Hi,
If you want to know the root cause's of the problems in the middle east, this book will bring you through time and explain to how these problems came to be. This book writen by Mr Avi Shlaim Accurately documents the history of the middle east from when the problems started to the time of the first Gulf war.I highly recommend this book to anyone who has an interest in knowing why the problems exist in the Middle east, or as a project for students.
Ali

Examining Western relations with the Middle East since WWI, Oxford international relations professor Shlaim criticizes American policy in the region, charging that the U.S. continues to ignore the economic and social needs of that community

Avi Shlaim's incisive comprehension of Near Eastern geopolitics is evident in this short yet compelling critique of what has been wrong with America's involvement in the Mid-East. Shlaim points out that America's outlook has been warped by seeing a Soviet threat in every corner rather than simply confronting it where it actually existed (such as in Afghanistan). For this reason, Shlaim's contends, America has had a two-pronged (and confused, flawed, and ultimately detrimental) policy: globalist and confrontational designed to "contain" Soviet influence and regionalist/rationalist which would take each situation in the world and deal with it as per the local state of affairs. What is amazing is that the globalist approach often had the opposite effect because it often drove Arab states to become Soviet clients vis-à-vis the Israeli situation. Reagan, for example, was obsessed with the Soviet threat (and rightly so at the time), but he was shortsighted and unable to extricate regional conflicts such as those between Israel and Palestine and the destructive Iran-Iraq from the possibility of Soviet intervention. Of course the US didn't turn itself into the master puppeteer in the Mid-east until it forced Britain, France, and Israel to back out of Egypt in 1956. This marked the end of direct imperialism and the beginning of American hegemony wherever American interests lay. So why did the US start supporting Israel? Many reasons, Shlaim explains. Israel wisely positioned itself as a natural ally of the west and promoted the idea that it was opposed to Soviet Communism in the region (this played big with the gullible American masses, but not with American realists and academics). Israel had the most democratic society in the region (albeit in apartheid form) and was related to Americans as such by the so-called "Friends of Israel" (including groups of Jewish Americans, but not all, as well as many Christian fundamentalists and others). The American-Israeli interest groups promoted a hugely successful propagandist campaign that made any criticism of Israel synonymous with anti-Semitism and convinced many Americans that supporting Israel in her imperialist ventures was actually stabilizing the region when, in fact, it had the opposite effect. American foreign policy, Shlaim argues, was not to promote a "New World Order" but to entrench the Old Order that had existed since post-Ottoman times. The local perception of the disillusioned masses was that the US was the supporter of authoritarian regimes dependent upon American military assistance and as guarantors of the status of elites (the downfall of the Shah of Iran was largely due to American short-sighted support of his oppressive regime) of the region. What's more the wanton death and destruction that was continuously fueled by America's arms shipments to Iran (covertly and illegally done during the Reagan administration and subsequently dubbed the Iran-Contra Affair) and Iraq. What was the point of American foreign policy in the region? To safeguard American interests wherever possible, even at the expense of local populations. Why did the US leave Saddam in power in Iraq? In order to promote the Old Order that has been in existence since the carving up of the Ottoman Empire into unnatural states. The British and the French had created unnatural nations in the post-Ottoman period and the US thought it unwise to allow Iraq to disintegrate for no credible reason. Where was the US after it told the Kurds and Shiites to rebel against Saddam? America's vanishing act led to the deaths of thousands of Iraqi opposition forces and all to appease the Turks and to keep Iraq as weak as possible rather than pressing for a democratic Iraq which could stand as a beacon for progressive change in the region. What's also interesting is that Shlaim compares different American administrations and how the peace process would move forward when direct American pressure was brought to bear (such as under Bush Sr. who did not depend upon the Jewish American support) upon Israel to withdraw from the Occupied Territories (the parallels with the resolutions calling for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait are almost identical to those calling for Israel's withdrawal). The peace process would then get stalled every time the US resumed its blank check policy of supporting Israel's imperialist ventures when substantively receiving nothing in return except greater instability (this was the opinion of Baker and Bush Sr.). Shlaim argues that many of the solutions that the US could promote and enforce as the world's hegemonic power involve threatening to cut aid to Israel until they comply with UN resolutions. A natural Iraqi breakup would also actually promote greater stability in the region. With the Israeli "threat" gone, the region's radicals would find themselves without an audience to sponsor instability in the region, Shlaim contends. Why does the US public remain unable to comprehend the complexities of this conflict, which has poisoned America's image around the world? Because of misinformation and propaganda, short-sighted and flawed foreign policy, and selfish actions that keep the oil flowing but hurt civilian populations by the millions. Rather than simply taking the usual one-dimensional view that the region is simply full of radical primitives, Shlaim argues that there are clear patterns of logical response going on. Radicals aren't born in a vacuum. The seeds have to be planted and nurtured and the seeds of instability have had as their sole gardener, the US. Only a logical and CONSISTENT regional approach to the Near East can actually turn the perception of the US as a malevolent imperialist bully into a very plausible view of the US as an even-handed promoter of democratic rights and, in essence, the true American way and not the current policy of short-term elitist support and resource exploitation and catering to domestic interest groups such as AIPAC (the most prominent pro-Israeli lobby in Washington). The US does not have to be despised in the region. All it takes is more interest and action by the American masses and an independent press and political system that does not require private funding to function.

