Porch, one of America's foremost historians of the French military, endevors to answer the question: why did France spend billions of francs and waste hundreds of lives conquering an enormous, basically worthless desert? His answer, after an exhaustive study of the period and its personalities, is a resounding "they didn't know." Porch's tale is long on anecdotes, but complemented by a skillful discussion of French politics of the period. This saga of arrogant would-be railroad tycoons, religious fanatics, and homicidal soldiers is both tremendously entertaining and highly revealing for those with an interest in the colonial period. Of particular interest is his attempt to use modern ethnography to analyse the motivations of the dwellers of the desert who preceded the French, a study which would have profited the colonialists tremendously if they had been interested. Basically, if you enjoyed "Beau Geste", you owe it to yourself to read this book

Another fine book by Professor Porch. If you liked his book on the Conquest of Morocco, then this book will also be a good read. The only criticism I have of this book is that he didn't place any pictures in it, like he had in the Morocco book. A more detailed map may also have helped.
I agree with the previous reviewer about the intentions of the French. Why conquer an enormous sandpit? The answer is the French government did not know, and relied on the glory seeking soldiers of the French Army. The soldiers were interested in the conquest and not the money and lives the government expended. Colonialism failed because it did not pay, and the French experience in the Sahara was a prime example. Also answered the question why Algeria has a larger share of the desert than her rivals Morocco and Tunisia. Only later when the French were fighting an independance war was oil in the Sahara found.

I bought this book because it appeared to fill in the void of my knowledge on colonial wars. The author has clearly stated that all of his examples used to illustrate his principles will be that of properly formed armies versus irregular native troops (the Boers are an exception). Thus, the American War of Independence is excluded but surprisingly, several examples from the European Vendee rebellion are also included. The author's style is to state principles, followed by a litany of examples to illustrate his point. He cites many unknown engagements as examples but many of these examples lack firm details. A textual description apparently suffices as examples. The same examples could be used to illustrate other points. I found this approach rather boring and it began to read like a manual to me. On the plus side, there were some examples with more details given, including a sketch map which livened the proceedings somewhat. Douglas Porch provides a neat introduction into the background of Col Callwell, including the fact that he had numerous entries selected for the Encyc. Brittanica. Except for the one on Guerrilla warfare for which the editors selected TE Lawrence. I can see why - Callwell wrote from the perspective of the formed troops - Lawrence wrote from that of the guerrillas.

Colonel Callwell's book is a "must" for any student of military history and also practicing members of the armed forces. The wealth of detail and the numerous references to actual events and the ability to clearly convey the concept of how to manage such operations. I return to this volume constantly.

Written early in the 20th Century to teach British officers how to wage war against non-European armies in Asia and Africa, "Small Wars" retains its fascination at century's end. In fact, many of its lessons could well be applied to conflicts today.

The author served in the Second Afghan and both Boer Wars, was an assiduous student of warfare around the globe and retired as a Major General after heading the British Army's Intelligence division during the Great War. The breadth of his knowledge is shown by the range of examples that illustrate the principles laid down in his book. The chapter on "Feints", for instance, draws on actions from the Zulu Wars, the Indian Mutiny, the 1821 Wallachian insurrection against the Ottoman Empire, the Second Afghan War, the Kaffir War of 1878, the French occupation of Algeria, the British expedition against Abyssinia in 1868, the siege of Khartoum, the suppression of Riel's revolt in Canada, the war against the Mahdi and a couple of Indian campaigns. Elsewhere, we are presented with the Russians in Central Asia, the French in Tonkin, Dahomey and Madagascar, the U.S. cavalry against the Indians of the Great Plains, the British and French in China, and many more now-obscure imbroglios.

The first several chapters lay down broad strategic principles, most of them flowing from the key insight that regular armies enjoy great tactical advantages over forces inferior in organization, arms, training and discipline but suffer equally great strategic handicaps. In a "small war", therefore, the more "advanced" power can easily lose, due to ignorance of the enemy, failure to formulate clear objectives or, worst of all, the pursuit of military objectives that do not contribute to the conflict's political goal. Erroneous strategy, Callwell warns again and again, leads to desultory, defensive war that exhausts the regulars' resources while merely exasperating rather than subduing their enemy. (The reader may draw his own contemporary parallels.)

After the strategic foundation come discussions of operations and tactics from multiple perspectives: the character of the action (attack, defense, pursuit, retreat, feint, etc.), the terrain on which it is fought, and the types of troops that fight it (including such exotica as camel corps and the not-yet-dominant machine gun). The commander who mastered Callwell's course was prepared to force a mountain pass, assault a Boer laager or Sudanese zeriba, maneuver through a jungle or carry out any of the other varied tasks that circumstances might demand.

Aside from the inherent interest of its variegated subject matter and its appeal to wargamers, "Small Wars" will prove illuminating to the reader who wishes to understand more fully what happened in colonial warfare and how and why European forces won and lost. It is one of those rare works that makes concrete the challenges and achievements of a bygone era.

In terms of research & detail, this book is unparalleled for the period it covers (the founding of the Foreign Legion until the 1980s. The problem is that is gives too much detail. There are some 500+ pages of very fine print, and it takes a long, long time to read. The only reason I finished the book was I had already read 100 pages by the time I realized how slow it was going to be. At that point, I felt I'd invested too much time not to finish.

What might be breathaking narratives are convoluted with arcane details. For historical purposes, this might be good... but for a less voluminous, easier-reading history of the French Foreign Legion, which also covers more current information, I suggest John Parker's "Inside the Foreign Legion."

This book contains a lot of impressive research on the history and combat performance of the Legion. Unlike other books on this subject Mr. Porch has decided to take an objective, analylitical approach toward his study of the Legion. This may put off some readers because Porch's work is long, and does not contain a lot of exciting passages. This is a serious study of the Legion's origins, history, and combat performance. Those who stick with this long read will find it rewarding, but also time consuming!

