"It has frequently been stated by commanders in Korea that the one man they would like to meet when the war is over is the G-4 [Logistics Officer] of the Communist forces. How he has kept supplies moving in the face of all obstacles is a real mystery. He has done it against air superiority, fire superiority, gutsm and brawn."

Brigadier General Darr H. Alkire Deputy Commander for Material U.S. Far Eastern Air Forces June 1951

The war in Korea was primarily a war of logistics. The strategic and operational decisions of both sides were based largely on logistical considerations. The principle challenge faced by both sides was to provide adequate support to their forces in the field across long distances and often, through inhospitable terrain and weather.

On June 25, 1950 the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) swept south across the Korean border, shattering the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army and the myth of American military invincibility. Suffering defeat and heavy losses in their first battles against the NKPA, U.S. Army forces in Korea were thrown back to Pusan and almost off the peninsula. After massive reinforcement and a brilliant amphibious landing at Inchon (which severed the NKPA's logistical lines), United Nations forces counterattacked in September, capturing the North Korean capital of Pyongyang and driving to the Yalu River. The assault almost completely annihilated the NKPA. Only massive intervention by the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) in October and November 1950, in the form of some 300,000 troops, saved North Korean forces from total destruction. The Chinese inflicted heavy losses on UN troops, forcing them to retreat below the 38th parallel. By mid-1951, the conflict had devolved into a static war of trenches, small patrols and limited offensives. By mid-1953, more than a million North Korean and Chinese Communist troops had fought UN forces to a standstill along the 38th parallel. The Communist forces were supported by 10,000 Soviet and East bloc advisers and backed by almost 2,800 artillery pieces and 500 tanks. An armistice was signed on July 27, 1953, bringing the conflict to an end.

During the three years of fighting, the U.S. Army suffered almost 140,000 casualties, the South Korean Army almost 273,000, and other UN forces, 14,000. Communist military casualties were horrendous: 620,000 North Korean and almost 910,000 Chinese, for a total of almost 2,000,000 military casualties on both sides. In addition, more than two million North and South Korean civilians were killed or injured and practically all of North and South Korea had been devastated.

Shrader's study focuses primarily on how the North Korean and Chinese Communist were able to sustain their forces in the field for three years against the well equipped and more technologically advanced forces of the U.S. Army and the UN Command. It addresses logistical organization, methods, requirements and operations of the North Korean and Chinese armies from June 1950 to July 1953. It concludes that, although the numerically superior NKPA and CCF were never strong enough logistically to employ their maximum combat power to defeat the UN Command and eject it from Korea, they were able to maintain an almost uninterrupted flow of supplies to frontline units. This flow was sufficient to enable them to conduct a static defense strong enough to prevent a UN victory and, in the last months of the war, to mount strong, sustained offensive operations. Indeed, just prior to the signing of the armistice, the CCF savaged the ROK Army, inflicting some 50,000 casualties while incurring an estimated 108,000. Despite an intense UN air interdiction campaign of over 250,000 sorties, the NKPA and CCF were stronger than ever when the armistice was signed.

Schrader's study is based primarily on declassified documents of the NKPA and the CCF assembled by the UN Command during and immediately following the war. Using these sources, the author puts to rest a good many myths about the Communist forces, most notably, that their logistics doctrines, organizations, and methods were primitive and incapable of supporting large formations in modern warfare. Shrader shows that Communist logistics were, in fact, characterized by flexibility and innovation, which allowed them to compensate for their comparative lack of material resources and modern technology as well as restrictions on their freedom of action imposed by UN forces.

I enjoyed this book immensely for the unique perspective it provides on the Communist armies of the Korean War. I was surprised to learn just how professional, well-trained, well equipped, and relatively well-supplied the NKPA and CCF really were. Also, there is too often a tendency to believe that China's intervention in Korea was of an ad hoc nature and poorly planned and supported. Shrader shows convincingly that it was, in fact, an extremely well planned and supported endeavor. He does so in a style that is very readable.

The Korean War was America's first unpopular war and has been relegated to the dustbin of history. For this reason, it is often called "The Forgotten War." Yet as we approach the 50th anniversary of the beginning of that war, we owe it to ourselves, our children, and more importantly, all those who served, to come to terms with our involvement in Korea. Shrader's study, sure to become one of the standard works on the conflict, reinforces the lesson that one should never underestimate an enemy's willingness or ability to fight and continue fighting.