Creighton Abrams may have been the greatest American soldier of the second half of the 20th century. He served as a tank commander under General George Patton at the Battle of the Bulge, in occupied Germany and wartime Korea, as commander of United States military forces in Vietnam, and as Army Chief of Staff. It was a remarkable career! Lewis Sorley's admiring biography of General Abrams narrates the principal events in appropriate detail. In the prologue, Sorley asserts that Abrams was "the quintessential soldier," explaining that Abrams "demonstrated strategic and tactical skill and audacity," extraordinary physical bravery and intellectual courage, the capacity to lead and inspire men, [and] talent in dealing with complex and ambiguous managerial challenges." The measure of the value of this book lies in whether Sorley effectively makes that case. I believe that he largely does, as the result of which this is a very good, if not great, professional biography.

Although Sorley's approach to biography is conventional, he demonstrates on several occasions that Abrams's views could be very unconventional. Early in his chapter about West Point in the mid-1930s, for instance. Sorley asserts: "From the beginning Abrams was alienated by some aspects of the cadet experience." According to Sorley, Abrams was highly self-motivated and self-disciplined, and he resisted the petty tyranny of cadet life. After Abrams graduated and was commissioned, Sorley writes that he "was tolerant of his soldiers' having fun." (Sorley quotes one Abrams subordinate that the general, if Abrams had a weakness, "he sometimes was too easy on some people.") After World War II, while Abrams was serving in the Plans Section for Army Ground Forces in Washington, D.C., he was assigned to prepare a study on the future of the horse cavalry and quickly concluded that there was none. In 1965, shortly after President Johnson ordered American forces in Vietnam out of their advisory role and into combat, Abrams was briefing a civilian official about the sociological impact of the draft and stated that "the only Americans who have the honor to die for their country in Vietnam are the dumb, the poor, and the black." According to Sorley, "[o]ut in the field Abrams disliked briefings, especially of the canned and rehearsed variety," and "[o]ne of [Abrams's] favorite ways [to find out for himself the truth of what was going on] was through small groups of young officers he would have in for dinner." And when Abrams left Vietnam, Sorley writes that "he went as he had come - no bands, no ceremonies, no flags, no fuss." Similarly, when he arrived back in Washington, according to Sorley, he got rid of the Chief of Staff's ""big black Cadillac limousine...using instead a small Chevelle from Pentagon motor pool that was painted robin's egg blue. No amenities, not even a star plate."

Sorley occasionally offers significant insight. For instance, Sorley writes that Johnson's decision not to call up the reserves at the beginning of the expansion of the war in Vietnam was "perhaps the most fateful decision of the entire conflict." (Abrams explained the impact of this decision: "We decide[d] to use the Army in Vietnam, minus the National Guard and the Army Reserve.") In addition, according to Sorley: "A pervasive atmosphere of mistrust and antagonism characterized civil-military relationships in the Pentagon of the 1960s." Sorley describes the battle of Tet in 1968 as a "true watershed," which is not penetrating analysis, but he proceeds to explain: "Before Tet, America was seeking a military victory in Vietnam, but after it she was seeking to get out." About Abrams's appointment to the position of Army Chief of Staff, Sorley writes: "Creighton Abrams returned from Vietnam to head an Army that was widely viewed, both by the nation and from within its own ranks, as dispirited and desperately in need of reform. His appointment was the first step in getting on with the job of rebuilding."

In other places, Sorley's approach to his subject approaches hagiography. For instance, although Abrams' performance during the relief of Bastogne was heroic, Sorley's assertion that this made Abrams "the most famous small unit leader of the war" is debatable. And Sorley's assertion that "Abrams command in Vietnam was...arguably the most difficult any top American soldier in the field has ever had to face" seems extreme. But Sorley may well be correct in writing: "In terms of prior experience Abrams was probably the best-qualified man ever to assume the duties of Army Chief of Staff."

This biography concludes with Abrams's death. I would have much preferred for Sorley to devote a few pages to placing Abrams's accomplishments in the context of American military history from World War II through the middle of the Cold War. But Abrams had an extraordinary career, and this is a very good narrative of it.

GEN Abrams was responsible for the quality of the Army today and since he was the Chief of Staff. His wisdom and insight into soldiering, leadership, and combat ability is what won the Gulf War. Dr. Sorley is right on the money. It is obvious that Dr. Sorley really admires GEN Abrams and he has done his homework. It's a shame that GEN Abrams died so early, he tranformed the United States Army into the force it is today, or was at the time of the Gulf War.
...

