I'd write a longer review, but thinking back to reading this book aggravates me too much. For quality and most readers, myself included, this book merits 1 star. The 2 star rating is for those interested in a massively in-depth look at perhaps the two most dangerous crises of the Cold War, the authors' use of US and USSR sources, and crisis management theorists, who should go hog-wild over this work.

What I liked about this book is that it makes use of documents and materials from both the West and the Communist World. It is an interesting mix and a fair look at both sides of the Cold War. But there is the problem as well. Too much of the book and the evidence from both the US and USSR at times contradict each other, while at other times supports each other. In short, the chapters are confusing. Who is right? Who is wrong? For example their Cuban Missile Crisis chapters where interesting, but heck if I can draw a conclusion as to what really happened. Also, the title. The title is wrong. It is clear that the US and the West one the cold war. I think that is an undisputed fact. So again, the book has good information, but it is at times too much. The book is ultimately too much info and not enough conclusions.

History as the Memos & Recollections of a Few Chiefs

We All Lost the Cold War, by Richard Ned Lebow & Janice Gross Stein, Princeton University Press, 1994. Starting from a world material and social, economic and spiritual, historians have choices about which dimensions are the most important in explaining events. The choice of sources, even if not reflecting a conscious philosophical position, will at least lead to a final demonstration of which dimensions the historian considers to be most operative. The two authors here reviewed have relied almost exclusively on the memos, memoirs, and interviews of a few dozen policy-makers and their specialist advisors, "rounded" by critical references to the secondary literature previously synthesized out of similar sources. Not surprisingly, the resulting analysis of the Cold War is barren of any meaning to readers looking for anything beyond a microscopic study of tactical problems confronted by the war ch! ! iefs of empire. The main thesis of the book is that the strategy of deterrence practiced by both superpowers made their relations more hostile, dangerous, and costly than they had to be. Two crises of superpower relations are analyzed to support this: the "Cuban Missile Crisis" of 1962, and the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. What a nice pamphlet this study could have made! Instead, each crisis is given ten dozen pages of tedious, redundant narrative of every relevant conversation and cup of tea shared by the chiefs in the war rooms of both sides. There are seven full pages given to the effects of stress upon the mental functioning of decision-makers. That in itself might be appropriate, except there aren't even seven sentences in the book about why Cuba and the United States were such enemies (and still are), or why Arabs and Israelis warred over land (and still do)! Granted, the authors' main goal seems to be rebutting the dominant theory that the USA "won&! ! quot; the Cold War through "deterrence:" outprodu! cing the Soviets in terms of armaments and the credible threats of their use. "Oh, no," the authors sensibly conclude, rather deterrence gave both sides fewer options in a crisis if the threat was not immediately effective. The safer and more constructive tactics would have been the clear communication of interests and a shared vision of the efficacy of compromise. These were the crucial ingredients to the peaceful resolution of the Cuban crisis [at least as far as superpower relations were concerned], and the missing ingredients in the Arab-Israeli War allowing détente to smell like rotten meat by Reagan's time. And yet when Gorbachev finally brings these crucial ideas into play by articulating a vision of mutual security through mutual recognition of interests, Reagan too deserves credit for recognizing the new climate and bringing US policy to embrace it. Eureka! The diplomatic formula to end the Cold War had been discovered! In the spirit of Nixon idolatry! ! , sing praises to the man conservative enough to safely execute a liberal policy! The "biggest" idea in this book is only suggested: that the Cold War could have ended much earlier if only Khrushchev's recognition of the need for fundamental reforms had been complete, and if only American policy had made the Russians feel less threatened.

"Khrushchev's fear of the West severely constrained his search for accommodation.....When his actions were not reciprocated, the militant opposition at home forced him to revert to a confrontational style.... Gorbachev could not have succeeded in transforming East-West relations and ending the Cold War if the West had not become his willing partner." (pp. 374-375).

Of course the authors leave this strand undeveloped, since it would instantly take them beyond the tactical discussions of the war room and into the larger questions begged by the book's title: what was lost in the Cold War? What were, if not the "cost! ! s," then at least the effects of the Cold War --on eco! nomics, culture, politics, historiography, and even psychology? And why is it that so many of the world's conflicts and crises have not actually disappeared with the Cold War? Perhaps because the Cuba-US conflict and the Arab-Israeli war, to name a few, were never really about superpower relations, but the managers of empire and their cultish historians were always too powerdrunk and arrogant to appreciate the experiences and interests of the majority of Earth's people.

--Reviewed by Will Wilkin July 16, 1998