Many of the arguments Admiral Robert A. Theobald makes in this book have been fleshed out further by the research of later writers. In particular, readers familiar with Stinnett's "Day of Deceit" (2000) and Gannon's "Pearl Harbor Betrayed" (2001) will find many of the same arguments, though in a more condensed fashion, here.

The difference, of course, is that Theobald was writing in 1954. And he brings to the table not only the viewpoint of a professional naval officer, but also one who was in fact present in a relatively senior position (Commander, Destroyers, Battle Force) at Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack. His argument is that Roosevelt deliberately backed the Japanese into a position where they had no choice but to launch an attack on the Pacific Fleet -- a fleet that was deliberately weakened, and denied critical information, by orders of the President.

Theobald does a fine job presenting his evidence and drawing (in my opinion) solid conclusions. His problem, unfortunately, is the same as Stinnett's: he lacks the smoking gun that places blame solidly in FDR's lap. The author can draw an evidentiary noose around the President, but can't quite close in the rest of the way. The nearest he can come is a 1945 comment by Admiral Stark that everything he did in the days prior to the attack, including refusing to forward key information intercepted from coded Japanese messages to the commanders in Hawaii, he did on higher orders. Of course, as Theobald points out, Stark was the senior admiral in the Navy. The only "higher" place orders could come from was Roosevelt himself.

If Theobald's analysis has weaknesses (apart from the evidentiary ones), they are (1) his willingness to trust the motives of senior military and naval commanders implicitly, and (2) his apparent agreement with the idea that it was "psychologically essential to the successful prosecution of the war" that the "prestige" of Roosevelt and his Administration not be undermined during the war by suggestions they deliberately precipitated the attack (p. 157). I can't accept this second, but it's his opinion and he's entitled to it. The first weakness is the more serious: Theobald believes senior military commanders of high personal and professional reputation would never willingly do anything to put their ships and sailors at risk. Therefore, he argues, the fact that they did exactly that proves they must have been ordered to do so by FDR himself. This "evidence" seems to assume as much as it "proves."

On the whole, however, this book is an important part of the so-called "revisionist" school of Pearl Harbor scholarship. Later research, including many facts not available to Theobald in the 1950s, substantiates many of his arguments. And if it's still not possible to prove conclusively every part of the statement, "Roosevelt knew the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941," Theobald's *J'accuse* makes it clear that FDR's hands are, at any rate, far from clean. The "final secret" of Pearl Harbor may always remain exactly that.

Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobald makes the case (and a very good one) that Franklin Delano Roosevelt deliberately left Pearl Harbor commanders in the dark with regard to the threat of a Japanese attack in order to rally the American people into entering World War II.

I believe this book makes it abundantly clear that something was amiss in the way the Roosevelt administration handled the intelligence data that indicated Japan was preparing to attack the United States.

While other localities of military interest were fully cognizant of the ongoing evidence, the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii was kept out of the loop. Additionally, Pearl Harbor itself was given orders that were inconsistent with military intelligence and in fact suggest that Pearl Harbor was purposely weakened in order to make it more vulnerable (and hence attractive) to a Japanese attack.

The military officials who were responsible for informing Pearl Harbor of the unfolding events either were collectively incompetent or were given strict orders not to propagate pertinent information to Hawaii. And since many of these commanders reported directly to Commander-in-Chief FDR, Theobald believes (and I concur) that it was FDR's intention to ensure a Pearl Harbor slaughter of sufficient magnitude to change public opinion towards favoring entry into World War II.

On the evidence alone, I believe Rear Admiral Theobald makes a case sufficient to render a guilty verdict on FDR. But it is even more compelling given the documented corruption of FDR throughout his years in office. Of course, his most damnable action was the Yalta Betrayal where he agreed to enslave Eastern Europe to appease Uncle Joe Stalin.

. The sacrificing of American military men and women in order to effect public opinion is unforgivable.

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