Thornton looks at foreign policy in a way that not many other scholars do. He realizes that, for example, there was more to the Watergate Scandal than the American people were led to believe at the time, and even to this very day. By reading this work, you can become one of the few who understand the whole story behind the 'silent coup' that occurred in the early 70's. After reading Thornton's account of the Nixon-Kissinger years, you will never look at foreign policy the same way again.

Professor Thornton leads us through the labyrinth of foreign policy decision making during the Nixon Administration and the subsequent Kissinger "Shogunate." The reader must be prepared to think *strategically*, i.e. to consider apparently isolated events in a larger, global context. In other words, Thornton challenges us to think about world affairs just like the actual players did (and do).

Caveat: this is not a right-wing conspiracy-type book. It is a serious text on recent American and world history. People looking for a sensational ride through the subterranean passages of governmental power would probably be better off elsewhere.

Thornton does suggest explanatory models that are quasi-revolutionary, e.g. that Nixon's fall was the result of a commonplace political entrapment scheme by Kissinger, which led directly to (among other events) the fall of South Vietnam. Does that morsel sound tempting to you? The book is full of them. (I especially love Dr. Thornton's description of Watergate burglar G. Gordon Liddy - look up Liddy's name in the index to find the passage.)

Dr. Thornton is a Professor at George Washington University's School of International Affairs. He is an expert on China and its history (and he speaks several Chinese dialects). He is the "real McCoy" with a pedigree that includes a career in U.S. Air Force intelligence.

Richard Thornton's book is an important study for understanding the diplomatic machinations of the Cold War era in general and the Reagan-Thatcher partnership within it in particular. Hitherto, the British-Argentine conflict has been treated either as a sideshow in the history of international relations or as a symbolic reassertion of British power in what seemed to be its imperial sunset. Thornton's approach is entirely new and original, setting the conflict sqaurely where it belongs in the chronology of Cold War history. With substantial support the author argues that the conflict was a sting designed to divest Argentina of its military government and nuclear weapons program (a little-known fact, the details of which are only recently being elaborating) while strenghthening America's strategic relationship with Thatcher's Britain. Thornton gives great care to relate the nature of the divisions existing within the various (American, British, Argentine) leaderships and how they influenced the outcome of the war. Particularly relevant to Cold War students is his treatment of the machinations behind Thatcher's ability to make a necessary war and Reagan's ability to support her. Thornton exposes the attempts of Alexander Haig and the "wet" foreign ministers Lord Carrington and Francis Pym to sideline the military solution, secure Thatcher's political defeat, and implement a renewed detente relationship with the Soviet Union. The Reagan-Thatcher defeat of the detente cabal is of crucial importance to understanding the origins of the war and the place of its outcome in Reagan's strategy of renewed containment. Barring a few factual errors of the minor sort, Thornton's analysis is a true example of what American scholarship of the Cold War should be. It is a proud refutation of the left-wing view that international relations are simplistic or irrelevant and that the broad social trend is what should concern historians most.

This book is GREAT!!!

It shows how three National Governments define their foreign policies working from/amongst/within their internal disputes. The 3 nations involved are Argentina, Great Britain and the United States. The issue at stake is the Argentine claim, and 2nd April 1982 take-over, of the Malvinas (for Great Britain: Falkland) Islands. I guess it could be just anything else...

So it goes:
1) In the US: Haig vs Weinberger
2) In the UK: Nott vs Thatcher
3) In Argentina: Galtieri vs Viola

The books even reveals how Argentina lost the islands because of the steps taken by General Viola (de facto president ousted by General Galtieri) to make sure that the take-over was anticipated, which in turn gave the UK the time-window they needed (badly) to perform the re-taking.

This is a fascinating work of detailed scholarship. Thornton has put together a compelling retelling of the War, and by giving us hitherto undisclosed details as to the political infighting within Argentina, the United Kingdom and the United States he has managed to give meaning to so many unanswered questions which other writers simply dismiss as being 'illogical' or 'unexplicable' behaviour. Piecing together a wide web of inter-related intrigue, Thornton has put the entire conflict into a whole new light. Highly recommended.

Richard Thornton, an American history professor, has produced a detailed, but deeply misleading, study of the relations between the USA, the Soviet Union and China in 1949 and 1950. Unfortunately, but unsurprisingly, the book is very anti-communist; it whitewashes the US state and blames the Soviet Union and China for the war in Korea and for the 'Cold War'.

