The good stuff is the potential use this text supplies for research i.e. topical guide type. A history of all or most of the cases the Justice has presided over, great stuff. The disagreement lies with his thoughts on compliance with tax authorities which is absolute and his criticism of judicial review and activism. I think the common man should be able to stand up to corporate america's manipulation and purchase of politicians and their "unrighteous decrees" (see Isaiah cp.10).

I assume you have seen a description of the book already. The book is good enough to be recommended overall, but there were some disappointments. First, the justice does not stay long on his professed topic, the interpretation of statutes, but goes over into constitutional interpretation. Those who make replies follow gladly, and there is really little on the whole about statutory instead of constitutional interpretation. Moreover, the justice did not make it clear enough to me how his textualist philosophy differs from literalism, which he explicitly disavows. Also dissappointing is that I think the justice could have made a much stronger case for what I do glean to be his philosophy by invoking legal principles already understood when the constitution was written, and especially by invoking Justice Story's brilliant decision in Martin v Hunter's Lessee. In that decision rules of constitutional interpretation are stated clearly and authoritatively, and are much along the lines of what Scalia advocates. Lastly, Justice Scalia's essay does not measure up to the keenness of insight and language he shows in his best dissents, though there are some good moments. Despite these drawbacks, it is a very thought- provoking work and its brevity gives one less of an excuse for not reading it. It is largely free of technical vocabulary and there are no arcane discussions.

The centerpiece of this excellent book is an essay called "Common Law Courts in a Civil Law System," where Justice Scalia outlines and defends his theory of statutory and constitutional interpretation. The second part of the book has reactions from three law professors and an historian. Scalia then responds in a (testy) Afterwards that suggests that he doesn't take criticism well.

Scalia, a judge, believes that judges seek to grab power by covertly making laws. Prior to the 20th century, they made laws by manipulating common law precedents in the guise of "interpretation." The adoption of the Constitution and the growth of written laws should have ended this chicanery but didn't -- judges used the concept of "legislative intent" to evade the clear meaning of statutes and invented the notion of an "evolving constitution" to rewrite constitutional law as they saw fit.

To combat these evils, Scalia wants judges to decide cases by applying the "original meaning" of a statute or constitutional clause -- a strategy he calls "textualism." He has many intelligent things to say about statutory interpretation. Unfortunately, his theory of constitutional interpretation is a mess. Nothing in the text of the Constitution endorses "textualism" or any other rigid interpretive approach; on the contrary, the document's many vague, open-ended clauses made it inevitable that courts would create a "common law" of the Constitution. Historical investigations into "original meaning" may not yield certain, non-manipulable results, as shown by the disagreements among historians in this area. Clauses such as the First Amendment may not have had a clear "original meaning" at all.

No one in 2003, not even conservative jurists, really wants the country to be ruled by the "original meaning" of the Constitution. Freezing the Constitution in the understandings of 1791 or 1868 would only lead to permanent divisive pressures to amend the Constitution in ways that would probably horrify conservatives like Scalia. The Justice knows this. He accepts the legitimacy of stare decisis as an exception to textualism, even though it requires judges to uphold "wrong" Constituional decisions. He also knows that courts grappling with novel areas like TV broadcasting will find little guidance in the "original meaning" of the First Amendment: as Scalia concedes, "In such new fields, the Court must follow the trajectory of the First Amendment" -- "trajectory" being Scalia's euphemism for a Constitutional "common law."

The biggest disappointment is Scalia's failure to give an historically-informed, "inside" view of how the Supreme Court adjudicates cases, weighs political and legal factors, and adapts the Constitution to changing social circumstances in a way that preserves the Court's legitimacy. This would have given the reader a basis for deciding whether or not our affairs are sensibly arranged. Instead, Scalia reverts to the cliche that judicial lawmaking is undemocratic. He's right, it is, big deal. So is the Senate. So is the electoral college. And so are many other exceptions to pure democracy that Americans have put up with over the centuries. The question is not whether a limited judicial role in lawmaking is undemocratic. The question is whether it is bad.

To answer that question, we need to know how institutions function and interact in practice. Scalia fails on this score, reverting to cliches rather than analysis. True, federal judges are unelected -- but they are also above the fray of everyday politics, do their business case by case, give reasons for their decisions, and are subject to long-distance political control through the appointments process. Legislators, on the other hand, are indeed elected by the voters -- but they are also corruptible, short-sighted, subject to sleazy pressures, and unrepresentative of the electorate (how many black women are in the Congress?). Scalia should have discussed these institutional realities. Instead, he grinds an axe on behalf of a theory of adjudication that has never been followed in practice and never will be -- least of all by him.

"A Matter of Interpretation" is brief, thought-provoking, and jargon-free. The subject matter is important. It deserves a rating of five stars. I gave it only four because Scalia himself deserves only three.

This book is a must for anyone interested in the debate surrounding statutory interpretation and constitutional law. I began law school and before I knew anything - I mean a TOTALLY blank slate - about the Justices on the Supreme Court I quickly learned that I was "supposed" to hate Justice Scalia because he is a "stupid racist/facist/sexist" etc. Ironically, the more I learn about Scalia the more I understand why he is hated by the liberal left: Scalia doesn't sell out the law to political correctness. I, for one, admire that, but I don't pretend that isn't so because of my own political ideology. However, it is certain that Scalia is a brilliant and learned jurist, and, regardless of your politics, his judicial philosophy is wonderful to study.

Reserve judgment on Scalia and his Textualism until you have read, understand, and have digested the debate and Scalia's position. Be sure to ask yourself throughout the book: is the law certain? If not, ought the law be certain? If so, how ought one interpret statutes to facilitate and/or preserve the most possible certainty in the law? To underestimate Scalia is unfortunate; to dismiss him because he doesn't decide cases "your way," without considering his jurisprudence, is flat out ignorant.