This is an excellent anthology. The articles by Burge, Brewer, Friedman, Cassam, and Boghossian are superb, clear, and rigorous. I highly recommend this volume.

How about one clear sentence? Perhaps two??

There must have been a British school of philosophical prose--a cadre of gin-drinkers--(perhaps we could call it the Dummett School of Philosophical Prose) that cranked out folks who could write difficult sentences. Peacocke (and I daresay Crispin Wright, and McDowell in some moods) earned top honors. Must have been post-J.L. Austin, maybe post-Ryle.

Nevertheless, if you have the patience to find it, Peacocke has an interesting thesis here. He engages what he calls the 'Integration Challenge,' (IC) which is basically the task of accounting for both the metaphysical and epistemic grounds of our truth statements. Peacocke says that the notion is inspired from Benaceraff's paper on mathematical truth: "the concept of mathematical truth, as explicated, must fit into an over-all account of knowledge in a way that makes it intelligible how we have the mathematical knowledge that we have." So Peacocke wants to extend the IC for math truth to other philosophical areas.

Part One describes exactly what the IC is. Part Two is on Truth--whereby Peacocke advances what he calls the 'linking thesis' of epist. and metaphyiscs. Part Three is Dummett-like/Strawson-like: on the past, property identity, truth and realism. Part Four (which is most interesting to me) is on necessity (modal and wittgenstein challenges). Part Five is on self-knowledge. Part Six continues the discussion in part five, and goes into Delta Theories and Reductionism. Part Seven: Freedom. Freedom! Part Eight is concluding remarks, his nail in the coffin for his views.

This is some controversial stuff here. Not easy going. I also recommend some of the classical literature on truth and math necessity: Dummett, Stroud, Putnam, Horwich, Lewis's modal realism, McDowell, Davidson, Wright, Burge.

In my work I have found it much important to develop my understanding of semantics, concepts, and meaning. Peacocke's book is a scholarly and powerful treatment of concepts (for which it get 5 stars), but it is also difficult and one-sided. I highly recommend anybody to read the review by Herman Philipse in Inquiry, 1994, 37, pp. 225-252. The reviewer writes that Peacocke leaves out any full treatment of the relations between Concept possession and linguistic understanding. "While the philosophical tradition from Plato to Husserl endorsed it, revolutionary philosophers such as Schliermacher, Nitzsche, Peirce, and Wittgenstein held that it involves a fundamental mistake".

What I have found extremely useful for my purpose and for my understanding is the article by Georges Rey on concepts on pp. 185-193 in A COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND (ed. by Samuel Guttenplan. Published by Blackwell, Oxford, UK. in 1994 (and later reprints). I also strongly recommend Frank C. Keil: Concepts, Kinds, and Cognitive Development. Cambridge, MA.: The MIT Press, 1989.