Though perhaps not as exciting as... as... well, its not really very exciting at all. Professor Tilly rips to shreds nineteenth century notions of how populations organize to form dissent. His findings are often shocking. To summarize, he has discovered that most often populations organize in somewhat of a star shaped pattern when organizing to resist oppressive regimes, whereas they organize in a more free-flowing pattern (somewhat suggestive of radio waves when advocating Marxist revolution.

Charles Tilly is obviously taking on a big topic. In this book, he covers 1000 years of state formation in Europe. His primary interest is to determine why states have converged from divergent state forms (city states, federations, and empires) to a single form (the national state). What I enjoyed about this book is that, unlike so many theories of international politics, it does not take the modern state system for granted but shows that it is the product of a complex historical process. Central to the process is the imperative of the state of extend its influence and to protect itself from rival states. Tilly shows that the growth in the capital intensity and complexity of warfare has led over time to a strengthen of the state and an expansion of its role. This is a plausible theory which has much to commend it. I would have liked to have seen two more issues addressed in the book ...

1) What role did class struggle have in the formation of states?
This concerned is hinted at but not explored. If wars have
become increasingly expensive how have states been able to
impose the high cost of war on their citizens? Does this not
also mean increased exploitation and intensified struggle?

2) How have nuclear weapons effected the long term viability of
national states?

In these days of historical specialization, a comprehensive treatment of any subject is most welcome, whatever its faults. Tilly has indeed set himself a daunting task, namely to explain the development of state formation in Europe over the last millennium; specifically, he seeks to explain why a pattern of divergent state formations ultimately converged in the form of the modern nation-state. To the chagrin of social scientists, he assumes that war has always been the central object of the state; economic/political determinism is complementary but subordinate. Given that the nation-state has enjoyed the greatest military success throughout the centuries, all states have been forced either to move in that direction or cease to exist.

Tilly makes many good points. He reminds us that rulers did not operate with a specific plan of state formation in mind--they created states only in conjunction with certain of their subjects. Given geographic and temporal circumstances, rulers could only pursue increasingly costly military ventures by bargaining with power blocks within their subject population for the necessary resources--soldiers, rations, etc. Where capital was not accumulated and concentrated, the balance of power lay with landowners. Where a city had emerged with a concentration of capital, proto-capitalists held power. Where capital was unavailable, the ruler could resort to methods of coercion of his subjects. Political and economic conditions dictated the bargaining terms with which the ruler sought to win support for his military goals. Tilly argues that different combinations of coercion and capital created diverse types of states. As the demands of war increased, the power blocks which rulers depended on gained more and more advantage over them, thus winning for themselves concessions that increased their standing in the state's government. In effect, the era of bureaucratization was born. The means of capitalization and coercion were incorporated into the structure of the state, and thus was born the nation-state. Essentially, the nation-state has proven to be the best at mobilizing and fighting wars, leading lesser states to either emulate it or risk being conquered by it.

Tilly offers a somewhat simplistic argument, acknowledging the criticisms he duly expects will come. State formation is portrayed as little more than an afterthought of warmongering. The accumulation of royal concessions in time laid the foundation for permanent infrastructure. By seeking revenues and compliance from a subject population, rulers eventually found themselves having to provide for their subjects' welfare--via production, distribution, transportation, etc. In the most modern states, social spending now outweighs military spending; this has served to shorten the length of wars while greatly increasing their intensity. A major contribution of this book is its implication that social history by itself does not explain the emergence of modern states and societies. Some will find Tilly's simplistic model untenable, but I find it quite logical and compelling. His argument (and the wealth of resources on which he draws) certainly warrants serious thought on the part of the reader.

A fascinating study - for those of Sicilian ancestry - but a very difficult book to read. Maybe it is the author's style or his prose, but I'm not sure I would have finished it except that one of the villages Bloc writes about is where my mother's family comes from.