Barry Posen's work is a comparison of 33 hypotheses drawn from organizational theory and balance of power theory. The test of these hypotheses is the military strategy of interwar France, Germany and Great Britain.

While Posen's work has great explanatory value for the formation of military doctrine, what it does in actuality is refute the richness of organizational theory for explaining the sources of military doctrine. The problem is that Posen did not seemingly intend to refute organizational theory.

The book offers a well balanced response to the work of Jack Snyder on the ideology of offensive military strategy. I would highly encourage graduate students and facutly of international relations and military science to read this work.

Posen's reasoning is lucid and his writing is a pleasure to read. Usually identified as part of the Waltzian or neorealist school of thought in international relations, Posen argues for the primacy of structural factors in explaining unit-level outcomes (in this case, military doctrine). One thing he does not address is potential influence of another unit-level characterisitic, regime type, in determining military doctrine. But overall, an ambitious and cleanly laid out argument.