Too many books about Israel and the Middle East either paint Israel as a flawless sole democracy surrounded by hordes of anti Semites seeking only her destruction; or as an oppressor and violator of the inherent rights of the Palestinians. This book clearly falls somewhere in between; freely finding major fault in Israel's policies, particularly of the Likuds, while only seeming to touch on the Arab nations intolerance of the state in their midst.

Credit is deserved for the Arab nations who eventually did secure a peace treaty with Israel, and for the Israeli diplomats who sought peace even at the protest of some of Israel's elements who insisted that none of the West Bank or Gaza should be bargained away and that there was no Palestinian people (Golda Meir).

Schlaim offers some illuminating insights to the most complex political situation in the world. The aftermath of the Holocaust left the Jewish nation with an overwhelming drive for security, dictating the development if its awesome military. Zev Jabotinsky, one of Israel's earliest figures, envisioned the Iron Wall as a needed step to get the surrounding Arab nations to accept Israel, who would only then negotiate a peace.

Yet it was this military, so important to that security, that alarmed Israel's neighbors and made peace so hard to attain. Schley argues that Jabotinsky saw beyond the Iron Wall to peaceful relations, but that some of the current disciples saw only the continuing struggle, particularly Netanyahu. Schlaim was particularly harsh on Netanyahu holding him singularly responsible for destroying the breakthrough Oslo accords.

The time frame of the book ends just before the current intifada and the dramatic changes taking place today. It's coverage from the War of Independence through 2000 presents a revisionist perspective, that in spite of many flaws will help an open minded reader gain some valuable perspective of this complicated crossroads.

I have searched over and over for an objective non-prejudiced book recollecting the events and issues that shaped the Mideast conflict.The only book I have found that is characterized as such is The Iron Wall by Avi Shlaim. Given the fact that this issue is so complex, and since the factors affecting the conflict include-among others-sensitive issues like religious beliefs, racism and roots; often with an emotional dimension, most writers tend to be on one side or the other, almost always biased. This book is not only accurate, but more importantly very interesting as it reveals the most intriguing details about the people who shaped this history and events of the said conflict. Most books I read are either written by Arabs and so clearly overlooking the emotional value of the land to the Jews, or by Westerners, who always seem to neglect the basic Arab side of the story. I am very impressed by the comprehensiveness of the book. Although Shlaim does not draw conclusions (he only accounts for the background and tells the facts), the book is very 'intelligent' as it helps analyze the problem in a way different from all the other accounts of the Arab Israeli conflict. I wish everyone who holds a biased opinion as regards the Middle East-especially out of ignorance of the complete story-reads this book.

Professor Shlaim's review of the relationship between Palestinian Arabs and Jewish immigrants from the beginning of the Zionist colonisation project up to the election of Ehud Barak as Prime Minister is highly enlightening. "The Iron Wall" was an expression coined by Ze'ev Jabotinsky to denote that the immigrants will require a strong military to gain the respect of the Arab population both within the British mandate area as well as by their neighbors. The various wars the state of Israel has been involved in since its inception, and their reasons, are carefully documented. So are the policies which led to the current impasse between Israelis and Palestinians. It is most heartening to see that the views of both sides are presented rather than, as usual, the unilateral one from the Israeli side. The fact that the book is written by a Jewish rather than Arabic author makes it even more important.
The Iron Wall ought to be read by our politicians as well as media pundits because the current good versus evil depiction of the Arab-Israeli conflict is not only inaccurate but dangerous since it will inevitably result in further escalation of bloodshed.

His central thesis has been answered by everyone from Daniel Pepes and Shabtai Teveth, to Ephraim Karsh's new book "Fabricating Israeli History". He fabricates whole JAE speeches, mistranslates texts, and literally concocts a "Zionist Mythology" straw man to destroy. He fails. REad Karsh's book.

