If you want to know what happened to the Maine, read this book. There's a little historical background, but not the hundreds of pages that some authors devote to this subject.

It deals mostly with the "nuts and bolts" of the explosion and what caused it.

The story of the U.S.S. Maine and the disaster it encountered has been written many times. The tragic loss of 266 lives was blamed on a mine, and it was a partial cause of the Spanish-American war. Admiral Rickover's couriosity was tickled by a newspaper article, which indicated that the original Court of Inquiry ivestigating the cause of the explosion and destruction of the ship had some peculiar irregularities involved. The Court did not call on existing experts in explosions and mines to testify or examine the available evidence, and the ship's captain who might have been responsible was allowed to attend all court sessions and question witnesses. Admiral Rickover assembled a team of historians and explosions experts to examine all original records and evidence to form his own picture of what happened in the light of modern day knowledge of explosions. The book is the rsult of his team's work, and the first, and so far only, work that has dealt accurately with the technical aspects of the ship loss. All his team members were competent in their field, drawn from Navy experts, and there can be no doubt that his finding that the cause of the explosion was internal and purely accidental is accurate. His book is the definitive verdict on the story, and it is presented very clearly, even the technical details are explained so a layman can understand them, although not proven in the sense that scioentists would demand. From a purely scientific point of view, the reader will have to believe in the expertise of Admiral Rickover and his team. But who is to doubt the father of the nuclear submarine?

I have recently been doing some research on ethnographics, trying to better understand how the operating culture of nuclear power plants evolved. I was directed toward biographies of Admiral H.G. Rickover, and I found Duncan's work to be one of the most enjoyable readings on Rickover. Duncan gives an inside view to the Admiral and the history that led to the success of the Nuclear Navy through a historical account. The author's relationship with the Admiral, which was probably closer than many other biographers, shows Rickover a hard-driven centrist leader who stressed technical competence and sought excellence and integrity, as well as a respect and dedication for the high-risk technology. My only criticism would be that other biographies of Rickover dealve more into the Admiral's idiosincracies and somewhat odd expectations -- traits that leave the reader wondering if Rickover was crazy or a genius. I look forward to reading Duncan's new book "Rickover: A Struggle for Excellence" when it is released November 2001.

This is an excellent insider account of Rickover's efforts and
accomplishments. Dr. Rockwell really makes the history come alive.

This is a comprehensive account of the contentious genesis of the Los Angeles Class attack sub, a warship normally described as one of the most advanced in the world, but under suspicion here. Though this story will most likely appeal to those familiar with the terminology and technology of military submarines, it also has much to offer for those studying the military acquisitions process.

The Los Angeles class attack sub was borne of attempts to combat two implacable enemies - the Soviet Navy and America's own Hyman Rickover, the so-called father of the nuclear navy. Facing the combined soviet threats of submarine launched anti-ship missiles (previous Russian subs could only fire their missiles only after an elaborate process while on the surface where they were visible and vulnerable) and faster submarines equipped with more powerful reactors, American planners now find themselves desperate to reclaim an edge on speed. (Though setting the benchmark with the Skipjack class, progressive gains in the size and weight of latter subs using the same powerplant eroded this advantage). The switch to a newer reactor (actually one redesigned after use on the USS Long Beach, one of the world's first nuclear-powered surface ships) wasn't enough, and submarine vets had no choice but to make compromises, like reducing hull thickness and conseuqently reducing maximum safe operating depth. Conflict with the headstrong Admiral Rickover occurs when the winning design for the new sub is chosen by a firm other than General Dynamics, the established industry leader. Also complicating things is Takis Veliotis, a wily genius who is the only man who can stand up to greedy corporate reps eager to cut any corner and Rickover himself. Veliotis, unfortunately, has some of his own secrets to hide, resulting in his flight to Greece to avoid charges stemming from millions of dollars in kickbacks. What nearly dooms the program are the extensive compromises made to the construction schedules - resulting in ships being launched half-finished only to be quietly returned to the factory for completion. Millions of dollars in overruns are quietly overlooked, with the hope that a government bailout will convert these losses into profits. When that prospect begins to look unlikely, the corporate heads of GD begin turning on each other, while unskilled and unreliable labor, low morale and impossible construction schedules mix to spell the likely doom of the US submarine force.

