This book was life transforming! I didn't have a self before reading this tome.I was but a product of my social structure. I recommend this book for its depth and clarity.

First published in 1937, this book is a remarkable scholarly achievement and it richly deserves the status of a classic. It is not an easy read, partly on account of its genuine depth and partly because Parsons was never content with one word where ten or twelve would do.

Parsons offers a voluntarist theory of action described as a synthesis of tendencies in the work of Alfred Marshall, Emile Durkheim and Max Weber. This is actually a development the Karl Menger's "Austrian" approach to social and economic theory, and this work represents a parallel or simultaneous discovery with Ludwig Mises (praxeology) and Karl Popper (situational analysis).

Parsons' first task (in the 1930s) was to rehabilitate the role of theory in sociology and human studies. "Returning to this country (USA) I found behaviorism so rampant that anyone who believed in the scientific validity of the interpretation of subjective states of mind was often held to be fatuously naive. Also rampant was what I called 'empiricism', namely the idea that scientific knowledge was a total reflection of the 'reality out there' and even selection was alleged to be illegitimate".

He defended systematic theory against various forms of empiricism which emphasised the accumulation of facts. At the same time he attempted to justify analytical realism against theorists who looked upon theories as merely convenient fictions. Against the empiricists Parsons claimed that there could be no worthwhile fact gathering without some reference to theory, and against the "instrumental" view he maintained that "at least some of the general concepts of science are not fictional but adequately 'grasp' aspects of the objective external world".

So far as substantive theory was concerned, the problem situation which Parsons addressed was the failure of three great systems to provide an adequate general theory of action. A satisfactory theory had to provide a frame of reference to analyse the puzzling co-existence of social order with voluntarism (indeterminism) and it had to provide a frame of reference to analyse the emergence of complex systems whose function could not be reduced to the laws explaining the function of the parts, while explaining the interpenetration which exists between the factors controlling the whole and the factors controlling the parts.

The three systems which had failed were (1) utilitarianism and economic theory which involved a rationalistic, individualistic theory of social behaviour; (2) positivism, which involved the reduction of human behaviour to laws of physics and biology; (3) idealism, theories which interpreted social phenomena as emanations from the realm of cultural values.

Utilitarian theory could not account for ritualistic activities which and it gave no explanation of social order or the coordination of individual acts into organised social systems.

Positivism attempts to overcome the utilitarian dilemma by providing a scientific explanation for the coordination of ends. The explanation of action lies in the conditions of the action objectively rather than subjectively considered, meaning the factors of hereditary and environment. However this approach ignored the emergent properties of complex systems, particularly the ethical elements which Parsons believed are a creative factor in human action.

"The orientation of ethics (as opposed to science) is essentially active. Its centre of gravity lies in the creative role of the actor, his ends. Freedom of choice is basic to ethics; whatever determinism is accepted lies in the field of the consequences of having made a given choice".

Idealism presented answers to some of the problems left unsolved by utilitarianism and positivism, introducing the Geist or spirit of the culture to explain human action as an emanation. This solved the problem of order without using physical reduction but it involved reduction of a different kind. As a general theory of action, explanation of human behaviour as a manifestation of the Geist is hardly better than an explanation in terms of physics and biology. What was worse from Parsons' point of view as a systematic theorist was the doctrine that generalisations could not be made about societies or cultures. Every social situation had to be considered in its concrete uniqueness.

Parsons followed Weber in his reaction against two idealist doctrines which Parsons calls objectivism and intuitionism. Both schools agree that general laws cannot be used in the human sciences but they disagree as to the reasons.

Weber went on to build up a sophisticated methodology including three elements which Parsons adopted. These are:

I) general concepts are required in the social sciences as well as in the natural sciences.

2) verstehen, the faculty of sympathetic understanding, is required to cope with the subjective aspects of action.

3) if action is to be understandable there must be an element of rationality in it. There must be some comprehensible relationship between ends and means.

Parsons was not completely satisfied with Weber's methodology because he thought there was even less difference between the natural and social sciences than Weber allowed. Parsons instead proposed to make a distinction between analytical and historical sciences, which cuts across the boundaries usually placed between the natural and social sciences.

"Then for the historical sciences theoretical concepts are means to understanding the concrete historical individual. For the analytical sciences, on the other hand, the reverse is true; concrete historical individuals are means, 'cases' in terms of which the validity of the theoretical system may be tested by 'verification"'. For a similar approach see Popper on explanation in science and historical studies (Open Society, Chapter 24).

Subsequent work by Parsons was flawed by his idea that mathematics was the language of physics, and sociology similarly needed its own language which he attempted to provide by way of the pattern variable scheme. He also became trapped by the notion of "system" and lost the individualistic element that is essential to the action frame of reference and its parallels in praxeology and situational analysis.

Rather than a general theory or explanation of either economics or religion, Weber attempts to draw a specific link between what he sees as the conjunction of the work ethic of Protestant (mainly Calvinist) spiritual teachings, and the success of Western European Capitalism.

