed by the Croats against Serbs, Jews and Gypsies (500,000 murdered) were more sadistic and horrifying than anything since. The evil Ustasha, the terrorist arm of the Croats, specialized in sadistic torture prior to murder, all in the name of religion.

I picked this book up to learn about Marshall Tito, the fascinating political figure who successfully resisted both Hitler and Stalin, and who kept the tinderbox of Yugoslavia at peace throughout his life. Tito must have been an amazing man. And he didn't do it with terror. It is incredible how he maintained independence in that part of the world surrounded by such aggressive nations. The Tito period was a time of prosperity for Yugoslavia, making even their Italian neighbors envious.

This book provides an overwhelming amount of information regarding many of the abuses of power in the balkans that have not been reported in the mainstream press. It clearly demonstrates the truth to the old saying "People who do not understand history are doomed to repeat it." This is very true in the Balkans and Bosko Vukcevich provides the data. There is so much data that one can get overwhelmed, but the book is orgainized in the latter half as a collection of short essays with a clear topical headline. Anyone who wants to understand the real roots to the current problems in the balkans should have a copy of this book.

chetniks were the biggest war criminals during the WWII and during the most recent wars in former Yugoslavia.

A rare book which actually looks at all sides of a balkan conflict....one of the rare 90's books of yugoslavia which does not plainly chastize serbs... or the chetniks...a must read for anyone interseted or curious in this particular theatre of the second world war... an eye opener... a true gem

Michael Lees had a unique prespective on the wars which raged in former Yugoslavia in WWII. As a British SOE officer assigned to work with the Serbian Chetnik guerillas, he witnessed first hand their military efforts at disrupting German supply lines and in attacking large German units. He builds a convincing case, now proven by official British historians, that the British were duped by Communist moles in SOE to switch their support to Tito and his Communist Partisans - bitter foes of the Chetniks. Lees attacks what he calls the "received wisdom" which for years stated that Chetniks eventually "collaborated". In fact, Lees meticulous research of formerly classified British and American documents concludes the exact opposite. A tremendous contribution to a poorly understood theatre of World War II.

At slightly over 100 pages, this book, pamphlet really, is hardly worth its hefty price tag, particularly since the first 90 or so pages are an incredibly abbreviated and rather unobjective account of Tito's life and post-WW2 Yugoslav history. This summary-style makes it possible for Pavlowitch to make a number of sweeping generalizations and questionable statements without the need for backing his claims or citing evidence in footnotes. In a reductionist style suited to the book's format, Pavlowitch basically says that Tito was a rather unremarkable man of middling intelligence and ability who only achieved anything through a combination of cunning, conniving and luck. It is only in the last chapter (the only one worth reading by the way) that he concedes that Tito may have had some real political and diplomatic skills despite his many shortcomings. While I have nothing against demythologizing Tito and Titoism, this "reassessment" offers nothing new - the first cracks at the Tito myth were taken almost immediately after his death in the former Yugoslavia, while a number of non-Yugoslav scholars and analysts have produced excellent works that dissected the nature of Tito's seizure and maintenance of power. Pavlowitch's overall conclusion seems to place most of the blame for Yugoslavia's collapse squarely on Tito and the socialist system he set up - a point worth discussing - but he cites mainly superficial reasons for this. He also grossly oversimplifies the nature of the Yugoslav economy, which he seems to imply only remained viable due to massive Western support. In the end, despite extensive discussion of Tito's many failings, there is no real substanstial assessment of the actual failures of his leadership of the former Yugoslavia or the system he and his ruling clique set up. Also, Pavlowitch completely fails to account for Tito's charisma and the genuine affection that many in the former Yugoslavia felt, and still do feel, for him.

It is well written and informative, but reads more like a survey than a biography. It almost seems as if the book is written for journalists who need a crash course on Tito and some background information before they are shipped off to the Balkans to cover the latest mishaps of that region. Thus, the biography seems to short and feels lacking of details that would make the interpretation and understanding of certain events clearer. For example, more background and detail should have been put into Tito's relationships and subsequent breaks with Djilas and Rankovic or the purges of Inform Biro (Comintern) supporters after the break with Stalin. I also found the World War II chapters confusing and lacking in the explanation of the partisan and chetnik struggles against Germans, and their subsequent rivalry. From the limited information provided one is almost lured into viewing these two groups as two big groups caught into the 1940's version of a gang war.

Pavlowitch's 110-page overview gives an excellent account of Tito's early life, the development of his political acumen in the crucible of Comintern machinations in the 1920s and 30s, his slavish devotion to Stalinist ideals, and his stubborn adherence to his own closely-held vision for Yugoslavia. This vision was the integrating theme that maintained Yugoslav unity during his long rule, but it also contained the seeds of its own ruin in that Tito's inability to respond effectively to economic crises beginning in the mid-1960s and the subsequent societal disaffection with the Communist program gave sustenance to the nationalist fever which exploded in Croatia and Bosnia in 1992 and Kosovo in 1998.

Had Tito been a truly effective unifier, he would have done more than postpone the day of nationalist reckoning until ten years after his death, he would have addressed the fundamental forces underpinning nationalist yearnings.

This book provides an excellent look at Tito and his contributions to Yugoslavia. Pavlowitch is especially strong in his analysis of Communist party politics and Tito's schizophrenic relations with the Soviet Union. I only wish the author had provided a more detailed explanation of Tito's economic planning. The "self-management" economy receives only a dozen words of attention. It is difficult to fault Pavlowitch on this point after he heroically struggled to compress a mass of dense material into this fine short volume, but a cursory understanding of Yugoslav economic dynamics would be invaluable to a reader who might not buy another volume about the country. Surely a few paragraphs on economics would not stretch the book unreasonably.

On the nitpicking side, the book seems to have both British and American editors, as financial figures are given alternately in the British "$3,400 million" (p.77) and the American "$20-21 billion" (p.91). Also he sometimes assumes the reader has significant pre-knowledge, as when he introduces Tito's three senior lieutenants by last name only, "In the spring of 1938... he set up a provisional leadership around Djilas, Kardelj and Rankovic" (p.23) without providing further background on these individuals. I can only assume the relevant background material was left on the editing-room floor. However, these are quibbles, the book is excellent.

Too academic and philosophic. I could not finish the book. If you want to know about Tito, read West's book.

It hardly needs to be said that anyone interested in studying the life and times of the famed Yugoslav dictator Tito cannot avoid reading this book. Milovan Djilas was one of Tito's most trusted deputies during the communist-led antifascist resistance during World War II, and one of Yugoslavia's most influential politicians during the immediate postwar years (considered one of the regime's chief ideologues). Even after his break with Tito in the early 1950s and general fall from grace, Djilas kept abreast of Yugoslav political events at the highest levels, as well as the personalities standing behind them. Here he offers a relatively candid and often critical view of Tito, and provides many insights into his actions and motivations. At one point in the text, Djilas also inadvertently repeats some of the rationalizations used by Tito and other Yugoslav officials for the often brutal political repression of opponents (both real and imagined), especially after the 1948 Comintern crisis. All in all, this is a very readable and illuminating insider's account of Tito and his leadership style.