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The book, however, has a number of flaws. For a study based upon interviews with hundreds of individuals, the authors fail to support their assertions with either statistical data or detailed case studies (except for the first chapter, which is the most interesting part of the book). Instead, the text is a steady stream of broad generalizations, occasionally sprinkled with carefully-selected examples, and the authors' historical analysis. And, unfortunately, their analysis clearly reflects their positions in establishment-liberal academia. They reject (especially in the new Introduction) the logical suggestion that the rejection of traditional religion and morality is largely to blame for rampant individualism and social break-down. Instead, embracing an economic determinism worthy of Marx himself, they suggest that free-market capitalism and the decline of labor unions are to blame. Similarly, they call for greater communitarianism, and note that modern "therapeutic" worldviews provide no sound basis for such communitarianism. However, the authors are unwilling to embrace a sound basis for it, either, repeatedly pointing to the civic-minded and caring values of "biblical religion" (a.k.a. Christianity), but then declaring that a return to traditional religion is no longer a viable option. In short, the authors of this important work betray the same relativism and postmodernism that is behind the very individualism they decry.
The subtitle "Individualism and Commitment in American Life" is the main trope guiding the book, a bipolar perspective that neatly describes the American inability to reconcile the "utilitarian individualism" of Hobbes' "war of all against all" as exemplified in the liberal economic philosophy that grew up with America, with the "expressive individualism" of Whitman and Emerson which developed as a reaction to (in Henry James'' words), the "grope of wealth." The final chapter which elucidates "Six American Visions of the Public Good" describing them as three pairs of conflicting visions: "The Establishment versus Populism," "Neocapitalism versus Welfare Liberalism" and "The Administered Society versus Economic Democracy." But because they are dualistic does not mean they are exclusive categories. As Bellah and his fellow authors describe it, these competing visions often hold as many similarities as differences.
Specifically, from the latter 19th century until the depression both The Establishment and Populists recognized there was and needed to be a moral component in American public life. The Establishment side was represented Andrew Carnegie's "Gospel of Wealth," while on the Populist side were economic socialists such as Eugene Debs. The mores of the that time, de Toqueville's "habits of the heart," were still moralistic, still partaking of the ideal of the legacy of Jefferson's freeholding citizen even capitalism shook America off its foundations.
Of the next pair, Neocapitalism (which rose to its greatest heights in the form of Ronald Reagan) and Welfare Liberalism (exemplified by FDR), while they have different means look to the same ends according the authors. The first seeks to empower citizens through the "war of all against all" and keep the country competitive by unraveling the safety net. Slackers and failures must not be encouraged to take advantage of the winners because it is morally debilitating for society as a whole. Welfare Liberalism on the other hand believes that the net should be stronger because it has less confidence in the Market God believes in better chances and social justice, but still views Americans as individuals who must be encouraged in the Hobbesian war.
Of the last two visions, Felix Rohatyn, is the poster boy for the Administered Society -- a continuation of the Progressive ideal of scientific "mastery" a la Lippman, while Michael Harrington represents Economic Democracy. As compared to Rohaytn, who endorses a "partnership" of elites who work to adjust and balance the multiplicitous machine of political, economic and social interests, Harrington would spread out the decision making to at least nominally include the people. Harrington admits this would require a massive reorientation of consciousness -- an unlikely event in the view of the authors. But ultimately the authors say both sides endorse a similar kind of governance by expert, without moral content. The authors saw this last pair dimly stirring when they wrote this book in the mid-80s. Their prediction is perhaps half true as we have also witnessed the covert reassertion of NeoCapitalism in the last three administrations, if especially the current administration.
Along the way they also trace the politically neutralizing penetration of the individualistic "therapeutic mode" into religious life, the loss of "communities of memory" based on shared values, along with the "second language" of religious and republican virtue. All have which have acted to depoliticize American culture. Where once there was a language of sin and redemption, there is now only the therapeutic language of the self, a radical self which is encouraged by the therapeutic mode to consider one's self and one's happiness as paramount and thus mirrors and supports the ideology of the free market. We richly deserve the oxymoronic label of "private citizen."