This book tackled an unlikely subject - the LA Class is the backbone of America's submarine navy, not something you've heard described as essentially "Unsafe at any depth". However, the book is marred for two reasons - the author spends much more time concentrating on each specific transaction or exchange between characters (like Veliotis and either the head of GD or Rickover) without connecting these exchanges into a cohesive picture of a collapsing defense program. A more glaring flaw is the book being incomplete. "When it was over, there were just the submarines" but the submarines managed to operate at much higher safety standards than the Russian boats they confronted - the author never connecting these boats to the seeming time-bombs produced by GD. What had happened? Who can take credit for the success of the LA Class - or is even that perceived success an illusion? Even the supreme irony of speedy submarines is never addressed adequately, though the information was probably unavailable. Though developments in sub-launched missiles and their submarines themselves did substantiate the need for faster US subs, the threat of high-speed Russian subs was a cold war mirage. The Russians never gave much production priority to their high-powered reactors. Those installed in experimental versions of the November and Papa classes, and regularly in the Alfa class proved more trouble prone than realized. Though more compact than comparable western designs, these reactors were at least as loud, and, using molten metal as a coolant, had to be operated around the clock, even while in port, lest the coolant be allowed to "freeze" into solid metal and ruin the piping. Either of these two ommissions (the post-construction history of the LA class and the real threat posed by the Russians) is fatal to the subject. Nevertheless, I found it important reading. I'm hoping the author will revisit the subject again using the information he had no access to at first.

One of the best books on the 688 program and how it influenced the 726-class. The best part is the back of the book with transcripts of telephone conversations between Takis Veliotis (GM for GD/EB) and Rickover. Also a good summary of the engineering and operations analysis that led to the 688 design. Portions on the "holy grail" of speed, depth and stealth are great, particularly on how/why the hull wound up getting shaved to meet speed, but sacrificing depth. Overall, a great book, as good or better than Dalguish and Schwickert's (sp?) book, Trident.

Probrably the definitve book on the origin of the 688 submarine program and the corruption involved in the overspending by General Dynamics(Electric Boat). Some really good insights on Adm. Rickover not seen in other books. Very technically accurate. I believe at the time this book was written the government tried to ban the book. The first third of the book about the advent of Soviet fast subs and and the history of modern submarine design is a must read for anyone interested in submarine history. Cronicles some of the classic story's such as the USS Philidelphia being launched for the Congressmen and then pulled back into shipyard for another year to finish since it was so far behind schedule.

I was quite surprised after reading this book. It is an excellent history of Rickover and US Navy Nuclear propulsion. I had always wondered why nuclear power was always so safe for the Navy but the public utilities had so much trouble with it. This is an interesting history of moving up the ranks in the Navy and how you can advance. I was surprised at all the people who seemed to hate Rickover because he wanted to have his way and never to go below his specifications. This is why Rickover was never on the biography channel was because he was contriversial. The story really makes you want to know more and more about Nuclear submarines especially the times at Oak Ridge and when they were building the Nautilus. It's hard to think of a time when all the subs before that ran on the surface most of the time. I was glad that Rickover just took over and got the job done. The only part I did not like was that they were not specific enough about the design of the subs. I do not mean engineering drawings or national secrets but at least some general layouts of the submarines and the propulsion system in a layman's terms to have a better understanding of this. Richard Rhodes did a good job of this in his book "The Making of the Atomic Bomb" explaining the first nuclear reactor that went critical in Chicago. I would like to also know more about that light water breeder reactor that ran on thorium instead of uranium at Shippingport. Why haven't we made more of those instead of depending on fossil fuels? Rickover was in on the most exciting technology of the 20th century, how exciting must that have been.

