Algeria 1830-2000: A Short History directly addresses the history and root causes of the deadly, long-term civil war that has killed at least 80,000 people out of this nation of 28 million. Written with painstaking detail about the 1954-1962 Algerian civil war and the nation's history since its independence, Algeria 1830-2000 features college-level narration and analysis supplemented by tables, a very convenient acronym list, a 26-page chronology, and an index. Benjamin Stora (Professor of History at the University of Paris, Saint Denis) has written a new introductory chapter on Algeria's colonial period (1830-1954) and revised the final section with up-to-date information, making Algeria 1830-2000 a clear, detailed, rigorously factual, and up-to-date account of this troubled nation from 1830 down to the present day.

William Quandt has produced a brief look at the Algerian crisis that will give the reader with a time deficit a chance bone up quickly and accurately.

Between Ballots & Bullets by William Quandt is an excellent and exhaustive study of Algeria's transition from authoritarianism. The book is split into two parts: political history and political analysis. In Part I, the reader gets an excellent political history of the country, beginning with the struggle for independence from France all the way to aftermath of the 1997 elections (the book was published in 1998). In Part II, Quandt offers contending "perspectives" for analyzing Algeria's plight. He details cultural, socioeconomic and political explanations for the situation, while taking care never to dismiss the power of human agency and contextualized choice. In this book review, I will briefly summarize the book, review Quandt's style, and propose future implications for Algeria based on the knowledge I have gained.
It almost seems repetitive to give a summary of this book, because Quandt is extremely concise. He begins with a political account of the Algerian struggle for independence. He observes,

...the revolution that was launched November 1, 1954 was not only against the French, but also against the existing political institutions that Algerians had forged over the previous generation. In its origins, the Algerian revolution was antipolitics and antiparty. (18)

This observation is important because it helps the reader understand the importance of nationalism in the revolution. The Algerians did not fight with a detailed governance plan in their back pocket. Rather, they fought for a chance to establish themselves as independent people.
After discussing the Revolution and its rhetorical emphasis on unity, Quandt moves into the Boumedience Era. He notes that Algeria's first president, Ben Bella, lacked an institutional base of support and spent much of his time in office manipulating factions against each other. Ben Bella quietly faded into the background and Boumediene arose as the stable and rather "faceless" leader. He downgraded the FLN (the party credited with winning independence) in importance and suppressed any emerging opposition to his regime. Indeed, after 1968, there was very little internal opposition. During the 1970s, his regime had an Islamic cultural orientation but functioned in a secular socialist manner. There was definitely not much emphasis on a transition to democracy, but "Boumedience, at least, had brought stability to a country that had known far too much political violence" (29).
In the next chapter, Quandt explains that there was inevitable pressure to change, and Boumediene, as an authoritarian ruler, was unable to enact it. Chadli Benjedid became president in 1979, and long-suppressed demands for change came with the Berber spring of 1980. This initial movement for the rights of Berber-speaking people gave rise to other political movements, the most significant being the Algerian Islamic Movement. Beginning in 1982, the Islamic Movement took up arms and gained momentum, though for the most part the stability of the existing order kept protestors at bay. This all changed in 1988, when "the bottom fell out of the oil market." The rentier state was in trouble.
Quandt writes, "the mass protests of October 1988 proved to be one of those turning points that define a country's political trajectory for years to come. It was a nationwide youth revolt, but Islamic activists soon took charge. The military was called in and violence ensued. Hundreds of young Algerians were killed in the first use of the Algerian military against its own people.
As disturbing as this scene was, Quandt notes that it could have been a dramatic turn toward political expression and eventually democracy. Indeed, in 1989 reform-minded allies of Chadli drafted a new constitution. At least on paper, it created three distinct branches of government and guaranteed individual liberties--including what was to soon become a very significant free press. The army was supposed to now be above politics, and a significant new political party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) challenged the government on a plethora of issues. Many young unemployed and disillusioned men joined this group. Through political mediums such as strikes and the 1991 elections (in which the FIS received about twice the number of votes as the FLN in the first round), the FIS established itself as the new power in Algeria. In June of 1991, however, the army stepped in yet again (it had stepped in during the strike and arrested FIS leaders) and showed itself to be right in the middle of politics-certainly not above it.
In 1991 the army cancelled the constitutionally mandated second round of elections and forcefully removed both Chadli and the FIS from power. Quandt explains the army's motives well:

Many in the military had fought for Algeria's independence and genuinely felt that they had a legitimate role to play in the political life of the country. The FIS was a threat to all that they had fought for and, like the Turkish military, they would not stand by and watch the principles of the state be trampled. (60-61).

Thus, the military took over the state and political violence and terrorism was the norm for most of the nineties. Within months, the FIS was declared illegal. The leader appointed by the military, Boudiaf, was assassinated, and thousands of ordinary Algerians lost their lives in the chaos. Quandt writes, "The inability-or unwillingess-of the state to provide basic security was shocking" (75). Many Algerians emigrated to other nations.
Thus, the political history of Algeria is a complex and sometimes sad one. Quandt's book covers it so well because he understands that there is hope for the country. It has experimented with liberalization and might just be able to make it work. After all, nobody really expected Algeria to rebel against France in the first place, much less win a war of independence. Quandt's book is good because it presents this history in a very detailed fashion (Part I), and then it presents various perspectives to clarify the events and give insight to the future (Part II). An alternate format, like an interwoven mixture of history and analysis, might be very confusing to the average reader.