This dualistic strategy is supplemented by the touchstone use of Alexis de Toqueville's political and sociological insights to show how the seeds of much of American life today were sown early on. A fairly effective narrative trope, it serves their often stated goal of showing that it is through our shared history, our communities of memory, that we may see how others confronted the shifting landscapes of political economy, that we may today find a way to stop or at least hold at bay, in the words of Habermas, the "invasion of the lifeworld by systems logic." They maintain that such a course cannot be found through nostalgia for older institutions that once stood athwart the Mega-State. Many of those institutions, such as traditional churches, were paternalistic and discriminatory. Still social movements such as abolitionism grew out of them and were sustained by them. To recognize how the message of freedom forged by the founding generation has been reforged into a double-edged sword to enforce radical individualism, and destroy religious and republican morality and virtue. Government by a managerial elite, a kind of "democratic despotism" which de Toqueville saw as a potential of individualistic American mores has arrived.
As an example of the earlier language of America, they cite as an example Martin Luther King deployment of the language of the Bible and republican virtue in his "I Have A Dream" speech. His ringing biblical cadences, his use of "My Country 'Tis of Thee," and the words of the old Negro spiritual: "free at last, free at last, thank God Almighty I'm free at last," evoked our foundational civic and religious language. Bellah, like King, helps us remember and recapture the earlier language of America.
The subtitle "Individualism and Commitment in American Life" is the main trope guiding the book, a bipolar perspective that neatly describes the American inability to reconcile the "utilitarian individualism" of Hobbes' "war of all against all" as exemplified in the liberal economic philosophy that grew up with America, with the "expressive individualism" of Whitman and Emerson which developed as a reaction to (in Henry James'' words), the "grope of wealth." The final chapter which elucidates "Six American Visions of the Public Good" describing them as three pairs of conflicting visions: "The Establishment versus Populism," "Neocapitalism versus Welfare Liberalism" and "The Administered Society versus Economic Democracy" is the best example of this dualist view of America, but as Bellah and his fellow authors describe it, these competing visions often hold as many similarities as differences.
Specifically, from the latter 19th century until the depression both The Establishment and Populists recognized there was and needed to be a moral component in American public life. The Establishment side was represented Andrew Carnegie's "Gospel of Wealth," while on the Populist side were economic socialists such as Eugene Debs. The mores of the that time, de Toqueville's "habits of the heart," were still moralistic, still partaking of the ideal of the legacy of Jefferson's freeholding citizen even capitalism shook America off its foundations.
Of the next pair, Neocapitalism (which rose to its greatest heights in the form of Ronald Reagan) and Welfare Liberalism (exemplified by FDR), while they have different means look to the same ends according the authors. The first seeks to empower citizens through the "war of all against all" and keep the country competitive by unraveling the safety net. Slackers and failures must not be encouraged to take advantage of the winners because it is morally debilitating for society as a whole. Welfare Liberalism on the other hand believes that the net should be stronger because it has less confidence in the Market God believes in better chances and social justice, but still views Americans as individuals who must be encouraged in the Hobbesian war.
Of the last two visions, Felix Rohatyn, is the poster boy for the Administered Society -- a continuation of the Progressive ideal of scientific "mastery" a la Lippman, while Michael Harrington represents Economic Democracy. As compared to Rohaytn, who endorses a "partnership" of elites who work to adjust and balance the multiplicitous machine of political, economic and social interests, Harrington would spread out the decision making to at least nominally include the people. Harrington admits this would require a massive reorientation of consciousness -- an unlikely event in the view of the authors. But ultimately the authors say both sides endorse a similar kind of governance by expert, without moral content. The authors saw this last pair dimly stirring when they wrote this book in the mid-80s. Their prediction is perhaps half true as we have also witnessed the covert reassertion of NeoCapitalism in the last three administrations, if especially the current administration.
This dualistic strategy is supplemented by the touchstone use of Alexis de Toqueville's political and sociological insights to show how the seeds of much of American life today were sown early on. A fairly effective narrative trope, it serves their often stated goal of showing that it is through our shared history, our communities of memory, that we may see how others confronted the shifting landscapes of political economy, that we may today find a way to stop or at least hold at bay, in the words of Habermas, the "invasion of the lifeworld by systems logic." They maintain that such a course cannot be found through nostalgia for older institutions that once stood athwart the Mega-State. Many of those institutions, such as traditional churches, were paternalistic and discriminatory. Still social movements such as abolitionism grew out of them and were sustained by them. To recognize how the message of freedom forged by the founding generation has been reforged into a double-edged sword to enforce radical individualism, and destroy religious and republican morality and virtue. Government by a managerial elite, a kind of "democratic despotism" which de Toqueville saw as a potential of individualistic American mores has arrived.