There is lots of fascinating information here buried between the sometimes excessive analysis. A lot of focus is placed on Legion morale, combat effectiveness, and desertion. Porch spends large portions of time disecting these topics at length throughout the book to try to determine the real efficiency of the Legion and to seperate the myth from the reality. His conclusions are that the Legion performed best when used in colonial operations. It was not suited for European conflicts and World Wars, even though it did perform well in them. The often delicate pyschological make-up of the average Legionaire meant that he was not suited to perform certain tasks. The Legion prides itself on being a corps d'elite of the French army, even though the Legion itself often disdains that asscoiation. The love-hate relationship between France and her Legion is well illustrated in this book. Indeed, this was the very reason why it was formed in 1831 to safely deposit troublesom foreign elements of society. The Legion seeing this, has responded by imposing an insular discipline over the years which either consumes the recruit, or destroys him in the process!

For the length of this book, Porch could spend somewhat more time describing the Legion's battles and campaigns. The famed battle at Camerone in Mexico, now so much apart of Legion lore, gets scarsely a few pages, while the Dohomey and Madacascar campaigns receive lengthy treatments. The coverage of topics is sometimes uneven. One of the best early chapters is on the Carlist Wars of Spain in 1838 and how the Legion was loaned out to serve Queen Isabel in what was to become a long and thankless campaign. Then strangely, both the Crimean War and the Italian War of 1859 get just a small chapter together. The constant references to Legion performance and desertion are a bit redundant after a while. Still, there is much that is worthwhile here. The inter-war years chapter when General Rollet attempts to create the traditions of the Legion during the difficult Rif War of the 1920s provides a lot of interesting debate on the popular image we have seen of the Legion in movies and books.

Like most Legion histories this one ends after the loss of Algeria in 1961 and provides only a brief look at the attempted challenege to de Gaulle's policy there. There is no chapter on the Legion today which would really round off this book and help make it the deffinitive history which it purports itself to be.

Overall I found this book to be well researched, somewhat dry at times, filled with interesting information and analysis. No Legion buff should be without it as it discusses many aspects of the corp's history not often covered. The book probably could have been made shorter and covered effectively just as much material. There is a good collection of pictures which does enhance the work, and the few maps provided are helpful, if sparringly used. You won't find a lot of Legion lore and heros here, in fact many famous names mentioned elsewhere are deliberately ignored here because the author wishes to have a more detached approach toward this subject. Still, this book will reward the Legion grognard who fights his way through it!

At 634 pages plus references, this book is a lot of "Legion", and the reader will not be able to finish it on the plane. Professor Porch is to be commended on the thoroughness with which he treats his subject, but the lay reader may find some of the development excessively long, perhaps to the point of preventing a clear understanding of the main subject. For this hypothetical reader, the tale could have had twice the impact with half the words. An additional flaw is that, rather surprisingly after all the detail on historical matters, the treatment of the Legion in modern times is skimpy, and the book would have benefitted from a really strong closing chapter on the Legion today.

But precisely because it is highly detailed, the book can be mined for fascinating insights. The reader can learn about Cole Porter's Legion career and what Legionnaires really think of Beau Geste soldiers. Does the Legion really fight to the last man? Find out about mercenaries, idealism, cruelty, boozing, fighting in the ranks, mutinies, and many other aspects of Legion life. The book will almost surely be an eye-opener for some with preconceived notions (and we all have them where the Legion is concerned), but the author always gives documentation for his claims.

This is a useful reference on the French Foreign Legion and a rewarding read for anyone interested in the subject.

Porch focuses his story on the last grab at Africa from a European country (except Mussolini's grab at Ethiopia). The story resolves around a general named Lautrey nibbling away at the borders of a falling apart Morocco. The Sultan no longer commands the repect of his countrymen and the Eurpoean powers have set up their privileges in the country. France sets the conditions whereby the Colonial department can add Morocco as a
protectorate. I like Porch's writing style. This book focuses on Morocco similar to where The Scramble for Africa focuses on the colonial experience of all Africa.

I have read this author's account on the French Foreign Legion and 'The Conquest of the Sahara' and this book is just as good as those two. Douglas Porch almost seems to have a inside line into what it must have felt like to be one of the actors of these great drama's. If you want to read a great book and learn something of the French involvement in the Middle East, you'll love this book and his others. Take the chance and buy a copy and then sit down and enjoy!

Wars of Empire by Douglas Porch is part of the Cassell History of Warfare series edited by John Keegan. The title actually is a bit of a misnomer. It refers to the usage prevalent in Eurpoe around 1700-1900. By Empire, it means an imperial colonial system, and so examines predominately the European experience, although the American experience in the Phillipines, and Japanese efforts are also discussed. The series has been notable in its flexible approach. Rather than restricting its authors to a specific struggle or time period, the series has allowed some topics to span larger ranges of time and space. (examples: Age of the Fighting Sail, War in the Air: 1914-1945) This method of looking at the common points along a continuum helps to formulate a better understanding of seemingly disparate topics.

Major strengths: briefly summarizes the major imperial wars which created the vast colonial empires of the European powers between 1700-1900. It highlights their successes and failures. It traces the importance of technology (notably machine guns, naval power, telegraph) and how these actions were part of a greater political/economic plan. Of interest to current readers is the history of how areas were "pacified", and why empires have failed. The last chapter "Imperial Twilight?" examines why the great colonial empires fell apart after WWII.
Major weaknesses: it requires the reader to have some notion of the political climate of the different eras, and be able to sense the vast scales involved.

So, in conclusion, a well done effort on a complex topic. Not just a history of little known colonial actions.