An excellent summary of the roles played by government, competitors, and the AT&T corporate culture in the 1982 break-up of the telecommunications giant. Many other books on this subject have taken a technological approach, claiming the impetus for government action was rapid technological change. Temin argues that a confusion over pricing structures between inter- and intra- state exchanges dating to the New Deal, combined with FCC decisions which allowed entrants into segments of the regulated monopolies businesses forced government action in the late 1970's. Temin's key is the misunderstanding of how to allocate the cost of long distance calls as a proportion of the service provided by local switching equipment. The FCC's confusion on this matter in the 1950's and 60's extended to the courts, congress, the executive branch, and especially the Anti-Trust Division failed to offer AT&T a clear picture of what it was expected to be; A regulated monopoly, employing national averaged prices, or a competitor which was free to compete with MCI and other entrants when the FCC allowed entrants in specific markets. When AT&T cut prices to compete, it was seen as a predatory pricer. When it stuck to its role as "the efficient operator of the national telephone network," (Temin, p.27) it was accused of denying access to competitors. This sympathetic treatment of AT&T's problems is an excellent narrative. The Fall of the Bell System contains numerous primary source documents provided by the company.

The definitive history of the AT&T breakup by an MIT historian. Prepared with the full cooperation (and some sponsorship) of AT&T so thus it has all the inside scoop, although at times it's more sympathetic to AT&T than other academic treatments. But it has much less of an axe to grind than other books from the era, and also shows how divestiture became inevitable after earlier decisions by AT&T, rivals and the government.

This book was intended to argue against Friedman's monetary description of the Great Depression. However, it is hard to say that Temin responded to Friedman's main contention properly. For, while Friedman maintained that the Depression could have been alleviated had there been some appropriate actions of the Fed (namely, policies related to monetary expansion), Temin's response was composed of two parts which kill each other's clarity; namely, (A) there was no monetary constraint before September 1931: however, (B) we cannot say whether or not macroeconomic policies which were not used then could have been effective if they were actually used. At the same time, Temin's logic which made him say (A) above is based upon a coarse (and probably wrong) interpretation of Friedman's another article, ''Money and Business Cycles''. Nonetheless, I have to be fair to add that this book is one of good materials to examine Friedman's position from various points of views.

Not particularly knowledgable about economics, this book proved to be less than an easy read for me. The subject matter, however, was fascinating. It is thanks to the simple style in which Mr. Temin tries to write, that I was able to finish the book and enjoy it for all that it taught me. While he doesn' talk about simple issues, he does talk about important ones.

Temin's account of the Great Depression differs in almost every from the standard texts. Austrian business cycles, monetary tightness etc. are all passed over as the author goes for the big picture....the long view of political history in Europe.

The Great Depression was the direct result, he says, of the breakdown of peace in the first decade of the twentieth century. The international spirit of co-operation that had existed throughout most of the second half of the 19th century evaporated with the European struggles for empire. So when crisis loomed in the late 1920s all the lifeboats were full of holes. Franco-German rivallry, the demise of the British Empire and isolationism in the United States all produced paralysis when leadership was needed most.

When leadership finally did arrive, it came in the form of social democracy and labour market rigidities which put a floor under the markets but extended the depression in ways not dissimilar to Japan in the 1990s.

If you like your economics filled with Keynes and history this is for you. If Friedman or Schumpeter is more to your taste, then this is worth reading just to see what the other side thinks.

Great stuff.

Paul Krugman, Margaret Newell, and the volume's other contributors have journeyed back through 300 years of New England history to test how well the historical record comports with modern economic theory, and found more than a few interesting questions and quirks along the way.

The contradictions discovered and the resolutions pursued may well fascinate the reader with an interest in economic theory, but are unlikely to truly engage the reader seeking an understanding of the history of New England. The book, truth be told, is only secondarily about New England. It is first and foremost about economic theories considered in the test lab of history.

That said, this book does grapple with the central challenge facing all historians of New England: Why here? Why, that is, did this rocky, weather-beaten, apparently inhospitable area prove such fertile ground for industrial innovation? The answers range from "intellectual capital" to the profits from the slave trade, and are not uninteresting. All the more shame, then, that the writing sometimes suffers from a lack of lucidity.

The student of economic theory will find this volume highly worthwhile. The general interest reader might more profitably seek out another recent book, Diana Muir's Reflections in Bullough's Pond, for a much more interesting and readable treatment of the Why New England? question.