As an example of the earlier language of America, they cite as an example Martin Luther King deployment of the language of the Bible and republican virtue in his "I Have A Dream" speech. His ringing biblical cadences, his use of "My Country 'Tis of Thee," and the words of the old Negro spiritual: "free at last, free at last, thank God Almighty I'm free at last," evoked our foundational civic and religious language. Bellah, like King, helps us remember and recapture the earlier language of America.
Along the way they also trace the politically neutralizing penetration of the individualistic "therapeutic mode" into religious life, the loss of "communities of memory" based on shared values, along with the "second language" of religious and republican virtue. All have which have acted to depoliticize American culture. Where once there was a language of sin and redemption, there is now only the therapeutic language of the self, a radical self which is encouraged by the therapeutic mode to consider one's self and one's happiness as paramount and thus mirrors and supports the ideology of the free market. We richly deserve the oxymoronic label of "private citizen."
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The Bell Curve arguement was completely refuted after the second chapter!!! But Inequality By Design was very very fair, in how it attacked the arguement. Chapter by chapter the validity of the bell curve arguement shrunk more and more. Every issue was addressed and the authors provided complete and easy to understand examples of relevant phenomenon.
The only way I could see you NOT liking this book is if you are some kind of elitist trapped in the confines of the popular Euro-centric worldview of white superiority.
This book is definately worth your money...
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The main thesis of "The Good Society" is simple: we, meaning American society, are no longer in control of our institutions. The authors define institutions in a broad sweep, encompassing economic, political, religious, educational, law, and international organizations and bodies (while curiously ignoring the media, the most egregious institution of them all because they help prop up all of the other ones). Only by regaining control over institutions, by making them responsive to democratic ideals, can we achieve what the authors refer to as a "good society." An introductory chapter introduces the reader to several individuals involved in daily life, from a woman working for a company facing a merger to a couple attempting to help the poor in an underdeveloped urban area to an economist forced to make cost-benefit analyses with people's lives. Each of these people understands there is something wrong with the way they do things and the results of their actions. The authors point out that this is because people no longer challenge, let alone recognize, the underlying institutions responsible for our lives. For example, the woman facing problems from the company merger does not think to question the underlying economic system that reduces her to a mere number on a piece of paper. In short, people consider institutions as fixed, permanent entities impervious to change.
Central to this theme of institutional chaos is an examination of John Locke's belief in the rugged individual determining his own future in the social and economic realm. The authors argue that this old belief is no longer valid in today's world even though people still cling to those ideas. Through an examination of the economic history of the United States, "The Good Society" shows how the emergence of huge capitalist enterprises at the end of the 19th century effectively blunted any hopes that an individual could control his destiny. Even more dangerous to the Lockean ideal as it appears in the modern consciousness is the realization that corporations are not subject to democratic restrictions. Unfortunately, many institutions imitate or act as a support system (again, the media being the most rabid supporter) to corporations in today's society, with a concomitant resiliency to the type of public responsibility required in a healthy democratic state.
All of this high falutin' talk sounds interesting to those who live and breath politics or believe that corporations are out to run the world. But the book goes beyond mere political discourse to include analyses on education, religion, and law. Time and time again, the authors discover a sense of powerlessness among citizens when it comes to dealing with public institutions. A chapter on education shows how students who should come away with a broad area of knowledge end up as stooges for the business world. The section on religion reveals very little about deep theological discussion but much about how to cope in a world run by elites operating with the agendas of profit and politics. What ultimately emerges is how little effect real people are having on any social system existing today. The individual is dead, replaced by Howard Beale's humanoids, creatures that look human but are not as we gamely try to keep abreast of our chaotic, soulless institutions.
The book concludes with some recommendations about how to restore sanity. I do not really want to insult the authors, but these points for the recovery of our institutions are about as useless as Saddam Hussein running for president of the United States in 2004. For any type of sweeping change to work in this society, a devoted and dedicated populace is paramount. Instead, we have some 200 million couch potatoes, work dodgers, and celebrity worshippers. As long as the ballgame is on television, the mall is open, and the car is in the garage most people are content to let things ride.
The biggest problem I had with this book was the dense language. It seemed as though the authors had a problem paring their ideas down to a manageable length. I personally do not have a problem reading a big book with difficult prose, but if the authors wished to stay true to their goal of informing the public about institutional problems they failed miserably. "The Good Society" is just not accessible to the general population. Many people I know would read roughly one page of the text and put it down in a hurry. How are you going to solve the problems of unresponsive institutions when people will not turn off the television long enough to realize they need to become a force for change?
"The Good Society" covers interesting ground, but the treatment needs some serious editing in order to reach a wider audience.