Sir Robert Thompson, a British counter-intelligence expert, called Abrams "the best U.S. General since Grant." Reading Sorley's terrific account of Abram's life, it's hard to argue the point.

Abrams was an armored warfare genius. His gruff, no-nonsense exterior masked a big heart and an abiding, deeply rooted love for his men and his country. His selfless devotion to duty is a model for us all.

For a more in-depth analysis of Abrams'considerable (though largely overlooked) post-Tet, post-Westmoreland successes in Vietnam, read Sorley's "A Better War."

I'm four-fifths done with "Honorable Warrior", and about the same amount done with "A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam" by Neil Sheehan, and I'm terribly afraid, in fact, I'm pretty sure (I looked at the ending) that Mr. Sorley will duck the question that his subject could not duck..quite. That question was whether the military effort was going to work. General Johnson was averse to Phoenix-style assassination programs and to unrestrained bombardment. He thought local policing and interdiction of infiltration would answer things. This assumes (on his part) that the South Vietnamese regime would use this breathing space to flourish in democracy, rectitude, and mercy. Why did he assume this? His cherished analytical principle, Mr. Sorley informs us, was "challenge the assertion". For instance, the General tore to shreds, anaylytically, one of McNamara's "Systems Anaylysis" monster-reports on Vietnam by pointing out that it had been cobbled together out of twenty-eight other analyses, each of which had different assumptions. As my history professor would say, "scissors and paste" or "daisy-chaining" does not good history make. My question is whether the General was rigorous enough in evaluating his own thought, his own assertions. The question is directed to Mr. Sorley, who says in his conclusion that the war was actually against mere "surrogates" of China and the Soviet Union. By that logic, we would have been morally authorized to kill every Vietnamese, since they were only inert instruments of the source of the belligerency. Trying to look through Mr. Sorley's somewhat blood-misted eyes, I take seriously his suggestion that the General was often tempted to quit and that he had paralyzing doubts about the war, which he justified to himself as bringing freedom to the people of Vietnam. Did the General end up believing, in the words of the U.S. officer so often quoted, that in order to save the nation of Vietnam it was necessary to destroy it? No, I hear his fans shouting, he was too moral! But was he moral enough to realize that it was immoral to police and interdict a viable political regime (sponsored by Ho) to death in the hope that another regime would spring up from the morally toxic swamps of Saigon? (This concept of viability of regime is the standard upheld by so-called international law in determining which of competing regimes deserves recognition). Could he make that leap of faith in good conscience? Or did he in fact drape his moral doubt in words like "anti-communism" and "security", and leave it to someone else to decide if the whole thing was going to work? My suggestion for a moral lesson is that if you're called on to do something by someone who is farther from the action than you are to the extent that you're confident that you know more about the moral questions raised than your "superior" does, so much so that your sense of obligation to this superior evaporates, you cannot dress up your feeling of emptiness with some slogans, much less with the claim that you're only following orders, but must do something to rectify the malfeasance of your own superiors. In the words of Matthew Ridgeway, words that the Army put on a leadership poster ten years ago, "If you are confident that your orders are mistaken, you are obliged to attempt to fix things." Not his exact words. I don't think he just said to bring it to the attention of your superiors. I suppose that leaves disobedience, resignation, and forceful advocacy. It is the lack of forceful advocacy by the General, and lack of concern by Mr. Sorley over the General's lack of forceful advocacy, that makes the life of the General, as Mr. Sorley tells it, only worth four stars out of five. I mean, you can't just blame everything on General Westmoreland, especially when he worked for General Johnson, traditions of lattitude for field commanders notwithstanding. Alright, how do I know the General wasn't forceful enough since I haven't finished the book? He could have ordered Westmoreland to fix things: whatever, invade Laos, install U.S. commanders in all ARVN units, take over the administration of the South Vietnamese civil population, which is the same as taking over the Saigon regime, whatever it would have taken in his mind to win ("the freedom of the South Vietnamese people", remember) and then suffered the consequences. The President could have fired him. The fact that the President didn't fire him is proof to me that he didn't advocate forcefully enough. That is crude of me. Romantic. Duel at Diablo. End of story. Soul intact. It is so easy in a bureaucracy to adopt the attitude of "garbage in, garbage out", but they pay you and respect you for doing hard things. In the words of the New Testament parable, we are worthless servants when we only do what we are told. If the General had no doubt that his conduct of the war -- he was plumb in the middle of the road of the chain of command, it was on his watch -- was ethical, we cannot second-guess God's judgment of him. To quote the previous reviewer, however, it seems that he thought that his job was to follow orders. That is not ethical. That is, in the final analysis, stupid. We don't creates lines of authority to multiply our stupidity, but to diminish it. If, when you give somebody an order, there is no implicit "or am I being stupid" which they feel free to confirm or deny, you are not getting the best out of that subordinate and the people are not getting its best out of you. This applies the more so, the higher up you go. Hey?