While much maligned, Avi Shlaim writes an honest and cogent history of Abdullah, Jordan, British involvement in the Middle East and the conflict between Palestinians and Jews leading to 1948. His viewpoint, which many in the dwindling "Peace Now" movement share, needs to be understood. The history he writes is like nothing you will get reading mainstream writers like Bernard Lewis. Don't be scared away by those who say Shlaim's writings are "radical left-wing propaganda." It is nothing of the sort...simply an opinion based on what we should know any ethnic group is capable of doing to "others."

I read the unabridged version of the Politics of Partition (called "Collusion Across the Jordan") and found it to be an excellent history. My only regret is that Shlaim didn't keep his original title. In reaction to an earlier review, Efraim Karsh's book "Fabricating Israeli History" DOES NOT disprove Shlaim's assertions at all. Karsh's problem is that he can't tolerate the facts that have been uncovered since Israel's thirty-year law made thousands (perhaps millions) of pertinent documents available. Anyone who reads both books will see that Karsh does not even begin to disprove the well-documented histories written by the revisionist Israeli historians (Benny Morris, Avi Shlaim, Ilan Pappe, Uri Milstein, or Avner Cohen, to name some of the most prominent). I highly suggest Shlaim's book along with Benny Morris's book "The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem" and "The Road Not Taken" by Itamar Rabinovich. These were some of the first books to reveal how Zionist leaders dealt pragmatically and forcefully with their Arab neighbors to create the new Jewish state.

I recommend "War and Remembrance" by Israeli historian Yehoshua Porath in the summer 2002 issue of Azure on the subject of this book. The revisionist historians in it have attempted to tell "new" history of Israel and consider the entire previous historical record to be propaganda for the Zionist cause. In this book, Benny Morris, Avi Shlaim, Rashid Khalidi and Edward Said consider Jewish conduct in the 1947 and 1948, how the Jewish people defeated seven Arab armies, if the Jewish people were outnumbered and if they intended to expel the Arabs.

They dismiss all pre-revisionist Israeli history as a "quest for legitimacy," not honest accounting. That's pretty wild, because as Porath says Israeli universities and professors have supported views like these "for some time now" and have been honest about Israeli history. Yigael Alon and Israel Galili wrote the Book of the Palmah that gave Walid Khalidi material to argue in 1959 that the Dalet Plan was "the master plan of the Zionists" for wholesale expulsion of Palestinians and the 1973 History of the Hagana included the Dalet Plan's whole text.

Porath says the charge that Israel carried out a deliberate and systematic expulsion of the Palestinian Arabs is not "remotely substantiated by the extensive research that has been carried out in the last few decades."

They take material very selectively from the fringes of Israeli archives. Based on that, Porath says anyone could "make outrageously false claims"-- that Israel's victory resulted from "an imperialist conspiracy or an overwhelming advantage in manpower and arms." He says that is what these editors do, and I believe him, since he knows the Israeli record as well as any historian alive.

The book says the Arabs failed because they had no unified command, allying all the Arab forces. They were driven apart by intense disputes between their nations and the Arab regimes were afraid to send large forces to the front. That's not news. As Porath points out, it has been in traditional histories by people like Nathaniel Lorch and Meir Pa'il for a long time.

A chronology on the book's first few pages lists November 30, 1947 as "outbreak of civil war in Palestine." Porath says it would be more proper to call the 'civil war' "an assault upon the Jewish civilian population undertaken by the Palestinian Arabs" after they rejected the UN Partition Plan passed and accepted by the Jewish people the day before.

This book wants readers to think that 100 Arabs killed at Deir Yassin was the only massacre. It wasn't. Porath mentions other massacres too--the December 30, 1947 murder of about 50 Jewish Haifa refinery workers by their Arab co-workers and the April 13, 1948 massacre of more than 80 Jewish doctors, nurses and Hebrew University workers on Mount Scopus in Jerusalem.

Rashid Khalidi's essay on Palestinian Arab failure in 1948 covers Jerusalem Mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini, not very politely. Here's another oversight. Husseini was, in Porath's words, "an ardent and influential supporter of the Nazis and the Holocaust." A day after Hitler rose to power, Husseini gave Jerusalem's German Consul "his blessings in the name of 'three hundred million Muslims'," and urged the Nazis to take the whole world. He spent "much of the war" with the SS and Heinrich Himmler and in 1943 and 1944 talked Himmler out of trading Jewish lives for millions of dollars and military hardware. The Jews were murdered and at Husseini's request, the Nazis promised genocide for the Jews of Palestine, too.