Weber is an astute analyst, in many ways. He rightly notes that often the 'sine qua non' of Capitalism is thought of as "greed". Arguing against this notion, Weber points out that all societies have had greedy people within their particular economic system-greed is thus a factor irrespective of economic systems. Replacing this, Weber proposes that the "spirit" of Capitalism be thought of as a particular moral attitude towards work and idleness-an attitude that holds that constant and diligent work for its own sake is a moral imperative. In the face of what Weber calls "the radical elimination of magic from the world" this work ethic was the existential option left for people in terms of atonement and personal compensation for inadequacies. I believe that these two insights are right on target.

If there is a weakness involved in his characterization of this Protestant "Ethic," it lies in the fact that Weber attempts to draw a strict dichotomy in the origins of this ethic. He states forcefully that this ethic does not come out of any Enlightenment thought. The problem with trying to separate this ethic from the Enlightenment, is that this ethic which posits diligent work for its own sake is clearly found in the ethics of Immanuel Kant, who classified this kind of work and labor as a "duty" (ethical rule) that the self has to itself. In other words, how much of this is the legacy of the Reformation and how much of this is the legacy of the Enlightenment?

The necessity for this kind of work also appears in the ethics of Hegelian philosophy. Hegel characterizes work as a means of the realization of Spirit within the human self, since the performance of duties which one would not normally choose to do can be thought of as a deliberate placing of oneself in the context of alienation. The individual then, through diligent "work," attempts to convert that which is foreign (antithetical) to the self into that which is of the self. Work is thus a means of overcoming a system of deliberate self-alienation, and is vitally necessary. Kant and Hegel, clearly two giants of Enlightenment thought, both maintain that the essence of diligent work is to become, not acquire-acquisition is a by-product and consequence of work. This is very similar to Weber's characterization of this ethos.

Another problem arises when we attempt to draw a strict separation between the worldly attitudes of Catholic monasticism and this "Protestant Ethic." While it is certainly true that Catholic monasticism placed a high degree of value on contemplatio, Catholic dogma, from Augustine through Gregory the Great and onwards, held explicitly that one must always return to work in the world-contemplatio was always insufficient in itself as a mode of being. Biblically, this was often seen in light of the Hebrew story of Rachel and Leah, as well as the Greek story of Mary and Martha. The contemplative life is certainly of "higher" value in Catholic thought, yet it must be seen as returning the soul to the life of activity, lest the soul run the risk of the heresy of "Quietism." Some forms of Catholic mysticism ran into heretical issues precisely because they held that the life of activity should be abandoned. So, while there may be a difference in degree, we should be careful not to draw a stronger split than is there. Weber writes as if only Luther or Calvin has the concept of a life's "calling," when this was always already part of Catholicism too.

This entire issue actually has its roots in Greek political philosophy, where we see a clear tension between the "practical life", and the "contemplative life." The issue persists into Roman life. We can even see some evidence of this type of Protestant ethos in Stoicism, which held that the active pursuit of virtue and public activity was the highest good. Contrast to Epicureanism, which held that the private, quiet study of philosophy and other pleasures, away from worldly life, was the highest good. The issue, of course, reemerges in Christian thought. But for all of its force in Protestantism, we must not take a myopic view that this was somehow unique to Protestantism in Western intellectual thought. Other factors than religion must have also played a role in the development of capitalism.

The role of Judiasm is Weber's biggest problem. According to his own endnotes, Jews enjoy more economic success and motivation---so why would Protestantism give birth to Capitalism?

We should nonetheless congratulate Weber for attempting to take a close look at the interactions between religious and economic thought. Like Marx, his work serves a good framework to examine the way religious thought influences and inteacts with factors like world economics.

THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM by Max Weber is the kind of book which I imagined was important in my youth. I find it difficult, now, but not because anything which is says is any less true than it ever was. As history goes, it is some of the most thoughtful. The problem is that we are no longer living in history. Comparing ourselves to the contents of this book confirms that society is now at the level of farce, and likely to remain so. This conclusion might not strike anyone starting the book for the first time, but it ought to grab anyone who is capable of comprehending Chapter 3, "Luther's Conception of the Calling."

My point of view works best if it is accepted that, as America now stands, it can only be understood as a nation of shoppers. The large and still growing amount by which imports exceeds exports requires that the entire world maintains this view for monetary stability. The political parties might pretend to be theoretically split between those who use the government as a means of shopping for people's needs and those who would enhance the ability to make big bucks, but neither party can, in actuality, represent with their whole heart those who picture government as the ultimate shopper, which ought to be able to provide people with what they would not otherwise have, whether through liberal social programs or by imposing rigid security provisions and covert activities. Thinking about how well secret military tribunals or jailing users of illegal substances actually functions, as applied to "others," strike me as being an absurd application of Luther's "observation that the division of labour forces every individual to work for others." Both parties, to maintain their existence in such a tipsy world, must appeal to those who would maintain "the privileged position, legal or actual, of single great trading companies." Only the American ability to convince the world that everyone who takes our money for their products fully shares the ability of Americans to benefit from such great wealth can maintain such a situation as "a traditionalist interpretation based on the idea of Providence. The individual should remain once and for all in the station and calling in which God had placed him, and should restrain his worldly activity within the limits imposed by his established station in life. While his economic traditionalism was originally the result of Pauline indifference, it later became that of a more and more intense belief in divine providence, which identified absolute obedience to God's will, with absolute acceptance of things as they were." The uses of two "Absolute"s in that sentence is what frightens me. Any sign of inability to adapt to a future which includes vast changes is a bad characteristic for a modern society, and the modern economy seems to be headed in a direction that will no longer provide great wealth to all who expect it. In such a situation, anyone might consider the words of Milton in "Paradise Lost," as quoted by Max Weber, which points out that people are able:

To leave this Paradise, but shall possess
A Paradise within thee, happier far.

The next paragraph suggests, "The appeal to national character is generally a mere confession of ignorance, and in this case it is entirely untenable." The difference between what Max Weber is trying to describe and what I'm thinking is what makes this kind of book so difficult to read, and I wouldn't be surprised if you haven't read it.

Weber's Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism is CLASSIC - and should be a mandatory read for every student of sociology. Unfortunately, the classic literature of sociology isn't emphasized enough in today's educational institutions. Students are entering the real world without the foundation of social prophets and coming up with their own ideas of "what the world is coming to," and taking credit for ideology that has long been debated and written down by masterminds such as Weber. Pay attention! What is this book really about? This is a revolutionary work discussing critically the causes and effects of sociological chance, and how the sociology of religion has changed meaning because of the philosophy we now base our ideas on. Anyone interested in postmodern theory, the iron cage of bureaucracy, rationalization, and even symbolic interactionism should read this before continuing to literature of modern sociological thought.

The ideas and philosophical concepts in this book are generally sensible, rational, and correct, but the writing style and execution leaves much to be desired. In other words, this book is extremely difficult. The impenetrable density of this prose is intolerable, especially considering it was written IN ENGLISH, in the TWENTIETH CENTURY! If someone had handed me this book with a blank cover, I would have been convinced that it was originally written in old German during the time of Kant, and verbosely translated by some frustrated acedemic. It is beyond me how any book writeen in English so recently could be so unreadable.

I might recommend this book to someone with a highly scientific, mathematical and empiricist mind-set. After all, Whitehead is an accomplished mathematician, and his book has an aire of unbiased, empirical objectivity. For a mathematician with a desire to cross over into the philosophy genre, this might be a good choice. But for normal philosophy readers who come from a liberal arts/literary background, this book will probably come across as obfiscated and tortuous.

In short: A serious and thoughtful book about the meaning and impact of science. This is not light, popular science reading. (If you're looking for that, I highly recommend the works of folks like Freeman Dyson or Stephen Jay Gould.)

_Science and the Modern World_ has some stunning, timeless insights, and many things I'm fond of quoting. Here's a favorite, from the last chapter:

"Modern science has imposed upon humanity the necessity for wandering. Its progressive thought and its progressive
technology make the transition through time, from generation to generation, a true migration into uncharted seas of adventure.
The very benefit of wandering is that it is dangerous and needs skill to avert evils. We must expect, therefore, that the future
will disclose dangers."

(Here it comes:)

"It is the business of the future to be dangerous; and it is among the merits of science that it equips the future for its duties."

(*P*O*W*!*)

"The prosperous middle classes, who ruled the nineteenth century, placed an excessive value upon the placidity of existence. They refused to face the necessities for social reform imposed by the new industrial system, and they are now refusing to face the necessities for intellectual reform imposed by the new knowledge."

(Same as it ever was!)

"The middle class pessimism over the future of the world comes from a confusion between civilization and security. In the immediate future there will be less security than in the immediate past, less stability. It must be admitted that there is a degree of instability which is inconsistent with civilization. But, on the whole, the great ages have been unstable ages."

Whew.

I found this a curious blend of sparkling expression with sometimes impenetrable prose. It seems worth reading from a general-semantics view because of Whitehead's influence on Alfred Korzybski's work. In this book, Whitehead uses the history of western science as a backdrop for examining some of its basic assumptions and for discussing his own alternative to scientific materialism, which he calls the "theory of organic mechanism," (81) a forerunner of general-systems theory. Whitehead strongly emphasizes a process view of nature: "...nature is a structure of evolving processes. The reality is the process" (74). His discussion of what he calls the fallacy of misplaced concreteness seems close to Korzybski's notion of confusion of orders of abstraction. Whitehead pushes for including the concerns of philosophy, art and religion in a broadened view of science. He argues against "A self-satisfied rationalism [that] is in effect a form of anti-rationalism. It means an arbitrary halt at a particular set of abstractions" (201). Opposed to such limitations, he argues instead that "...almost any idea that jogs you out of your current abstractions may be better than nothing" (62). You may skip the book's at times difficult metaphysics and still find many gems to jog you.