Ballots and Bullets is only one of several books I have read dealing with Algerian Politics recently, and it amazed me how Quandt was able to grasp the fundamental themes of the transition Algeria has made in the past years. Quandt has a perspective on the subject that had never entered my mind before, and he explains it in the most comprehensive manner possible.

Bill Quandt's volume on the American role in the Middle East peace process reads more as a chronology of events than a real analytical piece of history. The author devotes an extradinary amount of detail to minor events and actions without really explaining the motives of the players behind the actions. The strongest part of the book is the Presidential Crisis decision making model, in which he explains how he feels US policy on the issue is molded. There is little to judge against, however, since the author does not really do justice to the other theories of US decisionmaking on the middle east. Whether or not he agrees with them, he could at least tell us why he thinks they are incorrect. And finally, the amount of minutia the author goes into ends up leaving the reader wishing he would just decide to highlight a few important events and motives.

This detailed account of the American peace process in the Arab Israeli conflict is written by William Quandt, who has served Nixon and Carter on the National Security council.
Quandt tells what diplomatic moves the United States made to bring peace between Israel and the Arabs.

The account begins with the Six Day war. After the Six Day war the Arabs wanted Israel to give back land they had taken and justice for the Palestinians. The Israelis wanted peace and the Arabs to recognize Israel's right to exist. But the Israelis had no intention of giving up land, and the Arabs were not likely to recognize Israel's legitimacy

Tension existed in the Middle East until war broke out again in October 1973. Kissinger had ignored the Middle East until then, after which he negotiated continually in the Middle East under Nixon and Ford to bring peace to keep the Soviets from exploiting the chaos.

Carter started negotiations in the 70s, after Begin began construction of settlements on the lands captured in the Six Day war, indicating that the lands would be permanently held by Israel, making peace with the Arabs much more difficult. Carter worked hard to gain peace between Israel and Egypt which cost him in domestic politics. Carter mentioned the Palestinians for the first time in the negotiations

Under Reagan there were a lot of plans, but little was accomplished. After the Gulf War Bush restarted peace negotiations, hoping that the Palestinians support of Saddam Hussein would weaken them, and the collapse of the Soviet Union would remove support for the Arabs. Quandt ends with an account of Clinton's attempts at peace in the Mideast.

Quandt concludes that certain conditions must be met to gain success. There must be a realist appraisal of the regional situation, presidents like Johnson, Nixon, and Reagan considered Mideast policy as part of US Soviet relations. The President and his top advisors must work together in the negotiations, not like in the Rogers plan. There must be domestic support for American policy, a problem for Carter. Success as a mediator depends on a feeling for both process and substance. There must be quiet negotiation and preparation for negotiations. Pressure only succeeds if carefully exerted. Timing is crucial for successful negotiations.

Because this book is about the peace process between America and Israel,
there is almost no information about the domestic politics of any countries, especially the Arab countries. This book includes a good bibliography, and some good maps.

I feel that this book deals beautifully with the issues it tries to attend to. Quandt manages to bring a fresh perspective to the middle eastern situation, which is a good change from most other books of this source. This is by far one of the best books on the middle eastern peace talks i have ever read and i would strongly recommend it to anyone who wants to learn more about it.

The Maghreb Arab Union has never been a union. Since its birth in 1989 the MAU has only met six times, instead of every six months. Hence the pragmatic American attitude: treat each of the five members (Mauretania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunesia and Libya) seperately. That's what also happens in this book, a collection of fifteen essays on the developments in the Maghreb in the 1990's. Mauretania hardly counts. Libya has been the world's pariah ever since the accusations of its involvement in the Lockerbie-bombing. Tunesia has pursued an exceptionally strict secular course with scant regard for human rights. Which leaves the two 'superpowers' Algeria and Morocco who have been at virtual state of war since the mid-seventies over the Western Sahara. What this book points out very well is that the five countries nevertheless have been converging over the last ten years. They cope with similar problems, of which the rise of islamism, espcially in Algeria, has been getting most of the attention. Naturally, islamism features in this book. But fortunately the editors have understood that there are other challenges facing the Maghreb in the new millennium. In fact, many dramatic events (the dead of King Hassan of Morocco, the release of the Lockerbie-suspects by Libya and the election of Bouteflika as president of Algeria) have already taken place since this book came out, changes which have seriously altered the political landscape in the Maghreb.

Nevertheless this remains a good read, particularly because it thoroughly (although sometimes too academically) analyzes the threefold crisis: economic, political and social. The contributors rightly focus on the birth of an important and independent civil society and on the uncertain future of the millions of unemployed youths, a potential timebomb. Equally interesting is the chapter devoted to the role of the French speaking intellectuals, who have been lambasted by the islamists as 'relics of colonialism', but who in fact have been instrumental in forging ties with the West and keeping the debate on democracy alive. What this book unfortunately lacks is a concluding chapter that sums it all up. What is also missing is a chapter on the role of women, even though four of the contributors are women. The Maghreb, it seems, remains a man's world.