Sorley had become the preeminent biographer of military leaders. His first book, Thunderbolt, was a joy to read. Honorable Warrior is the story of man who fought, the Japanese, survived the Battan Death march and many years of unspeakable horror in Japanese prison camps. He also fought with great bravery in Korea. However, I t was his time as Chief of Staff when General Johnson faced his most difficult professional agonies. Anyone interested in leadership, the military or American history should read this book.

I had the honor to know General Harold K. Johnson while he was a Commanding General, and then to serve two years as his personal aide while he was Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. Sorley has done a magnificient job of research and reporting on the life of the most dedicated American military leader in recent history. General Johnson was a unique man, humbled by his roots, molded by his experience as a POW, and a man whose personal moral standards never waivered. I think the author has portrayed General Johnson as the man I knew. My only difference with the portrayal is the implication of "resignation in protest" on a number of occasions. General Johnson held the view that his function was to advise the President, and that the President had no obligation to accept that advice. I would accept the "resignation" theory only if it portrayed General Johnson as considering resignation because he felt his advice was inadequate or that his articulation ! of that advice was inadequate. The idea of resignation would have been because he felt someone else could perhaps do it better. He was such a private man that I also doubt he would have shared that thought with others, particularly junior to him. But, a really excellent biography and Sorley has done himself proud.

As a younger reader (24 yrs.) who was not alive during the Vietnam era, this book offered insight that has not been typically presented by other accounts of the war. However, the book is not without its shortcomings. I would agree that the book is not an easy read; Sorley quotes entirely too often from both written and oral sources which tends to take away from the real message of the book. In terms of the flow of the book, although it is written chronologically, one does not get a sense of following the war very easily from the point where Sorely begins to the end, it overlaps in some areas. The book also seems to be a full fledged attempt to glorify General Abrams -- so much so that I believe the title of the book is a misnomer and should have included his name. In addition, the book comes across as the military's history, not the impartial observer which I would have preferred.

Despite these shortcomings, the book does have value. I thought the book increased in quality dramatically over its last third. Chapters focusing on veterans, the cease fire and selected other issues are very enlightening. Sorley seems to quote less often, and at more appropriate times, so the the reading is easier and more informative. Had he written the entire book in this manner it would have been a far superior account.

I would recommend that this book be read as a companion to one of the more established histories of Vietnam. Although it seems to miss the big picture of why the U.S. withdrew and of why South Vietnam collapsed, it offers insight into the smaller victories late in the war and the quality of leadership from Abrams. As a very one sided approach to the history, it offers a nice counterbalance to histories and accounts that have condemned the war and its leaders in a wholesale manner.

This well researched book answers some of the questions I had about Robert McNamara's book (Argument Without End) by examining the 1972 offensive and its use of newer sources (such as DeForest). I personally interviewed many of the NVA who particiapted in the An Loc offensive. Later I heard from a well placed source that the NVA was within days of a surrender during the bombing. Others have discredited that story, but one wonders if it were true or not.

I hope that Sorley has the opportunity to read more of the Vietnamese literature and to talk to the Vietnamese. IF is always open to speculation, but one wonders if a victory of the south in 75 would have ended it. I don't think so.

However, it is difficult to support the idea that the war could not be won. After all, we did much better in Korea. Can someone explain why it was so different in Vietnam?

For readers or researchers seeking a thoughtful and thoroughly researched book on a critical period in U.S. history, Sorley's book should be high on the list. Sorley has given historians and students of the Vietnam War a unique gift in this examination of the later years of America's longest war. For those that think they already know all there is to Vietnam, "A Better War" is a must-read. This is a new perspective from a reliable source and footnoted in manner that puts other works such as Stanley Karnow's "Vietnam" to shame.