Sarantakes covers the battle that began Easter Sunday in 1945, candidly dissecting the actions of the American commander in the battle and his resourceful Japanese counterparts. The book then proceeds to cover the political and strategic reasoning for keeping Okinawa under American control. The main reason, Sarantakes notes, is that America did not trust a militaristic Japan to maintain its promises in the surrender agreements, and wanted to be sure they didn't have to fight the battle of Okinawa all over again. Okinawa's strategic central location in Asia also made it very convenient as a forward deployment area should the need arise.

Keystone reads like a doctoral dissertation on the American administration of Okinawa. Historians and political science aficionados will find it interesting, but aside from the first chapter, there is little action. And there is little to no examination of 29 years of post-reversion history, even though Okinawa is still host to several American military bases and personnel.

I served on Okinwawa with the Army for three years, and while this book filled in a lot of the history from the Battle to Reversion, I was disappointed to find no mention of what has happened in the 29 years since.

In this thorough and well-written work, Professor Nicholas Sarantakes relates the story of how the United States occupied and controlled the strategically vital region of Okinawa after World War II, and held it until the early 1970s. No issue is ignored: Sarantakes combines politics, diplomacy, strategy, and even culture in this detailed look at a controversial American policy.

A number of general things make this book especially valuable. Sarantakes writes well, especially in his vivid description of the 1945 battle for Okinawa itself. His research is impressive, as he makes use of material from presidential archives, government repositories, and a good collection of oral histories. His argument that Okinawa was essentially an American colony is clear and convincing, even if policymakers would not have used the term. And, he does a nice job showing why American policymakers began to rethink this approach in the 1970s; not because of any ideals or principles, but because of Japanese resistance to the heavy-handed American presence.

A few things in particular deserve mention. Sarantakes does an excellent job explaining how American policy toward Okinawa evolved, showing that policymakers first wanted control of the area because of fears of a rearmed and aggressive Japan. Then, when it became clear that Japan was not moving toward militarism, American officials still refused to abandon Okinawa, afraid that doing so might encourage Japan to move toward a more neutral position in the Cold War. His account of the political infighting between State Department officials who saw withdrawal as a means to build up goodwill in Japan and elsewhere, and military leaders who clung to the base for its potential strategic value, is particularly insightful. He also does a nice job looking at the way that, especially in the early years, military officials were able to rule Okinawa with an almost iron fist. Finally, Dr. Sarantakes does a nice job putting the occupation in the context of the Cold War; its strategic location, for example, which allowed American planes to threaten targets in Asia and parts of Europe, made Okinawa especially valuable as American fears of Chinese and Soviet expansion grew.

Overall, this is convincing, thorough, and interesting book. I recommend it highly.