Many biographies have been written over the past 40 years about the impact that the life of Admiral H.G. Rickover has had on the United States Navy ' one in which redefined the role of the Navy in the post World II era. All of these works have focused on his many accomplishments and the controversies that surrounded him, which often conflicted with the executive branch of the Federal government, naval shipbuilders, and the U.S. Navy itself. Few, if any, clearly demonstrate who Rickover was, and how his principles evolved. No doubt, the author of 'Rickover: The Struggle for Excellence,' Francis Duncan, is the only biographer afforded enough access to the Rickover as an outsider to the Navy and its Naval Reactors program, to know him well enough to accomplish a detailed account of what shaped the man. This book, the third in a series by Duncan, tells the stories from birth till his death, remarking on events that shaped his priorities and principles, and addresses many of the unanswered questions or mysteries that readers of other biographers may have found in the story of Rickover's career. Some of the misconceptions about Rickover that Duncan's work clears up are concerns such that Rickover had lied about his age or that Rickover had been for the most part unsuccessful and out of place in the Navy prior to his work with Naval Reactors. Unlike the Polmar and Allen 'Rickover' biography, which often appears lengthy and intimidating as an all encompassing view of Rickover's life, Duncan's work is very readable and pleasant. I assume that Duncan knew that the larger than life Rickover story could never be captured in single volume, and separated his works, which describes his evolution; 'Nuclear Navy, 1946-1962' which deals with the influence of Atomic Energy on the modern U.S. Navy,' and the 'Rickover and the Nuclear Navy: The Discipline of Technology,' describing the founding and management of Rickover's technical program.

Although the emphasis of most Rickover biographies has been his impact on the Navy, his story serves two other main purposes. First, from a management and organizational behavior perspective Rickover seems to break all the rules and still maintain a highly committed program that integrated safety, reliability and high-performance He embedded principles and expectations that continue to exist today, and are the core of the Naval Nuclear program. This is the ultimate measure of a founder's success, for an organization to remain relatively static around what principles and values drive its core mission. The second of course, is Rickover's influence on the operation of civilian nuclear power plants, an accomplishment that Rickover thought he was unlikely to achieve when he was forced to withdraw from Shippingport. However, his influence and principles have filtered down through the personnel he trained through 'NR,' and have subsequently redefined nuclear power operations in the Post-TMI era of nuclear power, and forced a paradigm shift in nuclear power operations and realigned the thinking about the discipline required to operate high-risk technologies.

My only criticism of Duncan is perhaps his fondness of Rickover, which comes through in his writing. Considering all of the negative stories of Rickover, I would expect more negatives in his depiction of Rickover as well. However, biographies are written about the life and accomplishments of great men, and gossip and scandals best left for supermarket tabloids.

"The Rickover Effect" is a fascinating depiction of Admiral Hyman Rickover's efforts to build the nuclear Navy. This book is not intended to serve as a comprehensive chronicle of Rickover's career and private life, but as a chronicle of Rickover's accomplishments in bringing nuclear power to the Navy as viewed by a subordinate. Within these self-admitted limitations, the book succeeds, but Theodore Rockwell also attempts to turn Rickover's leadership style into some sort of management primer.

Rockwell examines various anecdotes and discusses the effectiveness of Rickover's management acumen in dealing with both political and technical problems. This attempt to explain "The Rickover Effect" is rather clumsy and unnecessary. The reader can judge for him or herself the success of Rickover's abilities.

Readers unfamiliar with Rickover's personality must keep in mind that this account is written by someone who obviously admired and respected Rickover a great deal. Rockwell's close association with Rickover has caused him to see the Admiral through biased eyes. Rockwell sees Rickover as firm but fair, which isn't entirely accurate. Although truly a visionary, Rickover was extremely difficult for most military personnel to get along with and prone to frightening fits of rage. Although he was often the target of attacks on his character, Rickover often treated his political enemies and detractors cruelly, and at times led his own vicious attacks. Rockwell appears sincere in his treatment of Rickover, but it is obvious he doesn't see the Admiral as an outsider would.

With these limitations in mind, this is actually a very entertaining account of how the nuclear Navy started.

The author holds Admiral Rickover in extremely high regard, so much so that the book reads more like advertising than non-fiction. I can't recall a single case in the book where Rickover is described as making a mistake, being unreasonable, or doing something dumb! People in a position to know tell me that Rickover was extremely difficult to work with, especially when challenged by a subordinate, but you'd never guess at such problems from Rockwell's book! Rickover is presented as stern and demanding, but always fair. Despite my nit-picking, this is still a worthwhile book for someone interested in the subject. Rickover definitely knew how to get things done, and deserves great credit for his work on making nuclear power reactors into a working concept. It is highly readable, and the Rickover quotes sprinkled through the pages are worth the purchase price. A lengthy, but more balanced account is in Norman Polmar's book, Rickover.

I thought the book was well written by a man that knew and worked with this very remarkable genius. Rickover probably contributed more than any other person to bringing the USN to the forefront as a world power. Ted Rockwell gave us a good view of how the man made this all possible and even brought out his humorous side. Most refreshing and entertaining.