Porath's review points out another of Khalidi's oversights. The Jewish defenders of the Etzion Bloc who surrendered to the Arab Legion of the Kingdom of Transjordan were treated under formal rules of war. But nearly all the 131 people who surrendered to Palestinian Arabs were murdered. Only two survived.

At the same time, Jordanian forces in Jerusalem removed from the city all the Jewish residents, numbering about 100,000. Porath wonders if anyone could "seriously examine the war of 1948" without noticing that a significant Arab minority stayed in the part of Palestine that became Israel, while those parts of the country that fell under the Jordanian or Egyptian rule "became Judenrein."

In another essay, Avi Shlaim considers the number of fighters on each side. Porath calls it "a remarkable study in scholarly distortion." By taxing itself to the limit, Palestine's Jewish community managed to gather 35,000 soldiers by mid-1948, a number that reached 95,000 by early 1949. That compared to 25,000 Arab fighters. Shlaim claims Jewish fighters outnumbered Arabs at every stage of the war. Porath says this is not true. "Shlaim himself admits that the Arab states sent only a small portion of their armies" to Palestine and could have sent far more had they wished.

Besides that, Porath tells us that Shlaim "ignores the huge difference in manpower reserves available to each side." By early 1949, Israel had at most 750,000 Jewish residents, compared to 50 million in the 7 Arab states in the war. Israel's Jewish people had taxed themselves to the maximum. The war had ground their small economy and "vital industries" to a halt. But "the Arab states, by comparison could have fought the war indefinitely without seriously affecting their citizens' way of life."

Finally Columbia University professor Edward Said offers a personal account of his family's departure from the Talbieh neighborhood of Jerusalem. Porath says this is most useful in its unintended effect. Traditional Israeli histories always claimed that urban Palestinians left their homes voluntarily as they wearied of the war. Khalil al-Sakakini provides one of the best such accounts of his family's departure from Katamon in Jerusalem, but there are many others in the Israeli and British sources of the time. Porath says that Said's account "matches the testimonies of Sakakini and many others like him, and serves therefore to confirm further the traditional account."

I didn't like this book at all. But if I had any doubts, Yohoshua Porath sealed it for me.

Israel has won most of the propaganda battles over the story of its formation and its version of history has come to dominate current thinking. In recent years ironically a group of Israeli historians known to the world as the Revisionists have been exploring this history and suggesting that previous histories are inaccurate self-serving myths.

This book is an attempt to look at the war that gave rise to the creation of Israel as a state. The book is a collection of articles and with the exception of one article written by Benny Morris is rather leaden and academic never the less it raises some interesting issues. The last chapter by Edward Said moves away from academic objectivity and is a bit of pro-Palestinian propoganda but the other articles are interesting.

The basic foundation myth of Israel is that following the United Nations passing a motion supporting a partition plan, hostile Arab states invaded the area and were defeated by a heroic outnumbered Israeli army. Local Arabs reacting to calls from the invading powers left the area to become refugees. Their plight was self inflicted their claims to have their property returned were thus somehow illegitimate or irrelevant.

What the book shows is that most Arab states were reluctant to intervene and were not in a position to do so effectively. What in fact happened was that two wars occurred. The first prior to May 1948 saw the Haganah crush the local Arab forces. This led to strong pressure for the surrounding Arab states to intervene. However the surrounding states for their own reasons were reluctant to do so. Syria was more concerned about possible aggression from Jordan. Jordan had been busy negotiating a secret deal with Israel to occupy those parts of Palestine which were designated Arab. The Egyptians did not have the military capacity to launch a military action and it only occurred when Farouk overruled objections of his military commanders. At all times the Haganah had an advantage in numbers and was soon able to gain a decisive advantage in heavy weapons.

Benny Morris again shows that the flight of the Palestinians was not due to mythical broadcasts and his new essay is a significant departure from his earlier work suggesting that violence played a greater role than he previously suggested.

The book also makes it clear how the war altered the history of most of the Arab states. The failure of the Arab armies destroyed the legitimacy of those regimes who took power after de-colonisation. This in turn led to military coups in most Arab countries and started a tradition by which the military routinely became involved in politics. It also distorted the economy of these states as arming for further wars with Israel became a significant priority.

An interesting if book although it is rather dry and distinctly non riverting.

This book has helped me discover the source of the tragedy that Israel is living in. I encourage Jews, Christians, Muslims and others interested in peace to learn about the history of this great land from alternative sources as a prequisite to finding a way to live together.