"In our search for a reasonable world view, we should turn in the first place to common sense". Polanyi warns against mysticism and other mysterious think and asks the reader to instead apply common sense.

I've not read this book. But Marty is a good guy and y'all should all buy his book. I hear he's about to publish a biography on Michael Polanyi. I can't wait to read that one too!

If you are intrested in the thought of Polany, this is the best book. This is the introduction to Polanyi by Polanyi. If you carefully read this book, your view on Science, Knowledge, and Human being will be a bit changed. Polanyi tried to protect Science from Socialism and found it is necessiary to give up objectivism to protect Science.

This is an excellent review of Polanyi's work and its place in the history of philosophy--especially as it relates to contemporary tought.

In Part I, in order to illustrate the concept of the tacit coefficient of knowledge, Polanyi uses the example of handling a hammer in order to drive in a nail. He likens the hammer to the linguistic and symbolic tools that we assimilate into our subsidiary awareness in order to reach towards that which is focal. For his word-picture, not the nail, but the entire act of driving in the nail is part of our focal awareness. As we increase in our skill of knowing, our ability to bring structural tools into subsidiary awareness increases, just as we grow less aware of the hammer's existence until it is merely a sensation against our palm. Part II contains the example of using a map or a diagram to navigate. While we can articulate the relationships between various aspects of a diagram, exactly how we assimilate it in order to find our way is beyond our ability describe. This is another tacit component of knowledge.

These illustrations are part of Polanyi's larger project: a critique of the so-called "objectivist" model of scientific knowledge. As he explains it, this model of knowing claims that human beings can, and should, have a disinterested approach to the evidence that lies entirely outside of us. The goal in this project is to determine what reality is without going beyond experience. In Part III, Polanyi describes the corollary to the objectivist model: the "tool" of doubt. The desire for purely empirical data requires that humans doubt voluntary belief, passions that are not justified by evidence. At the end of this doubting enterprise, which Polanyi maintains cannot be carried out consistently, lies modern skepticism.

In opposition to this objectivist doubt, the Polanyian model requires the personal involvement of the knower in order to make commitments to knowing, fueled by a passionate interest in a pattern which they sense corresponds to reality. Thus, Polanyi claims, true knowing bridges the disjunction between the objective and the subjective. One way in which he demonstrates the futility of withdrawing personal participation in knowing is the example of the "logical inference machine" (258-9). He says it is "logically absurd" to say that a logical inference machine "draws inferences of its own" because we must ultimately accredit its conclusions as our own. Here he demonstrates that formalization--something which the objectivist model leans upon heavily--can reduce the tacit coefficient to "obvious informal operations" but can never truly eliminate our personal participation. Thus, the machine of the scientific process is never truly autonomous but requires knowers to accredit it. His analysis of the lingual aspect of knowing is subtle and impressive, especially in illustrating the way we use language as a tool. Any critique of his model would necessarily contain formalized logical inferences but yet require those very tacit elements that he has defined. Thus, it seems that once the reader is convinced of, or even brought into a preliminary acceptance of his model, it becomes nearly impossible to refute.

Polanyi's highly convincing model does not come from a Christian commitment, and as his own writing would imply, this has a tremendous impact on how he reasons. While I doubt that we can draw a systematic "biblical epistemology" out of the Bible, there are elements of scripture that dovetail neatly with Polanyi's assertions. Psalm 63 is a good example of the passion involved in knowing. The Psalmist "thirsts" for God and as he meditates on Yahweh (most likely through the language of scripture) he is "satisfied as with fat and rich food." John 6:27 uses food as a metaphor for knowing God as well, specifically through the bread that the Son of Man gives. The book of James gives insight into how knowing God occurs within the context of commitment and submission to authority. Can we know something without entering into a commitment to knowing? The proposition that "God is one" is known by demons and believers alike. Yet there is a difference between knowing this truth merely propositionally and knowing it through submission to it and all of the implications of that truth. The Polanyian model, for all its compatibility with a Christian worldview, has a gap when it comes to the problem of sin and evil. While he calls knowing a morally responsible act, he does not address the reason why human beings choose certain biases in their patterning of reality. 1 Corinthians 2:14 says, "The natural person does not accept the things of the Spirit of God, for they are folly to him, and he is not able to understand them because they are spiritually discerned." The thrust of this passage and many others is that the effect of sin is so great that humanity cannot know God without intervention from him. While we still may know God in a manner congruous with the Polanyian model, there is no way to enter into this knowledge except through spiritual rebirth-- something Polanyi misses.

The naturalist, materialist, and empiricist will cringe at Polanyi's book. True knowledge for Polanyi is derived as the mind becomes an active contributor to knowledge and appropriates knowledge through reason. In this regard he is similar to Kant.

Dogmatic and exclusive science is thereby dethroned and caste not lower than other forms of knowledge, but along side them. Knowledge based on authority and experience is shown to be interpersonal and relational. As a result, knowledge truly is personal and is not abstract. Therefore, knowledge derived via philosophy, religion, or authority can be just as valid as that which is derived from the chemistry set. This is a difficult task, but Polanyi works hard and ends with a compelling accomplishment.

I am fairly familiar with Polanyi's work and I thought it might be helpful to suggest who could benefit from this book. I would recommend this text to scientists and students who are interested in the philosophical issues and implications of their work, epistemology enthusiasts, philosophy students, and anyone trying to grapple with why Cartesian philosophy doesn't seem to explain reality.

Personal Knowledge is a dense read and Polanyi expects the reader to be familiar with many scientific and philosophic histories. It will require several reads to begin to get a grasp on the core of the material, but even a cursory reading is enjoyable and will challenge your thinking.

If you are not hip on philosophy, but are still interested in Polanyi's view of knowing reality, there are several texts available. If you don't know what the Cartesian Enlightenment is, then Meek's text "Longing to Know" is an excellent lucid primer that a high-schooler can understand. Drucilla Scott's text, "Everyman Revived" does a good job of expositing Polanyi with some biographical data as well.

The reason I rated this text 5 stars is because it is one of the best books I have ever read. However, it is not for everyone. not even a small minority of people will truly enjoy this book. So I hope I helped you become a member of the fractional minority or vice versa.