For a variety of reasons made clear in this book, British and Allied merchant convoys in World War Two could not employ hospital ships to rescue survivors of enemy attack. In their place, the Royal and merchant navies created the Rescue Ship Service, made up of civilian ships and mariners, usually augmented by RN doctors. The story of these gallant ships, almost completely forgotten now, is well told in this interesting book.

The ships' main duty was to follow a convoy and rescue sailors whose ships had been sunk by torpedoes and enemy gunfire. However, because they were not covered by international rules regarding hospital ships, they could engage in a variety of other activities as well. Many of the rescue ships were equipped with HF/DF, a system that allowed them to locate enemy U-boats based on their radio transmissions. They thus assisted in defending the convoys. Captain (later Admiral Sir) Peter Gretton, a famed convoy escort commander quoted in this book, wrote, 'It was a great thing to have a Rescue Ship with the convoy again, there never being enough of these invaluable ships to go round. ... In fact, with their wide experience of convoy work, they were almost as good as an extra escort, though they had no means of offence.'

There are many tales of real heroism in this book, and even I, who tend to grow tired of fishing-men-out-of-the-sea stories after just a few pages, found myself truly impressed. The authors, naval officers who had chain-of-command associations with the rescue ships during the war, do a fine job in rescuing these ships and their gallant crews from obscurity. Students of the World War Two convoy system should be sure to acquaint themselves with this part of the story.

The Germans were on the offensive, driving the Russians further and further back, and Stalin needed assistance (or so the secretive Soviet dictator claimed), and wanted it fast. His allies--the same allies who appeared to be dragging their feet on the "Second Front" issue--agreed to supply him with what he needed, and decided that the best way to do so was by convoys via the Arctic to Russia's northern ports. After a difficult start--the biggest setback being convoy PQ 17--and initially hampered by the Battle of the Atlantic, the allies managed to devise a convoy system that eventually succeeded in supplying the Soviets with millions of tons of foodstuffs, ammunition, equipment and medical supplies. In turn, the Germans never managed to get things together and lost some of their best ships: the Tirpitz and the Scharnhorst. Although considered a success, Stalin--despite his own secrecy and lack of cooperation--viewed his allies' handling of the convoys as more proof that they were secretly against him. Therefore, despite the heroic effort of thousands of merchant (of whom 800+ gave their lives) and navy sailors, the Russian Convoys in the end played a role in the cooling of relations between Stalin and his allies.

Written from the British perspective, Schofield's account is a very compatent overview of this aspect of the war. It is, however, like many works from this period (it was published in 1964) not that well referenced and apparently not that exhaustively researched.