But the record shows that the USA was the aggressor in East Asia: it intervened in Korea's internal affairs from 1945 by occupying the south of the country, and it intervened in China's internal affairs in 1950 by sending the 7th Fleet into the Formosan Straits to defend Chiang Kai-Shek's defeated forces on Taiwan. These acts broke the Cairo Agreement, the Potsdam Agreement and the UN Charter.

Thornton claims that Stalin ordered Kim Il-Sung to start the Korean War to 'prod China into conflict with the United States'. But Stalin did not cause US-Chinese enmity; the US interference in China's internal affairs was quite enough to gain China's enmity.

Thornton believes that President Harry Truman outsmarted Stalin and Mao! He writes that Truman tried to keep the Soviet Union and China apart, but this ploy failed when they signed their Treaty of Alliance in 1950. Thornton then saves his thesis, at the cost of contradicting himself, by arguing that Sino-Soviet cooperation also served Truman's purpose!

Certainly, Truman got the war he wanted: he rejected all chances of a peaceful settlement of the Korean conflict, and he provoked China to enter the war, so intensifying the 'Cold War'. But he also got a defeat - which he didn't want! China beat the USA by stopping it from destroying the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and Mao and Stalin together prevented World War Three by stopping the USA from invading China. As Mao had warned, "if the US imperialists won the war, they would become more arrogant and would threaten us."

Before, during and after the war in Korea, Britain's Labour government began its long stint as the USA's jackal, giving the USA the political support that it needed for its unjust wars.

Although I found quite a bit interesting the overall concept I found to being quite unbelievable. That Stalin intended that the North Koreans would lose the war, so that he intended to drag in the Chinese and that the US would for their own reasons allow the South Koreans to lose a limited defeat so that they could save them after a long fight once they got the US congress to support the war.

Its just too far fetched. A simpler explanation would be that Kim a Korean nationalist decided to unify Korea, and Stalin, Mao and Kim all miscalculated the US response. So losing control.

The conventional interpretation of the Korean War is that Kim Il Sung provoked the war, and forced a reluctant Stalin to support him, and that the United States was surprised both by the North Korean offensive of June 1950 and by the subsequent Chinese offensive of November 1950. In this important new book, Thornton offers a compelling argument for a re-examination of this version of events.

Thornton begins with a logical examination of the geopolitical interests of the principal actors: the USSR, the PRC, the USA, and North and South Korea. He shows that Mao wanted good relations "with all nations" - including the US - but needed Soviet assistance to seize Taiwan. Stalin, however, regarded a Sino-American rapprochement as his worst nightmare, and responded by unleashing North Korea against South Korea. Stalin calculated that this move would inevitably bring the US and China into conflict, and thus forestall his nightmare scenario. (In his discussion of Mao and Stalin, Thornton builds on such works as Goncharov and Lewis's "Uncertain Partners".) The US, for its part, wanted to keep Russia and China apart, and in late 1949 began backing away from support from Taiwan, which was of course the main obstacle to good US relations with the PRC. This policy was subsequently re-evaluated when Washington understood that the Soviets and the Chinese had reached an understanding of their own.

Thornton demonstrates that Stalin was the principal instigator of the Korean War, not Kim Il Sung - the tail did not wag the dog. The Soviets planned the June offensive, and supplied the North Korean Army with the weapons without which no attack could take place. Moreover, the Soviets controlled the timing, pace, and outcome of the North Korean offensive through their control of crucial resources: communications equipment, bridging equipment, anti-aircraft weapons, food, fuel, and ammunition. Without these resources, the North Korean offensive could NOT succeed, a fact that certain so-called experts in the field of logistics have utterly failed to understand.

Thornton shows that the development of NSC-68 tracks precisely with the evolution of the Sino-Soviet alliance and the Soviet decision for war in Korea. He argues that Truman deliberately left South Korea vulnerable to invasion (a "tethered goat") in order to invite the war that would cement public, political, and congressional support for the new strategy of containment. Thornton shows that the United States was aware of the Soviet arms buildup in North Korea and of North Korean intentions. Therefore, US action (and inaction) in response to this ample intelligence lead inexorably to the conclusion that the US did not wish to deter attack, but to entice it. Similarly, Thornton shows that Truman was not surprised by the Chinese attack in late 1950, but decided to accept war with China with a full understanding of the consequences. These consequences were, in Thornton's view, ultimately beneficial to the United States; Chinese intervention enabled America to construct a global position of considerable strength and advantage over the Soviet Union and its allies by the mid 1950s.

In conclusion, this work should be read by all students of the early Cold War, and particularly those who wish to understand the interplay of American, Soviet, and Chinese policy.